| Lec # | Topics | Key Dates |
|---|---|---|
1 |
Introduction to Game Theory |
|
2 |
Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty Expected Utility Theory; Risk Aversion |
|
3-5 |
A More Formal Introduction to Games Extensive Forms and Normal Forms Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies Nash Equilibrium Applications of Nash Equilibrium |
|
6-8 |
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection Analysis of Extensive-Form Games Backward Induction Subgame Perfection Applications Bargaining and Negotiations Forward Induction Applications |
Problem Set 1 due on Lecture 6 Problem Set 2 due two days after Lecture 8 |
9 |
Review |
|
10 |
In Class Midterm Exam 1 |
|
11-12 |
Repeated Games and Cooperation |
|
13-14 |
Incomplete Information Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Auctions Applications |
Problem Set 3 due on Lecture 14 |
15-16 |
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information |
Problem Set 4 due on Lecture 16 |
17 |
Review |
|
18 |
In Class Midterm Exam 2 |
|
19-21 |
Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion Applications of Signaling The Principal-Agent Problem Applications; Lemons, Efficiency Wages, Credit-Rationing, Price-Discrimination |
Problem Set 5 due on Lecture 21 |
22-23 |
Global Games |
|
24-25 |
Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics |
Problem Set 6 due on Lecture 25 |
26-27 |
Applications and Review Final Exam |








