

# Interactive Epistemology

14.126 Game Theory

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## Road Map

1. Formalizing knowledge for a single person
2. Common Knowledge
  1. Among two individuals
  2. Among many individuals
  3. Agreement Theorem
3. Constructing a universal state space
4. Syntactic and semantic approach
5. No-trade theorem

## Basics

- $\omega$  = a state, a complete description of the world;
- $\Omega$  = the set of all states;
- $E$  = an event, a subset of  $\Omega$ ;
  - $E \subseteq F$  =  $E$  implies  $F$
  - $E \cap F$  =  $E$  and  $F$
  - $E \cup F$  =  $E$  or  $F$
- $\mathfrak{E}$  = the set of all events

## Equivalent Formalizations of knowledge

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Knowledge function:</b> <math>\kappa</math> from <math>\Omega</math> to some space; the agent knows the value of <math>\kappa</math>, i.e., he knows <math>\kappa(\omega)</math>, but not <math>\omega</math>.</li> <li>• <b>Information Function:</b><br/> <math>I(\omega) = \{\omega' \in \Omega \mid \kappa(\omega) = \kappa(\omega')\}</math> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <math>\omega \in I(\omega)</math>;</li> <li>– If <math>I(\omega) \cap I(\omega') \neq \emptyset</math>, then <math>I(\omega) = I(\omega')</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>p</math> = price of bread (<math>p \geq 0</math>);</li> <li>• <math>e</math> = noise (<math>e \in [0,1]</math>)</li> <li>• <math>\omega = (p,e)</math></li> <li>• He gets a noisy signal <math>\kappa = p+e</math>.</li> <li>• <math>I(p,e) = \{(p',e') \mid p'+e'=p+e\}</math></li> </ul> |
|--|---|

## Knowledge, continued

- **Information partition:**

- $\mathfrak{I} = \{I(\omega) | \omega \in \Omega\}$

- **Knowledge u(niversal)field:**

$\mathfrak{K}$  = all possible unions of cell in  $\mathfrak{I}$ .


- **Knowledge operator:**

$K : \mathfrak{E} \rightarrow \mathfrak{E}$

- $KE = \{\omega \in \Omega | I(\omega) \subseteq E\}$

- $KE = \cup_{F \in \mathfrak{I}, F \subseteq E} F$

- KE is the largest member of  $\mathfrak{K}$  included in E.



- $E = \{(p,e) | p > 1\}$

- $I(p,e) \subseteq E$  iff  $p + e > 2$ .

- $KE = \{(p,e) | p + e > 2\}$

## Knowledge operator

1.  $KE \subseteq E$
2.  $E \subseteq F$  implies  $KE \subseteq KF$
3.  $KE \subseteq KKE$
4.  $\sim KE \subseteq K\sim KE$

- $K(E \cap F) = K(E) \cap K(F)$ .

- $KE = KKE$ ;

- $\sim KE = K\sim KE$ .


- $K\Omega = \Omega$ .

1. If I know something it must be true.
2. If E logically implies F, and if I know that E is true, then I know that F is true.
3. If I know something, I know that I know that.
4. If I don't know something, I know that I don't know that.

Associated!

## Common knowledge (2 person)


- $i = 1, 2; K_i, I_i, \text{etc.}$
- $\text{CKE} := K_1 E \cap K_2 E \cap K_1 K_2 E \cap K_2 K_1 E \cap K_1 K_2 K_1 E \cap K_2 K_1 K_2 E \cap K_1 K_2 K_1 K_2 E \cap K_2 K_1 K_2 K_1 E \dots$
- $\kappa_1 = p+e; \kappa_2 = p.$
- $I_1(p,e) = \{(p',e') | p'+e'=p+e\}$
- $I_2(p,e) = \{(p',e') | p'=p\}$
- $E = \{(p,e) | p > 1\}$
- $K_1 E = \{(p,e) | p+e > 2\}$
- $K_2 E = \{(p,e) | p > 1\} = E;$
- $K_1 K_2 E = K_1 E$
- $K_2 K_1 E = \{(p,e) | p > 2\}$  (why?)
- $K_1 K_2 K_1 E = \{(p,e) | p+e > 3\}$
- $\text{CKE} =$



## Theorems about CK (2-person)

1.  $\text{CKE} \subseteq E$
2.  $K_i \text{CKE} = \text{CKE}$
3.  $E \subseteq F \Rightarrow \text{CKE} \subseteq \text{CKF}$
4.  $\text{CKE}$  is the largest event  $F$  with  $F \subseteq E$  and  $K_1 F = K_2 F = F.$
5.  $\text{CK}$  is a knowledge operator associated with  $\mathcal{K}_1 \cap \mathcal{K}_2.$
6.  $\text{CKE} = \text{CKCKE}; \sim \text{CKE} = \text{CK} \sim \text{CKE}$
7.  $\text{CKE} \Omega = \Omega.$

## A Graphical approach



- $\Omega$  = all the nodes;
- Two nodes are in the same cell of  $\mathcal{I}$  iff they are connected by an edge indicated by  $i$ ;
- CK partition = largest connected subgraphs.

## Common Coarsening $\mathcal{I}_1 \wedge \mathcal{I}_2$


- $\mathcal{I}_1 \wedge \mathcal{I}_2$  is the finest partition that is coarser than both  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$ , associated with  $\mathcal{R}_1 \cap \mathcal{R}_2$ .

$$I_{1,2}(\omega) = \bigcap_{\omega \in F \in \mathcal{R}_1 \cap \mathcal{R}_2} F$$

- $I_1(\omega) \cup I_2(\omega) \subseteq I_{1,2}(\omega)$ .
- $I_{1,2}(\omega)$  can be written as the union of some cells in  $\mathcal{I}_1$ .
- $\omega' \in I_{1,2}(\omega)$  iff  $\exists \omega_0, \omega_1, \dots, \omega_n$ ,  $\exists i(0), i(1), \dots, i(n)$  s.t.  $\omega_0 = \omega$ ,  $\omega_n = \omega'$ ,

$$\omega_k \in I_{i(k-1)}(\omega_{k-1})$$

for all  $k > 0$ .



## Common knowledge (n person)

- $i = 1, 2, \dots, n; K_i, I_i, \text{etc.}$
  - $K^1 := \bigcap_i K_i;$
  - $K^m := (K^1)^m;$
  - $\text{CKE} := \bigcap_m K^m$
1.  $\text{CKE} \subseteq E$
  2.  $K_i \text{CKE} = \text{CKE}$
  3.  $E \subseteq F \Rightarrow \text{CKE} \subseteq \text{CKF}$
  4. CK is a knowledge operator associated with  $\mathfrak{K}_1 \cap \mathfrak{K}_2 \cap \dots \cap \mathfrak{K}_n.$
  5. CKE is the largest event F with  $F \subseteq E$  and  $K_1 F = K_2 F = \dots = K_n F = F.$
  6.  $\text{CKE} = \text{CKCKE}; \sim \text{CKE} = \text{CK} \sim \text{CKE}$
  7.  $\text{CKE} \Omega = \Omega.$

## Common Coarsening – same

- $\mathfrak{I}_1 \wedge \mathfrak{I}_2 \wedge \dots \wedge \mathfrak{I}_n$  is the finest partition that is coarser than all  $\mathfrak{I}_1 \dots \mathfrak{I}_n$ , associated with  $\mathfrak{K}_1 \cap \mathfrak{K}_2 \cap \dots \cap \mathfrak{K}_n.$

$$I_{1, \dots, n}(\omega) = \bigcap_{\omega \in F \in \mathfrak{K}_1 \cap \dots \cap \mathfrak{K}_n} F$$

- $I_{1, \dots, n}(\omega)$  can be written as the union of some cells in  $\mathfrak{I}_1.$
- $\omega' \in I_{1, \dots, n}(\omega)$  iff  $\exists \omega_0, \omega_1, \dots, \omega_n, \exists i(0), i(1), \dots, i(n)$  s.t.  $\omega_0 = \omega, \omega_n = \omega',$

$$\omega_k \in I_{i(k-1)}(\omega_{k-1})$$

for all  $k > 0.$

## Agreement Theorem

- $B$  = a finite set of decisions  $b$ ;
- $d : E \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow B$ , a decision rule;
- $d$  satisfies the sure-thing principle: if  $E = \cup_a J_a$  where  $\{J_a\}$  is a family of disjoint sets, and if  $d(J_a) = b$  at each  $a$ , then  $d(E) = b$ .

**Theorem:** For each  $i$ , define  $d_i : \Omega \rightarrow B$  by  $d_i(\omega) = d(I_i(\omega))$ . Then,

$$CK(d_1=b) \cap CK(d_2=c) \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow b = c.$$

Proof: Assume:  $\omega \in E := CK(d_1=b) \cap CK(d_2=c)$ .

1.  $\exists \{J_a\} \subseteq \mathfrak{J}_1$  s.t.  $E = \cup_a J_a$ .
2.  $d(J_a) = b$  for each  $a$ .
3.  $d(E) = b$ .

## Application – agreeing to disagree

- $A$  = a fixed event
- $B = [0,1]$
- $d(E) = P(A|E)$ , conditional probability w.r.t. a common prior  $P$  given  $E$ .
- Bayes' rule  $\Rightarrow d$  satisfies the sure-thing principle.
- Agreement Theorem  $\Rightarrow$  if it is common knowledge at  $w$  that  $P(A|I_1(\omega)) = b$  and  $P(A|I_2(\omega)) = c$ , then  $b = c$ .

## No-trade Theorem

- $\omega = (x, z)$ ;  $z = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ ,  $i$  observes  $z_i$ , owns  $e_i(x)$ .
- $y : \Omega \rightarrow B$ ,  $y \in Y$ .
- $u_i(y_i(\omega); x) := \underline{u}_i(y_i(\omega) + e_i(x); x)$ .

**Lemma:** Assume that  $y$  is Pareto-optimal, and  $y'$  and  $A \subseteq \Omega$  are s.t.  $E[u_i(y_i'(\omega); x)|A] \geq E[u_i(y_i(\omega); x)|A]$  and  $\text{Prob}(A) > 0$ . Then,  $E[u_i(y_i'(\omega); x)|A] = E[u_i(y_i(\omega); x)|A]$ . If each  $u_i$  is strictly concave, then  $y' = y$  on  $A$ .

**Proof:** Define  $y^* = [y'$  on  $A$ ;  $y$  on  $\sim A]$ . Apply the sure-thing principle. Then,  $E[u_i(y_i^*(\omega); x)] \geq E[u_i(y_i(\omega); x)]$ . If  $E[u_i(y_i'(\omega); x)|A] > E[u_i(y_i(\omega); x)|A]$ , then  $E[u_i(y_i^*(\omega); x)] > E[u_i(y_i(\omega); x)]$ .

## No-trade Theorem

**Theorem:** Assume that  $y = 0$  is Pareto-optimal, and  $\text{Prob}(I_{1, \dots, n}(\omega)) > 0$ . If it is common knowledge at  $\omega$  that  $y$  is feasible and each  $i$  weakly prefers  $y$  to  $\underline{y}$ , then each is indifferent between  $y$  and  $\underline{y}$ . If each agent is strictly risk averse, then  $y = \underline{y}$ .

Proof: Take  $A = I_{1, \dots, n}(\omega)$  in the lemma.

## An equilibrium example

- $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$ .
- 2 players,  $i = 1, 2$
- $I_1 = \{\{\omega_1\}, \{\omega_2\}\}$ ;
- $I_2 = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$ ;
- Asset 1 gives
  - \$-1 at  $\omega_2$ .
  - \$10 at  $\omega_1$  and
- Asset 2 gives
  - \$-1 at  $\omega_1$ , and
  - \$1 at  $\omega_2$ .

## Universal state-space

- $X =$  an alphabet of letters  $x, y, z,$  ...
- Formulas: finite strings of symbols s.t.
  - Every letter is a formula;
  - If  $f$  and  $g$  are formulas, so is  $(f)\text{OR}(g)$ ;
  - If  $f$  is a formula, so are  $\text{NOT}(f)$  and  $k_i$ .
- A list  $L$  (of formulas) is *logically closed* iff
 
$$[f \in L \ \& \ (f \Rightarrow g) \in L] \Rightarrow g \in L;$$
- *Epistemically closed* iff
 
$$f \in L \Rightarrow k_i f \in L.$$
- A state  $\omega$  is any logically closed list s.t.
  - $f \in \omega \Leftrightarrow \text{NOT}(f) \notin \omega$ ;
  - $\omega$  includes all the “tautologies.”
- $\Omega =$  the set of all states.
- $\kappa_i(\omega) = \{k_i(f) \mid k_i(f) \in \omega\}$

## Tautologies

The set of tautologies is the smallest logically and epistemically closed list that contains all:

- $(f \text{ OR } f) \Rightarrow f$
- $f \Rightarrow (f \text{ OR } g)$
- $(f \text{ OR } g) \Rightarrow (g \text{ OR } f)$
- $(f \Rightarrow g) \Rightarrow ((h \text{ OR } f) \Rightarrow (h \text{ OR } g))$
- $k_i(f) \Rightarrow f$
- $(k_i(f \Rightarrow g)) \Rightarrow (k_i(f) \Rightarrow k_i(g))$
- $k_i(f) \Rightarrow k_i(k_i(f))$
- $\text{NOT}(k_i(f)) \Rightarrow k_i(\text{NOT}(k_i(f)))$

## Some theorems

- $E_f := \{\omega \in \Omega \mid f \in \omega\}$
- $\sim E_f = E_{\text{NOT}(f)}$
- $E_f \cup E_g = E_{(f \text{ OR } g)}$
- $E_f \cap E_g = E_{(f \& g)}$
- $K_i E_f = E_{k_i(f)}$
- $E_f \subseteq E_g \Leftrightarrow [f \Rightarrow g \text{ is a tautology}]$