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PROFESSOR: OK, so what we're
going to do today is continue

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our discussion of oligopoly
which we started last time.

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I want to return to the example
we were using last

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time to discuss the example
of Cournot competition.

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We started last time by talking
about general game

00:00:44.070 --> 00:00:46.550
theory and the prisoner's
dilemma and the concept of

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Nash equilibrium.

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Then we turned to a specific
example of a Cournot

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competition, the way we can
specifically model two firms

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competing in a market.

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And so if you recall the example
from last time, we had

00:01:00.830 --> 00:01:09.680
demand curve of the form p
equals 339 minus q where this

00:01:09.680 --> 00:01:13.220
is thousands of passengers
per month.

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And we had a marginal
cost of $147.

00:01:17.430 --> 00:01:19.610
And we have flat marginal cost,
so average cost equals

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marginal cost equals 147, equals
average cost. So flat

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marginal cost.

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And what we said, so therefore
if the firm was a monopolist,

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if American Airlines say was a
monopolist, they would set

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marginal revenue equal to
marginal cost which would be

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339 minus 2q equals 147.

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And so the monopolist was going
to set a quantity of 96.

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That was the monopolist quantity
with the price.

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So the quantity of monopolist
is 96 and the price of

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monopolist is $243.

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So that was the monopoly case.

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Something you should be very
facile with for tomorrow night

00:02:07.620 --> 00:02:12.410
is solving those kinds of
monopoly problems. And then we

00:02:12.410 --> 00:02:14.910
said, OK, but what if, in fact,
it recognizes that it's

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not a monopoly.

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There's another firm
in the market.

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United is in the
market as well.

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Well in that case it has to
consider its residual demand.

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So in that case we said the qa,
its residual demand, for

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American was equal to the
total market q minus the

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quantity absorbed
by United, qu.

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And we showed last time what
this leads to graphically.

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And so we re-handed out figure
16-3 just to review.

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The notion was that each
firm develops a

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best response curve.

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Each firm says, based on what
the other firm's going to do,

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here is my best level
of production.

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Here's my profit maximizing
level of production.

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And each firm having developed
a curve, there's an

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equilibrium where those curves
intersect because at that

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point both firms are happy.

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You've achieved your Nash
equilibrium because at that

00:03:07.250 --> 00:03:10.810
point both firms are satisfied
with the strategy they're

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playing given what the
other firm's playing.

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So that point of intersection,
both firms' best response are

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consistent with each other.

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And that's we developed
last time graphically.

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Intuitively, I think it follows
from the same logic,

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the idea is we're playing this
game and the game will only

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have a stable outcome
if we're both

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satisfied with the outcome.

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If we're not both satisfied
we'll continue to change our

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behavior and it won't
be stable.

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And so what I want to do now is
talk about how we solve for

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this mathematically.

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So let's just think about the
mathematics of solving for

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Cournot equilibrium.

00:03:44.530 --> 00:03:48.550
So what's the mathematics now?

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What's American Airlines's
residual demand function?

00:03:52.130 --> 00:03:59.050
Well their price, p sub a, is
equal to the total demand,

00:03:59.050 --> 00:04:04.140
339, minus what they supply
minus what United supplies.

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So the price in the market,
they don't have separate

00:04:09.450 --> 00:04:14.350
prices, the price in the market
is going to be 339

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minus what each of
them supplies.

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So now American can't control q
sub u, American has to take

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that as an outside
given factor.

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That's what they're
responding to.

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So American says, I need to
optimize this with respect to

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what I can control
which is q sub a.

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So how does it do it?

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Well, it computes marginal
revenue.

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Well marginal revenue
is p times q sub a.

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So that's 339qa minus qa
squared minus quqa.

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Just multiplying through.

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That's their revenue function.

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So marginal revenue,
differentiating with respect

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to qa which is all they can
control, is going to be 339

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minus 2qa minus qu.

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That's going to be
their residual

00:05:09.360 --> 00:05:10.610
marginal revenue function.

00:05:13.250 --> 00:05:17.320
And they're going to set this
equal to marginal cost. So I'm

00:05:17.320 --> 00:05:22.550
going to set marginal revenue
equal to marginal cost. So

00:05:22.550 --> 00:05:26.710
they're going to set this equal
to 147 which is marginal

00:05:26.710 --> 00:05:29.140
cost. And solving.

00:05:29.140 --> 00:05:40.380
you get that qa equals
96 minus 1/2qu.

00:05:40.380 --> 00:05:42.290
qa equals 96 minus 1/2qu.

00:05:42.290 --> 00:05:45.440
Once again reviewing, what we're
doing is we're saying we

00:05:45.440 --> 00:05:48.290
set up their residual
demand function.

00:05:48.290 --> 00:05:50.980
We compute what that implies
in terms of revenues.

00:05:50.980 --> 00:05:53.366
We differentiate with respect
to their control variable, q

00:05:53.366 --> 00:05:56.110
sub a, to get a marginal
revenue function.

00:05:56.110 --> 00:06:02.990
You set that equal to marginal
cost. And you solve for their

00:06:02.990 --> 00:06:04.450
best response curve.

00:06:04.450 --> 00:06:06.910
Essentially you just solve
mathematically for the curve

00:06:06.910 --> 00:06:08.160
you see here graphically.

00:06:08.160 --> 00:06:11.080
You go to the graph and you
look at American's best

00:06:11.080 --> 00:06:13.070
response curve.

00:06:13.070 --> 00:06:14.360
That is exactly this line.

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When qu is 0, it intersects
at 196.

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When qu is 192, qa is 0.

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So you can see we've just
mathematically developed where

00:06:23.610 --> 00:06:27.010
this best response
curve comes from.

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We've just solved for that
mathematically through the

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similar mathematics of monopoly
profit maximization.

00:06:33.970 --> 00:06:36.390
In this case we're essentially
saying, imagine you're a

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monopoly except for the stuff
produced by the other guy.

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That's the way to
think about it.

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Imagine you're a monopoly except
for what the other guy

00:06:41.810 --> 00:06:44.780
does and you get this best
response function.

00:06:44.780 --> 00:06:47.600
Now, since we set this problem
up to be symmetric--

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that is we said the marginal
cost identical for both firms,

00:06:51.520 --> 00:06:54.880
and the market demand applies
to both firms--

00:06:54.880 --> 00:06:58.240
since we set this up to be
symmetrical, then we know that

00:06:58.240 --> 00:07:00.840
we can also write a symmetrical
best response

00:07:00.840 --> 00:07:07.310
function for United, which
is q sub u equals 96

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minus 1/2 q sub a.

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We can solve for this but
there is a shortcut.

00:07:12.690 --> 00:07:14.820
If it's symmetrical problem
they'll have symmetrical best

00:07:14.820 --> 00:07:16.910
response functions.

00:07:16.910 --> 00:07:17.980
So we can just write
the symmetrical

00:07:17.980 --> 00:07:20.900
best response function.

00:07:20.900 --> 00:07:22.580
And then we can find
the equilibrium.

00:07:22.580 --> 00:07:24.390
Remember the steps I went
through last time.

00:07:24.390 --> 00:07:26.200
Now we have n equations
and n unknowns.

00:07:26.200 --> 00:07:28.820
We have two equations
and two unknowns.

00:07:28.820 --> 00:07:32.880
We can just solve by plugging
one into the other.

00:07:32.880 --> 00:07:41.900
And we get that qa star equals
qu star equals 64.

00:07:41.900 --> 00:07:45.000
Which is in fact where these
curves intersect.

00:07:45.000 --> 00:07:46.950
So that's how I found the
intersection of these curves

00:07:46.950 --> 00:07:49.760
was solving mathematically
for the optimal level of

00:07:49.760 --> 00:07:53.020
production given what the
other guy's doing.

00:07:53.020 --> 00:07:55.780
And the price, what's
the price?

00:07:55.780 --> 00:08:01.820
Well the price is 339 minus
q sub a minus q sub u.

00:08:01.820 --> 00:08:07.890
So it's 339 minus 128 or 211.

00:08:07.890 --> 00:08:14.980
So you end up with each
firm producing 64,000

00:08:14.980 --> 00:08:17.930
units a price of $211.

00:08:17.930 --> 00:08:20.260
And this is the Cournot
equilibrium.

00:08:20.260 --> 00:08:22.580
Because it's on both firms'
best response function.

00:08:22.580 --> 00:08:25.780
Both firms are maximizing
profits.

00:08:25.780 --> 00:08:28.160
And in maximizing profits they
both have chosen the same

00:08:28.160 --> 00:08:29.470
point to produce and
so you're done.

00:08:29.470 --> 00:08:30.110
They're happy.

00:08:30.110 --> 00:08:31.750
That's the Nash equilibrium.

00:08:31.750 --> 00:08:32.000
Yeah.

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AUDIENCE: So in the
last lecture was

00:08:33.333 --> 00:08:34.720
that game theory box.

00:08:34.720 --> 00:08:38.833
And this would be the lower
right hand box, correct?

00:08:42.617 --> 00:08:45.400
PROFESSOR: That's a very
good point, yes.

00:08:45.400 --> 00:08:49.300
This is sort of like game
theory but with a whole

00:08:49.300 --> 00:08:50.470
distribution.

00:08:50.470 --> 00:08:52.610
But in some sense it's like
at each point you've

00:08:52.610 --> 00:08:53.580
reached that point.

00:08:53.580 --> 00:08:56.540
But I really wouldn't draw
that parallel actually.

00:08:56.540 --> 00:08:57.790
The parallel that's important
from that is

00:08:57.790 --> 00:08:59.900
the equilibrium concept.

00:08:59.900 --> 00:09:01.905
The reason we choose the
prisoner's dilemma instead of

00:09:01.905 --> 00:09:03.460
choosing the equilibrium
concept--

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and the equilibrium concept is,
you're in equilibrium when

00:09:05.990 --> 00:09:10.970
each firm's dominant strategy
yields an equilibrium outcome.

00:09:10.970 --> 00:09:13.630
Here we've just taken that
intuition and solved

00:09:13.630 --> 00:09:15.980
mathematically for each firm's
dominant strategy.

00:09:15.980 --> 00:09:18.092
And that yields an equilibrium
outcome.

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AUDIENCE: That top left
box, there's no way--

00:09:21.870 --> 00:09:22.850
we shouldn't think about
that at all?

00:09:22.850 --> 00:09:24.900
PROFESSOR: No, actually it's a
great segue to what I'll talk

00:09:24.900 --> 00:09:27.930
about next which is a
cooperative equilibrium.

00:09:27.930 --> 00:09:30.930
So what we've solved for is we
solved for a non-cooperative

00:09:30.930 --> 00:09:32.400
equilibrium.

00:09:32.400 --> 00:09:33.470
Where they're not cooperating.

00:09:33.470 --> 00:09:35.280
So it's like the prisoner's
dilemma in the sense they end

00:09:35.280 --> 00:09:38.750
up in that lower corner.

00:09:38.750 --> 00:09:41.050
But in some sense I think that
parallel, I'm not sure how

00:09:41.050 --> 00:09:43.350
much that helps other than
thinking about the strategies

00:09:43.350 --> 00:09:46.560
and about thinking that that's
non-cooperative.

00:09:46.560 --> 00:09:50.560
We want to turn to next what
happens if they can cooperate.

00:09:50.560 --> 00:09:52.510
But before I do so,
two things.

00:09:52.510 --> 00:09:56.910
First of all, these problems do
not have to be symmetric.

00:09:56.910 --> 00:09:58.920
I've just solved symmetric
problem often, and you'll see

00:09:58.920 --> 00:10:00.620
symmetric problems, that
makes the math easier.

00:10:00.620 --> 00:10:01.740
But they don't have to be.

00:10:01.740 --> 00:10:04.090
American and United can be
different and you could solve

00:10:04.090 --> 00:10:04.600
the same math.

00:10:04.600 --> 00:10:08.480
And in fact Perloff goes through
an example like that.

00:10:08.480 --> 00:10:10.450
Symmetry is not guaranteed in
these problems, it's just a

00:10:10.450 --> 00:10:12.480
feature of the way
I set this up.

00:10:12.480 --> 00:10:15.460
So this question is a great
segue to the next topic, which

00:10:15.460 --> 00:10:17.790
is what about cooperative
equililbria.

00:10:17.790 --> 00:10:22.050
Can't American and United get
together and form a cartel?

00:10:24.700 --> 00:10:27.320
Remember we talked in the
prisoner's dilemma about how

00:10:27.320 --> 00:10:29.390
that would be the best outcome
if the two persons could just

00:10:29.390 --> 00:10:30.560
trust each other.

00:10:30.560 --> 00:10:33.490
Well here can't American and
United just trust each other

00:10:33.490 --> 00:10:35.680
and form a cartel?

00:10:35.680 --> 00:10:39.080
And what they do here
mathematically is pretty easy.

00:10:39.080 --> 00:10:42.580
They would just say, look, let's
get together and pretend

00:10:42.580 --> 00:10:45.060
we're one firm.

00:10:45.060 --> 00:10:49.320
Then let's act as that one firm
monopoly would and split

00:10:49.320 --> 00:10:51.710
the profits.

00:10:51.710 --> 00:10:52.750
It's the way a cartel
could work.

00:10:52.750 --> 00:10:55.190
They could say let's get
together, we'll produce as if

00:10:55.190 --> 00:10:57.800
we're a monopoly and let's
split the profits.

00:10:57.800 --> 00:10:59.670
Well what would happen
if they did that?

00:10:59.670 --> 00:11:03.910
Well we know that the total
monopoly production if they

00:11:03.910 --> 00:11:08.780
had been a monopoly is 96.

00:11:08.780 --> 00:11:12.210
So that's a big Q. The quantity
for the market is 96

00:11:12.210 --> 00:11:19.030
and the price if they're
a monopoly is $243.

00:11:19.030 --> 00:11:21.300
So what they did is they said,
look, we'll each do 48

00:11:21.300 --> 00:11:28.370
flights, for a total of 96 and
we'll charge $243 and we'll

00:11:28.370 --> 00:11:30.030
agree to do that.

00:11:30.030 --> 00:11:31.020
But what would happen?

00:11:31.020 --> 00:11:38.340
Well their profits to each firm
would be their 48 flights

00:11:38.340 --> 00:11:44.510
they do times the price they get
minus the marginal cost.

00:11:44.510 --> 00:11:47.190
Marginal cost is average
cost here.

00:11:47.190 --> 00:11:55.040
The price they get minus the
marginal cost. That would mean

00:11:55.040 --> 00:12:01.490
per firm the profits
would be $4,608.

00:12:01.490 --> 00:12:04.195
So each firm would make
$4,608 in profits.

00:12:04.195 --> 00:12:05.070
Actually that's four million.

00:12:05.070 --> 00:12:06.060
This is in thousands, right.

00:12:06.060 --> 00:12:09.400
So $4,608,000.

00:12:09.400 --> 00:12:12.300
Let's compare that to the
profits they made as Cournot

00:12:12.300 --> 00:12:13.690
competitors.

00:12:13.690 --> 00:12:15.936
Once again comparing the upper
box to the lower box, going

00:12:15.936 --> 00:12:16.770
back to the prisoner's
dilemma.

00:12:16.770 --> 00:12:19.830
I think that is actually
useful to think about.

00:12:19.830 --> 00:12:21.320
Let's compare that to what
happened when they were

00:12:21.320 --> 00:12:22.460
Cournot competitors.

00:12:22.460 --> 00:12:26.650
When they were Cournot they
each took 64 flights.

00:12:26.650 --> 00:12:31.260
They each did more flights when
they were competing, but

00:12:31.260 --> 00:12:36.890
they only got to charge $211
with that same marginal cost.

00:12:36.890 --> 00:12:39.840
So their profits as Cournot
competitors

00:12:39.840 --> 00:12:48.640
were $4,096,000 each.

00:12:48.640 --> 00:12:51.810
So by monopolizing and splitting
the market they

00:12:51.810 --> 00:12:55.360
raised their profits by
12.5%, by an eighth.

00:12:55.360 --> 00:12:59.200
Their profits went up by an
eighth, by 12.5%, which is a

00:12:59.200 --> 00:13:02.920
major jump in profits by getting
together and forming

00:13:02.920 --> 00:13:03.940
this cartel.

00:13:03.940 --> 00:13:06.790
Just as the two prisoners were
better off not ratting each

00:13:06.790 --> 00:13:08.680
other out, they were
both better off not

00:13:08.680 --> 00:13:09.780
ratting each other out.

00:13:09.780 --> 00:13:13.070
These guys are both better off
getting together and forming a

00:13:13.070 --> 00:13:19.380
cartel and splitting the
profits, same logic.

00:13:19.380 --> 00:13:22.710
So why don't we see these
cartels everywhere?

00:13:22.710 --> 00:13:24.376
Why do we have American
and United, why don't

00:13:24.376 --> 00:13:25.600
they just do this?

00:13:25.600 --> 00:13:27.790
Well that's for two reasons.

00:13:27.790 --> 00:13:31.530
Two reasons why we don't see
these cartels everywhere.

00:13:31.530 --> 00:13:34.745
The first reason, so
why not cartels?

00:13:40.380 --> 00:13:43.860
The first reason why we don't
see cartels is there's a

00:13:43.860 --> 00:13:45.110
fundamental instability.

00:13:49.220 --> 00:13:52.680
Cooperative equilibria are
fundamentally unstable because

00:13:52.680 --> 00:13:57.200
any one party has an
incentive to cheat.

00:13:57.200 --> 00:14:01.190
Any one party in a cartel can
make money by cheating because

00:14:01.190 --> 00:14:03.310
they stick the other firms
in the cartel.

00:14:03.310 --> 00:14:05.850
So let's just talk about
this for a second.

00:14:05.850 --> 00:14:08.800
Imagine what would happen if
American decided to cheat.

00:14:08.800 --> 00:14:10.560
Imagine they had this cartel,
it's running along, they're

00:14:10.560 --> 00:14:14.060
each making their $4,608,000
per month profit.

00:14:14.060 --> 00:14:16.020
They're all very happy.

00:14:16.020 --> 00:14:19.210
Now imagine American says, wait
a second, what if on the

00:14:19.210 --> 00:14:23.530
sly I increase my number
flights from 48 to 50?

00:14:23.530 --> 00:14:25.760
What if I just did that and did
it in a way which wasn't

00:14:25.760 --> 00:14:27.720
immediately transparent
to United?

00:14:27.720 --> 00:14:32.110
So American takes its q sub a
which was cranking along as 48

00:14:32.110 --> 00:14:35.200
and it raised it to 50.

00:14:35.200 --> 00:14:37.010
Well what happens?

00:14:37.010 --> 00:14:41.480
Well if they do that the total
quantity in the market instead

00:14:41.480 --> 00:14:45.320
of being 96 rises to 98.

00:14:45.320 --> 00:14:47.270
And if it rises to 98 that means
the price is going to

00:14:47.270 --> 00:14:48.150
fall, right?

00:14:48.150 --> 00:14:49.650
This is not a price
discriminating monopolist,

00:14:49.650 --> 00:14:51.740
this is a one price monopolist.
So if they want to

00:14:51.740 --> 00:14:54.850
sell 98 flights, the price
is going to have to fall.

00:14:54.850 --> 00:14:59.060
So the price is going to
fall to $241 from the

00:14:59.060 --> 00:15:02.270
current level of $243.

00:15:02.270 --> 00:15:03.790
Well you might say, gee
American just shot

00:15:03.790 --> 00:15:04.480
itself in the foot.

00:15:04.480 --> 00:15:07.500
Its just lowered the price
by selling more flights.

00:15:07.500 --> 00:15:10.510
But look what happens to
American's profits.

00:15:10.510 --> 00:15:19.020
American's profits are now 50
times 241 minus 147 which

00:15:19.020 --> 00:15:24.830
equals $4,700,000 which
is higher than it

00:15:24.830 --> 00:15:27.390
was making ib a cartel.

00:15:27.390 --> 00:15:32.750
American just increased its
profits to more than they were

00:15:32.750 --> 00:15:37.970
making when they cartelized
splitting the profits.

00:15:37.970 --> 00:15:40.280
And what's happened to United?

00:15:40.280 --> 00:15:42.070
So this is profits
for American.

00:15:45.840 --> 00:15:49.250
United's still doing 48 flights
but the price has now

00:15:49.250 --> 00:15:53.910
fallen to $241.

00:15:53.910 --> 00:16:04.930
So United's profits
fall to $4512.

00:16:04.930 --> 00:16:06.760
United's profits fall.

00:16:06.760 --> 00:16:09.520
American's profits go up.

00:16:09.520 --> 00:16:11.086
So basically American
has stuck it

00:16:11.086 --> 00:16:12.336
to United by cheating.

00:16:15.470 --> 00:16:17.470
It's raised its profits at
the expense of United.

00:16:17.470 --> 00:16:18.300
And why is that?

00:16:18.300 --> 00:16:19.360
What's the intuition?

00:16:19.360 --> 00:16:21.155
Well it goes back to our
monopoly intuition.

00:16:24.010 --> 00:16:28.570
Because when one firm cheats
in a cartel it gets all the

00:16:28.570 --> 00:16:32.250
benefit of the extra quantity,
but only feels part of the

00:16:32.250 --> 00:16:34.250
poisoning effect.

00:16:34.250 --> 00:16:36.090
Remember when a monopolist
increases its quantity.

00:16:36.090 --> 00:16:36.910
It's got these two effects.

00:16:36.910 --> 00:16:39.390
It sells more but poisons
its previous sales.

00:16:39.390 --> 00:16:42.060
Well here when American sells
two more flights, it sells

00:16:42.060 --> 00:16:44.840
more, it's got all that effect
like a monopolist would, but

00:16:44.840 --> 00:16:48.270
the poisoning effect is
shared with United.

00:16:48.270 --> 00:16:51.210
They don't feel as much pain
from that price going down

00:16:51.210 --> 00:16:52.860
because they're sharing
that pain with United.

00:16:52.860 --> 00:16:54.840
They get all of the benefit
from quantity going up and

00:16:54.840 --> 00:16:57.220
only part of the pain for
price coming down.

00:16:57.220 --> 00:16:59.516
And that's why it makes
sense to cheat.

00:16:59.516 --> 00:17:01.340
A monopolist would never
cheat itself.

00:17:01.340 --> 00:17:03.410
It'd make no sense for the
monopolist suddenly to go from

00:17:03.410 --> 00:17:06.480
96 to 98 and say, ha I've
cheated myself because it

00:17:06.480 --> 00:17:09.900
would feel the entire pain
of the poisoning effect.

00:17:09.900 --> 00:17:10.910
But American doesn't.

00:17:10.910 --> 00:17:13.119
That's shared with United.

00:17:13.119 --> 00:17:15.520
So it actually makes sense to
cheat because they get all the

00:17:15.520 --> 00:17:17.228
benefit of the more quantity and
only part of the cost of

00:17:17.228 --> 00:17:18.780
the lower price.

00:17:18.780 --> 00:17:24.540
And that's intuitively
what's going on.

00:17:24.540 --> 00:17:27.599
Questions about that?

00:17:27.599 --> 00:17:32.850
Well knowing this, clearly
United says, wait a second, if

00:17:32.850 --> 00:17:35.180
we form a cartel American
will cheat.

00:17:35.180 --> 00:17:37.330
So I'm going to cheat
first and the

00:17:37.330 --> 00:17:38.120
whole thing falls apart.

00:17:38.120 --> 00:17:40.020
And we get back to the repeated
game intuition we

00:17:40.020 --> 00:17:41.480
talked about in our game
theory lecture.

00:17:41.480 --> 00:17:44.350
Where if they can commit to
never cheat, if they can

00:17:44.350 --> 00:17:45.900
commit to punish each other if
they cheat, you might be able

00:17:45.900 --> 00:17:48.020
to make this work in a repeated
game, but only if the

00:17:48.020 --> 00:17:50.740
repeated game never ends.

00:17:50.740 --> 00:17:53.040
So if there's either not a
repeated game, or it's a

00:17:53.040 --> 00:17:54.980
repeated game with an end,
then there's going to be

00:17:54.980 --> 00:17:56.140
incentive for someone
to cheat.

00:17:56.140 --> 00:17:57.710
Once there's an incentive for
someone to cheat, the whole

00:17:57.710 --> 00:17:59.660
thing falls apart.

00:17:59.660 --> 00:18:03.780
And that's why cartels are
fundamentally unstable.

00:18:03.780 --> 00:18:09.070
Now there's a second reason why
we don't see cartels which

00:18:09.070 --> 00:18:10.830
economists would always
put second.

00:18:10.830 --> 00:18:13.270
We always put the economic
stuff first and the legal

00:18:13.270 --> 00:18:14.090
stuff second.

00:18:14.090 --> 00:18:17.250
The second is they're illegal,
but we think that's less

00:18:17.250 --> 00:18:22.480
important as economists because
we think folks are

00:18:22.480 --> 00:18:25.380
often smart enough to figure
their way around laws.

00:18:25.380 --> 00:18:26.150
Technically these are illegal.

00:18:26.150 --> 00:18:28.330
In fact, in the late 1800s
cartels were very

00:18:28.330 --> 00:18:29.170
common in the US.

00:18:29.170 --> 00:18:30.830
They were called the trusts.

00:18:30.830 --> 00:18:33.610
There were trusts in sugar,
railroads, other areas.

00:18:33.610 --> 00:18:35.940
This is how these robber barons
made all their money--

00:18:35.940 --> 00:18:38.120
the Rockefellers and the
Vanderbilts and stuff-- was by

00:18:38.120 --> 00:18:41.200
building monopolies.

00:18:41.200 --> 00:18:42.000
That's what made their money.

00:18:42.000 --> 00:18:45.420
And then in the early 20th
century Congress passed what

00:18:45.420 --> 00:18:50.040
was called anti-trust laws which
explicitly forbid the

00:18:50.040 --> 00:18:55.160
creation of cartels or
these kind of trusts.

00:18:55.160 --> 00:18:57.160
So technically they're
illegal.

00:18:57.160 --> 00:19:00.380
In fact, there are lots of ways,
and Perloff talks about

00:19:00.380 --> 00:19:02.840
this in his book, there are lots
of ways that firms can

00:19:02.840 --> 00:19:05.130
implicitly cartelize.

00:19:05.130 --> 00:19:10.880
There are ways that firms can
say, look we'll get together

00:19:10.880 --> 00:19:14.790
not under the government's
auspices and we'll agree that

00:19:14.790 --> 00:19:16.730
you raise your price and I'll do
it two weeks later and look

00:19:16.730 --> 00:19:17.610
like we're not a cartel.

00:19:17.610 --> 00:19:20.820
I'm just following you, but in
fact we've agreed to do it.

00:19:20.820 --> 00:19:28.480
So there is some implicit
cartelization and basically

00:19:28.480 --> 00:19:30.830
that's why there's an anti-trust
division exists

00:19:30.830 --> 00:19:31.160
that's quite large.

00:19:31.160 --> 00:19:34.290
The Department of Justice is
basically to prosecute exactly

00:19:34.290 --> 00:19:35.750
those cases when firms
try to do that.

00:19:38.480 --> 00:19:41.730
Now in fact, however, the
government has a bit of blood

00:19:41.730 --> 00:19:44.210
on its hands in this respect,
because sometimes the

00:19:44.210 --> 00:19:46.390
government actually promotes
cartels even though it might

00:19:46.390 --> 00:19:47.970
not mean to do so.

00:19:47.970 --> 00:19:52.480
And the best example was the
1981 voluntary export

00:19:52.480 --> 00:19:56.500
restraint policy, the Reagan
administration.

00:19:56.500 --> 00:20:00.070
1981 was the worst recession
before this one.

00:20:00.070 --> 00:20:02.085
Actually unemployment was
higher than this one.

00:20:02.085 --> 00:20:04.060
This is a very bad recession,
but actually unemployment was

00:20:04.060 --> 00:20:05.660
higher in 1981.

00:20:05.660 --> 00:20:08.430
It was well over 10%.

00:20:08.430 --> 00:20:11.940
And a big place where
unemployment was high was in

00:20:11.940 --> 00:20:13.670
the manufacturing sector,
particularly auto

00:20:13.670 --> 00:20:14.610
manufacturing.

00:20:14.610 --> 00:20:16.440
We were getting killed
by Japan.

00:20:16.440 --> 00:20:18.660
Basically this was the first
wave of Japan really producing

00:20:18.660 --> 00:20:20.490
much better cars than the US.

00:20:20.490 --> 00:20:22.180
And US car manufacturers
were suffering

00:20:22.180 --> 00:20:24.060
enormously as a result.

00:20:24.060 --> 00:20:27.700
So basically the Reagan
administration was trying to

00:20:27.700 --> 00:20:30.240
figure out what to
do about this.

00:20:30.240 --> 00:20:32.070
One thing you could do, and
we'll talk about in

00:20:32.070 --> 00:20:34.150
international trade in a few
lectures, you could impose a

00:20:34.150 --> 00:20:37.200
quota and you could actually say
to Japanese producers, you

00:20:37.200 --> 00:20:38.460
can't sell in America.

00:20:38.460 --> 00:20:39.965
But Reagan was a Republican.

00:20:39.965 --> 00:20:41.480
And Republicans are
for free trade.

00:20:41.480 --> 00:20:43.730
And he really couldn't
do that politically.

00:20:43.730 --> 00:20:45.740
Plus economists have often
said that's a bad idea.

00:20:45.740 --> 00:20:47.960
And we'll talk about why
that's a bad idea.

00:20:47.960 --> 00:20:51.410
What Reagan did instead was
said to the Japanese auto

00:20:51.410 --> 00:20:53.640
manufacturers, look, I'm
a charismatic guy.

00:20:53.640 --> 00:20:54.500
I'm Ronald Reagan.

00:20:54.500 --> 00:20:56.570
Why don't we get together in a
room and I'll convince you to

00:20:56.570 --> 00:20:58.810
just export less to America.

00:20:58.810 --> 00:21:01.220
Let's have a voluntary export
restraint agreement.

00:21:01.220 --> 00:21:02.990
Where I'm not going to put on a
quota, because that would be

00:21:02.990 --> 00:21:04.980
bad, I'm going to actually
suggest to you, I'm going to

00:21:04.980 --> 00:21:08.940
make you an offer you can't
refuse that you just export

00:21:08.940 --> 00:21:11.530
less to the US.

00:21:11.530 --> 00:21:14.230
It was basically a back door
way of imposing a quota

00:21:14.230 --> 00:21:17.880
without looking as politically
bad as actually imposing one.

00:21:17.880 --> 00:21:21.390
And in fact, Japanese automakers
agreed to this and

00:21:21.390 --> 00:21:24.630
reduced their sales
of cars in the US.

00:21:24.630 --> 00:21:27.550
Now why would they
agree to this?

00:21:27.550 --> 00:21:29.680
Now there's two explanations.

00:21:29.680 --> 00:21:31.850
One is they could have thought
if they didn't then a quota

00:21:31.850 --> 00:21:32.580
was coming.

00:21:32.580 --> 00:21:35.320
They could have said, look,
this is kind of an olive

00:21:35.320 --> 00:21:38.050
branch before they
lower the hammer.

00:21:38.050 --> 00:21:39.460
That's a really bad
set of metaphors,

00:21:39.460 --> 00:21:40.740
but you get the idea.

00:21:40.740 --> 00:21:43.020
That basically look, if we don't
do this, then he's going

00:21:43.020 --> 00:21:44.840
to impose a quota.

00:21:44.840 --> 00:21:46.890
The other is they could have
said, thank you Ronald Reagan,

00:21:46.890 --> 00:21:49.160
you've just formed
a cartel for us.

00:21:49.160 --> 00:21:51.690
We can't stop from competing
against each other.

00:21:51.690 --> 00:21:53.900
We can't stop cheating.

00:21:53.900 --> 00:21:55.510
We'd like to form a cartel
but we can't.

00:21:55.510 --> 00:21:57.610
But you've told us we have to
cartelize because you've

00:21:57.610 --> 00:21:59.680
limited how much we can sell.

00:21:59.680 --> 00:22:03.130
You've essentially said, look
you can't sell more than this.

00:22:03.130 --> 00:22:04.410
You have to agree to sell
more than that.

00:22:04.410 --> 00:22:06.470
You've essentially allowed us
a framework where we can get

00:22:06.470 --> 00:22:09.200
together and implicitly
cartelize in a way where it's

00:22:09.200 --> 00:22:10.820
hard to cheat because then
we'd be violating the

00:22:10.820 --> 00:22:12.990
agreement with America.

00:22:12.990 --> 00:22:16.410
So basically what Reagan gave
the Japanese was a cartel

00:22:16.410 --> 00:22:18.130
enforcing device.

00:22:18.130 --> 00:22:21.600
What American and United need is
some way where American and

00:22:21.600 --> 00:22:24.540
United can monitor each other to
make sure they don't cheat.

00:22:24.540 --> 00:22:25.820
That's what Reagan gave
the Japanese.

00:22:25.820 --> 00:22:27.530
Said, I'm going to report on how
many cars are selling in

00:22:27.530 --> 00:22:29.910
the US and you're going to agree
to limit it to this.

00:22:29.910 --> 00:22:32.260
And they're like, great, that
gives us the tool we need to

00:22:32.260 --> 00:22:34.330
enforce the cartel we wanted
in the first place.

00:22:34.330 --> 00:22:35.480
Thank you very much.

00:22:35.480 --> 00:22:36.580
They made a ton of money.

00:22:36.580 --> 00:22:38.930
American consumers lost out.

00:22:38.930 --> 00:22:40.720
And I'll talk more about
international trade on why

00:22:40.720 --> 00:22:41.500
that happens.

00:22:41.500 --> 00:22:43.170
But the bottom line
is, this end up

00:22:43.170 --> 00:22:46.070
being just like a quota.

00:22:46.070 --> 00:22:48.335
The bad thing about quotas and
things like this is that

00:22:48.335 --> 00:22:53.750
essentially they raise prices
and hurt American consumers.

00:22:53.750 --> 00:22:55.420
And in this case they were bad
for American consumers and

00:22:55.420 --> 00:22:57.340
very good for Japanese
producers.

00:22:57.340 --> 00:23:00.710
We essentially increased profits
for Japanese producers

00:23:00.710 --> 00:23:02.530
which they used to develop
better cars and then came in

00:23:02.530 --> 00:23:04.810
later and killed us in the
car market anyway.

00:23:04.810 --> 00:23:08.680
So it was dynamically a pretty
terrible policy.

00:23:08.680 --> 00:23:14.100
So that's the legal issues
around cartels.

00:23:14.100 --> 00:23:16.900
Now what I want to do now is
step back for a second and

00:23:16.900 --> 00:23:22.940
say, we've now talked about
three different kinds of

00:23:22.940 --> 00:23:27.300
market forms. We've talked about
perfect competition.

00:23:27.300 --> 00:23:28.810
We've talked about monopoly.

00:23:28.810 --> 00:23:30.070
And we've talked about
oligopoly.

00:23:30.070 --> 00:23:32.070
In particular, non-cooperative
oligopoly which is a more

00:23:32.070 --> 00:23:33.790
interesting case since within
cartels it's going to be hard

00:23:33.790 --> 00:23:34.950
to sustain.

00:23:34.950 --> 00:23:36.230
Non cooperative oligopoly.

00:23:36.230 --> 00:23:37.190
We've talked about three.

00:23:37.190 --> 00:23:38.750
How do these compare?

00:23:38.750 --> 00:23:41.730
So let's just do ourselves
a little chart.

00:23:41.730 --> 00:23:42.990
Let's consider the
three cases.

00:23:42.990 --> 00:23:51.010
We've got monopoly, oligopoly,
and perfect

00:23:51.010 --> 00:23:54.120
competition, three cases.

00:23:54.120 --> 00:23:56.970
Let's ask how they compare
on quantity and

00:23:56.970 --> 00:23:59.500
on profits per firm.

00:23:59.500 --> 00:24:03.750
Quantity produced in the market
and profits per firm.

00:24:03.750 --> 00:24:06.840
And let's do it for this
American, United example.

00:24:06.840 --> 00:24:09.940
Well we know the monopoly case,
we told you that in the

00:24:09.940 --> 00:24:13.210
monopoly case 96 units get
produced in the market.

00:24:13.210 --> 00:24:20.500
And the profits per firm
are $4,608,000.

00:24:20.500 --> 00:24:24.430
In the oligopoly case that's
the Cournot case, in the

00:24:24.430 --> 00:24:27.920
Cournot oligopoly case we said
the total amount in the market

00:24:27.920 --> 00:24:32.180
was 64 per firm or 128,000.

00:24:32.180 --> 00:24:34.010
And the profits per
firm were lower.

00:24:34.010 --> 00:24:40.510
They were $4,096,000 per firm.

00:24:40.510 --> 00:24:43.910
Now what about in perfect
competition?

00:24:43.910 --> 00:24:46.120
What's the quantity that's going
to be sold, what's the

00:24:46.120 --> 00:24:49.710
price going to be in perfect
competition?

00:24:49.710 --> 00:24:50.670
We haven't done perfect
competition.

00:24:50.670 --> 00:24:51.160
You can tell me.

00:24:51.160 --> 00:24:51.920
You can just do that
intuitively.

00:24:51.920 --> 00:24:54.310
What's going to happen in this
market if there's perfect

00:24:54.310 --> 00:24:55.090
competition what's this
price going to be?

00:24:55.090 --> 00:24:57.090
Somebody raise their
hand and tell me.

00:24:57.090 --> 00:24:57.870
Yeah in the back.

00:24:57.870 --> 00:24:59.271
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]

00:24:59.271 --> 00:25:01.920
PROFESSOR: 147, because price
equals marginal cost in

00:25:01.920 --> 00:25:03.130
perfect competition.

00:25:03.130 --> 00:25:08.890
So quantity would be 339
minus 147 or 192.

00:25:08.890 --> 00:25:10.450
There will be 192 units sold.

00:25:10.450 --> 00:25:11.970
And what will profits be?

00:25:11.970 --> 00:25:14.130
Zero.

00:25:14.130 --> 00:25:15.420
Zero profits in perfect
competition.

00:25:15.420 --> 00:25:17.640
With a flat marginal cost there
will be zero profits

00:25:17.640 --> 00:25:20.250
with perfect competition.

00:25:20.250 --> 00:25:33.970
So we can now compare this and
we could say, an oligopoly

00:25:33.970 --> 00:25:38.140
case leads to less output and
more profits than does perfect

00:25:38.140 --> 00:25:39.630
competition.

00:25:39.630 --> 00:25:42.150
And a monopoly case leads to
even less output and even more

00:25:42.150 --> 00:25:43.615
profits than does oligopoly.

00:25:46.530 --> 00:25:51.360
And basically how do we think
about welfare in this case.

00:25:51.360 --> 00:25:53.230
Well to think about welfare
you'd have to actually draw

00:25:53.230 --> 00:25:58.490
the diagrams to compute producer
and consumer surplus.

00:25:58.490 --> 00:26:03.435
What I could draw and show you
is basically social welfare is

00:26:03.435 --> 00:26:06.336
highest in the perfect
competition case, lowest in

00:26:06.336 --> 00:26:08.933
the monopoly case, and we talked
a couple times about

00:26:08.933 --> 00:26:09.965
the deadweight loss
of monopoly.

00:26:09.965 --> 00:26:10.970
This is not a price

00:26:10.970 --> 00:26:12.610
discriminating monopolist remember.

00:26:12.610 --> 00:26:15.500
This is a one price monopolist
so there's deadweight loss.

00:26:15.500 --> 00:26:18.190
And it turns out if you write
down the graph that it's in

00:26:18.190 --> 00:26:20.370
between the oligopoly case.

00:26:20.370 --> 00:26:24.050
Oligopolies cause some
deadweight loss, it's worse

00:26:24.050 --> 00:26:26.420
than perfect competition but
better then monopoly in terms

00:26:26.420 --> 00:26:28.440
of total welfare.

00:26:28.440 --> 00:26:31.670
And in fact, the bottom line
is, we can actually pretty

00:26:31.670 --> 00:26:33.060
much tell what happens
to welfare.

00:26:33.060 --> 00:26:34.920
A shortcut for thinking
about welfare

00:26:34.920 --> 00:26:37.890
is to look at quantity.

00:26:37.890 --> 00:26:42.000
Because remember what social
welfare is about, what causes

00:26:42.000 --> 00:26:44.730
deadweight loss, is trades
that aren't made.

00:26:48.330 --> 00:26:51.380
Under perfect competition
every trade that has a

00:26:51.380 --> 00:26:54.620
positive social surpluses
is made.

00:26:54.620 --> 00:26:57.420
So the closer the quantity
produced comes to the perfect

00:26:57.420 --> 00:27:00.310
competition level, the smaller
will be the deadweight loss,

00:27:00.310 --> 00:27:01.910
roughly speaking.

00:27:01.910 --> 00:27:04.480
So it isn't always true, and
you can find bizarre

00:27:04.480 --> 00:27:08.850
deviations, but a good rule of
thumb is that welfare, the

00:27:08.850 --> 00:27:10.450
distortion of perfect
competition will be

00:27:10.450 --> 00:27:13.090
proportional to how much
quantity falls relative to

00:27:13.090 --> 00:27:15.490
perfect competition.

00:27:15.490 --> 00:27:17.020
If quantity falls a lot
relative to perfect

00:27:17.020 --> 00:27:19.200
competition, that's going to
be a big loss in welfare.

00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:20.950
If quantity is falling just a
little, it's going to be a

00:27:20.950 --> 00:27:21.740
small loss in welfare.

00:27:21.740 --> 00:27:23.500
And that goes back to that
deadweight loss triangle.

00:27:23.500 --> 00:27:25.080
About the fact that it's
smallest right around the

00:27:25.080 --> 00:27:27.076
perfect combination equilibrium
and gets bigger as

00:27:27.076 --> 00:27:28.326
you move further away.

00:27:30.420 --> 00:27:34.600
So basically perfect combination
is the best,

00:27:34.600 --> 00:27:35.900
monopoly is the worst, oligopoly
would be somewhere

00:27:35.900 --> 00:27:37.150
in between.

00:27:43.380 --> 00:27:44.690
This leads to the question.

00:27:44.690 --> 00:27:46.180
I think you might look at this
chart and ask yourself is

00:27:46.180 --> 00:27:49.850
well, gee, does this sort of say
that the number of firms

00:27:49.850 --> 00:27:52.090
determines welfare?

00:27:52.090 --> 00:27:55.696
You've got one firm, two firms,
infinite firms so can

00:27:55.696 --> 00:27:58.190
we make a more general statement
about the role the

00:27:58.190 --> 00:27:58.930
number of firms.

00:27:58.930 --> 00:28:02.610
And it turns out the Cournot
model we can.

00:28:02.610 --> 00:28:06.260
Basically in the Cournot model,
the more firms there

00:28:06.260 --> 00:28:10.240
are, the closer you get to
perfect competition.

00:28:10.240 --> 00:28:13.550
In the Cournot model as n
increases you approach perfect

00:28:13.550 --> 00:28:16.040
competition.

00:28:16.040 --> 00:28:17.910
And in particular, and the book
does the math in this,

00:28:17.910 --> 00:28:20.940
you don't need to know the math,
it's more the intuition.

00:28:20.940 --> 00:28:24.440
But the book shows that the
markup in a market, price

00:28:24.440 --> 00:28:28.020
minus marginal cost over price,
in a Cournot market is

00:28:28.020 --> 00:28:31.410
equal to 1 over n times the
elasticity of demand.

00:28:36.250 --> 00:28:41.740
That is that we've said before
that markup was inversely

00:28:41.740 --> 00:28:44.370
proportional to elasticity
of demand.

00:28:44.370 --> 00:28:46.260
I might have used a different
letter, I might have used nu

00:28:46.260 --> 00:28:47.050
for that elasticity.

00:28:47.050 --> 00:28:48.150
But this is elasticity
of demand.

00:28:48.150 --> 00:28:49.380
I forget what letter
I used last time.

00:28:49.380 --> 00:28:51.600
Same elasticity I've
been using.

00:28:51.600 --> 00:28:55.200
So basically, we said before we
had this equation, right?

00:28:55.200 --> 00:28:56.915
We said markup was inversely
proportional

00:28:56.915 --> 00:28:58.290
to elasticity demand.

00:28:58.290 --> 00:29:00.540
The more inelastic was the good,
the higher market power

00:29:00.540 --> 00:29:02.080
the monopolist had.

00:29:02.080 --> 00:29:06.140
Well here we now divide by n.

00:29:06.140 --> 00:29:08.680
So the point is, that for a
given elasticity of demand the

00:29:08.680 --> 00:29:11.260
more firms that are competing in
the oligopolistic setting,

00:29:11.260 --> 00:29:19.050
the closer and closer you're
going to get to a zero mark-up

00:29:19.050 --> 00:29:21.750
with a Cournot equilibrium.

00:29:21.750 --> 00:29:24.500
So it's just this intuition
you see from this table.

00:29:24.500 --> 00:29:26.110
This is one firm.

00:29:26.110 --> 00:29:27.770
Then oligopoly can imagine
a number of branches.

00:29:27.770 --> 00:29:29.490
This is oligopoly with two
firms. You should be able to

00:29:29.490 --> 00:29:30.000
show yourself.

00:29:30.000 --> 00:29:32.410
If there were three firms, which
you can solve, that's

00:29:32.410 --> 00:29:33.600
three equations and
three unknowns.

00:29:33.600 --> 00:29:36.700
It's the same math
we just did.

00:29:36.700 --> 00:29:37.520
It's high school math.

00:29:37.520 --> 00:29:40.120
You can do this if you just put
in three firms, do three

00:29:40.120 --> 00:29:42.040
equations and three unknowns,
you get an even higher

00:29:42.040 --> 00:29:43.600
quantity and so on.

00:29:43.600 --> 00:29:45.360
So as the number of firms goes
up you're going to move that

00:29:45.360 --> 00:29:47.590
quantity up towards the perfect
competition level and

00:29:47.590 --> 00:29:50.260
profits will fall towards the
zero that we get from perfect

00:29:50.260 --> 00:29:52.780
competition.

00:29:52.780 --> 00:29:55.650
And this is consistent with
our rough notion.

00:29:55.650 --> 00:29:57.450
We talked about extremes, about
perfect competition

00:29:57.450 --> 00:29:59.990
being lots of firms, the
monopoly being one firm.

00:29:59.990 --> 00:30:02.870
But this confirms the rough
intuition of the more firms,

00:30:02.870 --> 00:30:04.690
the more competition.

00:30:04.690 --> 00:30:06.480
That's a good solid intuition.

00:30:08.980 --> 00:30:17.720
Now this raises the interesting
question about

00:30:17.720 --> 00:30:21.170
should we ever allow
the number of firms

00:30:21.170 --> 00:30:23.430
in a market to shrink.

00:30:23.430 --> 00:30:24.780
Should we ever allow the
number of firms in

00:30:24.780 --> 00:30:27.360
the market to shrink?

00:30:27.360 --> 00:30:31.810
What we call that is we
call that a merger.

00:30:31.810 --> 00:30:33.030
You've all heard of mergers.

00:30:33.030 --> 00:30:34.990
When two companies merge
to form one company.

00:30:34.990 --> 00:30:39.020
Well by the logic I just told
you that's going to be bad.

00:30:39.020 --> 00:30:41.320
I just said that the
more firms you

00:30:41.320 --> 00:30:42.440
have, the higher welfare.

00:30:42.440 --> 00:30:43.695
The more you get towards
perfect competition.

00:30:46.400 --> 00:30:47.840
And yet mergers happen
all the time.

00:30:47.840 --> 00:30:49.870
The government does
not stop them.

00:30:49.870 --> 00:30:52.070
The government typically
investigates them if they're

00:30:52.070 --> 00:30:54.810
big mergers, the government
would

00:30:54.810 --> 00:30:56.100
typically investigate them.

00:30:56.100 --> 00:31:00.290
But by and large they often
let them go through.

00:31:00.290 --> 00:31:02.370
Why is that?

00:31:02.370 --> 00:31:05.940
Why should the government
not stop all mergers?

00:31:05.940 --> 00:31:08.370
And in particular, if anyone for
extra credit, can anyone

00:31:08.370 --> 00:31:11.410
tell me what concept we covered
which would explain

00:31:11.410 --> 00:31:13.190
why it might make sense to
allow firms to merge.

00:31:13.190 --> 00:31:13.650
Yeah.

00:31:13.650 --> 00:31:14.940
AUDIENCE: The economy
of scale.

00:31:14.940 --> 00:31:17.410
PROFESSOR: Economies
of scale, exactly.

00:31:17.410 --> 00:31:18.980
That's the term I
was looking for.

00:31:18.980 --> 00:31:22.520
It could be that you have two
firms that are producing

00:31:22.520 --> 00:31:25.560
inefficiently relative to having
combined production.

00:31:25.560 --> 00:31:28.100
So you've got one plant that
produces the left shoes and

00:31:28.100 --> 00:31:31.850
one plant that produces
the right shoes.

00:31:31.850 --> 00:31:32.920
And that's not a good example
because they wouldn't really

00:31:32.920 --> 00:31:33.770
compete with each other.

00:31:33.770 --> 00:31:34.600
But you know the point.

00:31:34.600 --> 00:31:39.858
The point let's say you've got
two firms competing with each

00:31:39.858 --> 00:31:42.170
other and they're both running
a plant at half capacity.

00:31:42.170 --> 00:31:43.880
There's two separate plants
running half capacity, much

00:31:43.880 --> 00:31:46.090
more efficient to have them
merge and have one plant run

00:31:46.090 --> 00:31:47.920
at full capacity.

00:31:47.920 --> 00:31:51.020
And yes, if they merged they
would then be a monopolist,

00:31:51.020 --> 00:31:54.440
but it's possible the cost
efficiencies could be so high

00:31:54.440 --> 00:31:56.960
a monopolist with lower marginal
cost might be better

00:31:56.960 --> 00:31:59.560
than oligopolist with higher
marginal cost. This is kind of

00:31:59.560 --> 00:32:02.053
like the patent example
I did last lecture

00:32:02.053 --> 00:32:03.140
or the lecture before.

00:32:03.140 --> 00:32:05.120
Where I talked about how a
patent could be a good thing

00:32:05.120 --> 00:32:06.210
or a bad thing.

00:32:06.210 --> 00:32:09.370
It depends on how much demand
increases due to the patent.

00:32:09.370 --> 00:32:10.940
It's the same notion here.

00:32:10.940 --> 00:32:13.920
The tradeoff is on the one hand
you get marginal cost

00:32:13.920 --> 00:32:21.890
down by allowing a merger, on
the other hand you reduce the

00:32:21.890 --> 00:32:24.020
number of firms in the market
by allowing a merger.

00:32:24.020 --> 00:32:25.540
And there's that tradeoff.

00:32:25.540 --> 00:32:29.850
You're going to raise each
firm's mark-up ability but by

00:32:29.850 --> 00:32:32.270
lowering marginal cost you might
actually in essence,

00:32:32.270 --> 00:32:34.090
might in the end lower
the price.

00:32:34.090 --> 00:32:35.490
And that's exactly what
the Department of

00:32:35.490 --> 00:32:38.250
Justice does every day.

00:32:38.250 --> 00:32:39.950
And this is what is the hundreds
of economists that

00:32:39.950 --> 00:32:41.380
work for the Department of
Justice do, they have quite an

00:32:41.380 --> 00:32:42.410
interesting job.

00:32:42.410 --> 00:32:44.410
They have to go ahead and
evaluate these mergers.

00:32:44.410 --> 00:32:46.715
People want to merge and they
have to say, well which effect

00:32:46.715 --> 00:32:48.720
is going to be larger.

00:32:48.720 --> 00:32:51.490
How do we decide whether the
savings from economies of

00:32:51.490 --> 00:32:54.900
scale exceed the cost and
increase market power?

00:32:54.900 --> 00:32:58.790
And that's just an incredibly
hard thing to do.

00:32:58.790 --> 00:33:02.060
That turns out to be an
incredibly hard thing to do.

00:33:02.060 --> 00:33:04.540
And part of the reason it's hard
is exactly comes back to

00:33:04.540 --> 00:33:06.000
what I talked about when I
talked about regulating

00:33:06.000 --> 00:33:06.950
monopolies.

00:33:06.950 --> 00:33:10.090
Because the data is controlled
by the market participants.

00:33:10.090 --> 00:33:12.560
And so you can have necessarily
good data on what

00:33:12.560 --> 00:33:13.440
it's going to do.

00:33:13.440 --> 00:33:17.060
So a great example
is hospitals.

00:33:17.060 --> 00:33:19.560
Over the last 20 years there's
been enormous mergers in the

00:33:19.560 --> 00:33:21.040
hospital sector.

00:33:21.040 --> 00:33:23.300
Even here in Boston we've seen
huge mergers of things like

00:33:23.300 --> 00:33:25.766
the Beth Israel and Deaconess
hospitals merge.

00:33:25.766 --> 00:33:28.280
Other hospitals merged.

00:33:28.280 --> 00:33:30.770
These mergers were big and had
to go before regulators.

00:33:30.770 --> 00:33:32.760
And the hospitals rightly argue,
look, there's huge

00:33:32.760 --> 00:33:36.120
economies of scale in
hospital production.

00:33:36.120 --> 00:33:39.050
Partly because hospitals
are rarely full.

00:33:39.050 --> 00:33:40.880
They have to have excess
capacity in case somebody

00:33:40.880 --> 00:33:41.480
comes in injured.

00:33:41.480 --> 00:33:42.890
They have to have an
extra bed around.

00:33:42.890 --> 00:33:45.440
They don't want people sleeping
in the halls.

00:33:45.440 --> 00:33:48.040
As a result, in a situation
where you're rarely full,

00:33:48.040 --> 00:33:50.370
where you're constantly under
capacity, there could be huge

00:33:50.370 --> 00:33:53.950
economies of scale from
combining and using your

00:33:53.950 --> 00:33:56.070
combined space more
effectively.

00:33:56.070 --> 00:33:57.710
So pretty compelling argument.

00:33:57.710 --> 00:34:02.220
And for that reason,
pretty plausible.

00:34:02.220 --> 00:34:03.490
Most hospital mergers were
allowed through.

00:34:03.490 --> 00:34:06.300
Very few hospital mergers
were rejected.

00:34:06.300 --> 00:34:07.670
Well what happened?

00:34:07.670 --> 00:34:10.310
It turns out the hospitals
just lied.

00:34:10.310 --> 00:34:12.630
They kept exactly the same
production process they had

00:34:12.630 --> 00:34:15.929
before the merger and
just raised prices.

00:34:15.929 --> 00:34:19.159
So in fact, Beth Israel and
Deaconess each kept their

00:34:19.159 --> 00:34:21.520
building just like they
had before the merger.

00:34:21.520 --> 00:34:22.980
They just charged more.

00:34:22.980 --> 00:34:26.050
Essentially they just
cartelized.

00:34:26.050 --> 00:34:28.199
But the government let
it go through.

00:34:28.199 --> 00:34:30.920
And what we've done,
essentially, is we're fooled

00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:34.639
by the theory of these economies
of scale, when in

00:34:34.639 --> 00:34:38.030
fact there was nothing to
force the companies to

00:34:38.030 --> 00:34:40.719
necessarily do much
to realize them.

00:34:40.719 --> 00:34:43.520
We just allowed them to
have market power.

00:34:43.520 --> 00:34:46.310
So basically this is an
incredibly tricky and

00:34:46.310 --> 00:34:49.050
difficult issue in deciding
whether to allow mergers or

00:34:49.050 --> 00:34:52.856
not is basically evaluating
whether in practice you'll see

00:34:52.856 --> 00:34:54.880
the economies of scale
that justify the

00:34:54.880 --> 00:34:56.310
increased market power.

00:34:56.310 --> 00:35:00.590
And that's why the Department
of Justice has a hard job.

00:35:00.590 --> 00:35:01.840
Questions about that?

00:35:04.230 --> 00:35:08.560
One other point I want to make
here is about the size the

00:35:08.560 --> 00:35:14.990
market is, I've talked about how
mathematically the size of

00:35:14.990 --> 00:35:17.930
the market will lead to
more competition.

00:35:17.930 --> 00:35:20.360
There's also another reason,
which is the bigger the

00:35:20.360 --> 00:35:23.900
market, the harder to
enforce a cartel.

00:35:23.900 --> 00:35:29.365
If there's two players in the
market and one cheats, the

00:35:29.365 --> 00:35:32.790
other one has the first one
whacked or something.

00:35:32.790 --> 00:35:35.630
You know what's going on, you
can keep an eye on each other,

00:35:35.630 --> 00:35:37.580
you know who's to blame.

00:35:37.580 --> 00:35:39.920
When there's lots of players
in the market it becomes--

00:35:39.920 --> 00:35:43.070
so let's say there was 10
airlines flying, it becomes

00:35:43.070 --> 00:35:45.390
hard to figure out
who's cheating.

00:35:45.390 --> 00:35:48.430
Or more still, imagine the most
important cartel in the

00:35:48.430 --> 00:35:50.100
world which is OPEC.

00:35:50.100 --> 00:35:53.210
The Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries.

00:35:53.210 --> 00:35:56.270
This is an organization of 20
plus countries who control the

00:35:56.270 --> 00:35:58.100
world's oil supply.

00:35:58.100 --> 00:36:00.590
But there's no good way
of tracking who's

00:36:00.590 --> 00:36:01.370
selling what oil.

00:36:01.370 --> 00:36:04.160
We just know the total amount
of oil sold out there.

00:36:04.160 --> 00:36:07.600
So if a country like Venezuela
run by some nutty guy decides

00:36:07.600 --> 00:36:10.930
to cheat and throw a bunch of
oil on the market, it's hard

00:36:10.930 --> 00:36:14.930
for the other members of OPEC
to actually view that.

00:36:14.930 --> 00:36:17.280
OPEC's efficiency has
varied over time.

00:36:17.280 --> 00:36:19.485
At times OPEC has not done such
a good job of controlling

00:36:19.485 --> 00:36:22.730
the supply of oil in the world,
at other times it has.

00:36:22.730 --> 00:36:24.460
But basically the more players,

00:36:24.460 --> 00:36:26.400
the harder it becomes.

00:36:26.400 --> 00:36:29.400
And as a good example, which
is the cartel to produce

00:36:29.400 --> 00:36:32.140
mercury was an existing
cartel.

00:36:32.140 --> 00:36:35.150
Italy and Spain essentially had
controlled the market to

00:36:35.150 --> 00:36:38.010
sell mercury.

00:36:38.010 --> 00:36:39.780
They had a very well
functioning cartel.

00:36:39.780 --> 00:36:43.640
Other countries entered and
the cartel broke down.

00:36:43.640 --> 00:36:44.790
So we can see this.

00:36:44.790 --> 00:36:48.980
And this becomes a big issue in
thinking about the benefits

00:36:48.980 --> 00:36:51.220
of enforcing competition.

00:36:51.220 --> 00:36:53.230
And becomes a big issue
in government policy.

00:36:53.230 --> 00:36:54.750
Here's another government policy
issue which you may

00:36:54.750 --> 00:36:58.210
followed lately which is
the rare earths issue.

00:36:58.210 --> 00:37:00.170
You guys all know as scientists
better than I, the

00:37:00.170 --> 00:37:01.680
importance of rare earths, but
these are materials which are

00:37:01.680 --> 00:37:03.910
very important for putting
in cell phone

00:37:03.910 --> 00:37:04.930
batteries and other things.

00:37:04.930 --> 00:37:07.210
These are important
new materials

00:37:07.210 --> 00:37:08.890
for the modern economy.

00:37:08.890 --> 00:37:11.710
The US used to be the dominant
producer of rare earths and

00:37:11.710 --> 00:37:13.870
then China turned out were able
to produce it much more

00:37:13.870 --> 00:37:16.410
efficiently, so we just
let China take it.

00:37:16.410 --> 00:37:20.560
So now 97% of the world's rare
earths are produced in China.

00:37:20.560 --> 00:37:23.226
China's now started saying
things like, Japan we're mad

00:37:23.226 --> 00:37:25.980
at you, we're not selling you
rare earths, which is a huge,

00:37:25.980 --> 00:37:27.310
huge problem.

00:37:27.310 --> 00:37:29.200
And basically we've allowed
China to essentially

00:37:29.200 --> 00:37:31.160
monopolize this market.

00:37:31.160 --> 00:37:35.590
Now we tend to think in
economics it's a bad idea for

00:37:35.590 --> 00:37:38.330
the government to subsidize
businesses.

00:37:38.330 --> 00:37:39.920
The government should just let
the economy work and decide

00:37:39.920 --> 00:37:40.650
what works.

00:37:40.650 --> 00:37:42.000
But this may be a case where the
government wants to say,

00:37:42.000 --> 00:37:44.220
no, we are going to actually
subsidize rare earths

00:37:44.220 --> 00:37:46.350
production in America, to make
sure on national security

00:37:46.350 --> 00:37:49.650
grounds we have enough in case
China decides to shut us off.

00:37:49.650 --> 00:37:51.490
And that's exactly the kind of
issue the government has to

00:37:51.490 --> 00:37:56.230
face in terms of trying to
decide whether or not to try

00:37:56.230 --> 00:37:58.320
to actively get in there and
promote competition versus

00:37:58.320 --> 00:38:01.280
just letting the market work.

00:38:01.280 --> 00:38:02.530
Questions about that?

00:38:04.840 --> 00:38:08.660
Now I want to talk about one
last thing before we stop,

00:38:08.660 --> 00:38:13.110
which is the fact that Cournot
competition is not the only

00:38:13.110 --> 00:38:15.930
model of competition
out there.

00:38:15.930 --> 00:38:17.410
In fact it might not even
be the first one

00:38:17.410 --> 00:38:18.990
that comes to mind.

00:38:18.990 --> 00:38:22.120
In fact, if I said to you,
imagine two firms competing to

00:38:22.120 --> 00:38:26.200
sell something, the first thing
to come to your mind

00:38:26.200 --> 00:38:30.470
would probably not be best
response functions.

00:38:30.470 --> 00:38:33.060
If you say, well they just
compete over the price.

00:38:33.060 --> 00:38:34.670
And if there was really tough
competition the price would

00:38:34.670 --> 00:38:35.980
just come down.

00:38:35.980 --> 00:38:39.640
And the limit, if they're
incredibly good competitors,

00:38:39.640 --> 00:38:43.680
the price would have to come
down close to marginal cost.

00:38:43.680 --> 00:38:49.250
Well that is a different model
of competition that we call

00:38:49.250 --> 00:38:53.575
Bertrand or price competition.

00:39:01.260 --> 00:39:03.670
Cournot competition is
competition over quantities.

00:39:03.670 --> 00:39:06.350
You get together and decide how
much quantity to produce

00:39:06.350 --> 00:39:08.210
given what the other guy is
producing and then the market

00:39:08.210 --> 00:39:09.860
gives you the price.

00:39:09.860 --> 00:39:14.450
Bertrand competition is the flip
of that, which is firms

00:39:14.450 --> 00:39:17.540
set their price and they produce
whatever the market

00:39:17.540 --> 00:39:20.250
demands at that price.

00:39:20.250 --> 00:39:22.440
Once again, Cournot competition
is firms set their

00:39:22.440 --> 00:39:26.340
quantity and then they set
the price reading it

00:39:26.340 --> 00:39:27.940
off a demand curve.

00:39:27.940 --> 00:39:29.100
Bertrand competition is
totally different.

00:39:29.100 --> 00:39:31.110
They say, we're just going to
compete over price and we'll

00:39:31.110 --> 00:39:32.860
just produce whatever quantity
you want at that price.

00:39:32.860 --> 00:39:36.240
We don't really even care
what demand is.

00:39:36.240 --> 00:39:38.570
We're just going to compete
over price.

00:39:38.570 --> 00:39:44.090
And the idea is that you have
some marginal cost that firms

00:39:44.090 --> 00:39:46.360
will never go below
in the long run.

00:39:46.360 --> 00:39:48.390
And the question is how much
will they compete down to that

00:39:48.390 --> 00:39:51.640
marginal cost. In practice,
what's crazy about Bertrand

00:39:51.640 --> 00:39:55.240
competition is it's possible
with two firms you can get to

00:39:55.240 --> 00:39:59.070
the perfectly competitive
outcome, with only two firms.

00:39:59.070 --> 00:40:01.010
Because those two firms are
competitive enough in setting

00:40:01.010 --> 00:40:03.020
the price, they can fight it
all the way down to the

00:40:03.020 --> 00:40:03.720
marginal cost.

00:40:03.720 --> 00:40:06.870
That is if I ever try set it
to marginal cost plus $1,

00:40:06.870 --> 00:40:09.200
you'll come in and set it to
marginal cost plus $0.99,

00:40:09.200 --> 00:40:10.970
because you can still
make money.

00:40:10.970 --> 00:40:13.630
Now I'll come and set it to
marginal cost plus $0.98,

00:40:13.630 --> 00:40:14.840
because I can still
make money.

00:40:14.840 --> 00:40:17.680
And we'll compete it all the
way down until we both are

00:40:17.680 --> 00:40:19.810
charging marginal cost
plus a penny.

00:40:19.810 --> 00:40:21.990
And if anyone tries to sell a
higher price they can't sell

00:40:21.990 --> 00:40:23.140
the product because people
will only buy the

00:40:23.140 --> 00:40:24.390
lower priced good.

00:40:26.480 --> 00:40:30.930
So you could have a world with
Bertrand competition where

00:40:30.930 --> 00:40:32.560
essentially firms compete
over price.

00:40:32.560 --> 00:40:35.930
And where unlike this case, oh
I just covered it up, unlike

00:40:35.930 --> 00:40:38.350
our comparison where with two
firms there's still lots of

00:40:38.350 --> 00:40:39.730
profits to be made.

00:40:39.730 --> 00:40:41.920
In Bertrand competition it's
possible that two firms are

00:40:41.920 --> 00:40:45.340
enough, just two firms are
enough to get us to perfect

00:40:45.340 --> 00:40:46.500
competition.

00:40:46.500 --> 00:40:49.800
You don't need n firms.
Two firms are enough.

00:40:53.690 --> 00:40:54.990
And in some sense, if we thought
about it, that's

00:40:54.990 --> 00:40:56.760
probably the first model we
have in mind if we thought

00:40:56.760 --> 00:40:58.130
about firms competing
is they compete over

00:40:58.130 --> 00:40:59.370
where to set the price.

00:40:59.370 --> 00:41:01.820
And that's essentially what
the Bertrand model is.

00:41:01.820 --> 00:41:04.200
So two questions about that.

00:41:04.200 --> 00:41:08.150
The first is, well jeez,
which model do we use?

00:41:08.150 --> 00:41:10.035
How do we know whether it's
Bertrand competition or

00:41:10.035 --> 00:41:10.670
Cournot competition?

00:41:10.670 --> 00:41:12.440
How do we know which
model to use?

00:41:12.440 --> 00:41:14.760
We've got a market with two
firms in it, you tell us the

00:41:14.760 --> 00:41:17.310
models are going to give very
different answers, how do we

00:41:17.310 --> 00:41:18.890
know which one to use?

00:41:18.890 --> 00:41:21.450
And the answer is, basically
we don't know which

00:41:21.450 --> 00:41:22.640
one to use for sure.

00:41:22.640 --> 00:41:24.680
We can talk about the conditions
under which

00:41:24.680 --> 00:41:27.020
quantity competition is more
likely and under which price

00:41:27.020 --> 00:41:29.630
competition is more likely.

00:41:29.630 --> 00:41:32.540
Basically quantity competition
is going to be more likely

00:41:32.540 --> 00:41:36.000
when there's lags in the
production process.

00:41:36.000 --> 00:41:38.380
So that you can't flexibly say,
here's my price, I'll

00:41:38.380 --> 00:41:40.340
produce as much as I want.

00:41:40.340 --> 00:41:42.995
If an airline said, I'm charging
this, I'll fly as

00:41:42.995 --> 00:41:44.460
many guys as I want,
you can't do that.

00:41:44.460 --> 00:41:46.600
You only have so many planes.

00:41:46.600 --> 00:41:48.530
Airlines can't just set a price
and then meet whatever

00:41:48.530 --> 00:41:49.590
demand comes out.

00:41:49.590 --> 00:41:51.220
Airlines have to actually
sent a quantity.

00:41:51.220 --> 00:41:55.040
They have to say there's this
many flights we can do.

00:41:55.040 --> 00:41:58.350
So when there's lags in the
production process it's going

00:41:58.350 --> 00:42:00.250
to be hard to do pure
price competition.

00:42:00.250 --> 00:42:03.320
It's going to be more like
quantity competition.

00:42:03.320 --> 00:42:07.920
That's going to be like
airlines or cars.

00:42:07.920 --> 00:42:10.850
On the other hand, take
selling cereal at a

00:42:10.850 --> 00:42:13.390
supermarket.

00:42:13.390 --> 00:42:16.260
The supermarket if it runs out
of cereal the next day it can

00:42:16.260 --> 00:42:18.850
get a whole bunch more.

00:42:18.850 --> 00:42:21.060
The supermarket can almost
instantaneously replenish any

00:42:21.060 --> 00:42:22.640
supply it's out of.

00:42:22.640 --> 00:42:25.210
So there, you're more likely to
see same price competition

00:42:25.210 --> 00:42:27.680
between say cereals in
the supermarket.

00:42:27.680 --> 00:42:30.810
People can just compare
very easily.

00:42:30.810 --> 00:42:33.320
And if one's cheaper they'll
just buy it up and if it runs

00:42:33.320 --> 00:42:34.640
out the supermarket will
just reload the next

00:42:34.640 --> 00:42:36.190
day with that cereal.

00:42:36.190 --> 00:42:40.360
Essentially it's pretty
easy to meet quantity.

00:42:40.360 --> 00:42:43.080
So this is not a very
clean distinction.

00:42:43.080 --> 00:42:45.144
But the bottom line is quantity
competition is going

00:42:45.144 --> 00:42:46.960
to be more likely when
it's a hard good

00:42:46.960 --> 00:42:49.820
to produce on demand.

00:42:49.820 --> 00:42:51.885
And price competition more
likely when it's an easy good

00:42:51.885 --> 00:42:53.510
to do that.

00:42:53.510 --> 00:42:55.600
That's how you're going to
think about which kind of

00:42:55.600 --> 00:42:58.990
competition makes the most
sense in which context.

00:42:58.990 --> 00:43:02.140
That's point one.

00:43:02.140 --> 00:43:04.220
Point two, and the last
point I want to make.

00:43:04.220 --> 00:43:08.120
What can firms do to avoid
Bertrand competition.

00:43:08.120 --> 00:43:11.140
Let's say, for example, you're
a cereal producer.

00:43:11.140 --> 00:43:12.410
You're in a Bertrand market.

00:43:12.410 --> 00:43:14.340
Well this is a shitty
market to be in.

00:43:14.340 --> 00:43:17.930
I just said two firms can drive
your profits to zero.

00:43:17.930 --> 00:43:19.540
What do you do?

00:43:19.540 --> 00:43:22.161
What do cereal producers do?

00:43:22.161 --> 00:43:22.628
Yeah.

00:43:22.628 --> 00:43:23.562
AUDIENCE: Differentiate.

00:43:23.562 --> 00:43:26.240
PROFESSOR: They product
differentiate.

00:43:26.240 --> 00:43:29.570
So the way to beat Bertrand
competition is through product

00:43:29.570 --> 00:43:30.820
differentiation.

00:43:42.300 --> 00:43:44.610
Once your products are
different, then you can price

00:43:44.610 --> 00:43:46.340
above marginal cost. Then
they're not perfect

00:43:46.340 --> 00:43:48.860
substitutes anymore and you can
price above marginal cost.

00:43:48.860 --> 00:43:51.070
Have you ever asked yourself why
the hell there's so many

00:43:51.070 --> 00:43:51.770
kinds of cereal.

00:43:51.770 --> 00:43:54.130
I mean have you been
to the supermarket?

00:43:54.130 --> 00:43:55.470
It's crazy.

00:43:55.470 --> 00:43:57.410
Why are there so many kinds
of toothpaste and shampoo.

00:43:57.410 --> 00:43:59.580
It's all the same crap.

00:43:59.580 --> 00:44:00.140
Why?

00:44:00.140 --> 00:44:01.960
Because it's product
differentiation.

00:44:01.960 --> 00:44:05.130
It's to avoid Bertrand
competition.

00:44:05.130 --> 00:44:07.280
Because once you can
differentiate,

00:44:07.280 --> 00:44:08.590
you get market power.

00:44:08.590 --> 00:44:11.160
Differentiation provides
market power.

00:44:11.160 --> 00:44:13.225
In the book, this is too
detailed for the course, but

00:44:13.225 --> 00:44:15.290
in the book Perloff talks about
this as monopolistic

00:44:15.290 --> 00:44:16.520
competition.

00:44:16.520 --> 00:44:18.290
Which is sort of an odd
oxymoron, right?

00:44:18.290 --> 00:44:19.720
Monopolistic competition.

00:44:19.720 --> 00:44:25.840
But these are models of
differentiated products where

00:44:25.840 --> 00:44:28.700
essentially you can say, look
I'm different enough that

00:44:28.700 --> 00:44:31.510
essentially I can charge
a higher price than my

00:44:31.510 --> 00:44:33.420
competitor.

00:44:33.420 --> 00:44:35.250
This comes back the concept
of contestable

00:44:35.250 --> 00:44:37.150
markets we talked about.

00:44:37.150 --> 00:44:41.786
The idea is that, look, if
you're different you can

00:44:41.786 --> 00:44:42.650
charge a little bit
higher price.

00:44:42.650 --> 00:44:44.520
Once it's too high people are
going to switch back to the

00:44:44.520 --> 00:44:45.520
other food.

00:44:45.520 --> 00:44:47.150
But if you make it
different enough,

00:44:47.150 --> 00:44:49.070
people will pay something.

00:44:49.070 --> 00:44:53.010
The most famous example is
Apple Cinnamon Cheerios.

00:44:53.010 --> 00:44:55.180
Cheerios have been
around forever.

00:44:55.180 --> 00:44:57.280
And what happened was
people bought

00:44:57.280 --> 00:44:57.840
Cheerios, it was very popular.

00:44:57.840 --> 00:45:00.860
But then supermarkets started
producing generic Cheerios.

00:45:00.860 --> 00:45:03.760
And Cheerios are like pretty
freaking easy to produce.

00:45:03.760 --> 00:45:05.480
And it turned out they
were identical.

00:45:05.480 --> 00:45:08.020
And supermarkets charged
like half as much

00:45:08.020 --> 00:45:09.820
for the generic Cheerios.

00:45:09.820 --> 00:45:12.130
And Kellogg's, no Kellogg's?

00:45:12.130 --> 00:45:13.610
Not Kellogg's, the other one.

00:45:13.610 --> 00:45:14.470
General Mills.

00:45:14.470 --> 00:45:16.755
General Mills was
all like, any of

00:45:16.755 --> 00:45:18.590
you guys from Minnesota?

00:45:18.590 --> 00:45:20.560
Mall of America has this cool
General Mills thing in

00:45:20.560 --> 00:45:22.310
Minnesota, I remember it.

00:45:22.310 --> 00:45:25.620
So General Mills said,
well gee, we're

00:45:25.620 --> 00:45:26.330
getting killed here.

00:45:26.330 --> 00:45:28.560
These generic Cheerios are going
to wipe out our profits.

00:45:28.560 --> 00:45:31.680
So they invented the Apple
Cinnamon Cheerios.

00:45:31.680 --> 00:45:34.370
And this was a product
differentiation where

00:45:34.370 --> 00:45:36.390
basically they could still
charge a high price for Apple

00:45:36.390 --> 00:45:38.050
Cinnamon Cheerios because it was
different enough from the

00:45:38.050 --> 00:45:42.120
generic cheerios the supermarket
was making.

00:45:42.120 --> 00:45:43.500
And they could patent them.

00:45:43.500 --> 00:45:45.030
They could say, hey, we've got
a different thing we can

00:45:45.030 --> 00:45:48.370
patent our secret Apple
Cinnamon formula.

00:45:48.370 --> 00:45:50.910
So supermarkets now just
can't copy us.

00:45:50.910 --> 00:45:53.890
So for a while we get price
greater than the marginal

00:45:53.890 --> 00:45:56.200
cost. Or even if supermarkets
can copy them, they at least

00:45:56.200 --> 00:45:58.150
get for a while price above
marginal cost until

00:45:58.150 --> 00:46:01.220
supermarkets catch on and
make the product.

00:46:01.220 --> 00:46:04.630
So product differentiation is
the way that firms fight

00:46:04.630 --> 00:46:06.350
Bertrand price competition.

00:46:06.350 --> 00:46:07.900
So is this bad?

00:46:07.900 --> 00:46:09.350
Once again we don't know.

00:46:09.350 --> 00:46:12.190
It depends how much you like
Apple Cinnamon Cheerios.

00:46:12.190 --> 00:46:15.970
Just like patents, it depends
on whether the new good they

00:46:15.970 --> 00:46:19.960
invented delivers sufficient
extra consumer surplus that

00:46:19.960 --> 00:46:22.670
it's worth the fact that they
can market prices on it.

00:46:22.670 --> 00:46:25.380
In fact, one of the most famous
studies in this field

00:46:25.380 --> 00:46:28.680
was done by my colleague Jerry
Hausman, who actually measured

00:46:28.680 --> 00:46:31.860
the demand curve for Apple
Cinnamon Cheerios and the cost

00:46:31.860 --> 00:46:35.040
of producing Apple Cinnamon
Cheerios and found that the

00:46:35.040 --> 00:46:38.070
introduction of Apple Cinnamon
Cheerios raised consumer

00:46:38.070 --> 00:46:40.710
welfare by $67 million a year.

00:46:40.710 --> 00:46:42.980
That even though the prices were
high because of product

00:46:42.980 --> 00:46:45.210
differentiation, people were so
happy with this wonderful

00:46:45.210 --> 00:46:49.550
new taste, it shifted demand
out so much that actually

00:46:49.550 --> 00:46:51.280
consumer welfare went up.

00:46:51.280 --> 00:46:54.320
Even though this was a tool
introduced by the companies to

00:46:54.320 --> 00:46:55.990
avoid price competition,
which should make

00:46:55.990 --> 00:46:58.260
consumers better off.

00:46:58.260 --> 00:47:04.170
So it's all about these
trade-offs between how much

00:47:04.170 --> 00:47:06.430
does it make consumers better
off versus how much more

00:47:06.430 --> 00:47:08.170
market power does it
give the producers.

00:47:08.170 --> 00:47:11.910
And product differentiation is
another example of that.

00:47:11.910 --> 00:47:15.260
Why don't we stop there
and we'll come back.

00:47:15.260 --> 00:47:18.750
Good luck tomorrow night and
we'll come back on Wednesday

00:47:18.750 --> 00:47:20.780
and move on to factor markets.