

Problem Set 1 - Solutions

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Question (i)

Part (a)

Set $\bar{X} = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$, aggregate endowment. From the lecture notes, an optimal risk sharing contract (Y_1, \dots, Y_n) is given by

$$Y_i = \frac{1/\alpha_i}{1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n} \bar{X} + \tau_i \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n,$$

where $\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n \in \mathbb{R}$ are state-independent transfers such that $\sum_{i=1}^n \tau_i = 0$. Agent i gets

$$E[u_i(Y_i)] = -E \left[e^{-\frac{1}{1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n} \bar{X}} \right] e^{-\alpha_i \tau_i} = -e^{-\alpha_i \left(\frac{1/\alpha_i}{1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n} E[\bar{X}] - \frac{1/\alpha_i}{2(1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n)^2} \text{Var}(\bar{X}) + \tau_i \right)}.$$

Hence

$$Y_i \sim \frac{1/\alpha_i}{1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n} E[\bar{X}] - \frac{1/\alpha_i}{2(1/\alpha_1 + \dots + 1/\alpha_n)^2} \text{Var}(\bar{X}) + \tau_i,$$

where the right-hand side is the certainty equivalent of Y_i for agent i .

Part (b)

Notice that $E[\bar{X}] = n\mu$ and

$$\text{Var}(\bar{X}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \text{Cov}(X_i, X_j) = \sum_{i=1}^n \text{Var}(X_i) + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j \neq i} \text{Cov}(X_i, X_j) = n\sigma^2(1 + (n-1)\rho).$$

The results in Part (a) become

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i &= \frac{1}{n} \bar{X} + \tau_i, \\ E[u_i(Y_i)] &= -e^{-\alpha \left(\frac{1}{n} E[\bar{X}] - \frac{\alpha}{2n^2} \text{Var}(\bar{X}) + \tau_i \right)} = -e^{-\alpha \left(\mu - \frac{\alpha}{2n} \sigma^2(1 + (n-1)\rho) + \tau_i \right)}, \\ Y_i &\sim \mu - \frac{\alpha}{2n} \sigma^2(1 + (n-1)\rho) + \tau_i. \end{aligned}$$

Summing up the agents' certainty equivalent, the society as a whole is willing to pay

$$n\mu - \frac{\alpha}{2}\sigma^2(1 + (n-1)\rho)$$

for the assets. If we focus on symmetric contracts, $\tau_1 = \dots = \tau_n = 0$. Therefore

$$(\sigma^2, \rho) \succeq (\tilde{\sigma}^2, \tilde{\rho}) \Leftrightarrow \sigma^2(1 + (n-1)\rho) \leq \tilde{\sigma}^2(1 + (n-1)\tilde{\rho}),$$

which is the agent's preference over the assets. Comments: (i) fixing ρ , the agent prefers lower σ^2 , and (ii) fixing σ^2 , the agents prefers lower ρ .¹ Intuition: $Var(\bar{X})$ (and therefore $Var(Y_i)$) is decreasing in σ^2 and ρ , and the agent is risk averse.

Question (ii)

See solution to question 2, pset 1 2010.

Question (iii)

See solution to question 2, pset 1 2014.

Question (iv)

See solution to question 2, final 2011.

¹Notice that $(1 + (n-1)\rho) \geq 0$ by assumption, otherwise the assets are not *jointly* normal, that is, Σ is not positive semi-definite. In fact, $1 + (n-1)\rho$ is an eigenvalue of Σ .

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