|LEC #||TOPICS||DESCRIPTIONS||KEY DATES|
|I. Games of Complete Information|
|1||Normal Form Games I||
This session covers dominant strategies, pure strategies, mixed strategies, and Nash equilibrium.
Examples include the prisoners' dilemma, battle of the sexes, matching pennies, and chicken.
|2||Normal Form Games II||
This session covers continuous strategy spaces.
Examples include the duopoly, and spatial electoral competition.
|Problem set 1 due five days after lecture 2|
|3||Normal Form Games III||
This session covers more than two players.
Examples include "truel," oligopoly, and tragedy of the commons.
|Problem set 2 due|
|4||Normal Form Games IV||Examples include rent-seeking, lobbying, and resource allocation.||Problem set 3 due|
|5||Extensive Form Games I||
This session covers backwards induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Examples include the centipede game, the Stackelberg duopoly, and legislative rules.
|Problem set 4 due|
|6||Extensive Form Games II||Examples include 2-player sequential bargaining, and bargaining in legislatures.||Problem set 5 due three days after lecture 6|
|7||Extensive Form Games III||Examples include sophisticated voting and agenda control.||Problem set 6 due|
|8||Repeated Games||Examples include the development of cooperation, and overlapping generations.||Problem set 7 due|
|II. Games of Incomplete Information|
|9||Normal Form Games||This session covers Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Examples include the battle of the sexes again, auctions, and the revelation principle.
|Problem set 8 due|
|10||Extensive Form Games I||This session covers perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Examples include signaling games and nuclear deterrence.
|Problem set 9 due|
|11||Extensive Form Games II||Examples include cheap talk and the informational role of committees.||Problem set 10 due|
|12||Extensive Form Games III||Examples include the reputations.||Problem set 11 due|