

Problem Set 2

Answer 'yes' or 'no' unless otherwise indicated.

Note: the questions concern the introduction and the first two chapters of Searle's book; you may assume that Searle has the history right.

1. Does epiphenomenalism imply that mental states are never caused by anything?
2. Is the problem of intentionality the problem of explaining political events occurring in Washington, London, or Paris, for example?
3. Is the argument from analogy an argument against solipsism?
4. Did Descartes think that we never sleep?
5. According to Searle, is property dualism a very unpopular view these days, because it is hard to take seriously as a scientific hypothesis?
6. Did the logical behaviorists claim that dualism is not objectively testable?
7. Is Smullyan's unfortunate dualist the kind of dualist Searle discusses on pp. 31-2?
8. Suppose that I am identical to my brain, that my brain weighs three pounds, and that I drink beer. What follows by "Leibnitz's Law" (p. 39)?
 - (a) my brain does not drink beer.
 - (b) property dualism is false.
 - (c) I weigh three pounds.
 - (d) Either I do not weigh three pounds or my brain does not drink beer.
9. According to Searle, does the Turing test provide a conclusive way of establishing that a system has mental states?
10. According to Searle, can we talk about after-images in a topic neutral vocabulary?