

## Possessive Libertarianism<sup>1</sup>

### 1. What is the core libertarian idea?

Where utilitarianism makes the aggregate human welfare the basis of political morality, libertarian political philosophy—which bears some affinity to the classical liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith—is founded on the idea that individual liberty is the fundamental political value. The main idea, as Friedman states it, is that "freedom of the individual, or perhaps the family, [is] the ultimate goal in judging social arrangements" (F12).

More precisely, libertarians hold that individuals have an *equal basic right* to liberty (F195). Libertarians do not say that we should promote the sum of liberty (whatever that means) instead of the sum of happiness. Their view is more individual-centered: they reject sacrifices of the liberty of some people even to increase the aggregate liberty, much less the aggregate happiness. Slavery and other rights violations are wrong, even if they increase the overall level of liberty. Thus Nozick says that rights are "side-constraints" on the pursuit of social goals, including the utilitarian goal of promoting the general welfare.

To be sure, people claim all sorts of rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to food, clothing, and shelter; to equal opportunity, education, health, safe streets; to the preservation of their ethnicity and language. At least since Bentham—who said that natural rights are nonsense—critics of rights have said that rights-claims tend to grow like kudzu. Unless they are constrained by attention to the common good or general welfare, they will produce social anarchy. But libertarians hold, more specifically, that individuals have a *right to*

*liberty*—sometimes described as a “negative right”—which protects against aggression of various kinds, rather than a “positive right,” which enables a person to do and have certain things. We will explore the content of this right in some detail later.

The animating idea behind this right to liberty is suggested in a passage in *Capitalism and Freedom*: “the paternalistic ground for governmental activity,” Friedman says, “is in many ways the *most troublesome* to a liberal; for it involves the acceptance of a principle—that some shall decide for others—which he finds objectionable in most applications and which he rightly regards as the *hallmark of his chief intellectual opponents*, the proponents of collectivism in one or another of its guises, whether it be communism, socialism, or a welfare state.”<sup>2</sup> Friedman here echoes Hayek, who says in his *Constitution of Liberty* that each person is entitled to “follow his own plans and intentions,” to make the “pattern of his conduct of his own design, directed toward ends for which he has been persistently striving rather than toward necessities created by others in order to make him do what they want.”<sup>3</sup>

Both Friedman and Hayek here emphasize that libertarianism is a fundamentally *antipaternalist* outlook. It is animated by a conception of individuals as responsible agents, capable of setting their own goals and governing their conduct by reference to those goals, and entitled to govern their conduct, not to be made to bring their conduct into conformity with the views of others about the best way to live.

Now a fundamental libertarian claim is that the basic right to individual liberty—antipaternalist in inspiration—should at least make us wary about—

perhaps opposed to—restrictions on liberty in the name of the general welfare, and condemns restrictions of liberty in the name of socio-economic equality. If we are principled antipaternalists, they say, then we should also accept a basic right to liberty; but that same right to liberty will require relatively unregulated markets, skepticism about restrictions in the name of the general welfare, and opposition to regulations enacted in the name of equality.

Mill would have been surprised to hear this: he opposed paternalism, but also thought that “the social problem of the future,” he says, would be “to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership of the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor.” But if we worry that utilitarianism lacks a compelling basis for personal liberty, because it lacks a compelling account of the importance of individual lives, then perhaps we will see a deeper opposition between a commitment to liberty and to equality.

## **2. What distinguishes possessive libertarianism?**

With libertarianism, as with utilitarianism, the essential theme is played in (at least) two variations. Each version of libertarianism affirms a right to liberty, but they differ in their interpretations of the content of that right. I will refer to the views as (Nozick's) "possessive libertarianism," and (Friedman's) "choice-based libertarianism."<sup>4</sup> I will start with a brief contrast between them, and then move to the discussion of Nozick's possessive libertarian view, which has, I will emphasize, much more radical implications than Friedman's.

According to Friedman, any interference by others with my choices limits my liberty. Such interferences may be justified or unjustified, depending on circumstances. But in either case, the interference abridges my liberty. So when I am imprisoned, my liberty is abridged, though the interference with liberty may be justified by my conduct. For Nozick, in contrast, an interference abridges liberty only if the interference is unjustified; thus restrictions on liberty are *unjustified* interferences with choice (262): restrictions on options that do not result from the rightful conduct of others.

Now Nozick's notion that an abridgement of liberty is an *unjustified interference* requires a theory about which interferences with my conduct are unjustified. And that is provided by Nozick's views about individual natural rights: "Individuals have rights. And there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do."<sup>5</sup> Nozick nowhere states the precise content of these rights, but it seems clear that he includes only "negative" rights against certain kinds of intrusions on person and resources—rights not to be killed or assaulted if we do no harm to others, not to be coerced or imprisoned, not to have our property taken or destroyed, and not to be limited in the use of our property so long as we do not violate the rights of others.

The list of natural rights does not include positive rights, to life, food, shelter, equal opportunity, or the preservation of group and language. In expressing his opposition to more positive rights, Nozick says: "The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as

equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. No one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things and activities that other people have rights and entitlements over.”<sup>6</sup>

Now what accounts for the content of these rights—their stringency, scope, and limits? The underlying moral idea appears to be an expansive conception of *self-ownership*. At the heart of Nozick’s political philosophy is the idea that each of us belongs, as a matter of moral right, to him/herself, not at all to anyone else: not to humanity or the state; not to church or community; not to race, or ethnicity, or nation; not to those who made us. This idea is sometimes said to be drawn from John Locke’s political philosophy, and Locke did say that the foundation of property rights lies in the property that each of us has in our “own person.” But Locke believed, more fundamentally, that God owns us, and that His ownership set limits on what we are morally permitted to do to and with ourselves: we are not permitted in particular to kill ourselves, nor are we morally permitted to submit ourselves to an absolute authority, since we lack absolute authority over ourselves. For Nozick, we are fully “self-owners,”<sup>7</sup> and while that self-ownership substantially limits the claims that others may make on us, it leaves entirely unlimited what we may do to ourselves and therefore what we may permit others to do to us.

Self-ownership is a complex idea, and I will say more about it later. Suffice to say here that it comprises, among others, the rights to use and to abuse our powers, and the right to draw all the benefits that we can extract from their use

so long as we do not infringe on the similar rights of others. But self-ownership does not support any rights that depend for their existence on other other persons and their activities, because they are self-owners, too.

### 3. Why a minimal state?

Starting from this scheme of natural rights, then, Nozick aims to show that a minimal or "night-watchman state" is justified, but that no more than a minimal state can be justified.

A **minimal** state has very restricted responsibilities: it is, Nozick says, "limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts,"<sup>8</sup> and the rectification of past injustice. In essence, the minimal state has responsibility for protecting individual rights, and only for protecting individual rights: not for promoting the general welfare, or ensuring equal opportunities, or providing insurance against life's risks, or for providing a safety net, or for correcting unfair market outcomes. The guiding thought is that individuals—as free and self-governing—have a right to protect themselves, and can assign that right to an agency, purchasing its protection services. The state simply consolidates in the hands of a single agent the previously dispersed rights of individuals. So the minimal state itself is a kind of protection agency, hired by individuals to protect their rights, so that they may go about other business.

But if the minimal state is a provider of rights-protection services, three things distinguish it from other protection agencies, and make the minimal state a **state**: (i) it is dominant, in that there are no competing protective agencies in the territory (*dominant protective agency*); (ii) it *monopolizes* the legitimate use of

force in a territory, meaning that it does not permit individuals in the territory to protect themselves by their own methods, unless they are authorized by the agency to do so (*an ultraminimal state*); and (iii) it provides *universal* service, in that it extends a protective umbrella to everyone in the territory (*a minimal state*).

Some anarchists object as a matter of principle to this monopoly element, which, they say, directly violates individual rights to self-protection: it prevents me from deciding for myself on the best methods of self-protection. Thus the words of the 19<sup>th</sup> century American anarchist, Benjamin Tucker: “If the individual has the right to govern himself, all external government is tyranny.”<sup>9</sup> Nozick disagrees. He sees a possibility of a minimal state emerging from a state of nature with no state at all by a series of legitimate steps.

Thus Nozick argues, first, that a single dominant protective association could (not would!) emerge from a world with no states, because individuals would contract with providers of protection services. But in part because the value of those services is “relative” (17)—that is, dependent on the relative strength of protective associations—one dominant association might emerge from the market for protection. Suppose, however, that not everyone in the territory has purchased services from the association: some remain independent. But this dominant protection agency may permissibly prevent those independents from using their own methods of self-protection because of the risks to its clients that such methods may impose. The idea is not that the association may legitimately reduce the number of rights violations. No one has that right. Instead, individuals themselves have the natural right to judge whether they are being punished with reliable procedures, and to prevent those procedures from being used against

them: I have the right to prevent someone from protecting himself by using an AK47 with his finger constantly poised on the trigger. I do not have to wait for the damage to be done, and then demand compensation.

Because they have the right not to be subjected to what they judge to be risky procedures, they may assign it to the protection agency from which they buy protection services. (This is the essential point: all legitimate powers must be explained in terms of the rights of individuals.) There we have an ultraminimal state. But if they prevent, they impose a disadvantage. And because they do, they must pay compensation to the person who is prevented from defending him/herself by methods he/she judges appropriate. Nozick's thought, then, is that a minimal state provides compensation in the form of protection services. That is, the *monopoly* of coercion that arises when the ultraminimal state says that independents may only use approved methods of self-protection is legitimate if and only if protection is extended to all: only if there is universal service, thus a minimal state.

So once we have a dominant protective association, a legitimate state could then emerge if two conditions were met: (i) the dominant protective association protects its own clients from what it judges to be excessive risks by excluding independents from protecting themselves; and (ii) this monopolist then compensates non-clients by providing them with a minimal protection package, that compensates for the disadvantage of being denied self-protection.

It is essential to understand that this minimal state emerges from a web of bilateral contracts, with individuals purchasing protective services, not—as in Locke—from a social contract in which everyone in a territory agrees to form a

state. So there is no assumption that the process of bilateral contracting results in everyone getting the same package of legal or police services: individuals get the protection they can afford, and the compensatory protection package in particular is “unfancy.” Think of the protection package as offering a 911 response time: the less costly the package, the longer the agency may take to respond.

Once more, the contrast with possessive libertarianism with the classical liberalism of Locke is instructive. According to Locke, legitimate government—formed through a collective agreement to a common authority—is bound by a rule of law. That means, *inter alia*, that rules are “not to be varied in particular cases”: there is to be “one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough” (142). Nozick’s view contains no such principle: no requirement of equality before the law.

Aside from providing protections of person and goods, a minimal state may also ensure distributive justice, according to Nozick’s “historical entitlement theory” of just distribution. According to that theory, any outcome that results from individual choices—with no force, fraud, theft, or violations of contract—is just. The result is just because it results from individual decisions about how to use what each person has a right to: *from each as they choose; to each as they are chosen*. When the minimal state performs its night-watchman function of protecting people’s property, then, it protects liberty; by protecting liberty, it ensures that market outcomes results from the exercise of rights by individuals; and by ensuring this link between rights and outcomes, it ensures distributive justice, whatever the market outcome happens to be. The essential idea is that

nothing more is needed to ensure distributive justice than to protect individual rights to person and goods. (That is almost right. A just distribution must also satisfy what Nozick calls "the Lockean proviso," a condition that requires leaving "enough and as good for others.")

Certain items are absent from the list of considerations that justify state action: it cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds (ix), or on moral grounds. And self-ownership rights explain the restrictions. Take the prohibitions on paternalistic regulations. If I am the full owner of something I have the right to use and abuse the thing. In particular, then, if own myself, I have the right to abuse myself: that is part of the force of my not being owned by the state or other people. So if the state restricts my actions in the name of my own best interests, it violates my property rights in myself. In short, restrictions on paternalism are explained by the basic right of self-ownership.

Nozick also holds that regulations designed to ensure the preservation of competitive markets are illegitimate: if individual choices about the use of property lead to oligopoly, then oligopoly is legitimate. Similarly with the provision of public goods out of taxation: individuals do not have a right to extract resources from others to provide goods that advance the general welfare, so the state cannot have that right either. Moreover, regulations that restrict choice for the sake of equality are illegitimate—even to ensure equality of opportunity. But why precisely is it impermissible for the state to seek to advance any conception of equality?

#### 4. What is wrong with equality?

To make the case for impermissibility, Nozick presents his "Wilt Chamberlain" case.

He invites us to pick a distribution that conforms to our ideas of fairness: for example, one that is pretty equal, or one in which the virtuous are rewarded. Now suppose Wilt Chamberlain ... make it Manny Ramirez ... signs a contract which gives him/her 25% of the gate at Fenway Park. People want to see Manny play, so he gets richer. So we have a new distribution brought about by voluntary exchanges (each person puts money in a Manny slot), but the result violates the distributive standard that was initially satisfied. Now we have a choice: enforce the standard or pattern, thus infringing liberty (prohibiting capitalist acts between consenting adults). Or uphold the value of liberty, and accept the violation of the standard.

Nozick offers this example in support of the general proposition that "liberty upsets patterns."<sup>10</sup> The idea is that, as a perfectly general matter, a commitment to liberty conflicts with an insistence that distribution show a certain "pattern," whether the pattern is equality or of distribution according to moral merit or of distribution according to IQ or SAT scores. Because liberty raises difficulties for *all* patterned principles of justice, it raises troubles for principles that require us to redress inequalities in particular, which Nozick assumes to be patterned principles. His own entitlement conception is untouched because it does not require a pattern.

Nozick states "the general point" as follows: "no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be *continuously* realized without

continuous interference with people's lives."<sup>11</sup> But this statement is deeply misleading. The real trouble cannot lie in the frequency of the interference. After all, if lots of people were continually trying to rob other people, Nozick's own entitlement principle would countenance continuous interference with the thieves. So Nozick's point instead must be that patterned views permit *unjustified* interferences with our liberty. Now Nozick's conception of individual liberty is rooted, I have said, in the notion of self-ownership. So the real point of the example is that there is a conflict between *the property rights* we have in ourselves and distributive patterns (see 172). He says that liberty upsets patterns. But liberty is property, on his view. So what he seems to mean is that *our property rights in ourselves upset patterns*.

Why then do property rights upset patterns? If no one forces Manny to work, how could self-ownership conflict with a distributive pattern? Because the property rights people have in themselves are assumed to include a right to reap all the benefits they can extract from the use of their talents, so long as they do not infringe on the similar rights of others. So if Manny owns himself, we violate his liberty when we tax the earnings he generates from all the people who pay to see him pitch. Why? Because such taxation— even if the purpose is, say, to ensure greater equality of opportunity—violates his right to reap all the benefits he can get from others. This right to reap all the benefits is assumed to be a basic right, in just the way that our right not to be forced to work a few days a week to help others is a basic right. It is impermissible to promote equal opportunity by forcing Manny to work in a school for kids who would otherwise be poorly educated. So, analogously, it is impermissible to tax Manny to support the

school: that also takes what is rightfully his and thus limits his liberty—if we assume (as we now are) that he owns himself, and that ownership carries a right to draw all the benefits.

## 5. What is ownership?

We need to know, then, whether self-ownership, understood in this way, is a compelling moral idea. To answer this question, I will start with two background points.<sup>12</sup>

First, on the modern understanding of property, ownership consists in having a certain “bundle of rights” or “incidents of ownership.”<sup>13</sup> In particular, an owner has rights to control and use (or not to use) what is owned as he/she sees fit; to abuse what is owned; to exclude others from using or abusing it; to alienate it fully (sell it to someone else) or to rent it to others; and to draw benefits from its use: a right to the income that can be derived from trade. Within this class of ownership rights, we can distinguish two broad subsets: *control* rights, which include rights to use, abuse, exclude, and alienate, and rights to *benefit*. Justifying a system of ownership involves showing what the right mix of control and benefit rights is.

Second, these rights of control and benefit admit of different interpretations. Suppose you own yourself. The right to alienate—one of the control rights—might then be understood to include a right of self-enslavement (sell yourself to someone) or it might be more limited (say, a right to rent your talents for a certain period of time).

Or consider the right to benefit. According to one understanding—I will call it the Maximal Understanding—I have the right to everything I can get others to pay me for the use of my talents, consistent with respecting rights of others; any restriction violates my liberty. According to a second understanding—the Minimal Understanding—it simply would be wrong to force me to use the talent or prevent me from using it if others are willing to pay me. For example: Suppose Manny is willing to play for \$500,000, but other people are willing to pay him \$5,000,000. On the Maximal Understanding, self-ownership rights are violated if any of the \$5,000,000 is taxed, even though Manny is willing to play hard for much less. On the Minimal Understanding, Manny only has a complaint if he is forced to sing. If he pitches voluntarily, he will benefit, but only to the extent required to get him to play (namely, \$500,000).

- Let's say then that "full self-ownership"—the conception that Nozick endorses—includes a right to self-enslavement and the Maximal benefit right. This conception of self-ownership appears to be operating in his Chamberlain/Ramirez example, and it fuels the fundamental conflict between self-ownership (and therefore liberty) and equality.

## **6. What about self-ownership?**

So let's now ask: do I fully own myself as a matter of basic moral right? Full self-ownership is an idea with large implications. What is the case for it? Consider two lines of argument.

The first argument says that full self-ownership is morally compelling because it provides the best justification of our clear intuitive judgments of right

and wrong in certain cases. We have reason to postulate self-ownership as a moral principle because that principle accounts for these intuitions.

For example, we have a firm intuition that it would be wrong to drag a person off the street and extract an eye in order to distribute the eye to people who are blind in both eyes. Accepting that it is wrong, we ask: What makes it wrong? The full-self-ownership theory says that extraction is wrong because people fully own themselves. It is wrong to take eyes without permission because stealing is wrong and taking eyes is stealing.

But consider an alternative argument. Let's suppose that people have the right to bodily integrity—understood to include the right to exclude others from the use of our bodies. That is a control right, which suffices to condemn forced eye extraction, even if we do not have other control rights. So we have two explanations of what makes it wrong: that people fully own themselves and that we have rights of bodily integrity. Now the second rationale is much simpler than the first: it explains our intuitions in the eye example without postulating a right to all the different components of the property bundle, many of which have no bearing at all on the issue of forced eye extraction. The bodily integrity theory postulates just the control right, not a whole bundle of ownership rights. We need not assume that we have all the other rights of ownership, just because we have one of them, unless we assume incorrectly that ownership is something more than a bundle of rights and that, therefore, those who have one twig in the bundle must have full self-ownership.

I believe that this point generalizes: our clearest moral intuitions—about the wrongness of slavery or of aggression against a person—concern our rights

to control our powers, to exclude others from using them, and to enter into transactions with others: they are about control and self-regulation. But none of this requires full self-ownership, with the Maximal right to benefit, and therefore none of it creates the fundamental conflict between liberty and equality that Nozick identifies.

To see the force of this point, consider Nozick's contention that "taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor"<sup>14</sup>—taxation from earnings is, morally speaking, just as bad as forced labor. Now IF we accept full self-ownership, with the maximal right to benefit, then taxation and forced labor are morally on a par: IF I fully own myself, then forcing me to work and taxing earnings from my work are morally on a par because both conflict with self-ownership.

But why endorse full self-ownership? How do we get, for example, from the wrongness of forced labor—which seems clearly wrong—to full self-ownership, with the right to maximal benefit? Forced labor and taxation conflict with different parts of the ownership bundle. Forced labor conflicts with my right to control my powers. Taxation conflicts with the maximal right to benefit. We distinguish taxation from forced labor because we do not think of all elements of the ownership bundle as morally on a par. The interest in controlling our powers, which is violated by forced labor, is distinct from and seems more fundamental than the interest in entering into transactions in which get to keep everything that we can get others to pay. The clear moral intuition that forced labor is morally wrong does not, then, provide a compelling case for full self-ownership and therefore against taxation.

The point here may seem picky, but it is fundamental. Recall that the animating libertarian idea is anti-paternalism. The libertarian claims that anti-paternalism supports a right to liberty with anti-egalitarian implications. The points I am now making challenge precisely that line of thought. For paternalism (and moralism) conflict with rights of self-control or self-regulation. In contrast, appeals to the value of equality in political argument—including equality of opportunity—conflict with the maximal right to benefit. So if you accept that rights of self-control are fundamental, whereas rights to the full benefit are not, then you are in effect rejecting the idea that anti-paternalism leads directly to anti-egalitarianism.

- .A second strategy is to argue for self-ownership by attempting to derive it from some more fundamental moral idea. Nozick's discussion of the foundation of rights (in chapter 3) suggests two such lines of argument, though neither is fully worked out. The first concerns the meaning of life, and the second draws on the idea of the separateness of persons and the associated idea that it is wrong to require people to make uncompensated sacrifices for others. I want to consider just the first of these: the idea—mentioned though not developed by Nozick—that libertarian rights, understood to comprise full self-ownership, are founded on the human capacity to live a life with meaning.<sup>15</sup>

The line of thought seems to be based on two premises. First, that the source of meaning in a human life lies in the plan of life a person works out; that the meaningfulness of our lives lies in our achieving what we value and aspire to, not in our advancing some values whose importance is fixed independently of our own aspirations: put otherwise, to be meaningful, our lives must be meaningful to

*us*—from the inside—not simply meaningful in terms of our impact on the world. Second, we should respect the basic human capacity to live a life with meaning and that we are concerned not to deprive lives of meaning. Nozick's claim—only implicit, to be sure—is that these two considerations support the conclusion that individuals are full owners of themselves with the right to maximal benefit. If we regulate outcomes in the name of equality of opportunity, for example, we take from people what is rightfully theirs. To deny that it is rightfully theirs is to fail to give suitable weight to the capacity to live a meaningful life.

But this rationale for full self-ownership seems very implausible. Some aspects of full self-ownership are supported by considerations about the meaning of life. For example, without rights to bodily integrity, or to exclude others from the use of my powers, or to decide on how my powers will be used I will not be able to work out and to implement a conception of my good and so live a life that is meaningful “from the inside.” This line of thought might, for example, lead to prohibitions on paternalism and moralism.

But suppose these rights are protected. Suppose, too, that people are able to benefit from the use of their talents, but only to the degree required to get them to use those talents: they have a minimal right to benefit. Above that level, earnings are taxed (let's say) to support schools and other public facilities with a view to ensuring fair access for all to the enjoyments of life. It is not clear how this system conflicts with the moral importance of the capacity to live a meaningful life.

Consider people who would be better off in a system that did *not* aim to ensure that everyone has an equal chance to succeed in life—people who have,

say, been born into wealth and whose talents are highly valued. Ensuring equal opportunity, for example, does not prevent those people from reflecting on the conduct of their lives. It does not prevent them from leading their lives according to the results of that deliberation: they have resources for doing so, perhaps greater resources than others. Instead, limiting the right to benefit seeks precisely to show respect for other people—for their capacity to live a life with meaning—by ensuring that they have a fair set of resources needed for formulating and pursuing their goals as well.

## **8. Conclusion**

Nozick's case against a more-than-minimal state is that such a state illegitimately restricts choices by taking from individuals what they are entitled to. Their entitlements are based on their self-ownership, including a right to maximal benefit. But the arguments for this right seem only to establish rights of control and minimal benefit. And the case for the right to control that appeals to the idea of a meaningful life seems actually to provide reasons for limiting the right to benefit, and ensure for all fair opportunities for a meaningful life.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> The discussion of ownership and self-ownership in this lecture owes much to GA Cohen on self-ownership, Barbara Fried [PAPA], Tom Grey [Nomos], John Christman [PAPA]. On the connection between liberty and ownership rights, see GA Cohen; Adam Swift, *Political Philosophy*; Sam Freeman, "Illiberal Libertarians," *P&PA*, 30, 2: 126-29.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Hayek, *Constitution of Liberty*, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Taking the term from C.B. MacPherson's discussion of "possessive individualism" in his classical *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*.

<sup>5</sup> ASU, p. ix.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 245.

<sup>7</sup> ASU, 171-72.

<sup>8</sup> ASU, p. ix.

<sup>9</sup> Wolff, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> ASU, p. 160.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>12</sup> Since I do not think that liberals generally believe in self-ownership, as Nozick understands it, I will use the term "full ownership."

<sup>13</sup> See Thomas Grey [Nomos article on property]

<sup>14</sup> ASU, p. 169.

<sup>15</sup> The paragraph that follows interprets Nozick's discussion at A48-50.