


20-21-Lecture-Subprime-and-Acting-Wife

1 Is the *bunching* of low-documentation loans indicative of **adverse selection** or **moral hazard**?

- A Adverse selection of borrowers
- ☒ B Moral hazard by lenders
- C Both
- D Neither

2 Is the *lack of* a jump in interest rates to the right of FICO 620 consistent with moral hazard?

Interest Rates: Low-Documentation Loans



- ☒ A Yes – what we'd expect no jump
- B No – we'd expect a jump
- C Unclear – moral hazard makes no prediction

3 If there's **adverse selection** in low documentation loan origination, what should we expect to happen with loan delinquencies as FICO rises from <620 to ≥620?

- A Delinquencies jump down as FICO rises from <620 to ≥620
- ☒ B Delinquencies jump up as FICO rises from <620 to ≥620
- C Delinquencies are smooth across the discontinuity as FICO rises from <620 to ≥620

4 Which of these figures indicates adverse selection?



- A Figure 1
- ☒ B Figure 2
- C Both Figure 1 and 2
- D Neither figure

5 Clearly, there's an incentive problem here. Does this incentive problem cause **adverse selection**, **moral hazard**, or **something else**?

- A Adverse selection
- B Moral hazard
- C Both adverse selection and moral hazard
- ☒ D Something else

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