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PROFESSOR: So we have a lot
to talk about in the last week

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in terms of credit.

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I'm not quite done
with the labor section,

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so what I'm going to do is
just spend about 10 minutes

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just giving a
couple of highlights

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of some of the last--

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a little overview of some of
the topics that are in the labor

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notes.

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You're welcome to
review them in detail,

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and then I want to get into
the credit stuff in detail.

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So there were two other topics
that I just wanted to give you.

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The first is, there's been
some additional attention--

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and these are all
what's happening in kind

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of the urban labor markets.

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So there's been
some work recently

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on understanding
matching frictions.

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And in particular, a big
issue in labor markets

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is the fact that not
all jobs are the same,

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not all people are
the same, so we

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want to match people to jobs.

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A big issue that
differentiates labor markets

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from other markets is kind
of the rich heterogeneity,

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both in the employer side
and on the other side.

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And so job search
is a big issue.

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And this question is a big
one in developed country labor

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markets, and I think
people are just

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starting to understand
how those issues may

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be different in developing
country contexts.

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And one issue that people
have started to think about

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is that part of how we
help solve these problems

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is, we have various signals that
help us signal in the market

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what our skills are.

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So you get a PhD from MIT.

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That is a signal that you
can take the future employers

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and say, I know some
economics, for example.

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At least we hope
that's a useful signal.

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But if those signals are weak
and the quality of the signals

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is not as good, there
may be some challenges.

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So one paper is trying to
understand these issues,

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looking in the South
African labor market.

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And they do some
interesting things on this.

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They look at giving
people information about--

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and they note that these
skill assessments tell you

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multiple things.

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In the MIT example, if
you get a PhD from MIT,

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that's a valuable signal
in the labor market.

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It's also a signal to
you that actually you're

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pretty good at economics
because you managed

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to get a PhD in Economics.

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So those information,
they provide information

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both to the job seeker and
to potential employers.

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To get at this idea--

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so not with PhDs, for example--

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they basically help people--

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they do a skill
assessments of people.

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And they give them a certificate
with a World Bank brand,

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like a credible brand saying,
here's your skills assessment

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or whatever.

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Then they also do
a second arm where

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they give the same information
but kind of privately to job

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seekers.

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They show it to them, but they
don't give them a certificate

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they can bring out to people.

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And they show, in
order to decompose,

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what is the role of the job
seekers from the alleviation

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to the job seekers
from the information

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to potential employers.

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I'm sorry.

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This is about certificates.

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So they basically
decompose this.

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So I'm not going to go through
this in a lot of detail.

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I just wanted to highlight
that this area of, how

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do we think about the
job search in general,

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is an area people are
starting to think through

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and this question
about understanding

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the role of credible
signals for employers.

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And that is one way
to look at this.

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And it's a very nice paper.

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So I'm not going to go
through it in detail,

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but I encourage
you to look at it.

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The other thing people
are starting to look at

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is job search and
online platforms.

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So this has been a big move
in the developed country labor

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markets.

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It's the world of these
online job matching programs.

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Is that actually relevant
in these lower middle-income

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countries?

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I think people are starting
to think maybe it is,

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so that's something
people are working on.

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Job training,
there's a lot of work

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on this question of, how do we
teach people jobs, et cetera.

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Is there a general purpose
training, specific training?

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Again, I'm not going to
go through this in detail,

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but I wanted to give you a
pointer that some of this work

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exists.

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And if you're interested
in these questions,

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you should have a look at it.

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The second issue in
urban labor markets

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that I also want to highlight is
the rule of working conditions.

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And this is an
issue, I think, if we

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think both about the development
of the Industrial Revolution

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and the area post the
Industrial Revolution.

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In a lot of countries,
like the US or the UK

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or other kind of
richer countries today,

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or in a lot of lower
middle-income countries today,

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how do you think
about, what are working

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conditions like in a lot of
these industrial factories?

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There still not perfect
everywhere, of course,

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but there's a lot of
regulation, for example,

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in more developed countries.

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It helps make you think about
worker safety and things

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like that.

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If we have large
informal sectors that

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aren't subject to
those regulations,

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what's happening in these
lower middle-income countries?

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I mean, to me, this is a
really interesting and really

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important issue and one that
I feel is not particularly

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studied to the extent
it probably should

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be in the economic literature.

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So I think it's a
really important area.

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So as I mentioned,
there were huge uproars

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about this kind of 100
years ago in the US,

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for example, about some of
these workplace tragedies.

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There have been similar
tragic incidents.

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There were a couple of very
famous ones in Bangladesh

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about 10 years ago.

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There was this collapse of this
factory that had many textile

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shops, hundreds--

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or actually, over 1,000
people were killed.

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So how do we think about some of
these kind of workplace issues?

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Again, particularly
when you have a large--

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and why is this kind
of a development issue?

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It's because we think
that regulation actually

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is what helps solve some
of these problems in more

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developed countries.

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But with these large
informal sectors,

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the regulatory
issues, maybe not so.

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Regulatory solutions
may not work so well.

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So I just think I wanted to
flag that as something I think

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as a really important area.

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There was one paper
recently by Laura Boudreau,

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which I thought was a very
nice one about looking

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at these worker management
safety committees,

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and actually randomizing
the creation of these

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into Bangladeshi factories and
looking at some issues here.

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More generally, I
think, what is the role

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of multinationals actually?

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And are they playing a role
in disciplining the working

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conditions in the factories in
lower middle-income countries

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that are producing
their stuff, I think,

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is a really interesting area.

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Again, I'm not going to
go through this in detail,

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given the limited time I have.

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But I kind wanted to
just flag this paper

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if you're interested in
it and just more generally

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say that I think that this issue
about multinational-- issue

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of working conditions
in general,

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and multinationals in
particular, and what role they

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play is an important
one and one that's

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a good area for future research.

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OK, so that's all
I'm going to say,

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and then I'm going
to switch gears.

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Do people have any other
comments or questions

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before we switch
to the last topic?

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OK.

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So sorry I didn't get to go
through those papers in detail,

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but there's a lot to
talk about in credit too.

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I want to make sure I get to it.

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OK, so credit is obviously
a hugely important issue.

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If you think about what
we've talked about,

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if you think about the
overall production function,

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there's like--

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we think about a production
function that looks like this.

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We have labor,
which I just talked

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about, human capital,
which Ezra talked about

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in extensive detail.

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There are some other
components of this.

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One is productivity, and
the other is capital.

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So understanding what
are the challenges

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and overall production in
lower middle-income countries

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compared to the developed world,
you want to understand all four

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of these components.

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So we've talked a
lot about labor.

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We've talked a lot
about human capital.

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We're going to talk
next semester much more

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about productivity.

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There's going to be a
lot of discussion about,

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how do we think
about productivity,

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and how do we think about
heterogeneity in productivity

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across firms.

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And the final piece is, we
should think about capital.

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And we're going to split
our discussion of capital

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across what I'm going to talk
about today and next time

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and what we're going to talk
about in 14.772 next semester.

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And in particular, what
we're going to talk about

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is credit constraints.

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So normally, we're maximizing
this production function,

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you know, minus--

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if you were maximizing
something like this,

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over l, h, and k
minus whatever--

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wL minus whatever.

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I'll call it wh of H. You would
choose the amount of capital,

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such that a prime--

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sorry-- AF prime
sub k is equal to r.

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You would just maximize.

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Choose your level
of capital, such

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that the marginal
return to the capital

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was equal to the interest
rate or the rate of return

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to capital, which we think
of as the interest rate.

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So what we're going
to talk about today

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are reasons why we may
not be able to do that.

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And in particular,
we want to understand

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how does the market for capital
or the market for credit work,

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and are there reasons
why firms might not be

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able to get this much capital.

00:10:23.577 --> 00:10:25.410 align:middle line:84%
Firms, businesses,
anybody who needs capital

00:10:25.410 --> 00:10:27.202 align:middle line:84%
might not be able to
get this much capital.

00:10:27.202 --> 00:10:28.960 align:middle line:84%
It might be limited
in their capital.

00:10:28.960 --> 00:10:31.758 align:middle line:84%
So today, I want to talk about
the basic theory of credit

00:10:31.758 --> 00:10:34.300 align:middle line:84%
constraints, and that's going
to basically take me all today.

00:10:34.300 --> 00:10:37.650 align:middle line:84%
So how do we think about
why might people not be

00:10:37.650 --> 00:10:39.812 align:middle line:90%
able to get this much capital?

00:10:39.812 --> 00:10:42.270 align:middle line:84%
And I'll talk about moral hazard
reasons, adverse selection

00:10:42.270 --> 00:10:46.650 align:middle line:84%
reasons, and monitoring
reasons, and we'll think

00:10:46.650 --> 00:10:49.110 align:middle line:90%
about what does that all mean.

00:10:49.110 --> 00:10:53.730 align:middle line:84%
And then I'm going to talk
on Wednesday about the role

00:10:53.730 --> 00:10:58.110 align:middle line:84%
of microfinance and how we think
about microfinance as one way

00:10:58.110 --> 00:11:01.020 align:middle line:84%
of solving these kind of
credit-- or not solving,

00:11:01.020 --> 00:11:04.470 align:middle line:84%
but ameliorating some of these
credit constraints for really

00:11:04.470 --> 00:11:05.670 align:middle line:90%
poor--

00:11:05.670 --> 00:11:10.830 align:middle line:84%
not poor-- but typically poor,
very small micro enterprises.

00:11:10.830 --> 00:11:12.870 align:middle line:84%
And there's been an
explosion of work

00:11:12.870 --> 00:11:16.740 align:middle line:84%
understanding both whether or
not microfinance does or does

00:11:16.740 --> 00:11:18.330 align:middle line:84%
not ameliorate
credit constraints,

00:11:18.330 --> 00:11:20.882 align:middle line:84%
and understanding all the
many different features that

00:11:20.882 --> 00:11:22.590 align:middle line:84%
happen in microfinance,
and understanding

00:11:22.590 --> 00:11:24.440 align:middle line:90%
whether those are important.

00:11:24.440 --> 00:11:26.650 align:middle line:84%
So that's what I'm
going to do this week.

00:11:26.650 --> 00:11:31.270 align:middle line:84%
What we're, then, going to
think about is in 14.772,

00:11:31.270 --> 00:11:34.960 align:middle line:84%
we'll think about the role
of banks as intermediaries.

00:11:34.960 --> 00:11:36.100 align:middle line:90%
What are banks doing?

00:11:36.100 --> 00:11:37.540 align:middle line:90%
How are they allocating capital?

00:11:37.540 --> 00:11:39.645 align:middle line:84%
What are they doing
in credit constraints?

00:11:39.645 --> 00:11:41.020 align:middle line:84%
And more generally,
understanding

00:11:41.020 --> 00:11:44.230 align:middle line:84%
a firm's demand for credit and
the impact of credit on firms.

00:11:44.230 --> 00:11:46.780 align:middle line:84%
You can think of it in some ways
as estimating that Fk thing.

00:11:46.780 --> 00:11:49.900 align:middle line:84%
What is the impact of additional
capital on the firm sector?

00:11:49.900 --> 00:11:52.660 align:middle line:84%
So I split this topic,
either the stuff

00:11:52.660 --> 00:11:54.970 align:middle line:84%
that we think of
as a little more--

00:11:54.970 --> 00:11:57.350 align:middle line:84%
this is mostly about
people and the basics

00:11:57.350 --> 00:11:58.600 align:middle line:90%
of understanding these models.

00:11:58.600 --> 00:11:59.380 align:middle line:90%
I'm going to do now.

00:11:59.380 --> 00:12:01.797 align:middle line:84%
The stuff about really getting
into how this affect firms,

00:12:01.797 --> 00:12:04.140 align:middle line:90%
we'll do next semester.

00:12:04.140 --> 00:12:07.030 align:middle line:90%
That's the plan.

00:12:07.030 --> 00:12:12.275 align:middle line:84%
OK, so here's the neoclassical
model of the capital market.

00:12:12.275 --> 00:12:14.150 align:middle line:84%
Imagine that everyone
faces the same interest

00:12:14.150 --> 00:12:17.505 align:middle line:90%
rate, adjusted for risk.

00:12:17.505 --> 00:12:18.880 align:middle line:84%
Now, what that
means, by the way,

00:12:18.880 --> 00:12:23.230 align:middle line:84%
is if there's a d percent
risk of default, then--

00:12:23.230 --> 00:12:25.770 align:middle line:90%


00:12:25.770 --> 00:12:27.600 align:middle line:84%
so we're going to
work with what's

00:12:27.600 --> 00:12:30.420 align:middle line:84%
called the gross interest
rate, which is how much--

00:12:30.420 --> 00:12:33.780 align:middle line:84%
so you repay the gross, which
is often more convenient.

00:12:33.780 --> 00:12:35.760 align:middle line:84%
The interest rate we
think of as like--

00:12:35.760 --> 00:12:39.090 align:middle line:84%
so imagine I have a 3%
interest rate, so I would

00:12:39.090 --> 00:12:41.340 align:middle line:90%
have to pay 3% of interest.

00:12:41.340 --> 00:12:44.250 align:middle line:84%
The gross interest
rate is like 1.03.

00:12:44.250 --> 00:12:46.650 align:middle line:84%
It's the total amount
you have to pay back,

00:12:46.650 --> 00:12:49.830 align:middle line:84%
and that just turns out to
be convenient for the math

00:12:49.830 --> 00:12:50.940 align:middle line:90%
sometimes.

00:12:50.940 --> 00:12:57.200 align:middle line:84%
So imagine I default.
And different people

00:12:57.200 --> 00:13:00.050 align:middle line:90%
differ in their default risks.

00:13:00.050 --> 00:13:02.480 align:middle line:84%
Then what is the bank
going to get back?

00:13:02.480 --> 00:13:05.250 align:middle line:84%
Well, the bank's going to get
back-- well, with probability

00:13:05.250 --> 00:13:07.040 align:middle line:90%
d, it's going to get nothing.

00:13:07.040 --> 00:13:09.290 align:middle line:84%
With probability 1
minus d, it's going

00:13:09.290 --> 00:13:12.260 align:middle line:90%
to get the gross interest rate.

00:13:12.260 --> 00:13:15.415 align:middle line:84%
So in a basic kind
of market, if we

00:13:15.415 --> 00:13:16.790 align:middle line:84%
have different
chances of default

00:13:16.790 --> 00:13:20.750 align:middle line:84%
and that chance is exogenous
or whatever and observable,

00:13:20.750 --> 00:13:24.230 align:middle line:84%
then I'll just be happy to
offer you all different loans,

00:13:24.230 --> 00:13:27.260 align:middle line:84%
and the gross interest rate I'm
going to charge for your loan

00:13:27.260 --> 00:13:29.820 align:middle line:90%
is 1 minus d times r.

00:13:29.820 --> 00:13:38.500 align:middle line:84%
So I'm going to get back
my r in equilibrium.

00:13:38.500 --> 00:13:39.000 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:13:39.000 --> 00:13:43.180 align:middle line:90%


00:13:43.180 --> 00:13:45.040 align:middle line:84%
And basically, that's
kind of what you get.

00:13:45.040 --> 00:13:48.452 align:middle line:90%


00:13:48.452 --> 00:13:50.910 align:middle line:84%
That's what you get, and then
the expected marginal product

00:13:50.910 --> 00:13:52.785 align:middle line:84%
of capital should be
equal to 1 minus d times

00:13:52.785 --> 00:13:55.960 align:middle line:84%
r because that's the interest
that you have to pay.

00:13:55.960 --> 00:13:57.780 align:middle line:90%
Fine.

00:13:57.780 --> 00:14:00.550 align:middle line:84%
So here are some stylized
facts, and I'm not

00:14:00.550 --> 00:14:02.300 align:middle line:84%
going to go into the
detail between these,

00:14:02.300 --> 00:14:10.280 align:middle line:84%
but there's some work that
suggests these are true.

00:14:10.280 --> 00:14:13.778 align:middle line:84%
So we suggest that maybe that
simple neoclassical model is

00:14:13.778 --> 00:14:15.070 align:middle line:90%
not everything that's going on.

00:14:15.070 --> 00:14:18.972 align:middle line:90%


00:14:18.972 --> 00:14:21.180 align:middle line:84%
So then, by the way, one of
the implications of this,

00:14:21.180 --> 00:14:23.910 align:middle line:84%
by the way, is that what's
happening to depositors

00:14:23.910 --> 00:14:28.320 align:middle line:84%
and what's happening to
the people who are getting

00:14:28.320 --> 00:14:32.910 align:middle line:90%
the capital should be small.

00:14:32.910 --> 00:14:34.950 align:middle line:84%
Imagine there's free
entry into banks.

00:14:34.950 --> 00:14:38.760 align:middle line:84%
Then basically, that gap will
be kind of competed to zero

00:14:38.760 --> 00:14:40.980 align:middle line:84%
because depositors get
the highest interest rate,

00:14:40.980 --> 00:14:41.970 align:middle line:84%
borrowers will get the
lowest interest rate.

00:14:41.970 --> 00:14:43.730 align:middle line:90%
That gap will be very small.

00:14:43.730 --> 00:14:44.580 align:middle line:90%
So what do we see?

00:14:44.580 --> 00:14:46.747 align:middle line:84%
So we see, first of all,
there's a big gap sometimes

00:14:46.747 --> 00:14:49.960 align:middle line:84%
between the deposit
rates and loan rates.

00:14:49.960 --> 00:14:51.710 align:middle line:84%
It seems like there's
a lot of money going

00:14:51.710 --> 00:14:53.660 align:middle line:90%
in that intermediary sector.

00:14:53.660 --> 00:14:55.160 align:middle line:90%
What's that about?

00:14:55.160 --> 00:14:57.050 align:middle line:90%
Talk about that.

00:14:57.050 --> 00:14:59.670 align:middle line:84%
A lot of variability
in interest rate

00:14:59.670 --> 00:15:01.670 align:middle line:84%
within the same subeconomy,
and that's true even

00:15:01.670 --> 00:15:04.180 align:middle line:84%
with very low levels
of default. So we're

00:15:04.180 --> 00:15:10.750 align:middle line:84%
going to see heterogeneity
in interest rates that

00:15:10.750 --> 00:15:14.485 align:middle line:84%
seems to be maybe something else
going on beyond just defaults.

00:15:14.485 --> 00:15:16.360 align:middle line:84%
So we'll see if there's
something about that,

00:15:16.360 --> 00:15:18.658 align:middle line:84%
even though there is ex-ante
competition in markets.

00:15:18.658 --> 00:15:20.200 align:middle line:84%
And another thing
we're going to find

00:15:20.200 --> 00:15:24.010 align:middle line:84%
is that richer people seem to
be able to borrow more and pay

00:15:24.010 --> 00:15:27.490 align:middle line:84%
lower rates of interest
than poorer people.

00:15:27.490 --> 00:15:29.620 align:middle line:84%
And more generally,
it seems like people

00:15:29.620 --> 00:15:31.720 align:middle line:84%
who borrow more are paying
lower interest rates,

00:15:31.720 --> 00:15:33.020 align:middle line:84%
and that seems a
little weird, actually,

00:15:33.020 --> 00:15:34.240 align:middle line:90%
when you think about it.

00:15:34.240 --> 00:15:38.740 align:middle line:84%
You might have thought that
maybe the more you borrow,

00:15:38.740 --> 00:15:41.380 align:middle line:84%
the riskier you are, and maybe
the default rate should go up.

00:15:41.380 --> 00:15:42.430 align:middle line:84%
But actually, it
doesn't seem that way.

00:15:42.430 --> 00:15:44.638 align:middle line:84%
It seems like there's actually
a positive correlation

00:15:44.638 --> 00:15:45.930 align:middle line:90%
between the amount you borrow--

00:15:45.930 --> 00:15:48.430 align:middle line:84%
sorry-- a negative correlation
between the amount you borrow

00:15:48.430 --> 00:15:49.680 align:middle line:90%
and the interest rate.

00:15:49.680 --> 00:15:51.780 align:middle line:84%
So that also seems
kind of interesting.

00:15:51.780 --> 00:15:53.690 align:middle line:84%
So it seems like
there's something

00:15:53.690 --> 00:15:56.380 align:middle line:84%
a little more complicated
going on in the credit markets.

00:15:56.380 --> 00:15:59.470 align:middle line:90%
And so what might that be?

00:15:59.470 --> 00:16:01.800 align:middle line:84%
So here's a model,
a simple model,

00:16:01.800 --> 00:16:04.605 align:middle line:84%
that of moral hazard
in investment choices.

00:16:04.605 --> 00:16:07.120 align:middle line:90%


00:16:07.120 --> 00:16:12.700 align:middle line:84%
So imagine that there is a
menu of possible investments

00:16:12.700 --> 00:16:16.380 align:middle line:90%
that I as a firm can choose.

00:16:16.380 --> 00:16:22.850 align:middle line:84%
And they each differ in their
probability of success, p.

00:16:22.850 --> 00:16:26.120 align:middle line:84%
And investment p is going to
yield some return, r of p,

00:16:26.120 --> 00:16:29.300 align:middle line:84%
with probability
p and return zero,

00:16:29.300 --> 00:16:30.875 align:middle line:90%
with probability 1 minus p.

00:16:30.875 --> 00:16:34.560 align:middle line:90%


00:16:34.560 --> 00:16:40.002 align:middle line:84%
So my expected return
is going to be e of p,

00:16:40.002 --> 00:16:41.710 align:middle line:84%
and that's going to
be our-- that's going

00:16:41.710 --> 00:16:44.710 align:middle line:84%
to be the probability of
getting the positive return

00:16:44.710 --> 00:16:46.420 align:middle line:90%
times the return, if you get it.

00:16:46.420 --> 00:16:49.720 align:middle line:90%
That's my expected return.

00:16:49.720 --> 00:16:53.280 align:middle line:84%
We're going to assume
that r prime is negative,

00:16:53.280 --> 00:16:59.010 align:middle line:90%
that the product with lower--

00:16:59.010 --> 00:17:01.980 align:middle line:84%
the product with higher
probabilities of success

00:17:01.980 --> 00:17:04.810 align:middle line:84%
are going to return lower
amounts as they succeed.

00:17:04.810 --> 00:17:07.410 align:middle line:84%
And I think that's a
pretty general assumption

00:17:07.410 --> 00:17:09.839 align:middle line:84%
because, otherwise, there
would be dominated projects.

00:17:09.839 --> 00:17:11.839 align:middle line:84%
So we can choose the best
project for everybody,

00:17:11.839 --> 00:17:15.359 align:middle line:90%
and then it would happen.

00:17:15.359 --> 00:17:17.280 align:middle line:90%
Otherwise, not very interesting.

00:17:17.280 --> 00:17:20.490 align:middle line:84%
And we're going to assume
that that's going to yield.

00:17:20.490 --> 00:17:24.030 align:middle line:84%
And then we'll assume that
this e function is concave,

00:17:24.030 --> 00:17:26.700 align:middle line:84%
so there'll be an interior
level of the optimal project

00:17:26.700 --> 00:17:30.000 align:middle line:90%
for maximizing expected returns.

00:17:30.000 --> 00:17:31.170 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:17:31.170 --> 00:17:33.250 align:middle line:84%
And we're going
to note by p star

00:17:33.250 --> 00:17:37.200 align:middle line:84%
the maximizing project,
the efficient project.

00:17:37.200 --> 00:17:40.350 align:middle line:84%
That's the one that maximizes
the efficient returns.

00:17:40.350 --> 00:17:44.550 align:middle line:84%
So that's just maximize. p star
is just the max of this thing.

00:17:44.550 --> 00:17:49.620 align:middle line:84%
OK, so we would like people to
choose p star in some sense.

00:17:49.620 --> 00:17:56.370 align:middle line:84%
In addition to the
project choice, the p,

00:17:56.370 --> 00:17:59.190 align:middle line:84%
there's a return
to scale parameter,

00:17:59.190 --> 00:18:01.050 align:middle line:90%
which is given by f of k.

00:18:01.050 --> 00:18:03.157 align:middle line:84%
And maybe that's going
to be diminishing

00:18:03.157 --> 00:18:04.365 align:middle line:90%
returns of scale or whatever.

00:18:04.365 --> 00:18:07.240 align:middle line:90%


00:18:07.240 --> 00:18:13.350 align:middle line:84%
So your choice is, I'm going to
invest capital k in project p.

00:18:13.350 --> 00:18:15.540 align:middle line:84%
So I'm going to make two
choices, a k and a p,

00:18:15.540 --> 00:18:18.660 align:middle line:84%
and my return is going to
be the-- the p is going

00:18:18.660 --> 00:18:20.790 align:middle line:84%
to choose the expected
p, and then I'm

00:18:20.790 --> 00:18:22.560 align:middle line:84%
going to scale it
up by this f of k.

00:18:22.560 --> 00:18:25.150 align:middle line:90%


00:18:25.150 --> 00:18:26.470 align:middle line:90%
OK, is that clear?

00:18:26.470 --> 00:18:28.900 align:middle line:90%
So I could go into making--

00:18:28.900 --> 00:18:31.180 align:middle line:84%
I don't know-- belts
or t-shirts, that's p.

00:18:31.180 --> 00:18:33.520 align:middle line:84%
And then I can choose how
many of them I want to do.

00:18:33.520 --> 00:18:34.420 align:middle line:90%
That's f of k.

00:18:34.420 --> 00:18:36.980 align:middle line:90%


00:18:36.980 --> 00:18:37.480 align:middle line:90%
Clear?

00:18:37.480 --> 00:18:40.530 align:middle line:90%


00:18:40.530 --> 00:18:47.600 align:middle line:84%
Finally, suppose that the
investor has some wealth, w.

00:18:47.600 --> 00:18:50.885 align:middle line:84%
So if the investor
wants to borrow--

00:18:50.885 --> 00:18:55.430 align:middle line:84%
wants to invest k, she
has to borrow k minus w.

00:18:55.430 --> 00:18:57.080 align:middle line:90%
So that's the credit.

00:18:57.080 --> 00:18:57.950 align:middle line:90%
That's credit.

00:18:57.950 --> 00:19:01.070 align:middle line:84%
It's how much they
have to borrow.

00:19:01.070 --> 00:19:03.220 align:middle line:90%
The gross industry is r.

00:19:03.220 --> 00:19:05.150 align:middle line:84%
And we'll have
limited liability,

00:19:05.150 --> 00:19:09.310 align:middle line:84%
which is, if you can't
pay, what can they do?

00:19:09.310 --> 00:19:11.110 align:middle line:90%
There's some collateral.

00:19:11.110 --> 00:19:13.450 align:middle line:84%
Another way to think about
is, you put up your wealth

00:19:13.450 --> 00:19:16.300 align:middle line:84%
as collateral, they can take
your wealth but nothing else.

00:19:16.300 --> 00:19:19.510 align:middle line:90%


00:19:19.510 --> 00:19:21.850 align:middle line:84%
So I'll just tell
you, that is important

00:19:21.850 --> 00:19:27.910 align:middle line:84%
because you can see why
this is going to matter.

00:19:27.910 --> 00:19:34.050 align:middle line:84%
So if I am investing k, and
my wealth, w, is approximately

00:19:34.050 --> 00:19:36.030 align:middle line:84%
equal to k so I'm only
borrowing a little bit,

00:19:36.030 --> 00:19:40.620 align:middle line:84%
then if my project kind of
fails, I'm going to lose a lot.

00:19:40.620 --> 00:19:42.630 align:middle line:84%
They're going to take
almost my entire wealth.

00:19:42.630 --> 00:19:47.370 align:middle line:84%
Whereas if my wealth is, say,
zero, then if my product fails,

00:19:47.370 --> 00:19:49.560 align:middle line:84%
I get nothing in that
state so I'm only

00:19:49.560 --> 00:19:51.540 align:middle line:90%
interested in the upside.

00:19:51.540 --> 00:19:55.860 align:middle line:84%
So the amount of wealth, the
amount of collateral I have,

00:19:55.860 --> 00:20:02.160 align:middle line:84%
is determining what
share of the downside

00:20:02.160 --> 00:20:06.660 align:middle line:84%
of this project I have to bear
versus the bank has to bear.

00:20:06.660 --> 00:20:10.890 align:middle line:84%
And this idea is,
you can immediately

00:20:10.890 --> 00:20:15.480 align:middle line:84%
see why it's going
to be nice for banks

00:20:15.480 --> 00:20:18.240 align:middle line:84%
to want you to have
some collateral.

00:20:18.240 --> 00:20:19.800 align:middle line:84%
And particularly
why they're going

00:20:19.800 --> 00:20:20.940 align:middle line:84%
to want you to put
some of your own money

00:20:20.940 --> 00:20:22.892 align:middle line:84%
into projects is because
they want make sure

00:20:22.892 --> 00:20:24.850 align:middle line:84%
that you're bearing some
of the downside risks,

00:20:24.850 --> 00:20:26.308 align:middle line:84%
that you're not
taking-- otherwise,

00:20:26.308 --> 00:20:29.280 align:middle line:84%
you take super risky projects
because heads, you win, tails,

00:20:29.280 --> 00:20:30.662 align:middle line:90%
they lose.

00:20:30.662 --> 00:20:32.370 align:middle line:84%
That's not a very good
deal for the bank.

00:20:32.370 --> 00:20:34.880 align:middle line:90%


00:20:34.880 --> 00:20:37.708 align:middle line:84%
And so lots of loans
have this feature.

00:20:37.708 --> 00:20:39.500 align:middle line:84%
So for example, if you
want to buy a house,

00:20:39.500 --> 00:20:42.590 align:middle line:84%
you need to put 20% down
on the house or something.

00:20:42.590 --> 00:20:45.950 align:middle line:84%
That's basically saying,
they want the loan

00:20:45.950 --> 00:20:48.020 align:middle line:84%
to be no more than
80% of the total

00:20:48.020 --> 00:20:50.420 align:middle line:84%
because they want you to
have some stake in what

00:20:50.420 --> 00:20:51.680 align:middle line:90%
happens if things go wrong.

00:20:51.680 --> 00:20:56.170 align:middle line:90%


00:20:56.170 --> 00:20:59.400 align:middle line:84%
There are more complicated
situations in mortgage markets

00:20:59.400 --> 00:21:03.192 align:middle line:84%
actually because in addition,
often when the loan goes bad,

00:21:03.192 --> 00:21:04.150 align:middle line:90%
it starts from the top.

00:21:04.150 --> 00:21:09.750 align:middle line:84%
And so if you have 20% down,
the first 20% is your loss,

00:21:09.750 --> 00:21:11.548 align:middle line:84%
and the bank only loses
it more than that.

00:21:11.548 --> 00:21:13.590 align:middle line:84%
So actually, the ordering
of it is important too,

00:21:13.590 --> 00:21:16.730 align:middle line:84%
but we're not going to get
into that in this model.

00:21:16.730 --> 00:21:18.960 align:middle line:90%
OK, is this clear so far?

00:21:18.960 --> 00:21:27.860 align:middle line:84%
OK, so suppose that we can
contract over k the amount

00:21:27.860 --> 00:21:31.930 align:middle line:84%
of capital, but we cannot
contract over the project

00:21:31.930 --> 00:21:32.895 align:middle line:90%
choice, p.

00:21:32.895 --> 00:21:37.760 align:middle line:90%


00:21:37.760 --> 00:21:43.640 align:middle line:84%
So k is going to be fixed, but
then the borrower is going to--

00:21:43.640 --> 00:21:47.420 align:middle line:84%
for a given k,
once we agree on k,

00:21:47.420 --> 00:21:48.920 align:middle line:84%
the borrower gets
to say, OK, now

00:21:48.920 --> 00:21:50.930 align:middle line:84%
I know what my k is, I'm
going to choose my p.

00:21:50.930 --> 00:21:53.932 align:middle line:84%
And they can't
contract over that.

00:21:53.932 --> 00:21:55.890 align:middle line:84%
So in particular, what
are they going to solve?

00:21:55.890 --> 00:21:59.460 align:middle line:84%
Well, with
probability, p, they're

00:21:59.460 --> 00:22:02.620 align:middle line:84%
going to get f of
k times the return.

00:22:02.620 --> 00:22:05.220 align:middle line:84%
So the f of k times r of p--
that's how good the product

00:22:05.220 --> 00:22:05.880 align:middle line:90%
is--

00:22:05.880 --> 00:22:09.030 align:middle line:90%
times the scale.

00:22:09.030 --> 00:22:11.250 align:middle line:84%
And then they have
to pay the interest

00:22:11.250 --> 00:22:12.420 align:middle line:90%
on the amount they borrowed.

00:22:12.420 --> 00:22:17.890 align:middle line:90%


00:22:17.890 --> 00:22:21.460 align:middle line:84%
With probability 1
minus p, the bank

00:22:21.460 --> 00:22:24.260 align:middle line:84%
takes their wealth
and nothing else.

00:22:24.260 --> 00:22:28.180 align:middle line:84%
So another way, you can
also equivalently rewrite

00:22:28.180 --> 00:22:31.930 align:middle line:84%
this as saying, they paid
the gross interest rate on k

00:22:31.930 --> 00:22:36.760 align:middle line:84%
in all periods, and then
they lose their wealth

00:22:36.760 --> 00:22:38.830 align:middle line:90%
in this other period.

00:22:38.830 --> 00:22:42.490 align:middle line:90%


00:22:42.490 --> 00:22:52.440 align:middle line:84%
So the first order condition is
that the f of k times e prime--

00:22:52.440 --> 00:22:55.380 align:middle line:84%
e prime is the derivative of
the expected value with respect

00:22:55.380 --> 00:22:56.160 align:middle line:90%
to p--

00:22:56.160 --> 00:23:01.680 align:middle line:84%
has to be equal to the
effective r times k minus w.

00:23:01.680 --> 00:23:04.800 align:middle line:90%
This part doesn't matter.

00:23:04.800 --> 00:23:08.550 align:middle line:84%
And so we're just going
to get-- so p times r,

00:23:08.550 --> 00:23:11.050 align:middle line:90%
that's e, so the derivative.

00:23:11.050 --> 00:23:14.085 align:middle line:84%
So p times r was e, the expected
return, so it's just f prime--

00:23:14.085 --> 00:23:18.390 align:middle line:84%
I'm sorry-- f of k times
e prime of p is equal to--

00:23:18.390 --> 00:23:20.400 align:middle line:84%
there's a p in
here, so that's just

00:23:20.400 --> 00:23:23.660 align:middle line:90%
equal to r times k minus w.

00:23:23.660 --> 00:23:28.080 align:middle line:84%
OK, so that's the
first order condition.

00:23:28.080 --> 00:23:37.930 align:middle line:84%
So recall that the optimal p
had e prime of p equal to zero.

00:23:37.930 --> 00:23:40.870 align:middle line:84%
That was a socially
efficient level of p.

00:23:40.870 --> 00:23:48.620 align:middle line:84%
So what you can see
is that whenever

00:23:48.620 --> 00:23:54.320 align:middle line:84%
w is less than k, whenever
you're borrowing something--

00:23:54.320 --> 00:23:56.010 align:middle line:84%
so if w is equal
to k, by the way,

00:23:56.010 --> 00:23:57.385 align:middle line:84%
if it's all your
own capital, you

00:23:57.385 --> 00:24:00.000 align:middle line:84%
pick the socially efficient
level of a socially efficient

00:24:00.000 --> 00:24:00.500 align:middle line:90%
project.

00:24:00.500 --> 00:24:01.000 align:middle line:90%
Why?

00:24:01.000 --> 00:24:02.630 align:middle line:84%
Because the cost
and the benefits

00:24:02.630 --> 00:24:04.740 align:middle line:90%
you totally internalize.

00:24:04.740 --> 00:24:06.960 align:middle line:84%
Whenever we have a
wedge where you're

00:24:06.960 --> 00:24:09.810 align:middle line:84%
gaining more of the
upside than downside,

00:24:09.810 --> 00:24:13.570 align:middle line:84%
that's going to lead you
to take riskier projects.

00:24:13.570 --> 00:24:16.540 align:middle line:90%
And how do we see that?

00:24:16.540 --> 00:24:19.000 align:middle line:84%
We see that basically
that's because e

00:24:19.000 --> 00:24:22.675 align:middle line:90%
prime is greater than zero.

00:24:22.675 --> 00:24:27.040 align:middle line:90%


00:24:27.040 --> 00:24:32.800 align:middle line:84%
Because in order to make
this thing positive, the--

00:24:32.800 --> 00:24:34.718 align:middle line:90%
oh, no, sorry.

00:24:34.718 --> 00:24:36.010 align:middle line:90%
You're going to take more risk.

00:24:36.010 --> 00:24:36.510 align:middle line:90%
Sorry.

00:24:36.510 --> 00:24:38.230 align:middle line:84%
Because e double prime
is less than zero,

00:24:38.230 --> 00:24:40.870 align:middle line:84%
we're going to take
a little bit more

00:24:40.870 --> 00:24:42.927 align:middle line:84%
risk in order to make
this thing positive.

00:24:42.927 --> 00:24:45.910 align:middle line:90%


00:24:45.910 --> 00:24:49.510 align:middle line:84%
So the optimal
project is going to be

00:24:49.510 --> 00:24:54.850 align:middle line:84%
a little bit riskier in order
to make e prime positive.

00:24:54.850 --> 00:24:57.010 align:middle line:84%
And that's what I was
intuitively saying before.

00:24:57.010 --> 00:24:58.750 align:middle line:84%
Whenever you're not
perfect, whenever

00:24:58.750 --> 00:25:01.120 align:middle line:84%
you're getting more of the
upside than the downside,

00:25:01.120 --> 00:25:03.490 align:middle line:84%
that's going to lead you
to take too much risk

00:25:03.490 --> 00:25:06.760 align:middle line:90%
than is socially efficient.

00:25:06.760 --> 00:25:09.420 align:middle line:90%
Is that clear?

00:25:09.420 --> 00:25:11.222 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:25:11.222 --> 00:25:12.430 align:middle line:90%
That's basically what I said.

00:25:12.430 --> 00:25:15.030 align:middle line:90%


00:25:15.030 --> 00:25:15.980 align:middle line:90%
OK, clear so far?

00:25:15.980 --> 00:25:17.370 align:middle line:90%
Yeah?

00:25:17.370 --> 00:25:19.170 align:middle line:90%
All right.

00:25:19.170 --> 00:25:23.810 align:middle line:84%
So this already gives us
some comparative statics.

00:25:23.810 --> 00:25:26.620 align:middle line:84%
So this is the condition that I
just derived on the last slide,

00:25:26.620 --> 00:25:33.890 align:middle line:84%
that f of k times e prime of
p was equal to r k minus w.

00:25:33.890 --> 00:25:40.370 align:middle line:84%
So we can just
divide through by a--

00:25:40.370 --> 00:25:42.680 align:middle line:84%
if we can pull out a k
and make this 1 minus

00:25:42.680 --> 00:25:44.995 align:middle line:84%
w over k, divide
through by f of k,

00:25:44.995 --> 00:25:47.120 align:middle line:84%
and we get the second
expression here. e prime of p

00:25:47.120 --> 00:25:51.140 align:middle line:84%
is equal to k over f of k
times r times 1 minus w over k.

00:25:51.140 --> 00:25:53.930 align:middle line:84%
So why is writing things
in that way helpful?

00:25:53.930 --> 00:25:56.030 align:middle line:84%
It's because we can
immediately start to see

00:25:56.030 --> 00:25:59.520 align:middle line:90%
a few comparative statics.

00:25:59.520 --> 00:26:04.100 align:middle line:84%
So the first one is, we can
see how does p prime depend

00:26:04.100 --> 00:26:05.030 align:middle line:90%
on interest rate.

00:26:05.030 --> 00:26:06.110 align:middle line:90%
That's our p hat.

00:26:06.110 --> 00:26:08.390 align:middle line:84%
How does the equilibrium
choice of project

00:26:08.390 --> 00:26:10.740 align:middle line:90%
depend on the interest rate?

00:26:10.740 --> 00:26:14.270 align:middle line:84%
So when interest rate
goes up, e prime goes up,

00:26:14.270 --> 00:26:16.370 align:middle line:90%
therefore p goes down.

00:26:16.370 --> 00:26:17.930 align:middle line:84%
So when the interest
rate is higher,

00:26:17.930 --> 00:26:21.250 align:middle line:84%
we're going to be choosing
riskier projects, again,

00:26:21.250 --> 00:26:22.750 align:middle line:84%
assuming that we're
in a world where

00:26:22.750 --> 00:26:24.400 align:middle line:90%
you're borrowing something.

00:26:24.400 --> 00:26:27.508 align:middle line:84%
Obviously, if w is
equal to k, then we're

00:26:27.508 --> 00:26:29.050 align:middle line:84%
just at the socially
efficient level.

00:26:29.050 --> 00:26:31.210 align:middle line:84%
But assuming w is
less than k, we

00:26:31.210 --> 00:26:33.010 align:middle line:84%
have that higher
interest rates are going

00:26:33.010 --> 00:26:36.730 align:middle line:90%
to lead to riskier projects.

00:26:36.730 --> 00:26:37.300 align:middle line:90%
Clear?

00:26:37.300 --> 00:26:39.060 align:middle line:84%
By the way, stop me
if I'm going too fast.

00:26:39.060 --> 00:26:41.230 align:middle line:84%
Sometimes when you go through
a model on the slides,

00:26:41.230 --> 00:26:42.260 align:middle line:90%
it's too fast.

00:26:42.260 --> 00:26:45.010 align:middle line:84%
But if anything,
just slow this down.

00:26:45.010 --> 00:26:47.297 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: Higher interest
is called higher r?

00:26:47.297 --> 00:26:48.130 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Higher r.

00:26:48.130 --> 00:26:50.950 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: And higher
p is higher risk?

00:26:50.950 --> 00:26:52.790 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: No, lower
p is higher risk.

00:26:52.790 --> 00:26:56.020 align:middle line:84%
So higher r means
higher e prime.

00:26:56.020 --> 00:26:59.540 align:middle line:84%
But we have e is
concave, so we're

00:26:59.540 --> 00:27:07.456 align:middle line:84%
going to go we're going to
go down to get a positive.

00:27:07.456 --> 00:27:08.820 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: [INAUDIBLE].

00:27:08.820 --> 00:27:11.075 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: Yeah,
it's the same thing

00:27:11.075 --> 00:27:14.763 align:middle line:84%
because f prime is concave,
and the higher marginal product

00:27:14.763 --> 00:27:15.930 align:middle line:90%
means you have less capital.

00:27:15.930 --> 00:27:16.430 align:middle line:90%
Same idea.

00:27:16.430 --> 00:27:20.108 align:middle line:84%
Basically, we have
higher levels of e prime.

00:27:20.108 --> 00:27:21.900 align:middle line:84%
We're going to get
higher levels of e prime

00:27:21.900 --> 00:27:26.105 align:middle line:84%
with lower levels of p
because e prime was concave.

00:27:26.105 --> 00:27:27.950 align:middle line:90%
Sorry, e was concave.

00:27:27.950 --> 00:27:31.700 align:middle line:84%
Similarly, we can say, how
does p depend on the returns.

00:27:31.700 --> 00:27:35.480 align:middle line:90%
Returns is f of k.

00:27:35.480 --> 00:27:40.490 align:middle line:84%
F of k divided by k is, what
is the return on capital right.

00:27:40.490 --> 00:27:45.080 align:middle line:84%
Like you invest k, and
you get back f of k,

00:27:45.080 --> 00:27:49.560 align:middle line:84%
so this is like the
average return on capital.

00:27:49.560 --> 00:27:52.093 align:middle line:84%
This is going to be
increasing for the same reason

00:27:52.093 --> 00:27:53.260 align:middle line:90%
because this is 1 over that.

00:27:53.260 --> 00:27:55.830 align:middle line:90%
So it all goes backwards.

00:27:55.830 --> 00:28:02.550 align:middle line:84%
So higher returns leads you
to choose higher probability

00:28:02.550 --> 00:28:04.060 align:middle line:90%
projects.

00:28:04.060 --> 00:28:06.135 align:middle line:84%
And this one, I
think, is-- these two

00:28:06.135 --> 00:28:08.260 align:middle line:84%
are certainly going to be
the most relevant for us.

00:28:08.260 --> 00:28:12.070 align:middle line:84%
The third one is, how does
p hat depend on k over w,

00:28:12.070 --> 00:28:15.234 align:middle line:84%
where k over w is
leverage. k over w is--

00:28:15.234 --> 00:28:19.000 align:middle line:90%
obviously, this is 1 over k.

00:28:19.000 --> 00:28:22.922 align:middle line:84%
How does it depend on what
fraction you're borrowing?

00:28:22.922 --> 00:28:24.880 align:middle line:84%
Well, we know that it's
going to be decreasing.

00:28:24.880 --> 00:28:28.960 align:middle line:84%
Again, we know that
when k is equal to w,

00:28:28.960 --> 00:28:30.440 align:middle line:90%
we're at the optimal level.

00:28:30.440 --> 00:28:31.990 align:middle line:84%
And as we start to
increase k, we're

00:28:31.990 --> 00:28:33.415 align:middle line:90%
going to be choosing risk here.

00:28:33.415 --> 00:28:35.290 align:middle line:84%
Holding w at face, we're
going to be choosing

00:28:35.290 --> 00:28:36.498 align:middle line:90%
riskier and riskier projects.

00:28:36.498 --> 00:28:39.080 align:middle line:90%


00:28:39.080 --> 00:28:40.220 align:middle line:90%
Clear?

00:28:40.220 --> 00:28:43.950 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: What's the intuition
for the second point?

00:28:43.950 --> 00:28:46.640 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: So I think
it's a similar one, that

00:28:46.640 --> 00:28:49.500 align:middle line:90%
basically the--

00:28:49.500 --> 00:28:51.188 align:middle line:90%


00:28:51.188 --> 00:28:53.730 align:middle line:84%
actually, I don't have a good
intuition for the second point.

00:28:53.730 --> 00:28:55.397 align:middle line:84%
Does anyone else want
to give it a shot?

00:28:55.397 --> 00:28:56.590 align:middle line:90%
Sorry, I take it back.

00:28:56.590 --> 00:28:57.590 align:middle line:90%
I don't have a good one.

00:28:57.590 --> 00:28:58.730 align:middle line:84%
It's a little hard to
think about because you're

00:28:58.730 --> 00:28:59.855 align:middle line:90%
holding w over k fixed.

00:28:59.855 --> 00:29:05.423 align:middle line:90%


00:29:05.423 --> 00:29:06.090 align:middle line:90%
Hold on one sec.

00:29:06.090 --> 00:29:08.007 align:middle line:84%
Let me see if I can give
you a good intuition.

00:29:08.007 --> 00:29:12.940 align:middle line:90%


00:29:12.940 --> 00:29:13.440 align:middle line:90%
I'm sorry.

00:29:13.440 --> 00:29:14.857 align:middle line:84%
No, I don't have
a good intuition.

00:29:14.857 --> 00:29:15.830 align:middle line:90%
Let me think about it.

00:29:15.830 --> 00:29:16.830 align:middle line:90%
Anyone else want to try?

00:29:16.830 --> 00:29:20.274 align:middle line:90%


00:29:20.274 --> 00:29:22.540 align:middle line:84%
Ed, do you have a
good intuition for it?

00:29:22.540 --> 00:29:23.040 align:middle line:90%
No?

00:29:23.040 --> 00:29:24.332 align:middle line:90%
Sorry, I should think about it.

00:29:24.332 --> 00:29:26.130 align:middle line:84%
Sorry I don't have a
good answer for it.

00:29:26.130 --> 00:29:26.630 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:29:26.630 --> 00:29:28.340 align:middle line:84%
But luckily, I'm
going to mostly talk

00:29:28.340 --> 00:29:29.715 align:middle line:84%
about r and the
other ones, which

00:29:29.715 --> 00:29:31.370 align:middle line:90%
I do have a good intuition for.

00:29:31.370 --> 00:29:32.630 align:middle line:90%
Yeah, Hazel?

00:29:32.630 --> 00:29:35.275 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: So we're assuming that
the borrower is risk neutral,

00:29:35.275 --> 00:29:37.860 align:middle line:84%
but if we assume risk
aversion, would we--

00:29:37.860 --> 00:29:39.585 align:middle line:84%
so like taking
too much risk-- so

00:29:39.585 --> 00:29:41.257 align:middle line:84%
if we assume that
they were risk averse,

00:29:41.257 --> 00:29:42.840 align:middle line:84%
could we get rid of
that in the model?

00:29:42.840 --> 00:29:47.520 align:middle line:90%


00:29:47.520 --> 00:29:49.470 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: If we assume
they're risk averse,

00:29:49.470 --> 00:29:54.240 align:middle line:84%
it's going to lead
them to take less risk.

00:29:54.240 --> 00:29:54.740 align:middle line:90%
Hold on.

00:29:54.740 --> 00:29:55.130 align:middle line:90%
Let me think.

00:29:55.130 --> 00:29:55.630 align:middle line:90%
What?

00:29:55.630 --> 00:29:56.138 align:middle line:90%
Sorry.

00:29:56.138 --> 00:29:57.408 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Sorry.

00:29:57.408 --> 00:29:58.700 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: No, go ahead, Hazel.

00:29:58.700 --> 00:30:00.690 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: Because they were
taking too much risk before,

00:30:00.690 --> 00:30:00.890 align:middle line:90%
right?

00:30:00.890 --> 00:30:02.200 align:middle line:84%
And then if you
introduce risk aversion,

00:30:02.200 --> 00:30:03.480 align:middle line:90%
they might [INAUDIBLE].

00:30:03.480 --> 00:30:04.267 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Yes.

00:30:04.267 --> 00:30:05.350 align:middle line:90%
That clearly sounds right.

00:30:05.350 --> 00:30:08.812 align:middle line:90%


00:30:08.812 --> 00:30:10.770 align:middle line:84%
I think it's still going
to be the case they're

00:30:10.770 --> 00:30:11.395 align:middle line:90%
going to take--

00:30:11.395 --> 00:30:19.240 align:middle line:90%


00:30:19.240 --> 00:30:19.960 align:middle line:90%
so yes.

00:30:19.960 --> 00:30:21.050 align:middle line:84%
For sure, if
they're risk averse,

00:30:21.050 --> 00:30:21.790 align:middle line:90%
they're going to take less risk.

00:30:21.790 --> 00:30:23.350 align:middle line:84%
That's going to shift the whole
thing in the direction of less

00:30:23.350 --> 00:30:24.520 align:middle line:90%
riskiness.

00:30:24.520 --> 00:30:28.030 align:middle line:84%
And you could get that maybe the
optimal thing is to get e star,

00:30:28.030 --> 00:30:29.860 align:middle line:84%
but e star may no
longer be-- the same p

00:30:29.860 --> 00:30:31.270 align:middle line:84%
star may no longer be
optimal because it's

00:30:31.270 --> 00:30:32.510 align:middle line:90%
no longer optimal for them.

00:30:32.510 --> 00:30:35.010 align:middle line:84%
So I think it's still going to
be the case that if you think

00:30:35.010 --> 00:30:37.870 align:middle line:84%
about socially optimal
including the risk

00:30:37.870 --> 00:30:39.590 align:middle line:84%
aversion, like the
riskiness to them,

00:30:39.590 --> 00:30:40.600 align:middle line:84%
it's still going be the
case they're going to take

00:30:40.600 --> 00:30:41.892 align:middle line:90%
too much risk relative to that.

00:30:41.892 --> 00:30:46.230 align:middle line:90%


00:30:46.230 --> 00:30:47.240 align:middle line:90%
But yes, you're right.

00:30:47.240 --> 00:30:48.590 align:middle line:84%
Certainly, if we
add risk aversion,

00:30:48.590 --> 00:30:49.790 align:middle line:84%
they're going to take less
risk, and that's going

00:30:49.790 --> 00:30:50.957 align:middle line:90%
to shift the whole thing up.

00:30:50.957 --> 00:30:57.200 align:middle line:90%


00:30:57.200 --> 00:30:59.900 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: Intuition is just
to care about f times e.

00:30:59.900 --> 00:31:01.458 align:middle line:90%
And if f goes up--

00:31:01.458 --> 00:31:02.750 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: You care about what?

00:31:02.750 --> 00:31:04.322 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: You care
about f times e

00:31:04.322 --> 00:31:06.070 align:middle line:84%
to [INAUDIBLE]
objective function.

00:31:06.070 --> 00:31:12.070 align:middle line:84%
If f goes up, then you're
more invested in the return

00:31:12.070 --> 00:31:14.230 align:middle line:90%
once your repayment [INAUDIBLE].

00:31:14.230 --> 00:31:16.150 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Oh, I see.

00:31:16.150 --> 00:31:17.237 align:middle line:90%
This relative to that?

00:31:17.237 --> 00:31:17.820 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Yeah.

00:31:17.820 --> 00:31:19.045 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: OK, there you go.

00:31:19.045 --> 00:31:20.170 align:middle line:90%
Yeah, I think you're right.

00:31:20.170 --> 00:31:23.110 align:middle line:90%


00:31:23.110 --> 00:31:23.880 align:middle line:90%
OK, thanks, Ed.

00:31:23.880 --> 00:31:28.162 align:middle line:90%


00:31:28.162 --> 00:31:29.620 align:middle line:84%
The other thing I
want to note here

00:31:29.620 --> 00:31:30.580 align:middle line:84%
that comes out of
this model, which

00:31:30.580 --> 00:31:32.710 align:middle line:84%
is out of many of these
models, is there's

00:31:32.710 --> 00:31:35.440 align:middle line:90%
a positive probability--

00:31:35.440 --> 00:31:37.990 align:middle line:84%
there's a positive correlation
between the default

00:31:37.990 --> 00:31:41.620 align:middle line:84%
probability, which is 1 minus
p, and the interest rate.

00:31:41.620 --> 00:31:43.930 align:middle line:84%
So in general, we had
higher interest rates

00:31:43.930 --> 00:31:46.840 align:middle line:84%
lead to riskier projects, and
we get that in this model.

00:31:46.840 --> 00:31:48.340 align:middle line:84%
That was this
prediction over here.

00:31:48.340 --> 00:31:52.840 align:middle line:84%
And that positive correlation
between the interest rate

00:31:52.840 --> 00:31:57.910 align:middle line:84%
and the riskiness is
a classic prediction

00:31:57.910 --> 00:32:01.060 align:middle line:84%
of many of these kinds of
asymmetric information models,

00:32:01.060 --> 00:32:05.250 align:middle line:84%
including more hazard
models like this one.

00:32:05.250 --> 00:32:06.000 align:middle line:90%
Clear so far?

00:32:06.000 --> 00:32:08.810 align:middle line:90%


00:32:08.810 --> 00:32:10.460 align:middle line:84%
So the final thing
that we need to do

00:32:10.460 --> 00:32:18.990 align:middle line:84%
is, we need to add an exogenous
supply of funds for the lender.

00:32:18.990 --> 00:32:21.980 align:middle line:84%
So the lender can go out
to the capital markets--

00:32:21.980 --> 00:32:23.760 align:middle line:84%
call it Wall Street
or whatever--

00:32:23.760 --> 00:32:28.270 align:middle line:84%
and they can borrow
at rate, rho.

00:32:28.270 --> 00:32:34.420 align:middle line:84%
So they're only getting repaid,
of course, with probability, p.

00:32:34.420 --> 00:32:37.810 align:middle line:84%
So their equilibrium
condition is

00:32:37.810 --> 00:32:40.540 align:middle line:84%
that their cost
of funds, rho, has

00:32:40.540 --> 00:32:43.660 align:middle line:84%
to be equal to their
expected return.

00:32:43.660 --> 00:32:45.130 align:middle line:90%
With probably p, they get r.

00:32:45.130 --> 00:32:48.430 align:middle line:84%
With probability 1
minus p, they don't.

00:32:48.430 --> 00:32:52.120 align:middle line:84%
And so that's going to
determine their return.

00:32:52.120 --> 00:32:54.178 align:middle line:90%


00:32:54.178 --> 00:32:56.220 align:middle line:84%
So what is it going to
look like for equilibrium?

00:32:56.220 --> 00:32:59.175 align:middle line:84%
So there's two different
things going on.

00:32:59.175 --> 00:33:00.800 align:middle line:84%
The first would be
this market clearing

00:33:00.800 --> 00:33:03.950 align:middle line:84%
thing, which is that rho
is equal to p times r.

00:33:03.950 --> 00:33:05.860 align:middle line:90%
So this is r, and this is p.

00:33:05.860 --> 00:33:10.240 align:middle line:84%
And then we also derive
from the previous model

00:33:10.240 --> 00:33:12.700 align:middle line:84%
this moral hazard kind of
equilibrium, which also

00:33:12.700 --> 00:33:16.160 align:middle line:90%
gives you p as a function of r.

00:33:16.160 --> 00:33:18.427 align:middle line:84%
So as I've drawn here,
there's a single equilibrium.

00:33:18.427 --> 00:33:20.510 align:middle line:84%
This is going to be the
equilibrium in this market

00:33:20.510 --> 00:33:24.120 align:middle line:84%
where we're going to have
projects, p, down here

00:33:24.120 --> 00:33:27.290 align:middle line:90%
and this interest rate.

00:33:27.290 --> 00:33:28.190 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:33:28.190 --> 00:33:32.130 align:middle line:90%
But this thing is--

00:33:32.130 --> 00:33:34.500 align:middle line:84%
I mean, obviously this is
not drawn exactly right--

00:33:34.500 --> 00:33:38.430 align:middle line:84%
but this function here,
I guess this hyperbola,

00:33:38.430 --> 00:33:41.820 align:middle line:84%
given by this rho
equals pr, that's fixed.

00:33:41.820 --> 00:33:44.400 align:middle line:84%
But the shape of this
particular p hat of r

00:33:44.400 --> 00:33:46.710 align:middle line:84%
is not obvious what
it's going to be.

00:33:46.710 --> 00:33:49.740 align:middle line:84%
It's going to depend on
the underlying things that

00:33:49.740 --> 00:33:51.870 align:middle line:90%
went into that previous model.

00:33:51.870 --> 00:33:54.780 align:middle line:84%
In particular, it's going to
depend on this e function,

00:33:54.780 --> 00:33:56.040 align:middle line:90%
which could be--

00:33:56.040 --> 00:33:58.600 align:middle line:84%
we haven't specified
what that's going to be.

00:33:58.600 --> 00:34:02.070 align:middle line:84%
So we could draw it like this
with a single equilibrium.

00:34:02.070 --> 00:34:06.375 align:middle line:84%
It could look like
this, which has--

00:34:06.375 --> 00:34:08.250 align:middle line:84%
I mean, we know that it
has to be decreasing,

00:34:08.250 --> 00:34:11.489 align:middle line:84%
but the shape of this
thing is not clear.

00:34:11.489 --> 00:34:13.530 align:middle line:84%
So if I've drawn
it like this, there

00:34:13.530 --> 00:34:20.330 align:middle line:84%
are three equilibria, where
these are both, I think,

00:34:20.330 --> 00:34:23.406 align:middle line:90%
the stable equilibria.

00:34:23.406 --> 00:34:25.239 align:middle line:84%
And here, there could
be two equi-- so here,

00:34:25.239 --> 00:34:26.620 align:middle line:84%
there could be two equilibria
in this credit market.

00:34:26.620 --> 00:34:28.787 align:middle line:84%
We could have one where we
have really high interest

00:34:28.787 --> 00:34:31.637 align:middle line:84%
rates and very risky
projects, or we

00:34:31.637 --> 00:34:34.179 align:middle line:84%
can have very low interest rates
and not very risky projects.

00:34:34.179 --> 00:34:37.472 align:middle line:84%
Both of those could
be equilibria,

00:34:37.472 --> 00:34:38.889 align:middle line:84%
but it's a
multiequilibrium model.

00:34:38.889 --> 00:34:42.628 align:middle line:90%


00:34:42.628 --> 00:34:44.420 align:middle line:84%
Or you can maybe have
a no lend equilibrium

00:34:44.420 --> 00:34:48.469 align:middle line:84%
where, again, you have to draw
both of these things going out

00:34:48.469 --> 00:34:49.580 align:middle line:90%
like this.

00:34:49.580 --> 00:34:51.320 align:middle line:84%
But it's not obvious
these things are

00:34:51.320 --> 00:34:53.770 align:middle line:90%
going to start to intersect.

00:34:53.770 --> 00:34:56.635 align:middle line:84%
And so in this model,
the credit market

00:34:56.635 --> 00:34:59.530 align:middle line:84%
could collapse entirely if
there is no intersection

00:34:59.530 --> 00:35:02.250 align:middle line:90%
between these two points.

00:35:02.250 --> 00:35:02.750 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:35:02.750 --> 00:35:06.510 align:middle line:90%


00:35:06.510 --> 00:35:09.630 align:middle line:84%
So this already gives us some
important things going on.

00:35:09.630 --> 00:35:11.290 align:middle line:84%
It can already be
an explanation,

00:35:11.290 --> 00:35:13.950 align:middle line:84%
for example, why you might have
multiple different things going

00:35:13.950 --> 00:35:14.450 align:middle line:90%
on.

00:35:14.450 --> 00:35:16.710 align:middle line:84%
You could have really high
interest rates and really

00:35:16.710 --> 00:35:19.410 align:middle line:90%
terrible projects, for example.

00:35:19.410 --> 00:35:22.560 align:middle line:84%
Or sometimes you can have credit
markets that collapse entirely.

00:35:22.560 --> 00:35:26.235 align:middle line:84%
And it just depends on the shape
of that p hat of our function.

00:35:26.235 --> 00:35:28.770 align:middle line:90%


00:35:28.770 --> 00:35:30.860 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:35:30.860 --> 00:35:33.500 align:middle line:90%
What's happening with capital?

00:35:33.500 --> 00:35:37.376 align:middle line:84%
Well, you can think of us as
having derived that optimal p

00:35:37.376 --> 00:35:43.160 align:middle line:84%
hat function, which is a
function of the returns,

00:35:43.160 --> 00:35:46.160 align:middle line:84%
the leverage ratio, and
the interest rate, which

00:35:46.160 --> 00:35:48.770 align:middle line:84%
is in itself an
endogenous function of k.

00:35:48.770 --> 00:35:52.090 align:middle line:90%


00:35:52.090 --> 00:35:58.300 align:middle line:84%
So now, the bank
and the lender know

00:35:58.300 --> 00:36:03.340 align:middle line:84%
that conditional on a level
k and an interest rate,

00:36:03.340 --> 00:36:06.010 align:middle line:84%
they're going to
pick project, p.

00:36:06.010 --> 00:36:07.510 align:middle line:84%
They can't contract
over p, but they

00:36:07.510 --> 00:36:09.640 align:middle line:90%
know what that p function is.

00:36:09.640 --> 00:36:12.400 align:middle line:84%
And so they can make
a choice collectively

00:36:12.400 --> 00:36:15.850 align:middle line:84%
like, how much capital
would you like to borrow.

00:36:15.850 --> 00:36:17.110 align:middle line:90%
So then I can solve.

00:36:17.110 --> 00:36:24.650 align:middle line:84%
I can maximize over
capital the return here,

00:36:24.650 --> 00:36:31.010 align:middle line:84%
where I'm going to
maximize the amount I

00:36:31.010 --> 00:36:34.220 align:middle line:84%
get times the expected
return minus the amount I

00:36:34.220 --> 00:36:35.802 align:middle line:90%
have to pay back.

00:36:35.802 --> 00:36:37.760 align:middle line:84%
And here, I've just
substituted in for the fact

00:36:37.760 --> 00:36:41.190 align:middle line:84%
that in equilibrium, I
have to pay back rho.

00:36:41.190 --> 00:36:47.070 align:middle line:84%
So with probability, p, I
have to pay back r times--

00:36:47.070 --> 00:36:49.230 align:middle line:84%
I have to pay back r, so
I know this is just pr,

00:36:49.230 --> 00:36:56.100 align:middle line:84%
so I just substitute it
for rho, the market amount.

00:36:56.100 --> 00:36:57.660 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:36:57.660 --> 00:36:58.160 align:middle line:90%
What?

00:36:58.160 --> 00:36:58.820 align:middle line:90%
Sorry.

00:36:58.820 --> 00:37:01.448 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: Is it still the same
borrower making this decision,

00:37:01.448 --> 00:37:02.900 align:middle line:90%
or is the bank deciding on it?

00:37:02.900 --> 00:37:05.943 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: This is contractable,
so they can decide together.

00:37:05.943 --> 00:37:07.610 align:middle line:84%
The borrower can
decide it, but the bank

00:37:07.610 --> 00:37:10.870 align:middle line:84%
will be happy to do
this in equilibrium.

00:37:10.870 --> 00:37:13.330 align:middle line:84%
The key thing we
had to keep track of

00:37:13.330 --> 00:37:16.900 align:middle line:84%
is, once they choose k
together or whatever--

00:37:16.900 --> 00:37:18.520 align:middle line:84%
this is a contract--
then the borrower

00:37:18.520 --> 00:37:19.600 align:middle line:90%
goes off and chooses p.

00:37:19.600 --> 00:37:23.410 align:middle line:84%
So the key point is, we're
choosing the level of k,

00:37:23.410 --> 00:37:27.640 align:middle line:84%
taking the borrower's second
period choice of p as that.

00:37:27.640 --> 00:37:31.520 align:middle line:90%
That function is given.

00:37:31.520 --> 00:37:32.690 align:middle line:90%
And that's what I just said.

00:37:32.690 --> 00:37:34.310 align:middle line:84%
We're only maximizing
this over k.

00:37:34.310 --> 00:37:37.370 align:middle line:84%
We can't choose k and
p jointly because we

00:37:37.370 --> 00:37:39.200 align:middle line:84%
know that once we
choose k, I'm going

00:37:39.200 --> 00:37:41.460 align:middle line:90%
to go do whatever p I want.

00:37:41.460 --> 00:37:44.540 align:middle line:84%
And we might do better if we
commit to a level of k an p

00:37:44.540 --> 00:37:48.030 align:middle line:90%
together, but we can't.

00:37:48.030 --> 00:37:50.240 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:37:50.240 --> 00:37:52.700 align:middle line:84%
So that gives us a
first order condition.

00:37:52.700 --> 00:37:54.200 align:middle line:84%
So what's the first
order condition?

00:37:54.200 --> 00:37:58.460 align:middle line:84%
Well, it's just F
prime of k times e of p

00:37:58.460 --> 00:38:04.130 align:middle line:84%
plus the other term, F of
k times e prime of p times

00:38:04.130 --> 00:38:09.280 align:middle line:90%
p prime, so dp/dk.

00:38:09.280 --> 00:38:10.870 align:middle line:84%
And all that has
to be equal to rho.

00:38:10.870 --> 00:38:13.900 align:middle line:90%


00:38:13.900 --> 00:38:15.350 align:middle line:90%
Clear?

00:38:15.350 --> 00:38:17.090 align:middle line:84%
By the way, thanks
to Ed for helping me

00:38:17.090 --> 00:38:19.110 align:middle line:84%
clean up some my
algebra on this slide,

00:38:19.110 --> 00:38:22.070 align:middle line:90%
which I had some issues before.

00:38:22.070 --> 00:38:24.130 align:middle line:84%
But I'm pretty sure
this is correct.

00:38:24.130 --> 00:38:26.910 align:middle line:90%
So that's what we just had.

00:38:26.910 --> 00:38:28.470 align:middle line:90%
What would be the first best?

00:38:28.470 --> 00:38:31.200 align:middle line:90%


00:38:31.200 --> 00:38:36.930 align:middle line:84%
The first best would be that
the overall return, f prime

00:38:36.930 --> 00:38:39.600 align:middle line:84%
of k times the expected
return, should just

00:38:39.600 --> 00:38:42.100 align:middle line:84%
be equal to the
market interest rate.

00:38:42.100 --> 00:38:44.685 align:middle line:84%
So that would be the optimal
level of capital to invest.

00:38:44.685 --> 00:38:50.007 align:middle line:90%


00:38:50.007 --> 00:38:52.590 align:middle line:84%
And we can see what's going to
happen to the level of capital.

00:38:52.590 --> 00:38:57.110 align:middle line:84%
So in particular, we can rewrite
this equation as f prime e of p

00:38:57.110 --> 00:39:03.920 align:middle line:84%
is equal to rho minus
this term over here.

00:39:03.920 --> 00:39:05.300 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:39:05.300 --> 00:39:07.250 align:middle line:90%
f of k is positive.

00:39:07.250 --> 00:39:09.050 align:middle line:90%
e prime is positive.

00:39:09.050 --> 00:39:12.290 align:middle line:84%
We had that from one of
our assumptions before.

00:39:12.290 --> 00:39:17.500 align:middle line:84%
And we also just showed earlier
that dp/dk is less than zero.

00:39:17.500 --> 00:39:20.220 align:middle line:90%


00:39:20.220 --> 00:39:24.480 align:middle line:84%
OK, because of, say, for
example, the leverage channel.

00:39:24.480 --> 00:39:28.190 align:middle line:90%


00:39:28.190 --> 00:39:33.490 align:middle line:84%
So what this means is that if
we have a concave function,

00:39:33.490 --> 00:39:35.508 align:middle line:84%
a concave production
function, then

00:39:35.508 --> 00:39:37.300 align:middle line:84%
the level of investment
we're going to have

00:39:37.300 --> 00:39:41.174 align:middle line:84%
is less than k star, the
optimal level of investment.

00:39:41.174 --> 00:39:46.770 align:middle line:90%


00:39:46.770 --> 00:39:48.690 align:middle line:84%
Intuitively what's going
on, what's going on

00:39:48.690 --> 00:39:52.740 align:middle line:84%
is, the interest rate is kind
of high, given the moral hazard,

00:39:52.740 --> 00:39:56.655 align:middle line:84%
and there's going to be more of
this with more capital holding

00:39:56.655 --> 00:39:58.038 align:middle line:90%
this rate fixed.

00:39:58.038 --> 00:39:59.580 align:middle line:84%
So the interest rate
is already high.

00:39:59.580 --> 00:40:01.920 align:middle line:84%
That's going to drive down
the optimal level of k,

00:40:01.920 --> 00:40:03.900 align:middle line:84%
and then the additional
channel is only

00:40:03.900 --> 00:40:05.220 align:middle line:90%
going to reinforce that.

00:40:05.220 --> 00:40:07.410 align:middle line:84%
So the interest rate
is high because we

00:40:07.410 --> 00:40:08.820 align:middle line:90%
have the moral hazard problem.

00:40:08.820 --> 00:40:11.340 align:middle line:84%
And then if the
higher interest rate

00:40:11.340 --> 00:40:12.992 align:middle line:84%
I choose a lower
level of project,

00:40:12.992 --> 00:40:14.700 align:middle line:84%
that makes the interest
rate even higher,

00:40:14.700 --> 00:40:18.720 align:middle line:84%
and we end up in a-- the
equilibrium of that drives

00:40:18.720 --> 00:40:19.890 align:middle line:90%
capital even lower.

00:40:19.890 --> 00:40:23.923 align:middle line:90%


00:40:23.923 --> 00:40:25.340 align:middle line:84%
And so, again,
that says, look, we

00:40:25.340 --> 00:40:27.380 align:middle line:84%
prefer to be able to commit
to this level of p that

00:40:27.380 --> 00:40:28.310 align:middle line:90%
wouldn't have this problem.

00:40:28.310 --> 00:40:30.020 align:middle line:84%
It would give us a lower
level of interest rate

00:40:30.020 --> 00:40:31.910 align:middle line:84%
and a higher level of capital
and higher level return,

00:40:31.910 --> 00:40:33.077 align:middle line:90%
but we can't commit to that.

00:40:33.077 --> 00:40:41.620 align:middle line:90%


00:40:41.620 --> 00:40:45.300 align:middle line:84%
We can also show similarly that
dk/dw, is greater than zero

00:40:45.300 --> 00:40:47.890 align:middle line:90%
through a similar argument.

00:40:47.890 --> 00:40:49.660 align:middle line:84%
Just stepping back,
what have we shown?

00:40:49.660 --> 00:40:54.040 align:middle line:84%
This is a moral hazard model
where the choice of projects

00:40:54.040 --> 00:40:55.030 align:middle line:90%
was uncertain--

00:40:55.030 --> 00:40:59.020 align:middle line:90%
sorry-- was uncontractable.

00:40:59.020 --> 00:41:01.240 align:middle line:84%
And that plus limited
liability led people

00:41:01.240 --> 00:41:02.680 align:middle line:90%
to choose these risky projects.

00:41:02.680 --> 00:41:05.500 align:middle line:84%
The choice of risky projects
leads to these higher interest

00:41:05.500 --> 00:41:07.990 align:middle line:84%
rates, which leads to
lower levels of capital

00:41:07.990 --> 00:41:10.750 align:middle line:90%
in equilibrium.

00:41:10.750 --> 00:41:13.450 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: In the real
world, don't people

00:41:13.450 --> 00:41:15.338 align:middle line:84%
often contract over p
when they're like, oh,

00:41:15.338 --> 00:41:16.630 align:middle line:90%
what do you want the money for?

00:41:16.630 --> 00:41:18.460 align:middle line:90%
For this business idea.

00:41:18.460 --> 00:41:19.780 align:middle line:90%
OK, no I don't like your idea.

00:41:19.780 --> 00:41:20.955 align:middle line:90%
I won't give you the money.

00:41:20.955 --> 00:41:21.580 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Yes.

00:41:21.580 --> 00:41:23.980 align:middle line:90%
So I think you're exactly right.

00:41:23.980 --> 00:41:27.535 align:middle line:84%
A whole lot of what
banks are doing

00:41:27.535 --> 00:41:30.160 align:middle line:84%
is trying to-- you can think of
a lot of what banks are doing--

00:41:30.160 --> 00:41:34.105 align:middle line:84%
well, let me also talk about
the adverse selection model too.

00:41:34.105 --> 00:41:36.425 align:middle line:90%


00:41:36.425 --> 00:41:38.050 align:middle line:84%
It's not obvious to
me how much they're

00:41:38.050 --> 00:41:40.240 align:middle line:84%
doing they're screening
about the adverse selection.

00:41:40.240 --> 00:41:42.400 align:middle line:84%
They're definitely
trying to figure out p

00:41:42.400 --> 00:41:43.630 align:middle line:90%
and whether it's the ex-ante.

00:41:43.630 --> 00:41:45.047 align:middle line:84%
Whether it's the
moral hazard part

00:41:45.047 --> 00:41:48.100 align:middle line:84%
or it's the adverse selection
part is less clear to me,

00:41:48.100 --> 00:41:49.810 align:middle line:84%
so we can come back
to what they're

00:41:49.810 --> 00:41:50.510 align:middle line:90%
doing in the real world.

00:41:50.510 --> 00:41:51.640 align:middle line:84%
I think a lot of what
they're doing looks more

00:41:51.640 --> 00:41:52.973 align:middle line:90%
like the adverse selection part.

00:41:52.973 --> 00:41:56.080 align:middle line:84%
So the selection part is kind
of the ex-ante, which we'll

00:41:56.080 --> 00:41:58.000 align:middle line:90%
talk about in the next model.

00:41:58.000 --> 00:42:00.222 align:middle line:84%
Ex-ante is saying,
hey, Tishana, what

00:42:00.222 --> 00:42:01.930 align:middle line:84%
are you planning on
doing with the money.

00:42:01.930 --> 00:42:03.100 align:middle line:90%
What's your p?

00:42:03.100 --> 00:42:04.470 align:middle line:90%
You can think of that as like--

00:42:04.470 --> 00:42:06.970 align:middle line:84%
that's ex-ante, trying to figure
out, we have different p's.

00:42:06.970 --> 00:42:09.670 align:middle line:84%
Your p is this, Aaron's p is
this, and so on and so forth.

00:42:09.670 --> 00:42:11.170 align:middle line:84%
We're trying to
figure out who's got

00:42:11.170 --> 00:42:12.640 align:middle line:90%
the good p's and lend to them.

00:42:12.640 --> 00:42:14.140 align:middle line:90%
That's adverse selection.

00:42:14.140 --> 00:42:16.000 align:middle line:84%
This model will
basically say, I want

00:42:16.000 --> 00:42:17.350 align:middle line:84%
you to come in here every
month, and I want you

00:42:17.350 --> 00:42:18.558 align:middle line:90%
to tell me what you're doing.

00:42:18.558 --> 00:42:20.800 align:middle line:84%
Kind of that very, very
regular monitoring.

00:42:20.800 --> 00:42:23.740 align:middle line:84%
Banks also do that, but
that's the closer to this one.

00:42:23.740 --> 00:42:25.250 align:middle line:90%
So I think you're right.

00:42:25.250 --> 00:42:28.000 align:middle line:84%
I think that you can
think about the whole--

00:42:28.000 --> 00:42:30.460 align:middle line:84%
a lot of the relationship
between banks

00:42:30.460 --> 00:42:33.520 align:middle line:84%
and their clients as being
about trying to combat these two

00:42:33.520 --> 00:42:34.922 align:middle line:90%
basic issues.

00:42:34.922 --> 00:42:36.630 align:middle line:84%
And if they're perfect
at combating them,

00:42:36.630 --> 00:42:37.818 align:middle line:90%
then this goes away.

00:42:37.818 --> 00:42:39.360 align:middle line:84%
In reality, I think
we probably think

00:42:39.360 --> 00:42:41.110 align:middle line:84%
they can combat
them to some extent,

00:42:41.110 --> 00:42:42.568 align:middle line:84%
and this is capturing
the residual.

00:42:42.568 --> 00:42:45.698 align:middle line:90%


00:42:45.698 --> 00:42:46.865 align:middle line:90%
Other questions or comments?

00:42:46.865 --> 00:42:50.980 align:middle line:90%


00:42:50.980 --> 00:42:54.100 align:middle line:90%
So question.

00:42:54.100 --> 00:42:57.387 align:middle line:84%
Would you say there are credit
constraints in this model?

00:42:57.387 --> 00:42:58.970 align:middle line:84%
What do we mean by
credit constraints?

00:42:58.970 --> 00:43:00.650 align:middle line:84%
We're going to talk a lot
about credit constraints.

00:43:00.650 --> 00:43:02.983 align:middle line:84%
Do we think people are credit
constrained in this model?

00:43:02.983 --> 00:43:05.703 align:middle line:90%


00:43:05.703 --> 00:43:07.870 align:middle line:84%
It's kind of a little
definitional, but I'm curious.

00:43:07.870 --> 00:43:08.450 align:middle line:90%
What do you--

00:43:08.450 --> 00:43:16.870 align:middle line:90%


00:43:16.870 --> 00:43:17.370 align:middle line:90%
Yes?

00:43:17.370 --> 00:43:17.870 align:middle line:90%
No?

00:43:17.870 --> 00:43:20.500 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: I would say,
no, because they can

00:43:20.500 --> 00:43:21.862 align:middle line:90%
borrow as much as they want.

00:43:21.862 --> 00:43:24.404 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: OK, no, because they
can borrow as much they want.

00:43:24.404 --> 00:43:26.348 align:middle line:84%
They're just choosing
k as much as they want.

00:43:26.348 --> 00:43:28.140 align:middle line:84%
What would be the
argument to say that they

00:43:28.140 --> 00:43:29.761 align:middle line:90%
are credit constrained?

00:43:29.761 --> 00:43:36.685 align:middle line:90%


00:43:36.685 --> 00:43:38.643 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: Because they're
getting less than what

00:43:38.643 --> 00:43:39.570 align:middle line:90%
the borrower gives.

00:43:39.570 --> 00:43:40.880 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Yeah, exactly.

00:43:40.880 --> 00:43:41.880 align:middle line:90%
So that's exactly right.

00:43:41.880 --> 00:43:43.338 align:middle line:84%
So I just want to
be clear on this.

00:43:43.338 --> 00:43:46.500 align:middle line:84%
This is a model where I think
you're exactly right, Cash,

00:43:46.500 --> 00:43:49.320 align:middle line:84%
that basically this is a model
where they're not constrained,

00:43:49.320 --> 00:43:53.070 align:middle line:84%
in the sense that they could
get more k if they wanted to.

00:43:53.070 --> 00:43:54.990 align:middle line:84%
The optimal level of
k for them to borrow

00:43:54.990 --> 00:43:57.330 align:middle line:84%
is whether the
interest rate will

00:43:57.330 --> 00:43:59.520 align:middle line:90%
adjust as they borrow more k.

00:43:59.520 --> 00:44:02.880 align:middle line:90%


00:44:02.880 --> 00:44:08.130 align:middle line:84%
And that's going to
lead there to be--

00:44:08.130 --> 00:44:10.470 align:middle line:84%
it looks like they're
not borrowing as much k

00:44:10.470 --> 00:44:12.900 align:middle line:84%
as they might have wanted
to if these information

00:44:12.900 --> 00:44:15.000 align:middle line:90%
asymmetries hadn't been there.

00:44:15.000 --> 00:44:17.810 align:middle line:90%


00:44:17.810 --> 00:44:19.180 align:middle line:90%
So that's model one.

00:44:19.180 --> 00:44:22.010 align:middle line:90%
That's the moral hazard model.

00:44:22.010 --> 00:44:25.412 align:middle line:84%
Here's another model, which is
the adverse selection model.

00:44:25.412 --> 00:44:26.620 align:middle line:90%
This is an alternative story.

00:44:26.620 --> 00:44:28.953 align:middle line:84%
And going back to what I was
talking about with Tishana,

00:44:28.953 --> 00:44:32.260 align:middle line:84%
this is kind of like screening
heterogeneity among projects.

00:44:32.260 --> 00:44:33.940 align:middle line:84%
So now, in this
model, we're going

00:44:33.940 --> 00:44:36.880 align:middle line:84%
to suppose that p is
a fixed characteristic

00:44:36.880 --> 00:44:38.150 align:middle line:90%
of an individual.

00:44:38.150 --> 00:44:41.310 align:middle line:84%
Some people have high p,
some people have low p.

00:44:41.310 --> 00:44:43.230 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:44:43.230 --> 00:44:45.990 align:middle line:84%
So in this model, we say,
look, suppose the bank offers

00:44:45.990 --> 00:44:48.350 align:middle line:90%
an interest rate, r.

00:44:48.350 --> 00:44:50.750 align:middle line:90%
Who's going to take that loan?

00:44:50.750 --> 00:44:53.410 align:middle line:90%
Who wants that loan?

00:44:53.410 --> 00:44:58.940 align:middle line:84%
Well, I'm going to take
that loan if, again,

00:44:58.940 --> 00:45:00.320 align:middle line:90%
same little liability.

00:45:00.320 --> 00:45:03.820 align:middle line:84%
The project fails, probability
1 minus p, I pay nothing.

00:45:03.820 --> 00:45:07.630 align:middle line:84%
Probability, p, I
get f of k r of p.

00:45:07.630 --> 00:45:08.770 align:middle line:90%
That's my return.

00:45:08.770 --> 00:45:11.710 align:middle line:84%
And I have to pay this gross
interest rate, r, on the amount

00:45:11.710 --> 00:45:13.015 align:middle line:90%
I borrow, which is k minus w.

00:45:13.015 --> 00:45:19.220 align:middle line:90%


00:45:19.220 --> 00:45:22.750 align:middle line:84%
So p is going to drop out,
but if r is greater than--

00:45:22.750 --> 00:45:25.000 align:middle line:84%
so big R, the return,
is greater than r,

00:45:25.000 --> 00:45:29.950 align:middle line:84%
the amount I have to pay back,
r times the amount I borrow,

00:45:29.950 --> 00:45:34.830 align:middle line:84%
divide it by f of k, then
I'm going to want that.

00:45:34.830 --> 00:45:36.480 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:45:36.480 --> 00:45:41.020 align:middle line:84%
So if you recall
from the beginning,

00:45:41.020 --> 00:45:52.410 align:middle line:84%
we had that r prime
was less than zero,

00:45:52.410 --> 00:45:55.148 align:middle line:90%
that we had the lower--

00:45:55.148 --> 00:45:57.690 align:middle line:84%
the riskier projects were the
ones that were paying the most.

00:45:57.690 --> 00:46:00.655 align:middle line:84%
The higher return
projects were paying less.

00:46:00.655 --> 00:46:01.155 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:46:01.155 --> 00:46:04.210 align:middle line:90%


00:46:04.210 --> 00:46:06.010 align:middle line:84%
What that means
is, there's going

00:46:06.010 --> 00:46:11.990 align:middle line:84%
to be a cutoff
value where people

00:46:11.990 --> 00:46:14.700 align:middle line:84%
with p less than
some cutoff value

00:46:14.700 --> 00:46:16.700 align:middle line:84%
are going to be the ones
who are going to pick--

00:46:16.700 --> 00:46:18.440 align:middle line:90%
going to take up the loan.

00:46:18.440 --> 00:46:21.290 align:middle line:90%


00:46:21.290 --> 00:46:25.850 align:middle line:84%
r of p less than some
cutoff is the same as saying

00:46:25.850 --> 00:46:30.650 align:middle line:84%
that p is going to be
less than some cutoff,

00:46:30.650 --> 00:46:32.670 align:middle line:84%
so the super risky
projects up to some cutoff

00:46:32.670 --> 00:46:34.545 align:middle line:84%
are the ones that are
going to take the loan.

00:46:34.545 --> 00:46:36.860 align:middle line:90%


00:46:36.860 --> 00:46:38.350 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:46:38.350 --> 00:46:43.840 align:middle line:84%
So we can define p tilde of
r as exactly that cutoff,

00:46:43.840 --> 00:46:47.500 align:middle line:84%
so we can just define p
tilde, such that r of p tilde

00:46:47.500 --> 00:46:49.210 align:middle line:90%
is exactly equal to this.

00:46:49.210 --> 00:46:51.700 align:middle line:84%
And everybody with a p less
than p tilde will borrow.

00:46:51.700 --> 00:46:54.830 align:middle line:90%


00:46:54.830 --> 00:46:55.330 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:46:55.330 --> 00:46:58.880 align:middle line:90%


00:46:58.880 --> 00:47:00.450 align:middle line:90%
And so what happens?

00:47:00.450 --> 00:47:03.490 align:middle line:90%
Well, as I r--

00:47:03.490 --> 00:47:06.880 align:middle line:84%
so I increase the
interest rate--

00:47:06.880 --> 00:47:10.810 align:middle line:84%
the p tilde is going
to shift to the left.

00:47:10.810 --> 00:47:12.515 align:middle line:84%
Because if I increase
the interest rate,

00:47:12.515 --> 00:47:13.765 align:middle line:90%
the return's got to be higher.

00:47:13.765 --> 00:47:16.240 align:middle line:84%
Higher return projects were
the ones with the lower p.

00:47:16.240 --> 00:47:18.190 align:middle line:84%
So again, higher
interest rates are

00:47:18.190 --> 00:47:20.500 align:middle line:84%
going to shift that
threshold to the left,

00:47:20.500 --> 00:47:22.860 align:middle line:84%
and we're going get
riskier projects.

00:47:22.860 --> 00:47:26.180 align:middle line:84%
So we're also going to get that
same correlation that we had

00:47:26.180 --> 00:47:28.070 align:middle line:84%
from the moral
hazard model, which

00:47:28.070 --> 00:47:30.590 align:middle line:84%
is a correlation between
the interest rate

00:47:30.590 --> 00:47:32.420 align:middle line:84%
and the riskiness
of the projects,

00:47:32.420 --> 00:47:35.895 align:middle line:84%
although it's happening
through this different channel.

00:47:35.895 --> 00:47:37.770 align:middle line:84%
One was this ex-ante,
who wants the projects.

00:47:37.770 --> 00:47:48.120 align:middle line:84%
The other is the ex-post,
who is the interest rates.

00:47:48.120 --> 00:47:50.490 align:middle line:84%
And intuitively what's going
on in this model, what's

00:47:50.490 --> 00:47:55.590 align:middle line:84%
going on here is like, look,
imagine the return is the--

00:47:55.590 --> 00:47:58.740 align:middle line:84%
in the good state, I
have to pay back a lot.

00:47:58.740 --> 00:48:00.000 align:middle line:90%
Who's going to want that?

00:48:00.000 --> 00:48:03.330 align:middle line:84%
Only people for whom the good
state is really, really good,

00:48:03.330 --> 00:48:05.925 align:middle line:84%
and those are the
people who were risky.

00:48:05.925 --> 00:48:14.090 align:middle line:90%


00:48:14.090 --> 00:48:17.290 align:middle line:84%
So again, we have this
negative correlation here.

00:48:17.290 --> 00:48:20.550 align:middle line:84%
Now, what's the market
equilibrium here?

00:48:20.550 --> 00:48:24.260 align:middle line:84%
Well, again, we have that rho,
that r times the amount you

00:48:24.260 --> 00:48:26.600 align:middle line:84%
get-- so here, we have a
slightly different condition.

00:48:26.600 --> 00:48:29.570 align:middle line:90%
What is the p?

00:48:29.570 --> 00:48:31.190 align:middle line:90%
For a given r, who borrows?

00:48:31.190 --> 00:48:35.690 align:middle line:84%
Well, it's everybody
with interest rate with p

00:48:35.690 --> 00:48:38.030 align:middle line:90%
less than that cutoff value.

00:48:38.030 --> 00:48:40.570 align:middle line:84%
So what's the average
probability of success?

00:48:40.570 --> 00:48:50.569 align:middle line:90%


00:48:50.569 --> 00:48:56.570 align:middle line:84%
It's just the expectation-- this
is e meaning expectation, not

00:48:56.570 --> 00:48:58.295 align:middle line:90%
e meaning the expected return.

00:48:58.295 --> 00:49:02.045 align:middle line:90%


00:49:02.045 --> 00:49:03.170 align:middle line:90%
So sorry for the imitation.

00:49:03.170 --> 00:49:06.450 align:middle line:84%
It's the expectation of p
conditional on p less than p

00:49:06.450 --> 00:49:06.950 align:middle line:90%
tilde.

00:49:06.950 --> 00:49:11.740 align:middle line:90%


00:49:11.740 --> 00:49:14.560 align:middle line:84%
We know that as p
tilde goes down,

00:49:14.560 --> 00:49:16.150 align:middle line:84%
the expectation of
p tilde goes down.

00:49:16.150 --> 00:49:18.272 align:middle line:84%
But beyond that, it's
the shape of that thing

00:49:18.272 --> 00:49:20.230 align:middle line:84%
depends on just what the
distribution of p's is

00:49:20.230 --> 00:49:22.910 align:middle line:90%
in the population.

00:49:22.910 --> 00:49:23.810 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:49:23.810 --> 00:49:27.830 align:middle line:84%
That also is going to mean that
r, the interest rate charge,

00:49:27.830 --> 00:49:30.080 align:middle line:84%
is going to be equal to rho
divided by the expectation

00:49:30.080 --> 00:49:30.290 align:middle line:90%
thing.

00:49:30.290 --> 00:49:31.707 align:middle line:84%
If this thing is
less than 1, that

00:49:31.707 --> 00:49:34.190 align:middle line:84%
means that the rs that going
to be charged to people

00:49:34.190 --> 00:49:36.140 align:middle line:90%
are going to be higher than rho.

00:49:36.140 --> 00:49:38.000 align:middle line:84%
So we're also going to
have higher interest

00:49:38.000 --> 00:49:39.470 align:middle line:90%
rates than equilibrium.

00:49:39.470 --> 00:49:44.090 align:middle line:84%
It's in the first best or
whatever, then that rho thing.

00:49:44.090 --> 00:49:46.710 align:middle line:84%
But the reasoning
is a bit different.

00:49:46.710 --> 00:49:48.433 align:middle line:84%
It's all about this
ex-ante screening.

00:49:48.433 --> 00:49:49.850 align:middle line:84%
Going back to your
point, Tishana,

00:49:49.850 --> 00:49:50.630 align:middle line:84%
this is where the
banks are going

00:49:50.630 --> 00:49:52.310 align:middle line:84%
to want to invest
in doing everything

00:49:52.310 --> 00:49:55.400 align:middle line:84%
that we can say to screen
people, kind of ex-ante

00:49:55.400 --> 00:49:57.000 align:middle line:84%
and get rid of
the people who are

00:49:57.000 --> 00:49:58.250 align:middle line:90%
going to be kind of lower rho.

00:49:58.250 --> 00:49:59.625 align:middle line:84%
Because for a
given interest rate

00:49:59.625 --> 00:50:02.300 align:middle line:84%
that the bank's charging,
conditional on charging

00:50:02.300 --> 00:50:05.900 align:middle line:84%
r, if it can weed out some
people who are the worst,

00:50:05.900 --> 00:50:06.932 align:middle line:90%
it's going to do better.

00:50:06.932 --> 00:50:08.390 align:middle line:84%
That's not necessarily
equilibrium,

00:50:08.390 --> 00:50:10.880 align:middle line:84%
but that's going to be the
bank's incentive function.

00:50:10.880 --> 00:50:12.830 align:middle line:90%
So I announce r.

00:50:12.830 --> 00:50:15.590 align:middle line:84%
I know that everyone with p
less and p tilde would like it.

00:50:15.590 --> 00:50:17.290 align:middle line:90%
How can I make even more money?

00:50:17.290 --> 00:50:17.840 align:middle line:84%
I'm going to be
able to break even,

00:50:17.840 --> 00:50:19.298 align:middle line:84%
but I can make even
more money if I

00:50:19.298 --> 00:50:21.515 align:middle line:84%
can find the really low
people and knock them out.

00:50:21.515 --> 00:50:23.390 align:middle line:84%
I want to get people
who are just as close as

00:50:23.390 --> 00:50:24.680 align:middle line:90%
possible to p tilde.

00:50:24.680 --> 00:50:26.330 align:middle line:84%
And you can think,
a lot of what banks

00:50:26.330 --> 00:50:27.950 align:middle line:84%
are doing in that
screening process

00:50:27.950 --> 00:50:29.780 align:middle line:84%
is trying to figure out who
are the good borrowers, who

00:50:29.780 --> 00:50:32.120 align:middle line:84%
are the bad borrowers, can I
remove the really bad ones.

00:50:32.120 --> 00:50:35.410 align:middle line:90%


00:50:35.410 --> 00:50:37.900 align:middle line:84%
So again, we can draw that
same kind of equilibrium.

00:50:37.900 --> 00:50:41.860 align:middle line:84%
Here, this thing is the same
market clearing condition,

00:50:41.860 --> 00:50:44.020 align:middle line:90%
but now, we have a different--

00:50:44.020 --> 00:50:45.520 align:middle line:84%
instead of a moral
hazard condition,

00:50:45.520 --> 00:50:48.500 align:middle line:84%
we have an adverse
selection condition,

00:50:48.500 --> 00:50:52.120 align:middle line:84%
which says that here is
the expectation of p,

00:50:52.120 --> 00:50:54.160 align:middle line:84%
given that p is less
than p tilde, where

00:50:54.160 --> 00:50:56.500 align:middle line:90%
p tilde is a function of r.

00:50:56.500 --> 00:51:02.230 align:middle line:84%
And so this curve here doesn't
come from project choices.

00:51:02.230 --> 00:51:05.080 align:middle line:84%
This is just a question of,
what is the distribution of p's

00:51:05.080 --> 00:51:06.350 align:middle line:90%
in the population.

00:51:06.350 --> 00:51:11.950 align:middle line:84%
This is just like
a property of the p

00:51:11.950 --> 00:51:14.430 align:middle line:90%
function of the population.

00:51:14.430 --> 00:51:19.340 align:middle line:84%
What is the distribution
of p's And again, you

00:51:19.340 --> 00:51:21.413 align:middle line:84%
can draw that in
funky different ways.

00:51:21.413 --> 00:51:22.330 align:middle line:90%
It can look like this.

00:51:22.330 --> 00:51:23.038 align:middle line:90%
It can intersect.

00:51:23.038 --> 00:51:27.200 align:middle line:84%
It can go on with equilibria
and so on and so forth.

00:51:27.200 --> 00:51:31.540 align:middle line:84%
It's got to be downward sloping,
but beyond that, unclear.

00:51:31.540 --> 00:51:33.600 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:51:33.600 --> 00:51:37.060 align:middle line:90%
Clear so far?

00:51:37.060 --> 00:51:38.810 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:51:38.810 --> 00:51:42.840 align:middle line:84%
So both of those
models, the moral hazard

00:51:42.840 --> 00:51:46.680 align:middle line:84%
model and the adverse
selection model,

00:51:46.680 --> 00:51:52.720 align:middle line:84%
are going to feature high
interest rates, or at least

00:51:52.720 --> 00:51:54.470 align:middle line:84%
both of those are
reasons why the interest

00:51:54.470 --> 00:51:56.770 align:middle line:84%
rate will be higher than
the market clearance.

00:51:56.770 --> 00:52:00.350 align:middle line:84%
This is why the market for, say,
microfinance, the interest rate

00:52:00.350 --> 00:52:04.010 align:middle line:90%
would be higher than, say, the--

00:52:04.010 --> 00:52:06.770 align:middle line:84%
Imagine you have a simple model
where microfinance institutions

00:52:06.770 --> 00:52:09.290 align:middle line:84%
are raising capital
on Wall Street

00:52:09.290 --> 00:52:11.972 align:middle line:90%
and lending it to small lenders.

00:52:11.972 --> 00:52:13.430 align:middle line:84%
This already tells
you there should

00:52:13.430 --> 00:52:16.010 align:middle line:84%
be reasons why the interest
rate is paid by small borrowers,

00:52:16.010 --> 00:52:18.030 align:middle line:84%
or it tells you why the interest
rate paid by the borrower

00:52:18.030 --> 00:52:19.572 align:middle line:84%
should be a lot
higher than the level

00:52:19.572 --> 00:52:21.900 align:middle line:84%
that the bank is charging
on interest rates.

00:52:21.900 --> 00:52:24.550 align:middle line:84%
But it comes from
the default channel.

00:52:24.550 --> 00:52:25.080 align:middle line:90%
All right.

00:52:25.080 --> 00:52:30.360 align:middle line:90%


00:52:30.360 --> 00:52:33.242 align:middle line:84%
So those models predict
high interest rates,

00:52:33.242 --> 00:52:34.950 align:middle line:84%
but the reason for
the high interest rate

00:52:34.950 --> 00:52:36.367 align:middle line:84%
is to cover the
expected defaults.

00:52:36.367 --> 00:52:39.540 align:middle line:90%


00:52:39.540 --> 00:52:43.680 align:middle line:84%
So one unfortunate
fact for this model

00:52:43.680 --> 00:52:46.800 align:middle line:84%
is that, at least
in microfinance,

00:52:46.800 --> 00:52:50.730 align:middle line:84%
at least in some cases,
interest rates are high.

00:52:50.730 --> 00:52:54.540 align:middle line:84%
But often repayment rates
are actually high too.

00:52:54.540 --> 00:52:55.790 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:52:55.790 --> 00:52:59.740 align:middle line:84%
So then that doesn't
work in this model

00:52:59.740 --> 00:53:01.780 align:middle line:84%
because the only reason
in both those models

00:53:01.780 --> 00:53:04.580 align:middle line:84%
that the rates were high
was to cover the defaults.

00:53:04.580 --> 00:53:09.610 align:middle line:84%
So to the extent
this is also a force,

00:53:09.610 --> 00:53:15.100 align:middle line:84%
if there are reasons for that
wedge beyond the default rates,

00:53:15.100 --> 00:53:17.050 align:middle line:84%
we'd add something
else to the model.

00:53:17.050 --> 00:53:18.710 align:middle line:84%
One simple way to
do it, by the way,

00:53:18.710 --> 00:53:21.727 align:middle line:84%
is if you thought that the
lenders were not competitive,

00:53:21.727 --> 00:53:23.185 align:middle line:84%
then they're just
charging markups.

00:53:23.185 --> 00:53:25.448 align:middle line:90%


00:53:25.448 --> 00:53:27.490 align:middle line:84%
It's not in the slide,
but if the lenders are not

00:53:27.490 --> 00:53:29.260 align:middle line:84%
competitive, then,
of course, they're

00:53:29.260 --> 00:53:34.550 align:middle line:84%
going to jack up the interest
rate and make more profits.

00:53:34.550 --> 00:53:35.050 align:middle line:90%
So fine.

00:53:35.050 --> 00:53:37.425 align:middle line:90%
That could be part of it.

00:53:37.425 --> 00:53:38.800 align:middle line:84%
And by the way,
there are reasons

00:53:38.800 --> 00:53:40.508 align:middle line:84%
to think that there
may be noncompetition

00:53:40.508 --> 00:53:42.670 align:middle line:90%
in lending markets.

00:53:42.670 --> 00:53:44.087 align:middle line:84%
In particular,
this whole question

00:53:44.087 --> 00:53:45.503 align:middle line:84%
that we were talking
about getting

00:53:45.503 --> 00:53:47.380 align:middle line:84%
to know people's p's
and monitoring them,

00:53:47.380 --> 00:53:51.250 align:middle line:84%
there's an important
rule for information.

00:53:51.250 --> 00:53:54.880 align:middle line:84%
So in particular, imagine
that I'm Tishana's lender,

00:53:54.880 --> 00:53:57.460 align:middle line:84%
and she and I have been
working together for years.

00:53:57.460 --> 00:54:02.560 align:middle line:84%
I may have information about her
p from my years of interaction

00:54:02.560 --> 00:54:05.020 align:middle line:84%
with her that, if Rabajit
chooses another lender,

00:54:05.020 --> 00:54:06.370 align:middle line:90%
Rabajit doesn't have.

00:54:06.370 --> 00:54:09.652 align:middle line:84%
So that may mean I have some
advantage of lending to Tishana

00:54:09.652 --> 00:54:11.860 align:middle line:84%
over Rabajit, and I'd be
able to use that and extract

00:54:11.860 --> 00:54:13.970 align:middle line:90%
some rents from that.

00:54:13.970 --> 00:54:17.500 align:middle line:84%
So in particular, there
may be good reasons

00:54:17.500 --> 00:54:19.600 align:middle line:84%
to think that the model
of perfect competition

00:54:19.600 --> 00:54:21.340 align:middle line:84%
is not necessarily
the only model.

00:54:21.340 --> 00:54:25.200 align:middle line:84%
It's not necessarily a
perfect model for this.

00:54:25.200 --> 00:54:26.430 align:middle line:90%
That's one.

00:54:26.430 --> 00:54:29.230 align:middle line:84%
But here's another model
that also could be relevant,

00:54:29.230 --> 00:54:30.920 align:middle line:90%
which is monitoring costs.

00:54:30.920 --> 00:54:33.710 align:middle line:84%
And in particular, this
monitoring cost idea

00:54:33.710 --> 00:54:35.903 align:middle line:90%
captures the--

00:54:35.903 --> 00:54:39.988 align:middle line:90%


00:54:39.988 --> 00:54:41.780 align:middle line:84%
this actually is not
going to quite capture

00:54:41.780 --> 00:54:44.090 align:middle line:84%
it the way it's going
to be written down here,

00:54:44.090 --> 00:54:45.650 align:middle line:84%
but it captures
the idea that banks

00:54:45.650 --> 00:54:47.960 align:middle line:84%
are spending a lot
of money doing stuff

00:54:47.960 --> 00:54:49.935 align:middle line:90%
to make sure people repay.

00:54:49.935 --> 00:54:50.435 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:54:50.435 --> 00:54:54.720 align:middle line:90%


00:54:54.720 --> 00:54:57.740 align:middle line:84%
So one version of monitoring is,
we have to spend a lot of money

00:54:57.740 --> 00:55:00.180 align:middle line:84%
upfront figuring out who the
good p's and who are the bad

00:55:00.180 --> 00:55:00.680 align:middle line:90%
p's.

00:55:00.680 --> 00:55:02.300 align:middle line:90%
That's one version of it.

00:55:02.300 --> 00:55:05.863 align:middle line:84%
A second version is the moral
hazard version, I think,

00:55:05.863 --> 00:55:08.280 align:middle line:84%
that we were talking about
earlier, which is to say, look,

00:55:08.280 --> 00:55:09.290 align:middle line:84%
I'm going to meet with
you every single month

00:55:09.290 --> 00:55:11.832 align:middle line:84%
and make sure you're doing what
you said you were going to do

00:55:11.832 --> 00:55:17.540 align:middle line:84%
and not deviating and
doing a worse project.

00:55:17.540 --> 00:55:24.290 align:middle line:84%
But a third one is, maybe I can
actually just spend some effort

00:55:24.290 --> 00:55:26.820 align:middle line:90%
to get you to repay.

00:55:26.820 --> 00:55:31.100 align:middle line:84%
So that's what this
model is about,

00:55:31.100 --> 00:55:35.300 align:middle line:84%
so let's think about
monitoring here.

00:55:35.300 --> 00:55:37.377 align:middle line:84%
So let's abstract
from the project

00:55:37.377 --> 00:55:38.960 align:middle line:84%
choices for the
moment, just to make--

00:55:38.960 --> 00:55:40.910 align:middle line:90%
and the project's failing.

00:55:40.910 --> 00:55:44.390 align:middle line:84%
But instead, we're going
to think about repayment.

00:55:44.390 --> 00:55:46.610 align:middle line:84%
So as before in
the previous model,

00:55:46.610 --> 00:55:50.680 align:middle line:84%
suppose that if I
invest k dollars, I get

00:55:50.680 --> 00:55:55.480 align:middle line:84%
a gross return, f of k,
the gross interest rate, r.

00:55:55.480 --> 00:55:58.270 align:middle line:84%
And so if I have wealth,
w, and I want to invest k,

00:55:58.270 --> 00:55:59.717 align:middle line:90%
I need to borrow k minus w.

00:55:59.717 --> 00:56:02.050 align:middle line:84%
And the amount I'm supposed
to pay is k minus w times r.

00:56:02.050 --> 00:56:04.530 align:middle line:90%
That's the same as before.

00:56:04.530 --> 00:56:06.350 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:56:06.350 --> 00:56:11.030 align:middle line:84%
But now, suppose that it's not
the good state or the state

00:56:11.030 --> 00:56:11.660 align:middle line:90%
anymore.

00:56:11.660 --> 00:56:13.670 align:middle line:84%
Suppose that
basically I can just

00:56:13.670 --> 00:56:23.610 align:middle line:84%
choose to stiff you and not
repay by paying a cost eta.

00:56:23.610 --> 00:56:24.900 align:middle line:90%
Right, eta?

00:56:24.900 --> 00:56:26.730 align:middle line:90%
Yes.

00:56:26.730 --> 00:56:30.151 align:middle line:84%
We don't have an eta
variant yet, do we?

00:56:30.151 --> 00:56:31.026 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: [INAUDIBLE].

00:56:31.026 --> 00:56:31.362 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Huh?

00:56:31.362 --> 00:56:33.190 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: It's already
[INAUDIBLE] omicron,

00:56:33.190 --> 00:56:34.928 align:middle line:90%
so presumably it just wasn't--

00:56:34.928 --> 00:56:36.220 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: It wasn't a big one.

00:56:36.220 --> 00:56:37.137 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: --a big deal.

00:56:37.137 --> 00:56:39.285 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: Yeah, they
skipped a couple recently.

00:56:39.285 --> 00:56:41.410 align:middle line:84%
They skipped nu apparently
because everyone thought

00:56:41.410 --> 00:56:42.910 align:middle line:84%
it was going to be
called the "new variant,"

00:56:42.910 --> 00:56:44.618 align:middle line:84%
and they thought that
would be confusing.

00:56:44.618 --> 00:56:48.010 align:middle line:90%
So anyway, eta, OK.

00:56:48.010 --> 00:56:50.320 align:middle line:84%
By cost, eta, that's
proportional to the amount

00:56:50.320 --> 00:56:51.730 align:middle line:90%
invested.

00:56:51.730 --> 00:56:53.420 align:middle line:84%
So that's what's
going to happen?

00:56:53.420 --> 00:56:57.760 align:middle line:84%
So lenders are going to provide
financing up to the point

00:56:57.760 --> 00:56:59.747 align:middle line:84%
where the borrower
is going to repay.

00:56:59.747 --> 00:57:01.330 align:middle line:84%
So this is a slightly
different model,

00:57:01.330 --> 00:57:03.910 align:middle line:84%
but in this case in particular,
they'd like to get paid back.

00:57:03.910 --> 00:57:10.300 align:middle line:90%


00:57:10.300 --> 00:57:11.950 align:middle line:90%
What's the borrower's choice?

00:57:11.950 --> 00:57:15.543 align:middle line:84%
Well, the borrower could
pay back and get f of k.

00:57:15.543 --> 00:57:17.460 align:middle line:84%
And the borrower's net
return if they pay back

00:57:17.460 --> 00:57:20.150 align:middle line:84%
is f of k minus the
amount they have to pay.

00:57:20.150 --> 00:57:25.820 align:middle line:84%
Or the borrower could pay this
default cost and get f of k

00:57:25.820 --> 00:57:29.420 align:middle line:90%
minus nu of k-- eta of k.

00:57:29.420 --> 00:57:31.370 align:middle line:84%
And you can think
of this as like,

00:57:31.370 --> 00:57:36.050 align:middle line:84%
they come and seize my factory
and take some share of it.

00:57:36.050 --> 00:57:41.160 align:middle line:90%


00:57:41.160 --> 00:57:44.200 align:middle line:84%
So it's a slightly
different model.

00:57:44.200 --> 00:57:54.270 align:middle line:84%
So if we rearrange
terms here, the kind

00:57:54.270 --> 00:58:01.710 align:middle line:84%
of key quality condition is that
r k minus w has to equal eta k,

00:58:01.710 --> 00:58:05.700 align:middle line:84%
or that k over w is equal
to r over r minus eta.

00:58:05.700 --> 00:58:06.200 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:58:06.200 --> 00:58:11.520 align:middle line:90%


00:58:11.520 --> 00:58:14.310 align:middle line:84%
So in this model,
this is actually

00:58:14.310 --> 00:58:16.702 align:middle line:84%
going to give a
maximum amount the bank

00:58:16.702 --> 00:58:17.910 align:middle line:90%
is going to want to lend you.

00:58:17.910 --> 00:58:20.880 align:middle line:90%


00:58:20.880 --> 00:58:24.650 align:middle line:84%
With amount of borrowing, it's
going to be increasing in w.

00:58:24.650 --> 00:58:33.270 align:middle line:84%
The more w you have,
the more you can borrow,

00:58:33.270 --> 00:58:34.770 align:middle line:90%
and decreasing in r.

00:58:34.770 --> 00:58:37.190 align:middle line:90%


00:58:37.190 --> 00:58:37.690 align:middle line:90%
OK.

00:58:37.690 --> 00:58:40.780 align:middle line:90%


00:58:40.780 --> 00:58:45.530 align:middle line:84%
So now, let's suppose there's
a monitoring technology.

00:58:45.530 --> 00:58:50.210 align:middle line:84%
So the lender needs to spend
some resources in order

00:58:50.210 --> 00:58:51.710 align:middle line:84%
to make the borrower
want to repay.

00:58:51.710 --> 00:58:53.540 align:middle line:84%
Basically, in
other words, eta is

00:58:53.540 --> 00:58:55.790 align:middle line:84%
equal to zero if the borrower
doesn't spend any money.

00:58:55.790 --> 00:58:57.410 align:middle line:84%
But if the borrower
does some stuff,

00:58:57.410 --> 00:59:00.345 align:middle line:90%
they can get you to repay.

00:59:00.345 --> 00:59:02.220 align:middle line:84%
Maybe that's like finding
out where you live.

00:59:02.220 --> 00:59:05.115 align:middle line:90%


00:59:05.115 --> 00:59:07.740 align:middle line:84%
If you think about a lot of the
microfinance institutions we'll

00:59:07.740 --> 00:59:09.990 align:middle line:84%
talk about next time, they
might be clustered together

00:59:09.990 --> 00:59:10.890 align:middle line:90%
in groups of people.

00:59:10.890 --> 00:59:12.998 align:middle line:84%
And the basic idea
is, if you defaulted,

00:59:12.998 --> 00:59:15.540 align:middle line:84%
other people in your group can
impose social sanctions on you

00:59:15.540 --> 00:59:16.290 align:middle line:90%
if you to default.

00:59:16.290 --> 00:59:18.990 align:middle line:84%
There's some cost we have to
create to get you to repay.

00:59:18.990 --> 00:59:20.657 align:middle line:84%
And in this model,
they're going to say,

00:59:20.657 --> 00:59:22.620 align:middle line:90%
suppose those are a fixed cost.

00:59:22.620 --> 00:59:24.795 align:middle line:84%
It's basically a
cost per borrower.

00:59:24.795 --> 00:59:28.190 align:middle line:90%


00:59:28.190 --> 00:59:30.890 align:middle line:84%
And there are some estimates
from this old paper by Aleem,

00:59:30.890 --> 00:59:35.630 align:middle line:84%
which says that maybe they're
pretty high, particularly

00:59:35.630 --> 00:59:36.590 align:middle line:90%
for very small loans.

00:59:36.590 --> 00:59:39.320 align:middle line:84%
And this cost would be a reason
why basically microfinance has

00:59:39.320 --> 00:59:42.050 align:middle line:84%
really high interest
rates, because if I

00:59:42.050 --> 00:59:44.600 align:middle line:90%
have to find out, yes--

00:59:44.600 --> 00:59:46.280 align:middle line:84%
Fixed cost may be
a little bit much,

00:59:46.280 --> 00:59:48.530 align:middle line:84%
like it's probably
cheaper to find out

00:59:48.530 --> 00:59:56.330 align:middle line:84%
if Joe's dry cleaner
is a better investment.

00:59:56.330 --> 00:59:58.520 align:middle line:84%
Or Joe's tailor
is probably easier

00:59:58.520 --> 01:00:01.848 align:middle line:84%
to figure out if they're
worth lending to then the Gap

01:00:01.848 --> 01:00:02.390 align:middle line:90%
or something.

01:00:02.390 --> 01:00:04.760 align:middle line:90%
It's probably not totally fixed.

01:00:04.760 --> 01:00:09.290 align:middle line:84%
But the idea that it has
this large fixed component,

01:00:09.290 --> 01:00:12.170 align:middle line:84%
or it's definitely not
increasing very much,

01:00:12.170 --> 01:00:13.520 align:middle line:90%
seems kind of reasonable.

01:00:13.520 --> 01:00:15.440 align:middle line:84%
And if that's true,
that's going to give us

01:00:15.440 --> 01:00:17.452 align:middle line:84%
a reasoning why
microfinance is making

01:00:17.452 --> 01:00:18.660 align:middle line:90%
lots and lots of small loans.

01:00:18.660 --> 01:00:19.790 align:middle line:84%
It's going to have to
have really high interest

01:00:19.790 --> 01:00:23.100 align:middle line:84%
rates because they have to cover
this fixed monitoring cost.

01:00:23.100 --> 01:00:25.168 align:middle line:84%
So basically, if you're
making a small loan,

01:00:25.168 --> 01:00:26.210 align:middle line:90%
you have this fixed cost.

01:00:26.210 --> 01:00:28.310 align:middle line:90%
You have to recoup it.

01:00:28.310 --> 01:00:30.350 align:middle line:84%
In terms of interest
rate, it's going

01:00:30.350 --> 01:00:33.170 align:middle line:84%
to be a large percent
of a small base,

01:00:33.170 --> 01:00:34.610 align:middle line:84%
whereas if it's a
really big loan,

01:00:34.610 --> 01:00:36.680 align:middle line:84%
that fixed cost is going
to be much smaller.

01:00:36.680 --> 01:00:39.960 align:middle line:84%
That's basically what's
going on in this model.

01:00:39.960 --> 01:00:40.830 align:middle line:90%
OK.

01:00:40.830 --> 01:00:42.220 align:middle line:90%
So how is that going to work?

01:00:42.220 --> 01:00:45.930 align:middle line:84%
So if it's a fixed
cost, then the lender's

01:00:45.930 --> 01:00:49.890 align:middle line:84%
going to just break
even, so their return

01:00:49.890 --> 01:00:53.050 align:middle line:84%
has to equal the market
return plus the fixed cost.

01:00:53.050 --> 01:00:56.370 align:middle line:84%
And so that's kind
of it basically.

01:00:56.370 --> 01:00:58.465 align:middle line:84%
If the amount they're
borrowing is really small,

01:00:58.465 --> 01:01:00.840 align:middle line:84%
then we only have to raise
the interest rate a little bit

01:01:00.840 --> 01:01:01.882 align:middle line:90%
to cover this fixed cost.

01:01:01.882 --> 01:01:03.725 align:middle line:84%
If that borrowing is
really big-- sorry,

01:01:03.725 --> 01:01:05.100 align:middle line:84%
if the borrowing
is really small,

01:01:05.100 --> 01:01:07.183 align:middle line:84%
if you're raising interest
rate a lot to cover it,

01:01:07.183 --> 01:01:09.730 align:middle line:84%
if the fixed cost of the amount
is really small, we don't.

01:01:09.730 --> 01:01:10.230 align:middle line:90%
OK.

01:01:10.230 --> 01:01:13.180 align:middle line:90%


01:01:13.180 --> 01:01:14.890 align:middle line:84%
So if we had this
condition from before

01:01:14.890 --> 01:01:18.850 align:middle line:84%
of what the optimal level
of the credit constraint is,

01:01:18.850 --> 01:01:24.010 align:middle line:84%
we can just substitute
that in and get the return.

01:01:24.010 --> 01:01:27.160 align:middle line:84%
It's going to be equal to the
market return plus this markup

01:01:27.160 --> 01:01:29.920 align:middle line:84%
term, which is going to be
a function of their wealth.

01:01:29.920 --> 01:01:32.860 align:middle line:84%
That's just combining
these two points,

01:01:32.860 --> 01:01:37.540 align:middle line:84%
and they're basically
for really--

01:01:37.540 --> 01:01:40.870 align:middle line:84%
and so what's the point--
for really rich borrowers.

01:01:40.870 --> 01:01:45.070 align:middle line:90%


01:01:45.070 --> 01:01:50.010 align:middle line:84%
For really rich borrowers,
they can borrow a lot,

01:01:50.010 --> 01:01:53.490 align:middle line:84%
and therefore, we
can spread that fixed

01:01:53.490 --> 01:01:54.720 align:middle line:90%
cost over a small amount.

01:01:54.720 --> 01:01:57.850 align:middle line:84%
For really poor borrowers, that
credit isn't really binding.

01:01:57.850 --> 01:01:59.340 align:middle line:84%
We're not going to be willing
to lend them very much,

01:01:59.340 --> 01:02:01.500 align:middle line:84%
and therefore, that interest
rate we're going to charge them

01:02:01.500 --> 01:02:02.660 align:middle line:90%
is going to be a lot.

01:02:02.660 --> 01:02:03.660 align:middle line:90%
And then you just solve.

01:02:03.660 --> 01:02:05.650 align:middle line:84%
And then, of course, that
has this additional thing,

01:02:05.650 --> 01:02:07.930 align:middle line:84%
which is the interest is in
an equilibrium condition,

01:02:07.930 --> 01:02:10.138 align:middle line:84%
so you have to do a little
algebra to solve that out.

01:02:10.138 --> 01:02:13.990 align:middle line:84%
But that's the basic
logic of what's going on.

01:02:13.990 --> 01:02:19.050 align:middle line:84%
So in this model, some people
will never be able to borrow.

01:02:19.050 --> 01:02:24.270 align:middle line:84%
And this condition over here,
if fee is greater than eta w,

01:02:24.270 --> 01:02:26.760 align:middle line:90%
then there's no equilibrium.

01:02:26.760 --> 01:02:31.782 align:middle line:84%
Either there's no solution where
you can cover the monitoring

01:02:31.782 --> 01:02:33.990 align:middle line:84%
cost with the interest rate
because the industry gets

01:02:33.990 --> 01:02:36.448 align:middle line:84%
too high, and then they won't
repay and so on and so forth.

01:02:36.448 --> 01:02:38.068 align:middle line:90%
There's no solution to that.

01:02:38.068 --> 01:02:40.110 align:middle line:84%
If it's less than that,
then there is a solution,

01:02:40.110 --> 01:02:42.693 align:middle line:84%
and then you have this condition
I said before that r is going

01:02:42.693 --> 01:02:44.560 align:middle line:90%
down with wealth going up.

01:02:44.560 --> 01:02:46.920 align:middle line:84%
So this is a model
where we have people

01:02:46.920 --> 01:02:49.080 align:middle line:84%
who are going to be
actually credit constrained.

01:02:49.080 --> 01:02:51.548 align:middle line:84%
Some people just
cannot borrow at all.

01:02:51.548 --> 01:02:53.340 align:middle line:84%
it's not this, you can
borrow a little bit.

01:02:53.340 --> 01:02:56.110 align:middle line:84%
Here, some people are just
totally cut out of the market.

01:02:56.110 --> 01:02:58.140 align:middle line:84%
And we also have
this thing now where

01:02:58.140 --> 01:03:01.977 align:middle line:84%
the people who are
borrowing a little

01:03:01.977 --> 01:03:04.560 align:middle line:84%
are the ones who are paying the
high interest rates, which is,

01:03:04.560 --> 01:03:07.170 align:middle line:84%
if you think back to one of
the motivating factors I kind

01:03:07.170 --> 01:03:08.878 align:middle line:84%
of gave you at the
beginning of the talk,

01:03:08.878 --> 01:03:10.960 align:middle line:84%
this is now something
that explains that.

01:03:10.960 --> 01:03:12.670 align:middle line:84%
And that also is
consistent why we

01:03:12.670 --> 01:03:14.670 align:middle line:84%
often-- consistent with
finding the fact that we

01:03:14.670 --> 01:03:19.180 align:middle line:84%
have all of these very small
loans having very high rates.

01:03:19.180 --> 01:03:21.697 align:middle line:84%
We also get-- maybe I won't
make so much of this--

01:03:21.697 --> 01:03:24.030 align:middle line:84%
but we have this multiplier
property, which is basically

01:03:24.030 --> 01:03:28.200 align:middle line:84%
that dr, d rho, how the
rate charged depends

01:03:28.200 --> 01:03:30.750 align:middle line:90%
on underlying market rate.

01:03:30.750 --> 01:03:33.832 align:middle line:84%
This thing is going
to be less than--

01:03:33.832 --> 01:03:36.030 align:middle line:84%
this thing is going to
be a multiplier that's

01:03:36.030 --> 01:03:39.150 align:middle line:84%
going to make the rate be very
sensitive to the underlying

01:03:39.150 --> 01:03:41.168 align:middle line:84%
rate, so it also kind
of moves around a lot.

01:03:41.168 --> 01:03:42.960 align:middle line:84%
But I'm not going to
focus on that as much.

01:03:42.960 --> 01:03:45.630 align:middle line:90%


01:03:45.630 --> 01:03:48.328 align:middle line:84%
So what did this model
add to these other things?

01:03:48.328 --> 01:03:49.120 align:middle line:90%
Well, a few things.

01:03:49.120 --> 01:03:51.390 align:middle line:84%
So it added a wedge
between the cost of capital

01:03:51.390 --> 01:03:53.310 align:middle line:90%
in the interest rate.

01:03:53.310 --> 01:03:55.155 align:middle line:84%
That was given by
high monitoring cost.

01:03:55.155 --> 01:03:57.992 align:middle line:90%


01:03:57.992 --> 01:03:59.950 align:middle line:84%
It gave you a sensitivity,
which I talked about

01:03:59.950 --> 01:04:02.320 align:middle line:90%
in the last slide.

01:04:02.320 --> 01:04:05.020 align:middle line:84%
It also implies that
subsidizing the cost of capital

01:04:05.020 --> 01:04:07.690 align:middle line:84%
can lead to welfare gains
because r will go down,

01:04:07.690 --> 01:04:11.450 align:middle line:84%
and this kind of allows
for us to borrow more.

01:04:11.450 --> 01:04:13.300 align:middle line:84%
It also suggests that
these monitoring costs

01:04:13.300 --> 01:04:15.175 align:middle line:84%
are really important
because these monitoring

01:04:15.175 --> 01:04:18.640 align:middle line:84%
costs are what's excluding
people from credit.

01:04:18.640 --> 01:04:21.220 align:middle line:84%
And this question
of, how do we think

01:04:21.220 --> 01:04:23.362 align:middle line:84%
about what kinds
of monitoring costs

01:04:23.362 --> 01:04:24.820 align:middle line:84%
are going to be
really effective is

01:04:24.820 --> 01:04:25.990 align:middle line:84%
going to be something we're
going to talk about a lot

01:04:25.990 --> 01:04:27.790 align:middle line:84%
more next time in the
microcredit lectures.

01:04:27.790 --> 01:04:30.760 align:middle line:90%


01:04:30.760 --> 01:04:31.420 align:middle line:90%
OK.

01:04:31.420 --> 01:04:32.110 align:middle line:90%
Yes?

01:04:32.110 --> 01:04:34.930 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Two slides ago--

01:04:34.930 --> 01:04:36.543 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: This slide?

01:04:36.543 --> 01:04:37.210 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Before.

01:04:37.210 --> 01:04:41.110 align:middle line:90%


01:04:41.110 --> 01:04:41.820 align:middle line:90%
What is cost for?

01:04:41.820 --> 01:04:45.780 align:middle line:90%


01:04:45.780 --> 01:04:49.330 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: Oh, these lenders
are not wildly profitable.

01:04:49.330 --> 01:04:50.660 align:middle line:90%
That's all it means.

01:04:50.660 --> 01:04:52.803 align:middle line:84%
So we're seeing
these big spreads,

01:04:52.803 --> 01:04:54.970 align:middle line:84%
but it's not like the
microfinance organizations are

01:04:54.970 --> 01:04:57.340 align:middle line:90%
making tons and tons of money.

01:04:57.340 --> 01:04:58.450 align:middle line:90%
So that was rejected.

01:04:58.450 --> 01:04:59.380 align:middle line:84%
Like I said, the
other thing is, maybe

01:04:59.380 --> 01:05:00.580 align:middle line:84%
they're not competitive
in certain events.

01:05:00.580 --> 01:05:01.660 align:middle line:84%
This bullet point
says, well, maybe it's

01:05:01.660 --> 01:05:03.470 align:middle line:84%
not that they're totally
making lots of rounds.

01:05:03.470 --> 01:05:04.720 align:middle line:84%
I think it could be
part of it, but I

01:05:04.720 --> 01:05:06.280 align:middle line:84%
think in general these
organizations are not

01:05:06.280 --> 01:05:07.000 align:middle line:90%
wildly profitable.

01:05:07.000 --> 01:05:08.800 align:middle line:84%
A lot of them actually are
losing money, or certainly

01:05:08.800 --> 01:05:11.370 align:middle line:84%
kind of breaking even, which
suggests that it's not--

01:05:11.370 --> 01:05:14.460 align:middle line:84%
although I do think the rent
thing could be part of it,

01:05:14.460 --> 01:05:16.260 align:middle line:84%
it's not mostly about
rents, and that's

01:05:16.260 --> 01:05:17.802 align:middle line:84%
why we kind of need
these real costs.

01:05:17.802 --> 01:05:21.250 align:middle line:90%


01:05:21.250 --> 01:05:22.330 align:middle line:90%
OK.

01:05:22.330 --> 01:05:27.610 align:middle line:84%
So the final or
penultimate thing

01:05:27.610 --> 01:05:30.360 align:middle line:84%
I want to talk about
today is this paper by--

01:05:30.360 --> 01:05:31.875 align:middle line:90%
I want to talk about the theory.

01:05:31.875 --> 01:05:33.250 align:middle line:84%
So basically, we
had three models

01:05:33.250 --> 01:05:34.420 align:middle line:90%
that you should keep in mind--

01:05:34.420 --> 01:05:36.253 align:middle line:84%
moral hazard model,
adverse selection model,

01:05:36.253 --> 01:05:37.850 align:middle line:90%
and monitoring cost model.

01:05:37.850 --> 01:05:43.390 align:middle line:84%
So those are three, I would
say, frameworks or tools

01:05:43.390 --> 01:05:46.002 align:middle line:84%
that you should keep in mind
as you think through some

01:05:46.002 --> 01:05:46.960 align:middle line:90%
of these credit issues.

01:05:46.960 --> 01:05:49.570 align:middle line:90%


01:05:49.570 --> 01:05:53.400 align:middle line:84%
So this Karlan and Zinman
paper was basically

01:05:53.400 --> 01:05:57.330 align:middle line:84%
trying to understand, how
do we think about, can we

01:05:57.330 --> 01:05:59.310 align:middle line:84%
differentiate between
the first two models,

01:05:59.310 --> 01:06:02.510 align:middle line:84%
adverse selection models
and moral hazard models.

01:06:02.510 --> 01:06:07.930 align:middle line:84%
And prior to this paper, there
was a bunch of previous papers

01:06:07.930 --> 01:06:13.270 align:middle line:84%
who said, look, can we test
for asymmetric information

01:06:13.270 --> 01:06:17.920 align:middle line:84%
by looking for, say,
a positive correlation

01:06:17.920 --> 01:06:23.417 align:middle line:84%
between the interest rate
and the default rate risk.

01:06:23.417 --> 01:06:25.250 align:middle line:84%
That was kind of that
was coming out before,

01:06:25.250 --> 01:06:26.170 align:middle line:84%
but they didn't
really say, was it

01:06:26.170 --> 01:06:28.587 align:middle line:84%
adverse selection or hazard
because both those models kind

01:06:28.587 --> 01:06:29.940 align:middle line:90%
of produced the same thing.

01:06:29.940 --> 01:06:31.565 align:middle line:84%
So they will say,
well, can we actually

01:06:31.565 --> 01:06:35.180 align:middle line:84%
do something to differentiate
between those two.

01:06:35.180 --> 01:06:38.680 align:middle line:90%


01:06:38.680 --> 01:06:40.312 align:middle line:84%
So again, adverse
selection is the idea

01:06:40.312 --> 01:06:42.020 align:middle line:84%
that some people are
riskier than others,

01:06:42.020 --> 01:06:43.520 align:middle line:84%
and it's a
characteristic about you.

01:06:43.520 --> 01:06:45.280 align:middle line:84%
And moral hazard is,
people can choose

01:06:45.280 --> 01:06:50.810 align:middle line:84%
how much risk they want to take,
and that's an ex-post choice.

01:06:50.810 --> 01:06:55.120 align:middle line:84%
And so these are going to look
similar in the cross-section.

01:06:55.120 --> 01:06:57.230 align:middle line:90%
We basically talked about that.

01:06:57.230 --> 01:06:59.620 align:middle line:84%
But the idea of their
paper is to say, well,

01:06:59.620 --> 01:07:04.060 align:middle line:84%
can experimentally we do
something to tease this apart.

01:07:04.060 --> 01:07:08.800 align:middle line:84%
And this paper pioneered
this experimental design,

01:07:08.800 --> 01:07:11.350 align:middle line:84%
but it's now been used for
many, many, many different kinds

01:07:11.350 --> 01:07:12.230 align:middle line:90%
of things.

01:07:12.230 --> 01:07:13.730 align:middle line:84%
And I think we may have
already seen it already,

01:07:13.730 --> 01:07:15.147 align:middle line:84%
but this is the
original paper, so

01:07:15.147 --> 01:07:18.360 align:middle line:84%
I wanted to go through
it a little bit.

01:07:18.360 --> 01:07:22.340 align:middle line:84%
So their idea was, adverse
selection is driven

01:07:22.340 --> 01:07:25.310 align:middle line:90%
by the ex-ante interest rate.

01:07:25.310 --> 01:07:28.180 align:middle line:84%
Moral hazard is driven by
the ex-post interest rate.

01:07:28.180 --> 01:07:32.420 align:middle line:84%
And in the world,
these are the same.

01:07:32.420 --> 01:07:34.640 align:middle line:84%
The interest rate that
you get when you--

01:07:34.640 --> 01:07:36.110 align:middle line:84%
like, I advertise
and say, hey, I'm

01:07:36.110 --> 01:07:40.880 align:middle line:84%
offering a loan
at whatever, 10%.

01:07:40.880 --> 01:07:43.680 align:middle line:84%
If you sign up for that
loan, the rate is 10%.

01:07:43.680 --> 01:07:47.760 align:middle line:84%
So those things in general,
in the world, are the same.

01:07:47.760 --> 01:07:53.020 align:middle line:84%
But maybe in an experiment, we
can differentiate between them,

01:07:53.020 --> 01:07:56.800 align:middle line:84%
and we can do that by surprising
people with an interest rate,

01:07:56.800 --> 01:07:58.800 align:middle line:84%
with a change in the
interest rate after they've

01:07:58.800 --> 01:08:00.550 align:middle line:90%
accepted the loan.

01:08:00.550 --> 01:08:03.540 align:middle line:84%
So you advertise one rate,
you get take up on one thing.

01:08:03.540 --> 01:08:06.930 align:middle line:84%
You change it ex-post, and
you get something else.

01:08:06.930 --> 01:08:17.229 align:middle line:84%
And in particular, you can't,
I think, make people worse off.

01:08:17.229 --> 01:08:19.151 align:middle line:84%
I can't advertise 10%
and surprise you to 20%

01:08:19.151 --> 01:08:21.609 align:middle line:84%
because, number one, people
would be really annoyed at you,

01:08:21.609 --> 01:08:24.279 align:middle line:84%
and number two, you still get a
selection effect because people

01:08:24.279 --> 01:08:26.020 align:middle line:90%
would drop out again.

01:08:26.020 --> 01:08:27.910 align:middle line:84%
But on the other
hand, almost everyone

01:08:27.910 --> 01:08:30.620 align:middle line:84%
is going to be happy with an
improvement in their terms.

01:08:30.620 --> 01:08:34.710 align:middle line:84%
So if I advertise a rate of 20%,
and then surprise some people

01:08:34.710 --> 01:08:36.762 align:middle line:84%
with a rate of
10%, there's going

01:08:36.762 --> 01:08:38.470 align:middle line:84%
to be essentially no
selection difference

01:08:38.470 --> 01:08:40.303 align:middle line:84%
because everyone who
wanted the thing at 20%

01:08:40.303 --> 01:08:41.689 align:middle line:90%
will be happy to take it at 10%.

01:08:41.689 --> 01:08:43.314 align:middle line:84%
So you can hold your
selection constant

01:08:43.314 --> 01:08:46.660 align:middle line:84%
but get a different kind
of interest rate ex-post.

01:08:46.660 --> 01:08:50.380 align:middle line:90%
So that's basically their idea.

01:08:50.380 --> 01:08:54.490 align:middle line:84%
They have this other
dynamic incentive thing,

01:08:54.490 --> 01:08:57.490 align:middle line:84%
but that's, I think,
neither here nor there.

01:08:57.490 --> 01:08:59.500 align:middle line:90%
The basic idea is this.

01:08:59.500 --> 01:09:05.500 align:middle line:84%
We just say, look, we offer
people either a high rate

01:09:05.500 --> 01:09:08.319 align:middle line:90%
or a low rate ex-ante.

01:09:08.319 --> 01:09:12.130 align:middle line:84%
If you sign up for the
loan with the low rate,

01:09:12.130 --> 01:09:14.035 align:middle line:90%
you get the low rate.

01:09:14.035 --> 01:09:15.910 align:middle line:84%
If you sign up for the
loan with a high rate,

01:09:15.910 --> 01:09:17.560 align:middle line:84%
with some probability,
we surprise you

01:09:17.560 --> 01:09:19.220 align:middle line:90%
and give you the low rates.

01:09:19.220 --> 01:09:24.069 align:middle line:84%
So now, we have three boxes, and
if we compare the high offers

01:09:24.069 --> 01:09:27.399 align:middle line:90%
to the high offer--

01:09:27.399 --> 01:09:30.700 align:middle line:84%
and this middle
box is the key box.

01:09:30.700 --> 01:09:33.460 align:middle line:84%
Because if we compare the
high offer, if we hold fixed

01:09:33.460 --> 01:09:36.220 align:middle line:84%
the high offer rate and look
at the actual contract rate,

01:09:36.220 --> 01:09:38.620 align:middle line:84%
this box to this box
tells us the moral hazard

01:09:38.620 --> 01:09:40.930 align:middle line:84%
effect, because you both
selected in at, say,

01:09:40.930 --> 01:09:43.090 align:middle line:84%
20%, but only some of
you experienced 20%,

01:09:43.090 --> 01:09:44.500 align:middle line:90%
and some of you experience 10%.

01:09:44.500 --> 01:09:48.850 align:middle line:84%
And if we compare
this box to this box,

01:09:48.850 --> 01:09:51.430 align:middle line:84%
we get the pure selection
effect because both of you guys

01:09:51.430 --> 01:09:53.649 align:middle line:84%
experienced 10%
ex-post, but here,

01:09:53.649 --> 01:09:55.900 align:middle line:84%
you were selected in as
having a 20% rate, and here,

01:09:55.900 --> 01:09:58.440 align:middle line:84%
you're selected as
having a 10% rate.

01:09:58.440 --> 01:10:02.887 align:middle line:84%
And this design is
useful for distinguishing

01:10:02.887 --> 01:10:04.470 align:middle line:84%
between selection
and moral hazard not

01:10:04.470 --> 01:10:07.480 align:middle line:84%
just in credit, but kind
of everywhere basically.

01:10:07.480 --> 01:10:09.870 align:middle line:84%
And so people have done this
thing in all other settings,

01:10:09.870 --> 01:10:13.230 align:middle line:84%
trying to use this surprise
improvement to differentiate

01:10:13.230 --> 01:10:14.690 align:middle line:84%
between selection
and moral hazard.

01:10:14.690 --> 01:10:16.470 align:middle line:84%
It's a very general purpose
experimental design.

01:10:16.470 --> 01:10:17.910 align:middle line:84%
It's also, I think,
a nice example

01:10:17.910 --> 01:10:20.820 align:middle line:84%
of how an experiment can let you
do something that you could not

01:10:20.820 --> 01:10:22.572 align:middle line:90%
do in the real world.

01:10:22.572 --> 01:10:24.780 align:middle line:84%
It's only because you have
this ability to manipulate

01:10:24.780 --> 01:10:26.473 align:middle line:90%
and ex-post change people's--

01:10:26.473 --> 01:10:28.890 align:middle line:84%
I mean, you could find a natural
experiment to mimic this,

01:10:28.890 --> 01:10:31.320 align:middle line:84%
but in general,
it'll be hard to do.

01:10:31.320 --> 01:10:39.450 align:middle line:90%


01:10:39.450 --> 01:10:42.410 align:middle line:90%
OK, is this clear?

01:10:42.410 --> 01:10:42.910 align:middle line:90%
Yeah?

01:10:42.910 --> 01:10:44.170 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: One quick question.

01:10:44.170 --> 01:10:47.680 align:middle line:84%
In the design that
they're doing,

01:10:47.680 --> 01:10:51.730 align:middle line:84%
the information of
the adverse selection,

01:10:51.730 --> 01:10:57.730 align:middle line:84%
is there some bundle
of the selection type,

01:10:57.730 --> 01:11:03.640 align:middle line:84%
but also potentially selection
on moral hazard basically?

01:11:03.640 --> 01:11:05.770 align:middle line:84%
Like, you wouldn't be able
to distinguish that just

01:11:05.770 --> 01:11:08.168 align:middle line:90%
from this, but you can--

01:11:08.168 --> 01:11:10.210 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: Sorry, say
again what you mean, Aaron.

01:11:10.210 --> 01:11:12.190 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: So with
adverse selection,

01:11:12.190 --> 01:11:14.710 align:middle line:84%
there's both I'm
selecting on my p,

01:11:14.710 --> 01:11:16.555 align:middle line:84%
but also I know how
I would respond.

01:11:16.555 --> 01:11:20.950 align:middle line:90%


01:11:20.950 --> 01:11:23.590 align:middle line:84%
There's also, I
guess, this notion

01:11:23.590 --> 01:11:27.460 align:middle line:84%
that you can select on
how you would respond

01:11:27.460 --> 01:11:31.040 align:middle line:90%
to different incentives.

01:11:31.040 --> 01:11:32.580 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: Oh, I
think I understand.

01:11:32.580 --> 01:11:35.900 align:middle line:84%
So you're saying, in
a more general model,

01:11:35.900 --> 01:11:38.360 align:middle line:84%
in addition to
selecting on just having

01:11:38.360 --> 01:11:40.350 align:middle line:84%
fixed p's or totally
endogenous p's,

01:11:40.350 --> 01:11:42.350 align:middle line:84%
I have another thing,
which is, some people have

01:11:42.350 --> 01:11:43.370 align:middle line:90%
different p of rs.

01:11:43.370 --> 01:11:44.150 align:middle line:90%
Is that what you're saying?

01:11:44.150 --> 01:11:44.520 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Right.

01:11:44.520 --> 01:11:45.020 align:middle line:90%
Exactly.

01:11:45.020 --> 01:11:47.570 align:middle line:84%
Yeah, so it's not anything
we've discussed previously,

01:11:47.570 --> 01:11:49.278 align:middle line:84%
but there's this other
dimension that you

01:11:49.278 --> 01:11:51.470 align:middle line:84%
could model that isn't
captured by the comparisons

01:11:51.470 --> 01:11:52.603 align:middle line:90%
that we're doing here.

01:11:52.603 --> 01:11:54.770 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: So OK, let's
think that through together.

01:11:54.770 --> 01:11:56.878 align:middle line:84%
So what's going to
be picked up here?

01:11:56.878 --> 01:11:58.670 align:middle line:84%
So you're saying, we
have three dimensions.

01:11:58.670 --> 01:12:01.553 align:middle line:84%
We have heterogeneity in p;
ex-ante, your choice of p;

01:12:01.553 --> 01:12:03.970 align:middle line:84%
and then you have this other
thing where people may differ

01:12:03.970 --> 01:12:05.175 align:middle line:90%
in their p of r function.

01:12:05.175 --> 01:12:05.800 align:middle line:90%
STUDENT: Right.

01:12:05.800 --> 01:12:10.600 align:middle line:84%
PROFESSOR: So how does that
affect your interpretation

01:12:10.600 --> 01:12:11.870 align:middle line:90%
here?

01:12:11.870 --> 01:12:14.240 align:middle line:84%
STUDENT: I guess
my interpretation

01:12:14.240 --> 01:12:17.510 align:middle line:84%
is that the hidden information
effect that they're picking up

01:12:17.510 --> 01:12:22.637 align:middle line:84%
is some composite of the two
different types of selection,

01:12:22.637 --> 01:12:24.595 align:middle line:84%
that it's both selection
on types and selection

01:12:24.595 --> 01:12:26.158 align:middle line:90%
on slips basically.

01:12:26.158 --> 01:12:26.950 align:middle line:90%
PROFESSOR: Hold on.

01:12:26.950 --> 01:12:28.100 align:middle line:90%
Let me think for a minute.

01:12:28.100 --> 01:12:32.437 align:middle line:90%
So it's clearly the case--

01:12:32.437 --> 01:12:33.520 align:middle line:90%
yes, I think that's right.

01:12:33.520 --> 01:12:35.145 align:middle line:84%
So it's clearly the
case, if we compare

01:12:35.145 --> 01:12:37.540 align:middle line:84%
these people who had the
same selection, some of them

01:12:37.540 --> 01:12:39.832 align:middle line:84%
got the lower interest rate,
that's a pure moral hazard

01:12:39.832 --> 01:12:41.500 align:middle line:90%
effect.

01:12:41.500 --> 01:12:44.060 align:middle line:84%
And if they compare
this versus this, then--

01:12:44.060 --> 01:12:47.888 align:middle line:90%


01:12:47.888 --> 01:12:48.680 align:middle line:90%
yeah, you're right.

01:12:48.680 --> 01:12:51.440 align:middle line:84%
I mean, yes, we
don't know what--

01:12:51.440 --> 01:12:54.020 align:middle line:84%
they're experiencing
the same p ex-post also.

01:12:54.020 --> 01:12:57.050 align:middle line:84%
So what we're getting
is like, in my example,

01:12:57.050 --> 01:12:58.700 align:middle line:90%
we're both lowered to 10%.

01:12:58.700 --> 01:13:01.343 align:middle line:84%
We're getting group
number one experience

01:13:01.343 --> 01:13:03.260 align:middle line:84%
at 10% and group number
two experience at 10%.

01:13:03.260 --> 01:13:05.390 align:middle line:84%
So you're right,
we don't know what

01:13:05.390 --> 01:13:08.640 align:middle line:84%
was the slope of
their selection thing.

01:13:08.640 --> 01:13:11.330 align:middle line:84%
But we are at least evaluating
it at the same point,

01:13:11.330 --> 01:13:13.860 align:middle line:84%
so it's still
clearly picking up,

01:13:13.860 --> 01:13:15.470 align:middle line:84%
I think, an adverse
selection point.

01:13:15.470 --> 01:13:17.428 align:middle line:84%
But yes, exactly, whether
the adverse selection

01:13:17.428 --> 01:13:19.470 align:middle line:84%
is a level or a
slope, we are at least

01:13:19.470 --> 01:13:20.678 align:middle line:90%
evaluating at the same point.

01:13:20.678 --> 01:13:24.164 align:middle line:90%


01:13:24.164 --> 01:13:25.870 align:middle line:84%
One thing I'll say
is that actually

01:13:25.870 --> 01:13:27.460 align:middle line:84%
if you read the
details of this paper,

01:13:27.460 --> 01:13:31.630 align:middle line:84%
it's not the perfect setting
to map into the model.

01:13:31.630 --> 01:13:34.450 align:middle line:84%
It's consumer credit, and
so it's a little harder

01:13:34.450 --> 01:13:35.250 align:middle line:90%
to think about.

01:13:35.250 --> 01:13:37.458 align:middle line:84%
I mean, of course, we can
think about the same issues

01:13:37.458 --> 01:13:39.110 align:middle line:84%
in consumer credit
as in firm credit,

01:13:39.110 --> 01:13:41.568 align:middle line:84%
but I don't think it necessarily
maps to that model that we

01:13:41.568 --> 01:13:44.350 align:middle line:84%
had in mind as nicely
as maybe it could.

01:13:44.350 --> 01:13:49.090 align:middle line:84%
But I think this paper was
really innovative for creating

01:13:49.090 --> 01:13:50.740 align:middle line:90%
this kind of general purpose.

01:13:50.740 --> 01:13:53.090 align:middle line:84%
I mean, there may be
another paper like it.

01:13:53.090 --> 01:13:55.340 align:middle line:84%
This is the one I certainly
know of that did it first.

01:13:55.340 --> 01:13:57.710 align:middle line:84%
There may be others
beforehand, but it certainly--

01:13:57.710 --> 01:14:01.850 align:middle line:90%


01:14:01.850 --> 01:14:04.850 align:middle line:84%
this design that they use here,
I think, became very popular,

01:14:04.850 --> 01:14:09.320 align:middle line:84%
and I think people have used it
in a wide variety of settings.

01:14:09.320 --> 01:14:14.780 align:middle line:84%
So in the end, the results
are not super duper strong.

01:14:14.780 --> 01:14:16.220 align:middle line:84%
They find a little
bit of evidence

01:14:16.220 --> 01:14:21.860 align:middle line:84%
of the contract rate, not a
huge amount on the offer rate.

01:14:21.860 --> 01:14:24.260 align:middle line:84%
But I want to
focus on this paper

01:14:24.260 --> 01:14:26.982 align:middle line:84%
less for the particular
results they have,

01:14:26.982 --> 01:14:28.940 align:middle line:84%
but more for that design
of how you might think

01:14:28.940 --> 01:14:30.857 align:middle line:84%
about distinguishing
between adverse selection

01:14:30.857 --> 01:14:32.500 align:middle line:90%
and moral hazard.

01:14:32.500 --> 01:14:33.940 align:middle line:90%
OK, so I'll stop here.

01:14:33.940 --> 01:14:36.160 align:middle line:84%
And then I will talk
about microfinance,

01:14:36.160 --> 01:14:39.610 align:middle line:84%
including the reading you
guys did on Wednesday.

01:14:39.610 --> 01:14:41.460 align:middle line:90%
OK, thanks.

01:14:41.460 --> 01:14:53.000 align:middle line:90%