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FLORA KLISE: Today, I am going to be giving you
a full run-through of the Singapore-Malaysia water
conflict.
This is something I knew nothing about before the class
but I've really enjoyed learning more about during this process
and applying the things we've learned in the class
this semester.
So, please, ask questions if things are not clear.
I can't promise I have an answer,
but I'm excited to share what I've learned.
So these are the things I'm going to run through today,
basically give you an overview of the case, then dive
into the water resources for both areas
and the key stakeholders, as well
as a brief overview of the agreements,
and then try to spend the bulk of the presentation talking
about the water diplomacy framework
and how I see room for improvement.
So this is a map of the region, just
in case you're not familiar with this part of Southeast Asia.
So Malaysia is much larger than Singapore.
And, for this case, we're only considering
peninsular Malaysia, which is on the left,
and, specifically, Johor, which is the state that
is most southernmost.
And it's hard to tell from this perspective,
but Singapore and Malaysia are separated by a small water
body called the Johor Strait.
And connecting the two countries physically is the Johor
Causeway, or more commonly known as just the Causeway.
So a summary of this case can be summed up
in these couple of bullet points.
So current water agreements regulate the importation
of raw water from Johor, Malaysia, to Singapore
and importation of treated water from Singapore to Johor.
So this map shows a simple overview
of the Johor River basin.
And you can see the prominent Johor River and the Linggiu
Reservoir.
And then the dotted line represents
the series of pipes that cross the Johor Strait.
There is also complex river networks
that offshoot from the main river,
as well as you can see the Johor River
Barrage, which is something I'll talk about a little bit more.
That was a joint project to improve the water supply.
There have been four main agreements signed
between the two parties, and the last agreements
will expire in 2061.
That's a number that--
or year that's going to come up a lot.
And, despite ongoing negotiations since 1990,
they've still failed to reach another agreement.
Singapore is classified as water-stressed
and relies on water from Johor to currently meet
40% of its water demand, so extremely significant.
And they're unable to meet their demand without this imported
water.
And a blossoming issue is the fact
that Johor has increasing issues with meeting its own water
demand due to a combination of increased pollution
as well as droughts.
So, to talk about Malaysian water resources,
Malaysia is fortunate to have very abundant water resources.
Despite being so close to Singapore,
it has quite a different landscape.
It's covered in rainforests and experiences heavy rainfall
almost all year.
Some Malaysian states do suffer from chronic water shortages
while others are experiencing surpluses.
So how is that possible?
Before 1992, state governments had almost complete control
over surface water resources.
So I guess you can--
so, as a result, there's been a lot
of issues of water management between the state
government and the federal government,
which has tried to become more involved as more issues arise
across the states that are common
and related to water resources.
Climate change and droughts put Malaysia
at an increasing risk of becoming water-stressed
in the next 50 years, according to research
done by institutions such as the World Resources Institute.
I used their Water Risk Atlas a lot
to help shape my projections for this case.
And I think it's really important
to note that currently, Malaysia, and specifically
Johor, has a lot of water and could manage it more
efficiently to meet its needs.
But it's possible, even managed efficiently,
they won't be able to do so in the future.
And I think kind of the biggest point
here is that Malaysia does not manage its water
resources effectively currently, which
is a big reason driving why they're unable to meet
their water demand.
This includes insufficient infrastructure
to collect rainfall, extreme water
pollution due to unregulated practices of mining,
logging, land development, and sewage disposal.
They have almost no water conservation efforts.
They're hesitant to invest in alternative water resources,
so things like desalination or wastewater reuse.
And, still, despite all of these things
they have agreements in place to export water
to both Singapore and Malacca.
So the image here on the upper right
is from part of a river in Johor,
and it was taken many years ago.
So it's actually much harder to find natural river--
or water resources that don't more
resemble that bottom image, where there's just
a lot of pollution buildup and very poor water quality.
So Singapore water resources is quite the different story.
The main issue that Singapore faces
is that it doesn't have enough natural water
supply to support their growing population and economy.
And, since 1965, when Singapore and Malaysia
separated from their brief union quite acrimoniously,
Singapore has made a very extreme effort
to implement a three-pronged strategy
to decrease their water vulnerability and water
dependence, especially from Malaysia, by 2061, when
their current agreements are going to expire.
So this three-pronged approach first
focused on optimizing their domestic water
supply by building dams and reservoirs.
They have built a total of 11 reservoirs in addition
to three that existed before 1965.
These reservoirs cover about half
of Singapore's total land area.
You can see in this image in the upper right
a glimpse of where the reservoirs are.
It's hard to tell, but there's small colorful dots.
This is from 2014.
But these are all the projects that
are started or finished having to do with water catchment.
So, actually, after 1986, there's
almost no opportunities to increase their water catchment
just due to restrictions and land area.
So they then turn to the second two prongs of their strategy,
which includes securing alternative water
supplies through seawater desalination, wastewater
reuse--
which they're one of the most advanced systems in the world.
They have a reclaimed water program called NEWater--
and negotiating a new agreement with Indonesia
for imported water.
I'm really not going to focus on that third one,
because they haven't reached an agreement yet.
But the other two are part of their--
have currently already started to be implemented and hope
to increase in the future.
And the final prong of their approach
is to improve water conservation.
So they also went at this quite aggressively.
They added regulations as well as monetary incentives
for individuals as well as businesses.
They've made investments in new water conservation technology
as well as improving existing infrastructure
to decrease the amount of water lost to leaks.
And then, they also launched a large budget education
campaign.
So it was very successful.
Already, Singapore is experiencing a 0.2% decrease
in water consumption per year despite continued population
and economic growth, so very impressive.
Most parts of the world, especially
with developing economies, are increasing
water consumption per capita, so pretty interesting.
And then, here, this is a slightly outdated infographic
published by Singapore's Public Utilities Board, also known
as PUB, which shows Singapore's plan for decreasing
the reliance on imported water and increasing their reliance
on reclaimed water from wastewater,
which is the NEWater campaign, which currently supplies
30% of their water demand.
But they have ambitious plans to be relying on it
for about up to 55% by 2060.
And then seawater desalination is currently
10% of their water demand, but they hope to be up to 30%
by 2060.
So, again, they're really--
I think the domestic water supply is about 20%
and won't really change.
So they're hoping that if they are
successful in this three-pronged approach,
they wouldn't be reliant on Malaysia.
But, as I mentioned at the beginning, currently,
they're still 40% reliant on water from Malaysia.
And it seems pretty unlikely that they'll
be 100% independent in just 40 years.
So, next, I want to talk about the key stakeholders
in the water negotiations.
So I'm not very familiar with the governmental structure
of Singapore and Malaysia.
So, based on my research about the water conflict,
I'm going to show you the stakeholders that stood out.
In my paper, I mentioned more about
how media had a unique role in the water conflict.
Basically, news about water negotiations and agreements
were widely covered in the local newspapers in both Singapore
and Malaysia, where the newspapers were not
only publishing factual news coverage.
There is also increasingly negative partisan editorials
and letters that were shared.
So this, combined with the lack of transparency
from both governments, went so far as--
like, one point, the governments were just
communicating with each other through the newspapers.
So one government official in Singapore
read a Malaysian newspaper with a public statement
from a Malaysian official that had not
been talked about officially behind closed doors.
So then, they had to release a different statement
to their local newspapers and on and on.
So it is quite complex and something
that I didn't want to muddle this idea,
but it meant that there's a lot of stakeholders with opinions
about the negotiations that are not at the table,
so people or groups representing ecology as well as competing
minority political groups in both territories.
So, here, we're going to talk about the Malaysian key
stakeholders, which are stakeholders from both the
federal and state governments.
So much of Malaysia's water management
happens at the state level.
However, Malaysia's political relationship with Singapore
inherently involves federal stakeholders.
So that would be people like the prime ministers.
Later, I'll mention that a change in Malaysian leadership
will improve negotiations.
So that's due to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, whose picture
is placed on the right, because he
was a driving force preventing further water agreements
from being reached during his position as prime minister.
And, unfortunately for water diplomacy,
he governed two times separately and basically has
a very primary focus on water pricing
and wanting to increase water prices for Singapore.
And, unfortunately, a focus on competitive pricing
is just not conducive to progress.
So, anyway, the National Water Council and the National Water
Resources Council were created in the 1990s
to improve water management, specifically between the state
and federal levels.
But I would say, overall, Malaysia's water management
is still relatively disorganized and ultimately ineffective.
And that's just a challenge that will need to be addressed.
And then, finally, the BAKAJ is a Malaysian counterpart
of the PUB, which is the Singapore Public Utilities
Board that runs their water management.
So, currently, BAKAJ and PUB have monthly meetings
to discuss water topics.
Quickly, to go over the Singaporean key stakeholders,
as I've mentioned several times now,
their management is led by the PUB, which was founded in 1963
and is part of the Ministry of Sustainability and Environment
in Singapore.
Publicly, the Singaporean prime ministers, and more
recently, the minister of foreign affairs,
Minister Vivian, has been quite involved
in the diplomatic relations with Malaysia.
And they're the ones who would be
responsible for signing any official agreements
between Malaysia and Singapore.
So, in my paper, I have a pretty in-depth description
of the terms of all four water agreements between Singapore
and Malaysia.
But, for the sake of time, I'm going
to highlight the main points that you need to understand.
So, starting in 1927, Singapore rented a plot of land in Johor
at an annual rate and then can use all the water
found in and on the land.
In return, Johor would buy back specific amounts
of treated water from Singapore.
An interesting thing to note is that this agreement allowed
for increases in land and treated water purchased
and traded, expecting that the water needs would change
and they would probably want to increase that.
So they specifically wrote that in.
The 1961 and 1962 agreements replaced the 1927 agreement.
They expanded the amount of resources that would
be traded between the two.
They defined a certain rate at which the prices--
the water would be bought.
So, in this agreement, Singapore would buy water, raw water,
from Johor at 3 sen per 1,000 gallons,
while Malaysia would buy treated water
for 50 sen per 1,000 gallons.
So I mention that because the agreements
both include a joint price review every 25 years.
Unfortunately, none of the times that they've met--
so I think the last one was in 1986 and 1987--
they weren't able to reach any update even
though an update was necessary.
It's like both sides kept asking for a little bit too much.
So, as a result, they got no agreement.
So, to this day, the water is still
being sold for 3 sen per 1,000 gallons and 50 sen.
So that would really come back later
when I talk about what needs to be done.
And, finally, the 1990 agreement was an extension
of the 1962 agreement.
It authorized a new construction of another dam.
Singapore has made a lot of infrastructure investments
in Johor to increase their water supply
but also benefits the local Johor community, and completely
at the Singaporean expense.
I guess, to sum up, the one agreement expired in 2011,
and then there's two that are still active.
But, again, they were not able to renew
the one that expired in 2011.
So, as a result, Singapore had to decrease the amount of water
they imported from Malaysia.
A couple of supplemental things that you might care about
is the 1965 Separation Agreement,
which is also known as the Independence of Singapore
agreement.
And it included a clause ensuring that Malaysia would
abide by the terms of the water agreements
already signed to ensure Singapore's water security.
And this was filed with the United Nations.
The 1998 through 2003 water pricing negotiations
were a time when Malaysia and Singapore were trying
to negotiate another agreement that would last for 100 years
to extend this deadline of 2061.
Malaysia was motivated because they needed finances
from Singapore to back their currency because there
was a financial crisis.
And Singapore just wanted to secure water resources
for an extended period of time.
Once Malaysia no longer needed the finances
because they got it from somewhere else,
the negotiations were reduced to debates about the water
pricing, packaging the water, policies
with other partisan issues, and just got out of control.
In these negotiations, Malaysia tried
to increase the price of raw water
from 3 sen per 1,000 gallons to 45 sen, then 60
sen, and finally, 625 sen per 1,000 gallons in 2002.
And, as you might expect, no agreement was made.
Finally, I highlight the Johor River Barrage project,
which was a three-year project funded by Singapore
and addressed the saltwater intrusion to the Johor River
Basin.
So that's an example of both Johor
and Singapore were suffering from a reduced quality of water
in the river basin.
So Singapore agreed to fund a project that
would improve these and ensure a longer-term water resource.
So now, I would love to talk about the water diplomacy
framework and how this fits in.
So the Singapore-Malaysia water conflict
is unique because there's only two parties
involved, sharing water resources that
are not physically common.
The water networks are defined through several water
agreements where water is being traded rather than shared.
However, Johor and Singapore still mutually benefit
from the terms of the existing agreements,
and they have acknowledged that publicly.
The water diplomacy framework acknowledges the complexity
of managing competition, feedback, and interconnection
between the natural and societal domains in the context
of the political domain.
So that is absolutely true.
In this circumstance, there were ongoing societal tensions
between Singaporean and Malaysian communities
at every level over a lot of issues, not just water.
And then, Johor has been experiencing increasing water
problems in the natural domain related to water quantity
as well as quality, which threatens both stakeholders.
And, finally, because the media was so involved
in covering the water negotiations,
the group of stakeholders with opinions
is actually much larger than the officials
that are involved in the signing of the agreements.
And, as a result, there's kind of a negative air
around the agreements and signing a new agreement.
So something that I recognized immediately
is that there would need to be trust
built between the stakeholders.
So the first issue that needs to be addressed
is how to build this trust and enhance cooperation
between the different stakeholders, mainly
state government officials.
And, before negotiations can make progress,
stakeholders from both sides will
need to recognize and accept the value of being
cooperative rather than competitive,
which is something we talked a lot about in this class.
So one of the stickiest points in the current negotiations
is the water pricing for the raw water
bought by Singapore and the treated water bought by Johor.
However, both Singapore and Johor
have increasing concerns about their water security.
So I think it'd be really beneficial to shift
the conversations away from competitive water
pricing that's motivated by self-interest
and start by discussing cooperative strategies
for making sure that both parties will have
enough water of the right quality,
because the opportunities for mutual gains
would then be more prioritized, which is what, obviously, they
both need.
So I guess I will note that there are ongoing negotiations
and conversations and meetings between Singapore
and Malaysian officials.
So I think things that have been highlighted is they have
an annual leaders' retreat, which is literally just
a retreat for their leaders to meet,
joint ministerial committee meetings that happen on monthly
and yearly basis, the ministers of both countries visit
the other country to improve relations,
and then they've recently created the Malaysia-Singapore
Joint Committee on the Environment,
which is also basically for this kind of--
to increase the relations in these topics.
So there's starting to be progress,
but it's really not being reflected
in any legislative progress, in my opinion.
This is something that I thought was interesting to point out.
So most partisan media articles from both sides
reflect slightly different versions of the same story.
So Malaysian media articles would
say that the current agreements only benefit
Singaporean stakeholders.
Johor is experiencing increasing incidents of water scarcity.
And Singapore just keeps taking the amount
that it's always agreed upon despite the circumstances
changing.
The water pricing has not been updated.
And, as a result, Singapore is getting this raw water at way
below the price that they should be buying it at.
And then, conservative Singaporean media outlets
would frame the issue quite differently.
But it's ultimately the same story,
where Singapore has been actively trying
to reduce its reliance on water from Johor
while continuously granting requests from Johor for more
treated water than agreed upon in the agreements
at the same discounted rates.
This is just to maintain goodwill between the two
parties.
And Singapore has prioritized enhancing their water security
by extending the water agreements.
However, if Johor wants to increase
the price of raw water, Singapore
would have to increase the price of treated water.
So this slide is basically to go over
how both sides, if you look at it objectively,
could be gaining from this relationship.
I chose this image.
This is a screenshot from the Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas tool
that I mentioned before.
This is their projection for water risk in Singapore
and Johor in 2040 if things continue, quote,
"business as usual."
So, as you can tell, Singapore is
classified as extremely high risk,
and Johor is medium to high risk.
So, for reference, currently, if you click to baseline,
both are classified as low risk.
So this is something where their water risk characteristics are
increasing due to changes in climate change, drought,
and pollution.
So, currently, Singapore and Johor rely on each other
to meet their water demands.
They both care about the decreasing water quality
in Malaysia since it jeopardizes both water security
of Singapore and Malaysia.
I recognize that Singapore has much more and better experience
in launching water conservation campaigns
as well as investing in alternative water supplies.
They have one of the most advanced
systems in the world for desalination and water reuse,
as well as very strict water quality tactics
because they don't want to waste their own water.
So I think that's one opportunity where
both nations could benefit if Singapore could
give some of their experience and help improve
the situation in Malaysia.
Secondly, both parties are unsure of the long-term effects
of climate change and drought on their water security.
So they both want to be resilient and prepared to adapt
to changing water circumstances.
The water prices for both the raw water and the treated water
are absolutely outdated and should be updated.
However, that should not be the only thing included
in the conversation, because that is currently only
representing self-interest.
Singapore benefits from Johor's water supply
to support its economic growth.
It needs the water.
And, while they say that they will be independent by 2061,
that has not been proven.
And I think, furthermore, an ongoing water relationship
for Singapore is convenient because Singapore has already
made long-term infrastructure investments
and already have good existing relationships with the water
representatives there.
So, rather than trying to find a different importing place
to get water from, it makes sense
that Singapore would want to stick with Malaysia.
And, finally, Malaysia would benefit
because they need the increased supply of treated water,
and they need assistance stimulating progress
in increasing their supply long-term,
since they have no progress in water treatment
development, water conservation development, or water pollution
regulation.
So, finally, a couple of other ways that the water diplomacy
framework could be utilized include utilizing
an impartial moderator.
So it was really successful when they lodged the document
with the UN after they split politically
to ensure that Malaysia would not renege on their agreement.
And I'm really confused why they haven't done that since.
It seems like incorporating some more impartial stakeholders
could really help promote progress.
And, secondly, I think it'd be interesting
if they would start conversations
about signing a new agreement, unrelated to the water
supply but kind of more toward a joint agreement,
trying to become more resilient in the face of climate change.
This part of the world is extremely vulnerable.
And if Singapore, Malaysia and some
of these other southeastern Asian countries and states
join together in their efforts to develop new technology
and get better information, it would really benefit them all.
So, yeah, these are the key takeaways.
But I think, just for the sake of time,
it's pretty clear that Singapore and Malaysia already
recognize that their agreements are mutually beneficial.
However, they have not been able to reach further agreements,
which is threatening both the water security of both,
and ultimately, preventing progress and security.
DR. GAIN: Thank you, Flora, for the nice presentation.
It's really wonderful.
So yeah, is there any feedback for Flora, Husnain or Cassiano?
AUDIENCE: Well, well done for your wonderful presentation.
As this topic was new for you, you have done a very great job.
Just first of all, let me give you a small comment.
As you mentioned a prospect for desalination,
my view would be that desalination is expensive
and its production is energy-intensive and involves
carbon emissions.
In the long run, Malaysia might not
be able to operate and maintain it as well.
As you mentioned in the case study
that Malaysia has had some availability of fresh water
and receives ample rainfall, it would be better for Singapore
to cooperate and invest in water infrastructure,
enhancing Malaysia's storage capacity, which,
in turn, would ensure long-term water security for Singapore.
And Malaysia could, in turn, offer increased water quality
to Singapore.
This could be a practical mutual gains approach in respect
to the water diplomacy framework.
And, secondly, the question would
be that what is the public sentiment in Malaysia
given their own water scarcity situation?
You mentioned that some states receive--
are water scarce.
And you mentioned that, as per the treaty,
water flows freely to Singapore.
But some states within Malaysia face water scarcity.
So what is the public sentiment within Malaysia about that?
FLORA KLISE: I can respond to that.
Yeah, so definitely, the public response is pretty negative.
I think it's negative in every regard.
It's like we want to sell the water to Singapore,
but they need to pay us way more.
We want to sell it to them, but they're not paying enough.
And then, it's also like, why are they taking our water when
we don't have enough water?
That's not fair either.
So I think part of that is unavoidable just
because, yes, Singapore also needs the water,
and it's confusing.
But I think the public sentiment is tainted
by political sentiment that's just Malaysians don't like
Singaporean as a stereotype but then further aggravated
by this increased water scarcity caused by these droughts
and lack of rain capture.
So yeah, it definitely is negative and not
very controlled.
The information shared in Malaysia
is not the same information shared in Singapore.
Media is extremely regulated in both countries
and is highly partisan.
So, as a result, it's really hard to change public opinion.
But, from what I understand, the public
doesn't have much control over what happens, so.
AUDIENCE: And just one more thing.
You know, as you mentioned, that the treaty expires in 2061.
And it is still four decades until the existing treaty
is going to expire.
And some clarity is required why negotiations
are needed to extend--
why negotiations have already started as of now because it
is still four decades remaining.
Or the two countries are trying to formalize a new treaty
before 2061 in order to get it for existing water scarcity
and water quality issues.
FLORA KLISE: Yeah, so basically, from their point of view,
40 years is not long at all.
In the early 2000s, they were trying
to negotiate a treaty that would last for 100 years,
so extend it from 2061 to more like 3001.
It sounds so weird to say.
But, yeah, they were unable to reach one.
But, basically, especially for Singapore,
since this is more of an issue of water security
in the next 40 years, if, in 2061,
they aren't able to import water from Malaysia anymore,
and they have not succeeded in increasing their water reuse
and water desalination, basically, Singapore
will no longer be able to supply water
to run its municipal and industrial water supply.
So that, I guess, is the threat of water security.
And some parties would even say, what would they do?
Would they try to fight Malaysia,
some kind of water war?
Most people say no.
But that's basically why it's so urgent, why they don't want
to wait until 10 years before, because, already, negotiations
have been going on for 30 years, and they
haven't reached any agreement.
Thank you.
AUDIENCE: Wonderful presentation, Flora.
Every time I have a question in my mind,
your next slide answered my question.
It was very good.
Flora, do you think that Indonesia could be considered
a partner for Singapore?
FLORA KLISE: Well, it seems like they'll
run into the same issues that they're
running into with Malaysia but having a little bit
less bad blood.
And it's extremely less convenient
since, already, Singapore has invested so much
in the Malaysian water resources that, if they were going
to do the same thing in Indonesia,
it would be like starting from scratch
and also probably ruin their relationship with Malaysia,
decrease their chances of renewing the water agreements.
So I think, in that regard, it's been quite hard.
Also, the main thing holding up any negotiations
is that Indonesia has had a lot of political turmoil
internally.
So just the lack of governance has
prevented real conversations from happening.
AUDIENCE: Yeah.
Flora, if you know more about this innovation,
can you talk about the four taps and the NEWater solutions?
FLORA KLISE: Yeah.
So Singapore has one of the most developed--
I mean, Larry and Animesh can stop me
if I'm just saying wrong things-- but a very advanced
water recycling program.
So NEWater is what they're calling it.
I have a manager from my internship
that lives in Singapore, and she always
laughs at me when she says, like, in your country,
you call reclaimed water toilet to tap.
And she's like, that sounds gross.
No wonder no one likes it.
She's like, in Singapore, we call it NEWater.
Everyone wants new water.
NEWater sounds great and cool and innovative.
She's like, toilet to tap?
That's bad advertising.
So yeah, basically, they've really
worked on increasing their reclaimed water supply.
They have very advanced technology
to do water reuse, which is a technology that's not
utilized very much in the US.
There's not as much technology development
in the US because of this hesitancy from the public
and industry to adopt it.
But that is what they're mainly relying
on where, instead of getting rid of wastewater,
you'd be able to recycle it one or two times to use it again,
which obviously makes sense.
And then, seawater desalination is their other big technology
push for their four taps, other than the rainfall capture,
since that is basically just exhausted.
They don't have any more land to expand into.
So yeah, I think Husnain raised a good point.
Desalination is expensive.
It currently relies on carbon fuel
and will wear out, potentially, if it's not
maintained properly.
So yeah, I think that's interesting.
I haven't really read any articles.
Right now, Singapore is just really in the push
to increase the amount of water that they are obtaining
from non-Malaysian sources
AUDIENCE: Thank you very much, Flora.
Congratulations again.
FLORA KLISE: Thanks.
PROFESSOR SUSSKIND: I just want to annotate the question
of desal a little bit.
Desalination now is completely solar-powered.
And the Israelis have created very advanced desalination
technologies, again, for their own uses.
Israel is going to be almost 85% desal in the next decade,
even though they have water.
They have aquifers.
But they're not going to hold out forever.
And Israel has developed new technologies
for separating the brine from the fresh water.
Kuwait is 95% desal.
Everything in the country, 95% of the water is in desal.
So yes, it was true that desal was mostly fossil fuel-driven.
It isn't-- no one planning a future desal facility of large
scale would think, unless they were an oil-generating country
and had so much extra oil they didn't know what else to do,
but that isn't the case in Singapore.
I personally think that Singapore will have no problem
through recycling.
People have to understand that Malaysia and Singapore think
of themselves as developed countries.
They do not think of themselves as developing.
They have the most advanced technology.
They have the most advanced universities.
Singapore has used advanced technology
on just about everything.
And, because it is a small island nation,
it has the limitations, as was nicely pointed out,
of scale in terms of land.
But it's going to be able to claim
existing space at its edges and expand development
on the water.
And my sense is that it's not crazy to think
that Singapore, through desal--
because it's got all of this area on the ocean--
and water recycling, which is the most
advanced in the world for municipal systems,
and a space that can't grow in terms
of large additional population, and it can't increase density
because it's already as high as Manhattan.
So my sense is that they've made some smart choices.
And I think they will take advantage of water
from Malaysia when they need it as they need it.
The other thing that has to be noted
is that Johor is a state in Malaysia,
but Malaysia has two parts.
The peninsula part that you talked about is in one place.
And the other two states, it's like Hawaii and Alaska
for Americans.
The other two states are on top of Borneo.
They're on top of another country
as far away as Hawaii is from San Francisco.
And those two states are amongst the most important
income-generating states because that's where
all the natural resources are.
And so the water policy in Malaysia
doesn't really focus on the two states
that are separate, because there's very few people there--
I mean comparatively-- and plenty of water.
So the water issues are in the peninsula of Malaysia.
And my sense is that there's plenty of water.
I'm a little less negative, I think, Flora,
than you are about their pollution improvements
over the last decade.
In all of their cities where the rivers run through the city,
they got the idea from San Antonio.
Instead of covering over the river
and just dumping everything in it, they uncovered the river
and they made it an attraction of the city, which
meant they had to do the pollution cleanup.
And the level of pollution cleanup--
I've been working in Malaysia for a decade.
And, even from year one to year seven,
the difference in pollution levels in rivers
is really dramatic.
And the coordination, which I understand--
when you look and do research on this,
the coordination between the federal level and the state
levels is dramatically enhanced in the last five years.
Now, they had this crazy change of governments.
And now, they're back to a normal kind of government
that has qualified people in senior positions.
There was a period a few years ago,
where the transition happened, where the people running
stuff were political appointees with zero
professional background and capabilities.
But now things are back in order.
So I think there's a chance of the negotiations.
Since a friend of mine is the head of the commission
and will be doing the negotiations,
I think there's a chance that they
will find all of these mutual benefits that you point out.
Johor, it has all these facilities
being built by Singapore.
The national government is saving the money,
and Johor is saving the money.
And, if Singapore is willing to build all these facilities,
and if Singapore continues to increase its own water
resources, it won't be so scary about its long-term need
for all of Johor's water.
Two other things that have happened maybe
since the material you were looking at was published.
One is that a Chinese developer has
built a new city floating in the Straits of Johor right
between Johor--
and Malaysia and Singapore.
And it's Malaysian.
So Singapore is quite distressed about it, especially because--
and this is the other thing.
You had it on the slide, but you need to explain it.
Malaysia is a democracy, but it also is a monarchy.
And so we're used to thinking about how
the British government operates.
Well, the sultans-- there are six sultans, six sultanates,
within Malaysia.
And, each year, one of them is the sultan of sultans.
And the sultanate is in the Constitution
and has a variety of things that it controls.
And the sultan of Johor is a player in the conversation,
even though it's country to country,
because the sultan has real say within what Malaysia does.
Malaysia is a Muslim country, even
though Chinese and Indian populations are growing.
It's basically a Muslim country.
And all of the original settlers came from Indonesia.
And so there are implicit connections to Indonesia.
But Indonesia is a long way away.
How are you going to get water?
You're not going to have a pipe from Indonesia to Johor.
That's nuts.
So my sense is that you're exactly on target,
that they need to do something about these negotiations
quickly.
And there are plenty of joint gains to be had.
But the negotiation will include Johor,
even though it's a state.
I think they ought to encourage the involvement of Malacca,
which is another state which isn't
a sultanate in the same way and would benefit
by being part of the deal.
And I think we should expect that solar-powered desal will
be very important in producing maybe 40% or 50% of everything
that they need into the future and that recycling
and this huge construction of all of these reservoirs--
it's amazing.
A tiny little island built 11 big reservoirs
to capture rainwater because they saw this problem coming.
So they're not in terrible shape.
Malaysia is not in terrible shape.
There are advantages to be had.
Yes, the pricing is going to have to change.
But there's so much shared interest in other things
that the last thing I would expect is a water war.
They don't have an army.
So that would make a difference.
Malaysia does, but my sense is that these two
nations and Johor will be able to figure this out.
But you do a beautiful job of describing
the history of identifying why these negotiations are
important.
The older negotiations were in a different time,
before you had such powerful economic countries.
These were developing countries.
Now they are developed nations with lots of money.
And they should be able to deal with each other.
So I think your emphasis is just right that.
The only two things I would point out,
which I think the threat of doing something with Indonesia
is nuts just because of distance and because Indonesia
has its own problems to worry about.
And I think-- and I think this floating city, Forest City--
that's what they called it, Forest City--
700,000 people on floating platforms
in wetland, in an internationally protected
wetland.
It's a disaster.
And so that's what led to the new joint effort on environment
and sustainability, which is Malaysia never should
have allowed it to happen.
But the national government defers on land use issues
to the state.
And the sultan of Johor is one of the major investors
in this ridiculous, gigantic new city.
And he was in it for the money, and it was his land.
And, because he owned the speck of island,
he didn't need to get any permissions to build.
And the Chinese developer was happy to fill.
And so they filled everything, and it created--
it killed all of the fishing industry up and down
the strait.
And oh, this was a mistake.
And they had to dig it out, and they had to re-go back,
and they did this through court action
because Singapore brought suit against Malaysia.
And the Malaysian government sheepishly
said, well, it was the state.
We didn't know what they were doing.
And this project is the largest planned community
by a Chinese developer outside of China.
And it's a gated community for Chinese.
But it's going to use all the water and all the services
and everything else from Johor.
There's so many things about it which is--
but it's created the need for the Malaysia
national government and Singapore national government
to work together on--
they are alleging it's climate change.
It's on sustainable development and the protection of wetlands
and the protection of other resources.
Sorry to go on.
It's just-- I think you did a beautiful job.
I'm delighted you chose the subject,
and we'll be able to put this in the collection
because it's an important example of nations
where states within nations really are players.
So this nation-to-nation treaty thing,
the agreement isn't going to happen
without Johorian involvement.
And it involves all kinds of technology.
Anyway, I think you did a great job, Flora.
FLORA KLISE: Thanks so much.
DR. GAIN: Yeah.
So thanks, Flora.
It was a wonderful presentation.
And I think, in terms of improvement,
in terms of exploration, you did an excellent job
as I read your draft paper.
And I already made comments I already sent to you.
But, in the presentation, you incorporated the water
diplomacy framework very well.
But, in the paper, it was not, so maybe we'll work on that.
And so maybe, for the implementing water diplomacy
framework, if you just focus on the conflict--
in my view, this conflict now they're
stuck is that Malaysia is demanding price increasing
and Singapore is not willing to provide that much amount
for the raw water.
So, in that point, how you can--
yeah, so how this stuck can be--
dispositional things can be improved
by these joint factfinding things.
The issue that you already mentioned,
if you just describe in a way that
can provide a systematic explanation of the things,
I think then the paper could be fantastic.
It's already nice, but it can be further improved in that part.
So yeah.
PROFESSOR SUSSKIND: I do think, Flora, your tone
about the relationship between these two countries
and its historical roots is very, very true and very,
very important.
And one of the reasons is that this really simple water
money--
recycled water treaty-- isn't getting
fixed is Singapore doesn't want to admit any need for anything
from Malaysia.
It's just-- it goes back to when they pulled apart,
and Singapore felt it developed itself as a developed nation.
And Malaysia took so much longer and didn't
know how to do what they did.
And they don't want to be beholden.
I have the advantage of talking with the person who's
doing the negotiations for Malaysia, who's a scientist,
and he thinks the whole thing is ridiculous.
And he just doesn't understand.
What do you want?
[? Is ?] [? that ?] the price?
Come on.
Let's ask some independent folks what the value of the water is
and the recycled water.
You've got a huge amount of money.
It's not about the money.
And I think, by involving more of the states,
it will be easier for Singapore to say,
well, we did this because we're helping those states,
because they just can't swallow the idea of doing anything
for or needing Malaysia.
And I think you captured that tone very appropriately
in your paper from the history.
FLORA KLISE: I think that's one of the interesting parts
of reading so many very partisan articles.
It's very clear-- it makes it even more clear where
the gaps in communication and pride and things
like that play in, because it's just so obvious as someone
impartial.
You feel like the parent watching your kids bicker.
You're like, you can both have water.
You don't need to just say the other person's ugly.
You can just take the water and then call it a day.
So yeah, it was very interesting.
There is not much literature, but there's a lot of coverage.
PROFESSOR SUSSKIND: There's a lot of coverage, yeah.
Well, people have been discouraged.
Scholars have been discouraged from writing about it quite
explicitly at University in Singapore and University
of Technology in Malaysia that I work with.
They've been told, don't do it.
You're killing your career if you write anything scholarly
about this, because this isn't really a scholarly issue.
And nobody wants--
FLORA KLISE: Hopefully, that doesn't come bite me later.
PROFESSOR SUSSKIND: Yeah.
But, for us, studying water diplomacy
to understand that the root issue is this historical not
just lack of trust, but really, almost hatred of two parties
that were part of the same country.
It's difficult.
And I think there's also--
partly, this is about the fact that the Muslim majority
in Malaysia is, in some ways, losing control.
It still gets who it wants elected,
and it's still 51% Muslim.
And the Chinese, though, are really
controlling industry in Malaysia.
They're controlling wealth in Malaysia,
whereas the Muslim majority, bare majority,
is controlling government in Malaysia and certain--
a few industries.
And it's-- Singapore is not interested in acknowledging
the power of a Malaysian partner who is Muslim.
They're much more focused on Chinese.
And the Muslim majority in Malaysia
thinks that the Chinese minority is using its connections
to Singapore to build more of its strength and power
in Malaysia and wants to take over the government, which
has always been the domain of the Muslim majority.
So all of these pieces and parts,
these are part of water diplomacy.
And I think your case is important because it brings out
these are not just about natural resource
management or territory.
This is about this lack of trust in this difficult relationship
between the two countries, which you do
a really nice job of raising.