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PROFESSOR: When last we met, I
think, you have to remind me of

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this, I put the bits on the
handout that I didn't have from

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last time, but we talked about
--if you look at the hand out--

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we talked about what I'm
calling the psychopathelogical

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theory of love, and the
chemical theory of attraction.

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I seem to recall that we
finished up last time talking

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about the shaky bridge.
 

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So, that allows me to
start today talking about

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social exchange theory.
 

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I put the other stuff on there
because I felt bad about not

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having it on there last time.
 

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But we'll start in the top
middle of the page two.

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And, the question here
continues to be, how do we

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explain why a particular
relationship happens?

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The evolutionary theory is good
for saying something about

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broad forces, but now we want
to know something about why

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specific relationships
happen and do not happen.

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And, I can think of no better
place to begin then with me

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as a high school freshman.
 

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The reason that I'm explaining
this as me as a high school

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freshman, I made up this
example a few years ago

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to illustrate the point
that I wanted to make.

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I ran through this elaborate
scenario about high school

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freshman stuff like that.
 

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And then I gave your
predecessors a choice.

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Did he do A, or did he do B?
 

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Somebody raised their hand.
 

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He said B.
 

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I said no, that's
the wrong answer.

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And, at that point, I realized
I've been giving autobiography.

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So I thought I might
as well just go with

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straight autobiography.
 

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All right, you've got to
imagine this high school

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freshman, who you can imagine
was kind of short, and

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nerdy, but good in English.
 

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I'm just noticing, as the
gentleman in the white shirt

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over there moves things around,
Google has these, how to

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use your brain things.
 

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What's the actual title on it?
 

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AUDIENCE: How to care for
your big, wonderful,

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high performing brain.
 

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PROFESSOR: Yes.
 

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How to care for your
big wonderful high

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performing brain.
 

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If you find one of those around
campus, over half the people

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have them, I realize you all
want to go work for Google, but

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an entertaining act might be to
see how many of the little

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factoids and stuff you think
are directly contradicted or

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directly contradict the
contents of this course.

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There are a variety
of oddities on that.

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But, it's not bad, and you
should send your resume to

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Google and become rich and
famous, rather than just being

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a nerdy high school freshman,
who was good in English.

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So I was in Sophomore
Honors English.

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Great.
 

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In Sophomore Honors English
was, at least through the fog

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of memory, a very beautiful,
very brilliant cheerleader

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and woman person.
 

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And, if we return to the
psychopathology theory

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of love, I was pretty
infatuated with her.

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The pick A or B question is
A, I let her know that this

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infatuated guy was sort
of sitting next to her in

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class whenever possible.
 

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And, we had a perfectly nice
high school relationship.

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Or, B, she managed to graduate
from high school presumably

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completely unaware that
I had been deeply

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infatuated with her.
 

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How many people vote for A.
 

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How many people vote for B?
 

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Why isn't John Kerry voting?
 

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You would think of all
people, he ought to be

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voting, wouldn't you?
 

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[APPLAUSE AND LAUGHTER]
 

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PROFESSOR: He does
have excellent hair.

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All right.
 

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Look John, stop grinning
at me, we can't all

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marry billionaires.
 

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[APPLAUSE AND LAUGHTER]
 

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PROFESSOR: All right, so the
intuition of the vast, cruel

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bulk of you is correct.
 

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I suspect, in her life,
I kept sort of turning

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up like a bad penny.
 

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I was continuously around.
 

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But, there was no
relationship there.

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Why not?
 

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What was my problem?
 

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We won't ask for vast details.
 

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All right, we'll ask
for some details.

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AUDIENCE: Fear?
 

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PROFESSOR: Fear works.
 

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But the last example
we had Romeo there.

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He was presumably scared out of
his little wits more or less.

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Yeah.
 

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AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
 

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look at her from afar.
 

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PROFESSOR: I like that.
 

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That sounds good.
 

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Self- confidence.
 

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I think I won't pursue this
further, because I may learn

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way more than I want to know
about exactly why I should

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have been fearful.
 

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Low self- confidence
and otherwise.

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But, the fact is I
didn't do nothing.

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The other fact that occurs to
me, is that, it would be

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entirely possible by this
point, that her son or daughter

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could be a student here.
 

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Yeah.
 

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I heard good deep intake
of breath there.

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There's a scary thought.
 

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The intuition is clear.
 

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Let's flip the example around,
and ask suppose that this

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gorgeous and brilliant high
school sophomore was attracted

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to this nerdy, little
high school freshman or

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something like that.
 

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Would she do anything about
that, one way or the other?

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Let's do the A or B vote.
 

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How many vote that she would
say, let's go out together,

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and that his hair would
curl or something.

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How many vote, yes,
she would do that.

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How many vote no?
 

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OK.
 

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Well little more divided.
 

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There's more chance that maybe
she would say something, but

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the majority goes with the no,
or the, I'm not voting on this.

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I voted once today already.
 

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Maybe I voted twice.
 

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But, anyway.
 

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The why would be ok.
 

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But, why not?
 

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What's wrong here?
 

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Economics.
 

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Either we're sitting here
reading the hand out, or

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he's on to something.
 

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Where's economics, Matt.
 

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AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
 

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her kinds of values
would go down.

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PROFESSOR: Oh.
 

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We don't have to make this
quite so specific, do we?

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[LAUGHTER]
 

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PROFESSOR: I should add, this
would be deeply pathetic if

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since high school, I've been a
broken and pathetic person who

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never formed a meaningful
relationship with another

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person, and I was still
waiting for her.

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But, when I did finally get
engaged to somebody, my dear

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sister's first reaction,
was sort of like that.

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Which was, how did you ever
get somebody so attractive

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to go with you?
 

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And, my mother's first
reaction, -- we were going to

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be engaged for two years
because we've been reading up

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this was a long time ago,
before evolutionary psych was

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big, but we were ahead of the
curve, and we knew that she had

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to be a couple of years younger
than me, because she needed to

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be evolutionarily fit.
 

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Anyway, she was two
years younger than me.

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I was already up here
in grad school.

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She was still at Princeton as
an undergrad, so we would get

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married two years later
when she graduated.

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My mother's first declaration
on this subject was that if

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anything happens to the
relationship in the intervening

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two years, she was keeping
Julie, my wife, and

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getting rid of me.
 

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So, you may be on to
something there.

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Yes.
 

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AUDIENCE: In high school,
women generally didn't

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ask guys out --
 

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PROFESSOR: OK
 

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I could have flipped
this around and change

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the genders here.
 

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But there's a possibility
of a social norm that

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the women don't ask men.
 

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But, I will assert that there
would have been a certain

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amount of discomfort if it'd
been a gorgeous, brilliant male

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cheerleader, Hey, don't knock
it, my sister- in- law

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married one of those.
 

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University of Michigan,
you know, gorgeous male

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cheerleaders are right there.
 

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I don't know.
 

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How is the MIT male
cheerleading squad a big thing?

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No.
 

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OK.
 

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Anyway, I think there would be
a certain ambivalence about

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this relationship even if we
switched the genders on it.

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Any other comments on this?
 

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Well, let me assert that this
sort of relationship feels

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uncomfortable because we have a
very deeply seated desire for

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relationships to be reciprocal.
 

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If you want to account for my
failure to ask this young woman

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out, in economic terms, you
could imagine that what I did

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was, I looked in my
romance wallet.

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And, I said, I don't you enough
to afford this relationship.

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Not in strictly economic terms.
 

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But I don't have enough
status for this.

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I'm a freshman.
 

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She's a sophomore.
 

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Made a big difference
at that point.

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You know, she's this, I'm this.
 

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She's this, I'm this.
 

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This isn't going to work.
 

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But, it also doesn't
work like this.

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If you've got too much in the
bank, in a sense, there's a

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discomfort that has to do with
unbalanced relationships.

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And there seems to be a very
deeply seated notion that

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relationships need to be
appropriately reciprocal.

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Now this isn't just
about romance.

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If I open the door for you,
you'd say, thank you.

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Now that's a very simple sort
of thing but, it suggests

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that you feel a need to
reciprocate for whatever

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act might come your way.
 

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In the sub culture in which I
live, if I invite somebody over

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to my house for dinner, their
reflective response is to

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say, what can I bring?
 

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Not because they have some
notion that the larder is

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bare at home, and if they
don't bring something,

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there's no dinner.
 

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But there's is a notion that
needs to be reciprocal.

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Quite typically, my response
would be, oh you don't need

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to be to bring anything.
 

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And, quite typically
nevertheless, whoever's

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coming over would bring
something anyway.

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Now you get into
interesting problems.

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The exact nature of what is
and is not reciprocately

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appropriate, seems to have
a strong cultural overlay.

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This was brought home to me by
a tale my parents told me,

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which was, a few years ago,
new neighbors moved in.

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And, so my parents, being
nice people, brought them

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over a welcome to the
neighborhood gift.

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I don't know what it was.
 

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But they brought
over a little gift.

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That's nice.
 

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But the people who moved
in were Japanese.

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The Japanese cultural
expectation was, if you get a

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gift, you have to give a gift.
 

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So, they gave my parents
a gift the next day.

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But, my parents' expectation
wasn't that they'd get a gift,

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so if they got a gift, there's
now a reciprocal demand here.

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So, they gave the
neighbors another gift.

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At least by the time you get my
mother's rendition of this, it

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sounded like the end of this
was sort of medieval warfare.

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You know, lobbing
gifts over the fence.

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Stop it already!
 

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AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]
 

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PROFESSOR: All of these
examples point out that there's

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a deep- seated notion, that we
don't like one- sided

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relationships.
 

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We like relationships that are
reciprocal in some fashion.

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And the reciprocation needs
to match the original act.

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If I invite you to dinner and
you throw yourself on your

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face, and swear eternal fealty
to me, that's reciprocal,

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but that's odd.
 

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That's out of proportion,
and wouldn't be right.

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The efforts to make these
intuitions, into something

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more than intuition, into a
systematic theory, one of

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the efforts is known as
social exchange theory.

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It is an effort to talk about
social relationships in terms

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that borrow from common
sense economic terms.

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Where, one of the goals is
to maximize your profits.

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There are benefits.
 

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There's the income side.
 

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There's the cost side, and
your profits are going to be

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something like the subtraction
of the costs from the benefits.

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Now, costs and benefits in
social exchange are not going

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to be in strictly monetary
terms by any stretch

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of the imagination.
 

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Benefits in social exchange
can be tangible like dinner.

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They can be intangible like a
compliment of some variety.

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Oh that's a lovely, yellow
t- shirt with some cool

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00:16:30 --> 00:16:31
description on it.
 

289
00:16:31 --> 00:16:31
Right.
 

290
00:16:31 --> 00:16:35
I just added to the plus
side of his ledger.

291
00:16:35 --> 00:16:37
Of course, I've also added to
the minus side, because I've

292
00:16:37 --> 00:16:39
directed attention to him,
and now, he's embarrassed.

293
00:16:39 --> 00:16:40
Everybody's looking at him.
 

294
00:16:40 --> 00:16:42
AUDIENCE: You're not
getting anything back!

295
00:16:42 --> 00:16:43
PROFESSOR: I'm not
getting anything back.

296
00:16:43 --> 00:16:47
No reciprocal here, at all.
 

297
00:16:47 --> 00:16:48
I just got something back.
 

298
00:16:48 --> 00:16:51
 
 

299
00:16:51 --> 00:16:53
Well, anyway.
 

300
00:16:53 --> 00:16:55
And, they can be internal.
 

301
00:16:55 --> 00:17:00
The benefits could be internal,
like a feeling of self-worth.

302
00:17:00 --> 00:17:02
Some boost in morale,
something like that.

303
00:17:02 --> 00:17:04
All these would be things
on the plus side.

304
00:17:04 --> 00:17:08
And, quite different than
just economic transaction.

305
00:17:08 --> 00:17:11
And, the same on
the minus side.

306
00:17:11 --> 00:17:14
You could have a physical
minus if someone smacks you,

307
00:17:14 --> 00:17:17
or something like that.
 

308
00:17:17 --> 00:17:24
An intangible minus; I won't
pick somebody out, because that

309
00:17:24 --> 00:17:28
would be rude, but did you get
enough sleep last night,

310
00:17:28 --> 00:17:29
or something like that?
 

311
00:17:29 --> 00:17:32
It sort of suggests that you
don't look so good, and you

312
00:17:32 --> 00:17:34
think, I did get a lot
of sleep last night.

313
00:17:34 --> 00:17:36
Maybe I just don't
look so good.

314
00:17:36 --> 00:17:40
And, it could be internal.
 

315
00:17:40 --> 00:17:42
You know, a feeling of
diminished self- worth,

316
00:17:42 --> 00:17:42
or something like that.
 

317
00:17:42 --> 00:17:46
And then you've got your
profits that are the

318
00:17:46 --> 00:17:49
difference between those.
 

319
00:17:49 --> 00:17:53
There is a necessary, at least
at this stage of any sort of

320
00:17:53 --> 00:17:57
model development, there is a
necessary imprecision here.

321
00:17:57 --> 00:18:02
Dinner minus two
insults equals what?

322
00:18:02 --> 00:18:04
It's clear that at least
a decent dinner is

323
00:18:04 --> 00:18:05
on the plus sign.
 

324
00:18:05 --> 00:18:07
The insults on the minus side.
 

325
00:18:07 --> 00:18:08
But you can't do the
calculation the way you

326
00:18:08 --> 00:18:13
would do a profit loss
statement in economics.

327
00:18:13 --> 00:18:17
So suffice it to say that in
its present state, the model

328
00:18:17 --> 00:18:21
is qualitative, more
then quantitative.

329
00:18:21 --> 00:18:24
But, rather like evolutionary
psych, the promise is, or the

330
00:18:24 --> 00:18:26
hope would be, that you
could move in a more

331
00:18:26 --> 00:18:30
quantitative direction.
 

332
00:18:30 --> 00:18:35
Do people actually do any
sort of math of this sort?

333
00:18:35 --> 00:18:39
Well you can get some intuition
about that perhaps by asking

334
00:18:39 --> 00:18:43
yourself about some
sort of a scenario.

335
00:18:43 --> 00:18:50
Like, you go to the polls
today, you're in line, and you

336
00:18:50 --> 00:18:58
see this guy who you think you
saw voting earlier in the day,

337
00:18:58 --> 00:19:00
when you voted the first time.
 

338
00:19:00 --> 00:19:03
 
 

339
00:19:03 --> 00:19:06
So, what do you do?
 

340
00:19:06 --> 00:19:10
Now, you could challenge him
or not challenge him or

341
00:19:10 --> 00:19:11
something like that.
 

342
00:19:11 --> 00:19:14
And ask yourself, what would
determine that decision?

343
00:19:14 --> 00:19:16
You'd sort of run down
a mental checklist.

344
00:19:16 --> 00:19:21
If I challenge him I might get
it sort of a tangible benefit

345
00:19:21 --> 00:19:24
of preserving the democratic
process in some fashion.

346
00:19:24 --> 00:19:28
I get an intangible set of
compliments from people all

347
00:19:28 --> 00:19:34
around me about my bold stand
for ballot integrity, and I'd

348
00:19:34 --> 00:19:36
get this great feeling
of self-worth.

349
00:19:36 --> 00:19:41
On the other hand,
I might be wrong.

350
00:19:41 --> 00:19:44
He might punch me.
 

351
00:19:44 --> 00:19:48
And, my neighbors in line,
might simply derive me for

352
00:19:48 --> 00:19:53
being a stupid busybody, and
it doesn't really matter

353
00:19:53 --> 00:19:54
what your answer is.
 

354
00:19:54 --> 00:20:01
The point is that this sort of
cost- benefit analysis has the

355
00:20:01 --> 00:20:05
feeling of the thing that we
do, not explicitly, not on a

356
00:20:05 --> 00:20:08
piece of paper with a check
list, but the thing that we

357
00:20:08 --> 00:20:12
do quite automatically.
 

358
00:20:12 --> 00:20:14
 
 

359
00:20:14 --> 00:20:17
The notion that you want to
maximize your profits is only

360
00:20:17 --> 00:20:24
one of the core tenants of
social exchange theory.

361
00:20:24 --> 00:20:26
You know that because
the handout, I think,

362
00:20:26 --> 00:20:28
lists three of them.
 

363
00:20:28 --> 00:20:31
One of them is to
maximize your profits.

364
00:20:31 --> 00:20:31
Oh, there it is.
 

365
00:20:31 --> 00:20:33
It says, "Three Tenants
Of Social Change Theory.

366
00:20:33 --> 00:20:35
Maximize Your Profits."
 

367
00:20:35 --> 00:20:37
The second one is the notion
that the profits for both

368
00:20:37 --> 00:20:40
sides in an exchange
should be roughly equal.

369
00:20:40 --> 00:20:45
That's the embodiment of
this notion of reciprocity.

370
00:20:45 --> 00:20:52
We don't like relationships
where you maximize your profits

371
00:20:52 --> 00:20:57
by exploiting the other
party to the relationship.

372
00:20:57 --> 00:21:01
And the third one, that we
haven't talked about yet, is

373
00:21:01 --> 00:21:06
that for a relationship to
last, it's gotta be better than

374
00:21:06 --> 00:21:08
the perceived alternatives.
 

375
00:21:08 --> 00:21:12
 
 

376
00:21:12 --> 00:21:14
The plus or minus of
that checklist is

377
00:21:14 --> 00:21:18
not itself adequate.
 

378
00:21:18 --> 00:21:22
If you think about this in
boring economic terms.

379
00:21:22 --> 00:21:25
You've got a pile of
money in this account.

380
00:21:25 --> 00:21:30
It's making 1%, so
you're making money.

381
00:21:30 --> 00:21:32
But, you see that there's
this other opportunity

382
00:21:32 --> 00:21:36
over here, to make 5%.
 

383
00:21:36 --> 00:21:38
Well, what are you going
to do with your money.

384
00:21:38 --> 00:21:41
 
 

385
00:21:41 --> 00:21:42
You're going to move it over.
 

386
00:21:42 --> 00:21:42
Look at that.
 

387
00:21:42 --> 00:21:47
Not only did I get a sweatshirt
out the deal, I got a nickel.

388
00:21:47 --> 00:21:48
And, a cute little pink thing.
 

389
00:21:48 --> 00:21:49
He left the coin he flipped.
 

390
00:21:49 --> 00:21:50
This is a great day.
 

391
00:21:50 --> 00:21:55
 
 

392
00:21:55 --> 00:21:57
So, the same logic applies
in social exchange

393
00:21:57 --> 00:22:01
theory to relationships.
 

394
00:22:01 --> 00:22:07
So you're in a relationship
that's getting you a

395
00:22:07 --> 00:22:13
net profit, with this
perfectly nice person.

396
00:22:13 --> 00:22:18
You see this other person, and
you say, I could get 5% on

397
00:22:18 --> 00:22:20
my relationship over here.
 

398
00:22:20 --> 00:22:21
What do you do?
 

399
00:22:21 --> 00:22:25
Now we'll come back later in
the lecture to the possible

400
00:22:25 --> 00:22:28
problematical nature of that
tenant of social

401
00:22:28 --> 00:22:29
exchange theory.
 

402
00:22:29 --> 00:22:32
But, the important point for
now is, it's not just that you

403
00:22:32 --> 00:22:35
want to be running positive,
not negative, you want to be

404
00:22:35 --> 00:22:39
running as positively as
possible, and you're looking at

405
00:22:39 --> 00:22:42
your alternatives to see
how you can do that.

406
00:22:42 --> 00:22:45
Now, this sounds, particularly
by the time we start talking

407
00:22:45 --> 00:22:49
about moving your investment
from one person to the next

408
00:22:49 --> 00:22:52
person, terribly crass.
 

409
00:22:52 --> 00:22:56
Is there any evidence that
people use is this sort

410
00:22:56 --> 00:23:03
of quasi- economic
calculation in romance?

411
00:23:03 --> 00:23:09
In making romantic attachments
with other people?

412
00:23:09 --> 00:23:12
There have been a number
of experiments that have

413
00:23:12 --> 00:23:15
endeavored to look for evidence
for social exchange theory

414
00:23:15 --> 00:23:22
principles in the settings of
romantic type relationships.

415
00:23:22 --> 00:23:25
And I want tell you
about a few of them.

416
00:23:25 --> 00:23:31
That's why I've got all these
cute little boxes on the

417
00:23:31 --> 00:23:34
handout that allow you to
plot out the results, the

418
00:23:34 --> 00:23:37
predictions and the results.
 

419
00:23:37 --> 00:23:43
So, let me tell you about one
of the earlier great efforts.

420
00:23:43 --> 00:23:46
Down on the handout is the
great computer match dance.

421
00:23:46 --> 00:23:51
Here's the way it works.
 

422
00:23:51 --> 00:23:59
In the early days of computers,
signs go up on campus for a big

423
00:23:59 --> 00:24:03
dance but the thing is you're
not supposed to invite anybody.

424
00:24:03 --> 00:24:06
You're not supposed to take
your date to this dance.

425
00:24:06 --> 00:24:08
What you're going to do, is
you're going to come fill out

426
00:24:08 --> 00:24:13
this big form, collecting
buckets of information on you,

427
00:24:13 --> 00:24:20
your GPA, your height, your
weight, family income,

428
00:24:20 --> 00:24:21
all sorts of stuff.
 

429
00:24:21 --> 00:24:24
And, the people on the other
side of the table, when you're

430
00:24:24 --> 00:24:29
doing this, are looking at you,
and rating your attractiveness,

431
00:24:29 --> 00:24:32
on a scale from like 1 to
10 or something like that.

432
00:24:32 --> 00:24:36
And, then all this goes into a
good 1960's style computer, so

433
00:24:36 --> 00:24:40
it's big computer with lots of
lights that flash on it, and

434
00:24:40 --> 00:24:43
out the other end is going to
come out the person you

435
00:24:43 --> 00:24:47
are matched with to
go to the dance.

436
00:24:47 --> 00:24:47
OK.
 

437
00:24:47 --> 00:24:49
Got the basic set up here?
 

438
00:24:49 --> 00:24:54
So we've got the male.
 

439
00:24:54 --> 00:24:57
He can be rated on some scale.
 

440
00:24:57 --> 00:25:00
You've got the female.
 

441
00:25:00 --> 00:25:05
She can be rated on
a similar scale.

442
00:25:05 --> 00:25:13
And, the story here, is that
we've matched you up with the

443
00:25:13 --> 00:25:19
perfect person for you in
some fashion or other.

444
00:25:19 --> 00:25:21
Actually, I don't think they
told you that this was the

445
00:25:21 --> 00:25:22
way it's going to be done.
 

446
00:25:22 --> 00:25:23
It is some complicated
algorithm.

447
00:25:23 --> 00:25:27
The fact is the complicated
algorithm was to flip coins.

448
00:25:27 --> 00:25:30
 
 

449
00:25:30 --> 00:25:34
The pairings were
completely random.

450
00:25:34 --> 00:25:39
So, the data on any dimension
that you looked for, were

451
00:25:39 --> 00:25:46
designed that male and female
ratings would be uncorrelated.

452
00:25:46 --> 00:25:47
OK.
 

453
00:25:47 --> 00:25:49
Now you have the dance.
 

454
00:25:49 --> 00:25:53
And, the question is, this
being the 60's, the issue of

455
00:25:53 --> 00:25:56
males asking females rather
than the other way around, is

456
00:25:56 --> 00:25:59
a much more straightforward
societal norm.

457
00:25:59 --> 00:26:03
The question they asked was
which males asked which females

458
00:26:03 --> 00:26:07
out again for another date?
 

459
00:26:07 --> 00:26:10
What's the social exchange
prediction here?

460
00:26:10 --> 00:26:14
 
 

461
00:26:14 --> 00:26:15
That's a hand?
 

462
00:26:15 --> 00:26:22
AUDIENCE: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
 

463
00:26:22 --> 00:26:23
PROFESSOR: Yes.
 

464
00:26:23 --> 00:26:30
 
 

465
00:26:30 --> 00:26:37
People should sort themselves
in some fashion to produce

466
00:26:37 --> 00:26:41
essentially reciprocal
balanced relationships.

467
00:26:41 --> 00:26:50
So, this quadrant is the me
not asking her out in high

468
00:26:50 --> 00:26:56
school neighborhood, and
this is the reverse.

469
00:26:56 --> 00:27:01
Her not asking me out
hypothetical relationship.

470
00:27:01 --> 00:27:03
But these are the matched
relationships that

471
00:27:03 --> 00:27:05
ought to work.
 

472
00:27:05 --> 00:27:09
In fact, this
experiment is a bomb.

473
00:27:09 --> 00:27:11
It doesn't work out the
way social exchange

474
00:27:11 --> 00:27:13
theory predicted.
 

475
00:27:13 --> 00:27:16
So, you look at the
correlational data for all

476
00:27:16 --> 00:27:20
sorts of variables, and it
turns out that the only

477
00:27:20 --> 00:27:26
variable that makes any
difference is ratings of female

478
00:27:26 --> 00:27:31
attractiveness, and the
data look like this.

479
00:27:31 --> 00:27:38
 
 

480
00:27:38 --> 00:27:42
Basically females who were
rated as more attractive

481
00:27:42 --> 00:27:44
got asked out.
 

482
00:27:44 --> 00:27:47
What's going on here?
 

483
00:27:47 --> 00:27:51
So the answer is there's a
fatal methodological flaw here.

484
00:27:51 --> 00:27:54
 
 

485
00:27:54 --> 00:27:55
There're two possibilities.
 

486
00:27:55 --> 00:27:59
One is that social
exchange theory is wrong.

487
00:27:59 --> 00:28:03
But If I thought that were the
case, then why would I bother

488
00:28:03 --> 00:28:07
to lecture about it, at least
in this sort of detail.

489
00:28:07 --> 00:28:10
The other possibility is
the experiment had a

490
00:28:10 --> 00:28:11
methodological flaw.
 

491
00:28:11 --> 00:28:13
So what's the problem?
 

492
00:28:13 --> 00:28:16
Why didn't this work out?
 

493
00:28:16 --> 00:28:18
Oh, Out in the cheap seats,
next John Kerry there.

494
00:28:18 --> 00:28:24
AUDIENCE: People thought that
they were well matched.

495
00:28:24 --> 00:28:26
PROFESSOR: That's good.
 

496
00:28:26 --> 00:28:29
Usually I get half a dozen
bizarre ideas did before

497
00:28:29 --> 00:28:31
somebody hits on
the right idea.

498
00:28:31 --> 00:28:34
But good for you, you got
the right idea first.

499
00:28:34 --> 00:28:36
The problem is with
the cover story.

500
00:28:36 --> 00:28:39
It's not people specifically
who are the problem.

501
00:28:39 --> 00:28:41
It's guys.
 

502
00:28:41 --> 00:28:49
The guys thought, so you
gotta imagine a guy here.

503
00:28:49 --> 00:28:56
So if this is the scale of
attractiveness, so here's ugly

504
00:28:56 --> 00:29:03
guy, ugly guy has thought all
along that he was, I've got a

505
00:29:03 --> 00:29:10
warm heart, but I'm ugly, and
then see, this high tech

506
00:29:10 --> 00:29:14
computer, spits out your
perfect match, and

507
00:29:14 --> 00:29:16
she's gorgeous.
 

508
00:29:16 --> 00:29:22
It's the economics of romance
equivalent to looking into the

509
00:29:22 --> 00:29:25
wallet and discovering you've
got a whole bunch of 20's

510
00:29:25 --> 00:29:28
you didn't know were there.
 

511
00:29:28 --> 00:29:34
And so everybody decided that
they were well matched, and

512
00:29:34 --> 00:29:42
this had it's biggest effect on
the guys who had previously

513
00:29:42 --> 00:29:44
thought that they didn't have
that much in the bank, and they

514
00:29:44 --> 00:29:47
thought well, I guess
I can afford this.

515
00:29:47 --> 00:29:51
They all asked out the-- what
we don't know, by the way,

516
00:29:51 --> 00:29:55
which of these phone calls
actually ended up in a

517
00:29:55 --> 00:29:57
date, and or relationship.
 

518
00:29:57 --> 00:30:01
The social change prediction
would have to be that only

519
00:30:01 --> 00:30:03
these would have survived.
 

520
00:30:03 --> 00:30:05
But we can come back
to that minute.

521
00:30:05 --> 00:30:11
Anyway, the experiment's a
bust, because the cover story

522
00:30:11 --> 00:30:13
gives people the wrong idea.
 

523
00:30:13 --> 00:30:19
This makes an interesting
point about these valuations.

524
00:30:19 --> 00:30:24
They're based on your
perception in relationship

525
00:30:24 --> 00:30:28
space, they're based on your
perception of the other, and

526
00:30:28 --> 00:30:30
your perception of yourself.
 

527
00:30:30 --> 00:30:37
 
 

528
00:30:37 --> 00:30:42
We have met males, for
instance, who consider

529
00:30:42 --> 00:30:47
themselves to be God's gift to
women, against the evidence.

530
00:30:47 --> 00:30:50
 
 

531
00:30:50 --> 00:30:54
If you have a systematic
misperception of your own

532
00:30:54 --> 00:31:00
value, you're going to end up
in the non- social exchange

533
00:31:00 --> 00:31:03
part of this space.
 

534
00:31:03 --> 00:31:07
And, then, the question
becomes whether or not its

535
00:31:07 --> 00:31:09
a self- correcting system.
 

536
00:31:09 --> 00:31:19
If you think that you are a 10
on every scale, and you keep

537
00:31:19 --> 00:31:23
asking people who are by your
assessment also 10's on every

538
00:31:23 --> 00:31:27
scale, and they keep saying no
to you, does that eventually

539
00:31:27 --> 00:31:30
cause you to come up with a
more realistic assessment

540
00:31:30 --> 00:31:36
of who you might actually
be in this marketplace.

541
00:31:36 --> 00:31:37
Well.
 

542
00:31:37 --> 00:31:39
We haven't got any evidence
if this works at all yet.

543
00:31:39 --> 00:31:42
Let's go find ourselves an
experiment that doesn't have

544
00:31:42 --> 00:31:44
this fatal flaw in it.
 

545
00:31:44 --> 00:31:46
Did I give this a clever
name of something sort?

546
00:31:46 --> 00:31:46
No.
 

547
00:31:46 --> 00:31:48
It just says, let's try again.
 

548
00:31:48 --> 00:31:53
So, here's this Kizler
and Barrel experiment,

549
00:31:53 --> 00:31:57
that works as follows.
 

550
00:31:57 --> 00:32:04
You go into a psych lab to do
what you think is some sort

551
00:32:04 --> 00:32:06
of a cognitive experiment.
 

552
00:32:06 --> 00:32:08
The task don't matter.
 

553
00:32:08 --> 00:32:13
You're doing this task,
broken into two halves.

554
00:32:13 --> 00:32:15
You're a guy.
 

555
00:32:15 --> 00:32:21
And, at the end of the first
half, you're going to take a

556
00:32:21 --> 00:32:24
break, and you're giving
some feedback about

557
00:32:24 --> 00:32:26
how you're doing.
 

558
00:32:26 --> 00:32:29
The feedback is either
of the form, wow.

559
00:32:29 --> 00:32:30
You did really well on that.
 

560
00:32:30 --> 00:32:32
Most people don't get
scores that are that good.

561
00:32:32 --> 00:32:34
You're really good at
this sort of thing.

562
00:32:34 --> 00:32:41
So that's a good, self-
esteem boosting kind

563
00:32:41 --> 00:32:42
a bit of feedback.
 

564
00:32:42 --> 00:32:45
Or, you're given feedback
of the form, did you get

565
00:32:45 --> 00:32:47
enough sleep last night?
 

566
00:32:47 --> 00:32:54
Most people get a higher score.
 

567
00:32:54 --> 00:32:55
Well, never mind.
 

568
00:32:55 --> 00:32:56
It's OK.
 

569
00:32:56 --> 00:32:57
Let's take a break.
 

570
00:32:57 --> 00:33:04
And so you've gotten
the bad information.

571
00:33:04 --> 00:33:07
Now, needless to say,
this is a set up.

572
00:33:07 --> 00:33:11
What information you get is
uncorrelated with your score.

573
00:33:11 --> 00:33:13
So, you may have
done brilliantly.

574
00:33:13 --> 00:33:14
You may have done badly.
 

575
00:33:14 --> 00:33:18
You have no idea how people
do on this task in general.

576
00:33:18 --> 00:33:22
And, and the experimenter has
flipped a coin and arbitrarily

577
00:33:22 --> 00:33:25
assigned you to the high self-
esteem or low self-

578
00:33:25 --> 00:33:26
esteem group.
 

579
00:33:26 --> 00:33:29
That's the manipulation
of the male.

580
00:33:29 --> 00:33:30
This is the guy.
 

581
00:33:30 --> 00:33:36
Now, we're going to
go have a snack.

582
00:33:36 --> 00:33:39
You and the experimenter
go off to the cafeteria

583
00:33:39 --> 00:33:45
to have a snack.
 

584
00:33:45 --> 00:33:53
And, you get some food, sit
down at the table, and a female

585
00:33:53 --> 00:33:57
friend of the experimenter
comes and says, Hi, can

586
00:33:57 --> 00:33:59
I sit down with you?
 

587
00:33:59 --> 00:34:01
And, the experimenter
says Hi, sure.

588
00:34:01 --> 00:34:04
 
 

589
00:34:04 --> 00:34:09
A female person comes
in two flavors.

590
00:34:09 --> 00:34:11
As you might guess from
this two by two thing.

591
00:34:11 --> 00:34:15
There's only one female here,
but the manipulation here is

592
00:34:15 --> 00:34:20
she's either looking good,
or she's looking bad.

593
00:34:20 --> 00:34:24
 
 

594
00:34:24 --> 00:34:26
I don't think, I've ever seen
pictures of this, so I don't

595
00:34:26 --> 00:34:31
quite know how they did this,
but the idea is that she's

596
00:34:31 --> 00:34:36
arranged herself to look
attractive, or comparatively

597
00:34:36 --> 00:34:38
unattractive.
 

598
00:34:38 --> 00:34:41
Same person, so you know no
personality variables changing,

599
00:34:41 --> 00:34:43
and a fairly tight script.
 

600
00:34:43 --> 00:34:46
And, at this point, the
experimenter says, I need to

601
00:34:46 --> 00:34:48
go rinse a few things out.
 

602
00:34:48 --> 00:34:49
I'll be right back.
 

603
00:34:49 --> 00:34:51
You two talk.
 

604
00:34:51 --> 00:34:56
And, so this woman, also an
experimenter is sitting there.

605
00:34:56 --> 00:35:02
And the data for this
experiment are any indications

606
00:35:02 --> 00:35:09
of romantic interest on
the part of the guy.

607
00:35:09 --> 00:35:12
Does he ask for her phone
number would be a sort of a

608
00:35:12 --> 00:35:13
transparent kind of thing.
 

609
00:35:13 --> 00:35:17
But there's a long checklist of
things that he might do or say

610
00:35:17 --> 00:35:20
that would indicate some sort
of interest, And, you're just

611
00:35:20 --> 00:35:27
making little check marks
presumably relatively subtly.

612
00:35:27 --> 00:35:40
 
 

613
00:35:40 --> 00:35:47
The trivial social exchange
prediction is he's feeling

614
00:35:47 --> 00:35:49
good, she's looking good.
 

615
00:35:49 --> 00:35:51
It must be love, kind of thing.
 

616
00:35:51 --> 00:35:59
And this the cell that gets
the highest number of

617
00:35:59 --> 00:36:01
indications of interest.
 

618
00:36:01 --> 00:36:07
The question is where's
the second highest set of

619
00:36:07 --> 00:36:09
marks in this experiment.
 

620
00:36:09 --> 00:36:12
And the answer is down here.
 

621
00:36:12 --> 00:36:17
She's looking bad,
he's feeling bad.

622
00:36:17 --> 00:36:21
It must be a match.
 

623
00:36:21 --> 00:36:23
And, these two lag behind.
 

624
00:36:23 --> 00:36:26
I don't know which one
is three and which one

625
00:36:26 --> 00:36:28
is four, actually.
 

626
00:36:28 --> 00:36:35
But the important point is that
there are more indications of

627
00:36:35 --> 00:36:41
interest here, has would be
predicted by a social exchange

628
00:36:41 --> 00:36:43
theory that's looking
for matching.

629
00:36:43 --> 00:36:48
 
 

630
00:36:48 --> 00:36:51
This is the case where you
looked in your wallet and you

631
00:36:51 --> 00:36:55
discovered that you actually
had a couple less twenties then

632
00:36:55 --> 00:37:00
you though, but you still
want to buy something.

633
00:37:00 --> 00:37:03
And, well I guess.
 

634
00:37:03 --> 00:37:08
Doesn't this sound terrible?
 

635
00:37:08 --> 00:37:11
It not only sounds terrible,
it sounds a little on

636
00:37:11 --> 00:37:15
the artificial side.
 

637
00:37:15 --> 00:37:20
Is there any evidence that
this happens in a more

638
00:37:20 --> 00:37:22
realistic setting?
 

639
00:37:22 --> 00:37:30
And the effort to figure that
out was done with the realistic

640
00:37:30 --> 00:37:34
setting of large introductory
psychology classes.

641
00:37:34 --> 00:37:39
So, large intro psych class, I
think maybe Minnesota, or Ohio

642
00:37:39 --> 00:37:42
State someplace where they
had a huge intro class.

643
00:37:42 --> 00:37:46
And, what they did was, they a
largely freshman class, they

644
00:37:46 --> 00:37:51
looked for who formed
relationships.

645
00:37:51 --> 00:37:55
So, let's go just like the
computer match dance thing, but

646
00:37:55 --> 00:37:57
we'll take the relationships
first, and work

647
00:37:57 --> 00:37:58
backwards from that.
 

648
00:37:58 --> 00:38:06
So they got like 213 I think,
couples, out of intro psych.

649
00:38:06 --> 00:38:09
And, they did the
same business.

650
00:38:09 --> 00:38:11
Rated them on attractiveness.
 

651
00:38:11 --> 00:38:16
Rated them on everything
under the sun.

652
00:38:16 --> 00:38:18
SAT scores.
 

653
00:38:18 --> 00:38:20
Religion and all
sorts of stuff.

654
00:38:20 --> 00:38:23
And, scatter plot the data.
 

655
00:38:23 --> 00:38:30
What you find is that these
freshman pairing were

656
00:38:30 --> 00:38:32
not highly correlated.
 

657
00:38:32 --> 00:38:35
They weren't random, like
if you randomized in the

658
00:38:35 --> 00:38:36
computer match thing.
 

659
00:38:36 --> 00:38:45
There are factors
that did correlate.

660
00:38:45 --> 00:38:48
But, they weren't
particularly striking.

661
00:38:48 --> 00:38:52
But now, let's ask, so we've
got some cloud of data points

662
00:38:52 --> 00:38:56
again, with perhaps some
positive correlation to it.

663
00:38:56 --> 00:39:01
Let's come back two years
later, and ask, who

664
00:39:01 --> 00:39:03
is still together?
 

665
00:39:03 --> 00:39:06
And, what you find, two years
later, I don't remember how

666
00:39:06 --> 00:39:09
many were still together, but
of the ones who are still

667
00:39:09 --> 00:39:15
together, now essentially all
of the variables correlated.

668
00:39:15 --> 00:39:23
So, you could pick anything you
liked, SAT scores, religion,

669
00:39:23 --> 00:39:28
looks, socio-economic status,
and now it's not that it all

670
00:39:28 --> 00:39:32
lay on the line of unit slope,
it's not that somehow you went

671
00:39:32 --> 00:39:35
through State University of
Minnesota or something like

672
00:39:35 --> 00:39:40
that, and you found the one
person who had exactly the

673
00:39:40 --> 00:39:42
same SAT scores as you.
 

674
00:39:42 --> 00:39:46
And, their parents made exactly
the same amount of money.

675
00:39:46 --> 00:39:51
And you were exactly
the same height.

676
00:39:51 --> 00:39:52
No.
 

677
00:39:52 --> 00:39:55
What you've got is it's still a
big cloud of data points, but

678
00:39:55 --> 00:39:59
now, all the variables are
positively correlated.

679
00:39:59 --> 00:40:02
 
 

680
00:40:02 --> 00:40:06
Well, what's the cliche here?
 

681
00:40:06 --> 00:40:06
I'll give you a hint.
 

682
00:40:06 --> 00:40:09
 
 

683
00:40:09 --> 00:40:10
Thank you.
 

684
00:40:10 --> 00:40:14
Birds of a feather flock
together would be the sort of

685
00:40:14 --> 00:40:17
punch line of this experiment.
 

686
00:40:17 --> 00:40:20
There may have been a degree of
noise in the initial

687
00:40:20 --> 00:40:23
assortment, but the
relationships that lasted where

688
00:40:23 --> 00:40:31
the relationships where the
birds of a feather were

689
00:40:31 --> 00:40:31
flocking together.
 

690
00:40:31 --> 00:40:36
And that hand is going
to say, but, Thank you.

691
00:40:36 --> 00:40:40
Next thing on the handouts
says the other cliche

692
00:40:40 --> 00:40:43
is opposites attract.
 

693
00:40:43 --> 00:40:49
Now the thing about cliches is
that cliches don't get to be

694
00:40:49 --> 00:40:52
cliches unless there is an
element of truth in

695
00:40:52 --> 00:40:53
there somewhere.
 

696
00:40:53 --> 00:40:58
In the element of social
exchange theory, truth in

697
00:40:58 --> 00:41:02
opposites attract is that
opposites attract when they

698
00:41:02 --> 00:41:05
increase each other's profits.
 

699
00:41:05 --> 00:41:09
So, this sense in which
opposites attract is

700
00:41:09 --> 00:41:12
she talks, he listens.
 

701
00:41:12 --> 00:41:15
From the outside, it may
look like, my goodness,

702
00:41:15 --> 00:41:16
he talks all the time.
 

703
00:41:16 --> 00:41:18
She talks all the time.
 

704
00:41:18 --> 00:41:21
And, she never says a word.
 

705
00:41:21 --> 00:41:23
How can they how can
they live together?

706
00:41:23 --> 00:41:25
Well, the answer is its great
deal easier probably, to live

707
00:41:25 --> 00:41:30
together that way, then if
they both talk all the time.

708
00:41:30 --> 00:41:33
Those two birds of a feather
are going to drive each

709
00:41:33 --> 00:41:35
other sort of nuts.
 

710
00:41:35 --> 00:41:38
And, he's a great cook.
 

711
00:41:38 --> 00:41:40
She's a great eater.
 

712
00:41:40 --> 00:41:42
 
 

713
00:41:42 --> 00:41:48
Or, at least an appreciative
audience or something.

714
00:41:48 --> 00:41:51
That is the sense in
which opposites attract.

715
00:41:51 --> 00:41:57
 
 

716
00:41:57 --> 00:42:03
You can ask yourself about
roommate issues, where there's

717
00:42:03 --> 00:42:07
a certain amount of random
assortment of people.

718
00:42:07 --> 00:42:11
I gather here, you pick your
roommate on the basis of

719
00:42:11 --> 00:42:14
sketchy information
when you arrive.

720
00:42:14 --> 00:42:18
Is that the current scheme?
 

721
00:42:18 --> 00:42:21
So, it's a sort of a
courtship on the basis

722
00:42:21 --> 00:42:23
of limited information.
 

723
00:42:23 --> 00:42:27
Anyway, when you discover that
even though you were correlated

724
00:42:27 --> 00:42:29
on a bunch of variables, it
turns out that there are few

725
00:42:29 --> 00:42:31
variables that really matter.
 

726
00:42:31 --> 00:42:34
Like person A is a slob.
 

727
00:42:34 --> 00:42:36
Person B is a neatness freak.
 

728
00:42:36 --> 00:42:39
That ain't an opposites
attract kind of situation.

729
00:42:39 --> 00:42:41
There's a couple of head
shaking around here,

730
00:42:41 --> 00:42:45
saying I know that.
 

731
00:42:45 --> 00:42:50
Or, in our lab, she wants
it to be 80 degrees.

732
00:42:50 --> 00:42:52
I wanted to be
about 50 degrees.

733
00:42:52 --> 00:42:54
That ain't opposites attract.
 

734
00:42:54 --> 00:42:55
But there we have it.
 

735
00:42:55 --> 00:42:59
This is also not reciprocal,
asymmetrical, relationship,

736
00:42:59 --> 00:43:02
where I'm the boss, and I get
to play with the thermostat

737
00:43:02 --> 00:43:06
first, unless Kristen gets in
first, in which case, it's

738
00:43:06 --> 00:43:12
tropical season in the lab.
 

739
00:43:12 --> 00:43:14
Anyway, the problem is she
got numbers on her side.

740
00:43:14 --> 00:43:16
The other people in the
lab, seem to like it hot.

741
00:43:16 --> 00:43:18
I don't understand them.
 

742
00:43:18 --> 00:43:27
Anyway opposites attract, in
these romantic relationships

743
00:43:27 --> 00:43:32
when they increase
each other's profits.

744
00:43:32 --> 00:43:39
That's a useful, complication
to keep in mind.

745
00:43:39 --> 00:43:43
It's not just a matter of we
all rate each other on all

746
00:43:43 --> 00:43:47
these scales, and then pick the
closest thing to exactly us.

747
00:43:47 --> 00:43:50
That's not what's going on.
 

748
00:43:50 --> 00:43:55
That's going to end up being
one factor, but there's a more

749
00:43:55 --> 00:44:00
general factor of what you're
looking for are relationships

750
00:44:00 --> 00:44:04
that are profitable and roughly
equally profitable for both

751
00:44:04 --> 00:44:08
sides in the relationship.
 

752
00:44:08 --> 00:44:18
 
 

753
00:44:18 --> 00:44:18
Let's see.
 

754
00:44:18 --> 00:44:23
I think I couched the next
bits as the problem set.

755
00:44:23 --> 00:44:26
The social exchange
problems set.

756
00:44:26 --> 00:44:31
Let's let's turn to that after
taking a brief break here.

757
00:44:31 --> 00:47:44
 
 

758
00:47:44 --> 00:47:45
Let me say a quick word.
 

759
00:47:45 --> 00:47:48
I got a couple of questions
about the syllabus.

760
00:47:48 --> 00:47:49
Let me say quick
word about this.

761
00:47:49 --> 00:47:52
 
 

762
00:47:52 --> 00:47:55
The chapters that are assigned
at the moment for instance

763
00:47:55 --> 00:47:58
are the chapters on
social psychology.

764
00:47:58 --> 00:48:02
Like any topic here, huge area.
 

765
00:48:02 --> 00:48:04
I'm taking a love and
romance cut through it.

766
00:48:04 --> 00:48:08
So I think, for instance,
you'll find stuff about social

767
00:48:08 --> 00:48:13
exchange theory in the book,
but not particularly

768
00:48:13 --> 00:48:15
necessarily in this sort of
straight love and

769
00:48:15 --> 00:48:17
romance track.
 

770
00:48:17 --> 00:48:25
I'm assigning chapters that's
are, it'll be less obvious that

771
00:48:25 --> 00:48:29
the book and I are marching in
lock step then it might

772
00:48:29 --> 00:48:31
have been for the memory
chapter, or something.

773
00:48:31 --> 00:48:34
 
 

774
00:48:34 --> 00:48:37
Somebody pointed out that the
sleep and dreams lecture has

775
00:48:37 --> 00:48:41
associated with that a
chapter that seems to be

776
00:48:41 --> 00:48:42
about mental illness.
 

777
00:48:42 --> 00:48:44
Well that's because sleep
and dreams going to be

778
00:48:44 --> 00:48:47
connected with Freudian
interpretation of dreams.

779
00:48:47 --> 00:48:51
It's all part of talking about
Freud and psychoanalysis, so

780
00:48:51 --> 00:48:56
that's the most relevant
chapter at the moment.

781
00:48:56 --> 00:48:58
It'll be less true for this
half the course then for the

782
00:48:58 --> 00:49:03
first half of course, that
there's an absolute clear match

783
00:49:03 --> 00:49:07
between the set of topics in
lecture one day and the

784
00:49:07 --> 00:49:10
set of topics in the
accompanying chapter.

785
00:49:10 --> 00:49:12
They will talk to each other,
but they will not match up

786
00:49:12 --> 00:49:17
quite as tightly as they might
have earlier in the course.

787
00:49:17 --> 00:49:21
 
 

788
00:49:21 --> 00:49:25
Let's do a few social
exchange sort of problems.

789
00:49:25 --> 00:49:28
One of these is the problem
of bad relationships.

790
00:49:28 --> 00:49:32
One of the mysteries on the
face of it is why would

791
00:49:32 --> 00:49:40
somebody stay in a relationship
that's running a deficit.

792
00:49:40 --> 00:49:44
Perhaps the clearest example of
this is why would a woman stay

793
00:49:44 --> 00:49:46
in an abusive relationship?
 

794
00:49:46 --> 00:49:51
I pick a woman because while
there are males who are abused

795
00:49:51 --> 00:49:54
in heterosexual relations, and
other males who are abused in

796
00:49:54 --> 00:50:00
homosexual relations, the
bulk of abused partners in

797
00:50:00 --> 00:50:01
relationships are women.
 

798
00:50:01 --> 00:50:05
But, why would anybody stay
in an abusive relationship?

799
00:50:05 --> 00:50:08
Why would a woman stay in
an abusive relationship?

800
00:50:08 --> 00:50:11
That's where this third
tenant of social exchange

801
00:50:11 --> 00:50:13
theory comes in.
 

802
00:50:13 --> 00:50:17
The social exchange answer to
the question is you would stay

803
00:50:17 --> 00:50:20
in a bad relationship
if you couldn't see a

804
00:50:20 --> 00:50:22
better alternative.
 

805
00:50:22 --> 00:50:25
And, so, if you imagine a
hypothetical situation of

806
00:50:25 --> 00:50:29
somebody in an abusive
relationship, maybe she's got a

807
00:50:29 --> 00:50:33
couple of kids, and while she
was raising these kids,

808
00:50:33 --> 00:50:35
she's not working.
 

809
00:50:35 --> 00:50:37
So, what's she going to do?
 

810
00:50:37 --> 00:50:41
You know, if she leaves, what's
she going to do with the kids?

811
00:50:41 --> 00:50:42
How's she going
to feed herself.

812
00:50:42 --> 00:50:44
Et cetera.
 

813
00:50:44 --> 00:50:49
Part of the logic of things
like shelters for abused women

814
00:50:49 --> 00:50:56
is a logic of giving an
alternative that looks better

815
00:50:56 --> 00:50:57
then the state you're in now.
 

816
00:50:57 --> 00:51:03
There's nobody saying that
living in a shelter for abused

817
00:51:03 --> 00:51:06
women is a relationship that's
running a great big

818
00:51:06 --> 00:51:07
positive score.
 

819
00:51:07 --> 00:51:11
But if it's running less of a
negative then the relationship

820
00:51:11 --> 00:51:18
that you in, you might get out
of the abusive relationship.

821
00:51:18 --> 00:51:21
 
 

822
00:51:21 --> 00:51:26
That's part of what drives this
notion that it's important, not

823
00:51:26 --> 00:51:33
just what the sign of your
profit- loss statement is, but

824
00:51:33 --> 00:51:36
what the alternatives that
you perceive are now.

825
00:51:36 --> 00:51:41
And the you perceive part is
important here too, because we

826
00:51:41 --> 00:51:45
all know people who are in
relationships where you from

827
00:51:45 --> 00:51:48
the outside look at this
relationship and you think

828
00:51:48 --> 00:51:51
you know that's not
a good relationship.

829
00:51:51 --> 00:51:52
Why is he in that?
 

830
00:51:52 --> 00:51:54
Why is she in that?
 

831
00:51:54 --> 00:52:00
But, if they see it as the best
current possibility, that

832
00:52:00 --> 00:52:05
in social exchange theory,
will be relatively stable.

833
00:52:05 --> 00:52:08
Now, these next two are sort
of related to each other.

834
00:52:08 --> 00:52:13
Who has power in a
relationship, and who works

835
00:52:13 --> 00:52:15
harder in a relationship.
 

836
00:52:15 --> 00:52:18
In a sense, they are sort of
reciprocal of each other.

837
00:52:18 --> 00:52:18
Who works harder?
 

838
00:52:18 --> 00:52:21
The person with less power.
 

839
00:52:21 --> 00:52:24
Let's do this
through a cartoon.

840
00:52:24 --> 00:52:27
 
 

841
00:52:27 --> 00:52:33
It's another sort of cliched
relationship out there.

842
00:52:33 --> 00:52:37
Young, beautiful woman.
 

843
00:52:37 --> 00:52:41
And old, less- than-
beautiful guy.

844
00:52:41 --> 00:52:47
What's the other part of the
description of the guy.

845
00:52:47 --> 00:52:48
Rich.
 

846
00:52:48 --> 00:52:49
Why?
 

847
00:52:49 --> 00:52:53
 
 

848
00:52:53 --> 00:52:56
We need a hand here.
 

849
00:52:56 --> 00:52:58
Nobody's got a clue.
 

850
00:52:58 --> 00:53:01
 
 

851
00:53:01 --> 00:53:04
AUDIENCE: That gives him a
way in which he doesn't have

852
00:53:04 --> 00:53:07
to work all the time --
 

853
00:53:07 --> 00:53:12
PROFESSOR: Well this perception
that she's bringing more to the

854
00:53:12 --> 00:53:16
relationship than he is, right?
 

855
00:53:16 --> 00:53:17
She, in a sense, has power.
 

856
00:53:17 --> 00:53:21
If she looks around and
what are my alternatives?

857
00:53:21 --> 00:53:25
Here I am.
 

858
00:53:25 --> 00:53:27
Beautiful.
 

859
00:53:27 --> 00:53:30
I'm hanging out here.
 

860
00:53:30 --> 00:53:34
Gee, I ought to be able, if
I look at my alternatives,

861
00:53:34 --> 00:53:36
to move here.
 

862
00:53:36 --> 00:53:41
So I have a certain power
to move if I'm this

863
00:53:41 --> 00:53:44
young beautiful female
person, hypothetically.

864
00:53:44 --> 00:53:48
And, what he's got to do, the
reason he's gotta work hard

865
00:53:48 --> 00:53:51
is to prevent that movement.
 

866
00:53:51 --> 00:53:53
Well, how do you
prevent that movement?

867
00:53:53 --> 00:53:58
One way to do it is to increase
-- well actually, I suppose not

868
00:53:58 --> 00:54:00
to prevent that movement --
it's to make that movement

869
00:54:00 --> 00:54:04
within the relationship
that you're in now.

870
00:54:04 --> 00:54:10
If she's a 10, and he's a 1 or
2 or something, he's gotta

871
00:54:10 --> 00:54:12
make himself into a 10.
 

872
00:54:12 --> 00:54:13
How's he make
himself into a ten?

873
00:54:13 --> 00:54:16
He can't make himself young, he
can't make himself beautiful.

874
00:54:16 --> 00:54:20
What he's gotta do is in the
cliche version, shower her with

875
00:54:20 --> 00:54:26
diamonds and furs, or something
like that, increasing the

876
00:54:26 --> 00:54:29
benefits that she's getting in
this relationship, so that

877
00:54:29 --> 00:54:33
other relationships don't
look more attractive.

878
00:54:33 --> 00:54:38
So, the basic notion is that if
you're bringing less apparent

879
00:54:38 --> 00:54:43
stuff to the relationship, your
partner is sitting there

880
00:54:43 --> 00:54:47
saying, I could do better,
at least hypothetically.

881
00:54:47 --> 00:54:49
And you're sitting there
saying, if I don't want him or

882
00:54:49 --> 00:54:54
her to go elsewhere, I've gotta
to be more loving, or I've

883
00:54:54 --> 00:55:00
gotta cook better, or I've
gotta do something here.

884
00:55:00 --> 00:55:04
So I'm the one who's
got to work hard.

885
00:55:04 --> 00:55:10
And, the other is the one
with the power there.

886
00:55:10 --> 00:55:18
Now, are romantic relationships
really just this crass

887
00:55:18 --> 00:55:21
economic kind of thing?
 

888
00:55:21 --> 00:55:22
Sounds pretty grim.
 

889
00:55:22 --> 00:55:28
Well, there are important
differences between economic

890
00:55:28 --> 00:55:30
exchange and social exchange.
 

891
00:55:30 --> 00:55:33
One of them we've already
pointed to, which is the fact

892
00:55:33 --> 00:55:36
that the economic costs and
benefits are typically

893
00:55:36 --> 00:55:42
much more calculate-able
than the social ones.

894
00:55:42 --> 00:55:46
That's the dinner minus
two insults problem.

895
00:55:46 --> 00:55:52
The other one that I point out
here, is that the rules of

896
00:55:52 --> 00:55:55
negotiation, what's permissible
as negotiation in economic

897
00:55:55 --> 00:56:03
exchange, is considered
desperately gauche, not

898
00:56:03 --> 00:56:09
done in social relations.
 

899
00:56:09 --> 00:56:14
You just wouldn't have a
conversation that says you can

900
00:56:14 --> 00:56:20
come up to my at room later
if you take me to dinner.

901
00:56:20 --> 00:56:20
OK.
 

902
00:56:20 --> 00:56:22
What kind to dinner
do you want?

903
00:56:22 --> 00:56:26
Well, you gotta take me to
a four star restaurant.

904
00:56:26 --> 00:56:26
No way.
 

905
00:56:26 --> 00:56:29
We'll go to Burger King.
 

906
00:56:29 --> 00:56:31
No.
 

907
00:56:31 --> 00:56:34
How about three
stars, three stars.

908
00:56:34 --> 00:56:37
All right, how about the
two star Thai place

909
00:56:37 --> 00:56:38
down the street?
 

910
00:56:38 --> 00:56:38
Oh.
 

911
00:56:38 --> 00:56:39
OK.
 

912
00:56:39 --> 00:56:42
It's a deal but you can only
come up for 20 minutes.

913
00:56:42 --> 00:56:45
 
 

914
00:56:45 --> 00:56:54
That sort of haggling in
strictly economic terms is

915
00:56:54 --> 00:57:03
not considered mainstream
romance mostly.

916
00:57:03 --> 00:57:09
It's also not really mainstream
US economics haggling

917
00:57:09 --> 00:57:10
these days, either.
 

918
00:57:10 --> 00:57:15
If you go to Target and want to
argue about the price of a

919
00:57:15 --> 00:57:17
toaster oven or something,
they're not actually going

920
00:57:17 --> 00:57:19
to be that interested.
 

921
00:57:19 --> 00:57:25
But, in those places in the
economic sphere, where haggling

922
00:57:25 --> 00:57:34
is still permissible, a
talented haggler, a talented

923
00:57:34 --> 00:57:40
negotiator will work
hard to be your friend.

924
00:57:40 --> 00:57:41
Why?
 

925
00:57:41 --> 00:57:44
Because the clearest example
that I know of in American

926
00:57:44 --> 00:57:47
economic life is
car dealerships.

927
00:57:47 --> 00:57:48
Go to a car dealership.
 

928
00:57:48 --> 00:57:49
You will do this
one of these days.

929
00:57:49 --> 00:57:51
Go to a car dealership.
 

930
00:57:51 --> 00:57:55
The guy who comes out --
typically a guy-- who comes out

931
00:57:55 --> 00:57:58
to sell you a car is going
to be your best buddy

932
00:57:58 --> 00:57:59
almost instantaneously.
 

933
00:57:59 --> 00:58:02
 
 

934
00:58:02 --> 00:58:03
Very nice, friendly guy.
 

935
00:58:03 --> 00:58:04
Why?
 

936
00:58:04 --> 00:58:06
Well, maybe he's a very
nice, friendly guy.

937
00:58:06 --> 00:58:08
We shouldn't disparaged
that possibility.

938
00:58:08 --> 00:58:13
But, the other reason is, that
if you behave to him as though

939
00:58:13 --> 00:58:18
you are in a social exchange,
while he knows perfectly well,

940
00:58:18 --> 00:58:21
that what you are doing is an
economic exchange, he's

941
00:58:21 --> 00:58:23
going to make money.
 

942
00:58:23 --> 00:58:25
Because you are disabled.
 

943
00:58:25 --> 00:58:28
You cannot argue with your
friend about money in the way

944
00:58:28 --> 00:58:35
you can argue with somebody in
a strictly economic

945
00:58:35 --> 00:58:36
market place.
 

946
00:58:36 --> 00:58:39
So he's going to
be your friend.

947
00:58:39 --> 00:58:43
You're going to come to a nice
friendly agreement, and then,

948
00:58:43 --> 00:58:46
it turns out that after you
have made this deal,

949
00:58:46 --> 00:58:48
that's not enough.
 

950
00:58:48 --> 00:58:51
You shake hands on that, that's
not quite enough because then

951
00:58:51 --> 00:58:53
he's gotta go talk to
his manager about it.

952
00:58:53 --> 00:58:57
He's such a good friend of
yours, that he may have gone a

953
00:58:57 --> 00:59:00
little too far, he worried.
 

954
00:59:00 --> 00:59:02
So, he's gotta go
talk to the manager.

955
00:59:02 --> 00:59:05
And the manager is
not your friend.

956
00:59:05 --> 00:59:08
So, he's gotta go and talk to
the -- but he's your friend, so

957
00:59:08 --> 00:59:11
he'll go and fight it out with
the manager -- you're

958
00:59:11 --> 00:59:14
never invited to this
discussion, by the way.

959
00:59:14 --> 00:59:19
He goes back to talk
to the bad manager.

960
00:59:19 --> 00:59:21
And I think what they actually
do is, they chortle a little

961
00:59:21 --> 00:59:26
bit about their kids, and the
Red Sox, and stuff like that.

962
00:59:26 --> 00:59:31
And then your friend comes
back, with a sad face, and

963
00:59:31 --> 00:59:34
says, my mean, nasty, evil
manager, not quite those

964
00:59:34 --> 00:59:36
terms, won't go for it.
 

965
00:59:36 --> 00:59:40
We can't just can't do this.
 

966
00:59:40 --> 00:59:44
You and I, we could do this,
with just an extra say,

967
00:59:44 --> 00:59:47
$500 of your money.
 

968
00:59:47 --> 00:59:55
And, because we're friends,
you put up the $500.

969
00:59:55 --> 00:59:58
I think, but, I don't know
this, but I think, the car

970
00:59:58 --> 01:00:01
dealers are explicitly -- they
know about social psychology.

971
01:00:01 --> 01:00:08
They are instructed that this
is a useful way to negotiate.

972
01:00:08 --> 01:00:13
By being your friend, by moving
the discussion from an economic

973
01:00:13 --> 01:00:17
exchange to a social exchange,
because of the differences in

974
01:00:17 --> 01:00:21
those sorts of interactions,
that can be exploited in a way

975
01:00:21 --> 01:00:26
that makes money the
for the car dealer.

976
01:00:26 --> 01:00:29
 
 

977
01:00:29 --> 01:00:33
The most beautiful example of
this, in my own personal

978
01:00:33 --> 01:00:37
experience, was not at a car
dealership, but was in the city

979
01:00:37 --> 01:00:43
of Marrakesh in Morocco where
everything is negotiable.

980
01:00:43 --> 01:00:47
A cup of water; the
price is negotiable.

981
01:00:47 --> 01:00:48
But anyway, a lot
of haggling there.

982
01:00:48 --> 01:00:53
And, so I was there for a
conference, and we were taken

983
01:00:53 --> 01:00:58
off as a group, for a tour of
the old market, which is great.

984
01:00:58 --> 01:00:59
You should all go
there sometime.

985
01:00:59 --> 01:01:02
We went to a rug merchant.
 

986
01:01:02 --> 01:01:04
This was early in my career.
 

987
01:01:04 --> 01:01:06
I didn't have no money.
 

988
01:01:06 --> 01:01:07
So, I'm not buying any rugs.
 

989
01:01:07 --> 01:01:12
Because to buy rugs, it's
good to have money.

990
01:01:12 --> 01:01:15
So, I'm sitting there drinking
buckets of mint tea, which is

991
01:01:15 --> 01:01:18
what you get in Morocco
while other people are

992
01:01:18 --> 01:01:19
negotiating for rugs.
 

993
01:01:19 --> 01:01:20
It's kind of fun to watch.
 

994
01:01:20 --> 01:01:24
But at some point, some
guy decides he's going

995
01:01:24 --> 01:01:26
to sell me a rug.
 

996
01:01:26 --> 01:01:31
And, he's going to show me
the special rugs out back.

997
01:01:31 --> 01:01:35
So, we're going out back, we're
up the back stairs, and he

998
01:01:35 --> 01:01:39
asked me, are you Jewish?
 

999
01:01:39 --> 01:01:41
My mother brought me
up to be honest.

1000
01:01:41 --> 01:01:43
Yes, I'm Jewish.
 

1001
01:01:43 --> 01:01:45
The next thing you know,
we're hugging and kissing,

1002
01:01:45 --> 01:01:47
because he's Jewish too.
 

1003
01:01:47 --> 01:01:49
Last week, I think
he was a Methodist.

1004
01:01:49 --> 01:01:57
But, in any case, so now
we're friends, of course.

1005
01:01:57 --> 01:01:59
Not friends, I mean, we're
practically blood relations.

1006
01:01:59 --> 01:02:05
He shows me only rugs
woven by Jewish virgins.

1007
01:02:05 --> 01:02:08
 
 

1008
01:02:08 --> 01:02:10
How do you know
this is the case?

1009
01:02:10 --> 01:02:12
Well, they've got this six
pointed star on them,

1010
01:02:12 --> 01:02:13
as he points out.
 

1011
01:02:13 --> 01:02:15
Well, it turns out that every
rug in Morocco seems to have

1012
01:02:15 --> 01:02:16
six pointed stars on it.
 

1013
01:02:16 --> 01:02:17
But never mind.
 

1014
01:02:17 --> 01:02:20
Plus, the guy has also taking
his intro psych class, and he

1015
01:02:20 --> 01:02:23
knows about forced choice
psycho physics, rather than

1016
01:02:23 --> 01:02:26
saying do you like this rug,
what he's doing is holding up

1017
01:02:26 --> 01:02:30
two rugs, and saying which
one do you like better?

1018
01:02:30 --> 01:02:32
So, you gotta give
an answer, right?

1019
01:02:32 --> 01:02:33
I like that one better.
 

1020
01:02:33 --> 01:02:33
OK.
 

1021
01:02:33 --> 01:02:34
Goes in the stack.
 

1022
01:02:34 --> 01:02:37
By the time we're playing this
game a little while, not only

1023
01:02:37 --> 01:02:39
does he have the theory
that I'm buying a rug, I'm

1024
01:02:39 --> 01:02:42
buying a stack of rugs.
 

1025
01:02:42 --> 01:02:44
But I still don't
have any money.

1026
01:02:44 --> 01:02:47
And, so I remember what
it said in guide book.

1027
01:02:47 --> 01:02:53
In the guide book, it said go
to the state store, because at

1028
01:02:53 --> 01:02:56
the state store, they only
mark up, by fifty percent.

1029
01:02:56 --> 01:03:00
And, so you the price you're
looking for is to negotiate

1030
01:03:00 --> 01:03:02
down by about fifty percent,
and then everybody

1031
01:03:02 --> 01:03:04
will be happy.
 

1032
01:03:04 --> 01:03:07
So, I remember this, and we're
in the state rug store, I

1033
01:03:07 --> 01:03:08
know what I'm going to do.
 

1034
01:03:08 --> 01:03:12
I'll offer this guy 10%
of his asking price.

1035
01:03:12 --> 01:03:15
He'll be so offended,
that he throws me out.

1036
01:03:15 --> 01:03:16
All right.
 

1037
01:03:16 --> 01:03:17
So I offer him 10%.
 

1038
01:03:17 --> 01:03:20
And, he accepts.
 

1039
01:03:20 --> 01:03:26
Now, you want to violate both
the borders of social and

1040
01:03:26 --> 01:03:31
economic exchange, backing
off your own offer, is

1041
01:03:31 --> 01:03:32
really, really rude.
 

1042
01:03:32 --> 01:03:34
And, at that point,
he threw me out.

1043
01:03:34 --> 01:03:35
Which is too bad.
 

1044
01:03:35 --> 01:03:37
I probably should just
maxed out the credit card.

1045
01:03:37 --> 01:03:39
I think I probably had a pretty
good deal at that point.

1046
01:03:39 --> 01:03:44
But, in any case, it was
another beautiful example of

1047
01:03:44 --> 01:03:50
trying to use the rules of
social exchange, not to mention

1048
01:03:50 --> 01:03:53
half a dozen other bits
of applied psychology, to

1049
01:03:53 --> 01:03:57
close and economic deal.
 

1050
01:03:57 --> 01:04:00
I think all my friends who came
back saying I got him down to

1051
01:04:00 --> 01:04:03
only 50% of the price probably
made a bunch of people

1052
01:04:03 --> 01:04:07
really, really happy.
 

1053
01:04:07 --> 01:04:15
The last thing I want to
mention here, is one last

1054
01:04:15 --> 01:04:17
problem in social exchange.
 

1055
01:04:17 --> 01:04:22
That's the problem of vastly
unequal and inevitably

1056
01:04:22 --> 01:04:24
unequal relationships.
 

1057
01:04:24 --> 01:04:27
There are relationships out
there that are simply not

1058
01:04:27 --> 01:04:30
going to be reciprocal.
 

1059
01:04:30 --> 01:04:36
One of the clear examples, are
parent- child relationships.

1060
01:04:36 --> 01:04:39
Like even if you're thinking
strict economic terms,

1061
01:04:39 --> 01:04:43
how much money have your
parents put into you?

1062
01:04:43 --> 01:04:48
How much money have you
put into your parents?

1063
01:04:48 --> 01:04:50
And it doesn't get any better
by the time you're my age.

1064
01:04:50 --> 01:04:54
 
 

1065
01:04:54 --> 01:05:00
It's inevitably a relationship
that is going to be unequal,

1066
01:05:00 --> 01:05:03
and that produces, as you may
have noticed at various stages

1067
01:05:03 --> 01:05:07
in your life, a sense of
discomfort about

1068
01:05:07 --> 01:05:09
that inequality.
 

1069
01:05:09 --> 01:05:10
How do you deal with it?
 

1070
01:05:10 --> 01:05:12
There are lots of ways
to deal with it.

1071
01:05:12 --> 01:05:16
And social exchange theory is
not capable of predicting which

1072
01:05:16 --> 01:05:18
one to chose at this point.
 

1073
01:05:18 --> 01:05:23
But you know, for example, a
very typical early adolescence

1074
01:05:23 --> 01:05:26
one is the assertion to one's
parents, you've never

1075
01:05:26 --> 01:05:29
did nothing for me.
 

1076
01:05:29 --> 01:05:38
No rational 13 year old in
the bits of some fight, you

1077
01:05:38 --> 01:05:39
never did nothing for me.
 

1078
01:05:39 --> 01:05:40
OK.
 

1079
01:05:40 --> 01:05:43
Where did the food come from?
 

1080
01:05:43 --> 01:05:45
Well, yeah, you did that, but.
 

1081
01:05:45 --> 01:05:48
It's not a logical statement,
but it's a statement that

1082
01:05:48 --> 01:05:51
attempts to balance the
accounts in some fashion.

1083
01:05:51 --> 01:05:53
It's a way of dealing with
this feeling that the

1084
01:05:53 --> 01:05:58
relationship is unequal.
 

1085
01:05:58 --> 01:06:06
There are the parental -- how
many how many of you have

1086
01:06:06 --> 01:06:10
heard, at some point, the line
from your parents that one day,

1087
01:06:10 --> 01:06:13
you should have a
child like you?

1088
01:06:13 --> 01:06:18
Or words to that effect?
 

1089
01:06:18 --> 01:06:22
That's another sense in
which this can be balanced.

1090
01:06:22 --> 01:06:26
The parental notion that the
accounts will be balanced

1091
01:06:26 --> 01:06:32
when your children do unto
you as you have done.

1092
01:06:32 --> 01:06:33
And, guess what?
 

1093
01:06:33 --> 01:06:35
Your parents are right.
 

1094
01:06:35 --> 01:06:42
And, can you remember thinking,
at some point, that you're

1095
01:06:42 --> 01:06:45
never-- should you ever have
children, --you're never going

1096
01:06:45 --> 01:06:49
to say anything as stupid,
to your own children.

1097
01:06:49 --> 01:06:53
Oh one perfectly lovely
concrete example, why

1098
01:06:53 --> 01:06:55
do I have to do this?
 

1099
01:06:55 --> 01:06:59
The parental answer to which
is, because I said so.

1100
01:06:59 --> 01:07:03
Have you heard the little voice
in your head promising that you

1101
01:07:03 --> 01:07:07
will never say anything that
lame to your own kids.

1102
01:07:07 --> 01:07:10
Guess what?
 

1103
01:07:10 --> 01:07:14
It's very grim.
 

1104
01:07:14 --> 01:07:16
And, you can just sit there
listening to yourself as you

1105
01:07:16 --> 01:07:19
say it, and say, oh god,
I said I'd never do that.

1106
01:07:19 --> 01:07:22
All right.
 

1107
01:07:22 --> 01:07:25
Beyond that realm, what
do you do about these

1108
01:07:25 --> 01:07:27
unequal relationships?
 

1109
01:07:27 --> 01:07:29
Last thought, there's an
interesting thought that comes

1110
01:07:29 --> 01:07:33
out of Roger Brown's book,
Social Psychology, a

1111
01:07:33 --> 01:07:37
beautifully written textbook
on social psychology.

1112
01:07:37 --> 01:07:41
He talks about the central
exchanged in social exchange.

1113
01:07:41 --> 01:07:47
The argument is that not all of
the interactions needs to be

1114
01:07:47 --> 01:07:52
between you and the person with
whom you were having a

1115
01:07:52 --> 01:07:55
relationship at this
particular moment.

1116
01:07:55 --> 01:07:58
There can be a bank.
 

1117
01:07:58 --> 01:08:01
Here's the experimental
evidence.

1118
01:08:01 --> 01:08:02
A bit of experimental
evidence; last little

1119
01:08:02 --> 01:08:04
two by two on there.
 

1120
01:08:04 --> 01:08:07
And, in my new free nickel
will do just fine.

1121
01:08:07 --> 01:08:11
It's becoming at slightly
archaic example, because most

1122
01:08:11 --> 01:08:14
people don't use phone booths
anymore, but, you still know

1123
01:08:14 --> 01:08:16
what a phone booth is, right?
 

1124
01:08:16 --> 01:08:20
You go into a phone booth, the
first thing you do, before

1125
01:08:20 --> 01:08:25
dialing the number or
anything is to check what?

1126
01:08:25 --> 01:08:27
Not if you have a quarter.
 

1127
01:08:27 --> 01:08:29
Is there a quarter
in the change slot.

1128
01:08:29 --> 01:08:30
Right?
 

1129
01:08:30 --> 01:08:33
Everybody goes and check
that little change slot.

1130
01:08:33 --> 01:08:37
And, oh, I just
changed her life.

1131
01:08:37 --> 01:08:38
Check next time.
 

1132
01:08:38 --> 01:08:39
Sometimes there's
a quarter there.

1133
01:08:39 --> 01:08:40
It's really good.
 

1134
01:08:40 --> 01:08:45
Anyway, we can use
this two by two here.

1135
01:08:45 --> 01:08:54
What this experiment did
was to spike phone booths.

1136
01:08:54 --> 01:08:56
They put quarters in
the phone booth.

1137
01:08:56 --> 01:08:59
And, so you go into the
phone booth, and some

1138
01:08:59 --> 01:09:03
people got a coin.
 

1139
01:09:03 --> 01:09:09
And some people
didn't get a coin.

1140
01:09:09 --> 01:09:12
This is not a big change in
your life, but it is an

1141
01:09:12 --> 01:09:14
unreciprecated good.
 

1142
01:09:14 --> 01:09:18
You're getting this good, but
you can't say, I gotta go

1143
01:09:18 --> 01:09:21
do something to the guy
who gave me a quarter.

1144
01:09:21 --> 01:09:21
Can't work.
 

1145
01:09:21 --> 01:09:24
So, here's what happens next.
 

1146
01:09:24 --> 01:09:25
You come out of the phone
booth, having made

1147
01:09:25 --> 01:09:27
your phone call.
 

1148
01:09:27 --> 01:09:31
And, as you're walking out a
woman comes by and she trips.

1149
01:09:31 --> 01:09:33
And her stuff goes
all over the place.

1150
01:09:33 --> 01:09:35
The question is do help her?
 

1151
01:09:35 --> 01:09:38
 
 

1152
01:09:38 --> 01:09:43
And, the data are, from this
particular experiment, so

1153
01:09:43 --> 01:09:51
it's help and no help.
 

1154
01:09:51 --> 01:09:54
Of the people who got a
coin in this particular

1155
01:09:54 --> 01:09:57
study, 14 helped.
 

1156
01:09:57 --> 01:09:58
1 didn't.
 

1157
01:09:58 --> 01:10:05
Of the people who didn't get
a coin, so this is the bulk

1158
01:10:05 --> 01:10:09
of the population as a
whole, 2 people helped.

1159
01:10:09 --> 01:10:13
And 24 didn't.
 

1160
01:10:13 --> 01:10:17
So, now that's
very interesting.

1161
01:10:17 --> 01:10:24
That suggests that just getting
that coin produced what Brown

1162
01:10:24 --> 01:10:29
would see as a an effort
to reciprocate to the

1163
01:10:29 --> 01:10:32
world more generally.
 

1164
01:10:32 --> 01:10:35
Now, that's a big effect.
 

1165
01:10:35 --> 01:10:41
Does this mean that we could
make the world a better place

1166
01:10:41 --> 01:10:44
by mailing everybody a quarter?
 

1167
01:10:44 --> 01:10:46
Doesn't sound right.
 

1168
01:10:46 --> 01:10:48
Now the experimental evidence
that it's not right comes from

1169
01:10:48 --> 01:10:50
another version of
this experiment.

1170
01:10:50 --> 01:10:51
You're at home.
 

1171
01:10:51 --> 01:10:56
Somebody rings the doorbell and
says, I'm new in town, I'm

1172
01:10:56 --> 01:10:58
setting up a new company.
 

1173
01:10:58 --> 01:11:00
We're going to sell paper.
 

1174
01:11:00 --> 01:11:04
I wanted you to have
this stationary.

1175
01:11:04 --> 01:11:05
Nice stationary.
 

1176
01:11:05 --> 01:11:06
Thanks.
 

1177
01:11:06 --> 01:11:07
Bye.
 

1178
01:11:07 --> 01:11:11
Shortly thereafter,
you get a phone call.

1179
01:11:11 --> 01:11:16
Somebody on the phone
says, is so and so there?

1180
01:11:16 --> 01:11:17
No, you got the wrong number.
 

1181
01:11:17 --> 01:11:18
Oh no!
 

1182
01:11:18 --> 01:11:21
I'm in a phone booth.
 

1183
01:11:21 --> 01:11:22
I don't have any more money.
 

1184
01:11:22 --> 01:11:26
Could you please call Fred
and tell them I'll be

1185
01:11:26 --> 01:11:27
home late or something.
 

1186
01:11:27 --> 01:11:29
I don't remember what the
exact story is, but it's

1187
01:11:29 --> 01:11:32
a request to do a favor.
 

1188
01:11:32 --> 01:11:39
If you just got the phone call,
no paper involved, only 12% of

1189
01:11:39 --> 01:11:42
people were willing
to do this favor.

1190
01:11:42 --> 01:11:46
If you got the paper, and you
got a phone call five minutes

1191
01:11:46 --> 01:11:51
later, 80% of people complied.
 

1192
01:11:51 --> 01:11:56
But, if you've got the paper,
and, were called 20 minutes

1193
01:11:56 --> 01:12:01
later, it dropped
back down to 12.

1194
01:12:01 --> 01:12:05
So, it produced a little
bump of good feeling.

1195
01:12:05 --> 01:12:08
Now, what we don't know,
because you can't really do the

1196
01:12:08 --> 01:12:11
experiment, is whether this
means that the central exchange

1197
01:12:11 --> 01:12:15
idea is trivial, and is a very
short lived teeny phenomenon,

1198
01:12:15 --> 01:12:19
or if you live a life where
much bigger good things happen

1199
01:12:19 --> 01:12:21
to you, or for that
matter, bad things.

1200
01:12:21 --> 01:12:26
Do you end up with an account
at the central exchange.

1201
01:12:26 --> 01:12:30
If life is good in general, do
you feel a central exchange

1202
01:12:30 --> 01:12:32
obligation to be
good to others?

1203
01:12:32 --> 01:12:36
If life is bad, in general, do
you feel a need to trip people

1204
01:12:36 --> 01:12:39
and watch the folders fly?
 

1205
01:12:39 --> 01:12:41