The following recitation notes are courtesy of Konrad Menzel and used with permission.
Course recitations.
| REC # |
TOPICS |
CONTENTS |
| I. Labor Market Statistics: Data Sources and Historical Overview |
| II. The Neoclassical Labor Supply Model |
| 1 |
Measurement Error (PDF) |
Deriving the Slutsky Equation
Using Roy's Identity
Measurement Error
Notation
Classical Measurement Error
Group Means as Proxy Variables
Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data
Cures for Classical Measurement Error
"Non-Classical" Measurement Error
|
| 2 |
Maximum Likelihood (PDF) |
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
MLE Examples
Bernoulli Distribution
Normal Linear Regression
The Probit Model
|
| 3 |
Panel Data (PDF) |
Estimation With Panel Data
Basic Setup
First Differences
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
Measurement Issues
Non-Classical EIV: Division Bias
Classical Measurement Error in Panel Data
One Solution to EIV: Wald IV
|
| III. Labor Demand, Immigration, Minimum Wages, and Unions |
| 4 |
Instrumental Variables (PDF) |
Grouped Data and Instrumental Variables
How Does OLS Work?
Group Means as Proxy Variables
Main Types of Bias in OLS
Grouped-Data IV
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
2SLS as a Grouped Data IV
Potential Problems: Weak Instruments, Many Instruments
Discussion of the Replication of Angrist
OLS Regressions
Fixed-Effects Regressions
2SLS Estimates
The Card Critique
|
| 5 |
Instrumental Variables (cont.) (PDF) |
Instrumental Variables (continued)
Omitted Variables and the Wald Estimator
2SLS as a Grouped Data IV
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
A Few Hints About Calculations With Scalars in Stata
|
| 6 |
Random Coefficient Models (PDF) |
Random Coefficient Models
Motivation
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Example: General Exam 2003, Question 1
|
| IV. Human Capital, Education, and Training |
| 7 |
Educational Choice (PDF) |
Educational Choice
The Discount Rate Bias Story
A Simple Model for Signaling
Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium in Signaling Games
Separating Equilibrium
Pooling Equilibrium
|
| 8 |
Bargaining and Hold-Up (PDF) |
Motivation
Bargaining
The Strategic Approach
The Axiomatic Approach
Interlude: Efficient Bargaining With Inefficient Outcomes?
The Hold-Up Problem - Investment in Physical Capital
|
| V. Labor Demand and Related Topics |
| 9 |
Labor Demand (PDF) |
Market Power and "Classical" Labor Demand
Estimating Market Power
The Conduct Parameter
The Corts Critique
|
| VI. Turnover, Matching, Learning, and the Returns to Tenure |
| 10 |
Normal Learning Model (PDF) |
Statistical Learning
The Normal Learning Model
The Jovanovic Example
The Holmström (1982) Career Concerns Model
|
| 11 |
Models of Turnover (PDF) |
Models of Turnover and Their Empirical Predictions
Motivation
Matching and On-The-Job Search - Deconstructing Jovanovic II
Dynamic Decisions, Convexity, and Option Values
Option Values in Continuous Time
|