

## IV Bratman on Intention

### Functional Benefits of Intention

#### (I) Deliberation curtailment

Two aspects: don't spend too much time; control when you deliberate. Do you need to form an intention to obtain these benefits? Why not just a judgment?

#### (II) Interpersonal and Intrapersonal coordination

Do one's intentions need to be *known* to achieve these benefits?

#### (III) Self-Knowledge

#### (IV) Resolving indifference and incommensurability

How do these differ? John Broome's Abraham example.

### Features needed to achieve (at least the first two of) these results

Control

Stability

Consistency

Means-Ends Coherence

### Why aren't they desires?

Consistency requirement; volitional control

### Why aren't they beliefs?

Motivating; volitional control; determinacy in cases of indifference and incommensurability

### Intentional Action and Acting with an Intention

The video game example (from 'Two Faces of Intention'): I play a game in which the goal is to hit either of two targets with either of two guns. I am ambidextrous, and so can simultaneously shoot with each hand. If both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. But I consider that it is worth risking this slight risk in order to increase my chance of hitting one of the targets. Do I intend to hit both targets? Bratman argues that I don't. Do I intend to hit one rather than the other? But which? So I have no intention, though I do *endeavour* to hit them both. But, Bratman argues, if I did hit one of the targets, I would intentionally hit it. Other examples: the doctrine of double effect.

### Intention and Belief

If they are not identical to beliefs, do intentions at least bring beliefs with them? The fallen tree example; the library example. Believing not v. Not believing. All out belief.

### What has become of the Humean Theory of Motivation?

Modest revision: all intentions must result from desires. More radical revision: they need not.