the identity theory, contd.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

proposed by JJC Smart and UT Place in the 1950s

a 'theoretical identity'

water=H2O

heat=molecular kinetic energy

pain=c-fibers firing

'c-fibers' is just a placeholder for a more realistic candidate

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

=

an equivalence relation

correlation vs. identity

    footprints≈the burglar / Bill Sykes=the burglar

'is' of predication / identity

    Sting is famous / Sting is (=) Gordon Sumner

strict or numerical identity vs. 'identical twins'

'analytic' vs. 'synthetic' identities

    the shortest bachelor=the shortest adult unmarried male / the morning star=the evening star

24.09 F11

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

this terminology is due to the 'American Pragmatist' C. S. Peirce (1839-1914), and is in the reading from Kripke for wednesday

example 1

how many words in this sentence?

'The cat sat on the mat'

6 tokens, 5 types

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

6 tokens, 3 types

'type-type'

pain = c-fibers firing

'token-token'

Smith's pain at 10am = c-fibers firing in Smith at 10am

Jones' pain at 11am = d-fibers firing in Jones at 11am...(etc.)

despite the terminology, 'type-type' identity theories are not best understood in terms of the 'type-token' distinction

it is better to think of the 'type-type' theory as identifying <u>properties</u> rather than <u>types</u>

note that the American flag—taken either as a type or a token—is not a property

the property of being in pain = the property of having firing c-fibers

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

identity as the best explanation

Image courtesy of qippy.com on Flickr.

Image courtesy of Mikey Jon Holm on Flickr.

$$\approx$$ or $$=?$$

Gordon Sumner:
born in Newcastle, England on 2 October, 1951, blond hair, plays the bass, has 16 Grammy awards...

Sting:
born in Newcastle, England on 2 October, 1951, blond hair, plays the bass, has 16 Grammy awards...

what are some 'correlational' hypotheses?

why is the identity hypothesis better?

what's the similarity with Smart's motivation for the mind-brain identity theory?

Fred sees a satusuma (and so has an 'experience of seeing something orange')

the object of Fred's experience



Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

the <u>object</u> of the experience is colored orange, not the experience itself

such-and-such brain process
= the experience of seeing
something orange

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

the identity theory does not identify the <u>object</u> of the experience with a brain process

the identity theory identifies the <u>experience</u> of having an afterimage with a brain process

but what about the <u>afterimages themselves</u> —aren't they non-physical things?


Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

'There is, in a sense, no such thing as an after-image or a sense-datum, though there is such a thing as the experience of having such an image'

see also Place on the 'phenomenological fallacy'

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.
A photograph of Saul A. Kripke. (1940 -).

Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Book cover for Naming and Necessity by Saul A. Kripke. 1980.

false   :   true

might have been true

necessary

p o s s i b l e

contingent

might have been false

impossible

Cobe sky map showing temperature fluctuations in the early universe hidden among instrumental noise.

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

possible worlds are 'complete stories'—maximal ways the world might have been

a proposition is <u>necessary</u> iff it is true at every possible world

a proposition is <u>possible</u> iff it is true at some possible world

consider any object **o**

o is identical to itself

further, **o** couldn't possibly have been identical to something else

in other words, necessarily **o** is identical to itself (in every possible world, **o** is identical to itself)*

do not confuse this thesis with the claim that names or other expressions in natural languages are 'rigid designators'—the necessity of identity is not a thesis about language at all

*don't worry about worlds in which **o** does not exist

Kripke, excerpt 2 from
Naming and Necessity

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

24.09 Minds and Machines

Fall 2011