|1||Introduction: What is rationality?|
|I. Individual decision theory|
|2-10||Preference, ignorance and risk||Resnik, chapters 1-3|
|Probability – subjective and objective||Jeffrey, chapters 1-5|
|Utility and value|| |
Resnik, chapter 4
Sen, Amartya K. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory." Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977): 317-344. Reprinted as chapter 4 in:
Sen, Amartya K. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982. ISBN: 9780262192149.
|Causal decision theory|| |
Lewis, David. "Causal Decision Theory." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59, no. 1 (March 1981): 5-30.
For those who want to explore causal decision theory in more depth, see Joyce, especially chapters 2-5.
|II. Game theory|
|11-19||The basic framework|| |
Resnik, chapter 5
Notes on games and models (PDF)
|Nash Equilibrium and other solution concepts||Leyton-Brown and Shoham, chapters 1-5|
|Game theory and individual decision theory|
|Coordination games, bargaining and negotiation||Schelling, chapters 4-5|
|III. Theory of collective choice|
|20-26||Defining social value in terms of individual value||Resnik, chapter 6|
|Arrow's theorem, and other impossibility results|| |
Sen, Amartya K. "Rationality and Social Choice." The American Economic Review 85, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-24.
Gibbard, Allan. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result." Econometrica 41, no. 4 (July 1973): 587-601.
|Interpersonal comparisons of utility||Sen, chapter 12|