1 00:00:00,090 --> 00:00:02,490 The following content is provided under a Creative 2 00:00:02,490 --> 00:00:04,059 Commons license. 3 00:00:04,059 --> 00:00:06,330 Your support will help MIT OpenCourseWare 4 00:00:06,330 --> 00:00:10,720 continue to offer high quality educational resources for free. 5 00:00:10,720 --> 00:00:13,350 To make a donation or view additional materials 6 00:00:13,350 --> 00:00:17,280 from hundreds of MIT courses, visit MIT OpenCourseWare 7 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:18,480 at ocw.mit.edu. 8 00:00:28,024 --> 00:00:31,880 ROBERT TOWNSEND: We want to talk about theoretical models. 9 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:34,610 They tell us stories. 10 00:00:34,610 --> 00:00:37,310 The key variables are very much of interest-- growth, 11 00:00:37,310 --> 00:00:42,130 inequality, poverty, but just telling a story as elegant, 12 00:00:42,130 --> 00:00:45,070 as it may be, even with surprises does not 13 00:00:45,070 --> 00:00:49,060 even necessarily tell us that it matches up to reality, 14 00:00:49,060 --> 00:00:54,550 and therefore, one might be a little bit cautious in terms 15 00:00:54,550 --> 00:00:57,220 of formulation of policy. 16 00:00:57,220 --> 00:01:02,890 Now it is true that having sort of a good conceptual 17 00:01:02,890 --> 00:01:06,010 foundation, a good well-articulated theoretical 18 00:01:06,010 --> 00:01:07,840 model is a very important step. 19 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:10,740 I'm not demeaning that step at all. 20 00:01:10,740 --> 00:01:15,365 What I'm trying to say is it's a very useful first step, 21 00:01:15,365 --> 00:01:16,740 but in the literature we're going 22 00:01:16,740 --> 00:01:19,930 to review today, we've gone beyond that, 23 00:01:19,930 --> 00:01:25,840 and to try to take the next step and see how well it fits. 24 00:01:25,840 --> 00:01:29,630 And how are we going to, quote, fit it? 25 00:01:29,630 --> 00:01:36,160 We're going to take the assumed micro-financial underpinnings 26 00:01:36,160 --> 00:01:42,100 and estimate those underpinnings, 27 00:01:42,100 --> 00:01:45,580 and get the bulk of the key parameters of the model pinned 28 00:01:45,580 --> 00:01:50,700 down in that way from the micro data. 29 00:01:50,700 --> 00:01:53,320 There'll be a few remaining parameters 30 00:01:53,320 --> 00:01:57,670 that we can't get from household choice or business choice, 31 00:01:57,670 --> 00:01:59,410 and we'll calibrate those. 32 00:02:02,230 --> 00:02:06,320 And then we'll simulate the models 33 00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:10,789 and get what the model would predict for growth inequality-- 34 00:02:10,789 --> 00:02:15,550 income, savings, labor's share of GDP, 35 00:02:15,550 --> 00:02:18,820 and actually also some of the key underpinnings 36 00:02:18,820 --> 00:02:20,770 of each model, and the first one it's 37 00:02:20,770 --> 00:02:23,830 going to be the fraction of households running businesses 38 00:02:23,830 --> 00:02:25,270 and the second one is going to be 39 00:02:25,270 --> 00:02:28,390 the fraction of households participating 40 00:02:28,390 --> 00:02:29,735 in the financial sector. 41 00:02:35,380 --> 00:02:38,425 So what do we do with these? 42 00:02:41,580 --> 00:02:44,430 Each one, then, after we get done 43 00:02:44,430 --> 00:02:47,370 looking at the goodness of fit, we 44 00:02:47,370 --> 00:02:53,400 can do welfare analysis of policy intervention. 45 00:02:53,400 --> 00:02:56,910 The first model has, to make it easier, 46 00:02:56,910 --> 00:03:00,210 an exogenously expanding financial sector 47 00:03:00,210 --> 00:03:04,240 at exactly the rate we see it in the data, 48 00:03:04,240 --> 00:03:08,460 and that's going to create winners or losers. 49 00:03:08,460 --> 00:03:12,120 As the financial system expands, we'll 50 00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:14,250 get changes on the extensive margin 51 00:03:14,250 --> 00:03:19,200 because some households will go into business. 52 00:03:19,200 --> 00:03:21,960 We'll get changes as wealth accumulates 53 00:03:21,960 --> 00:03:25,410 in the amount to take and invest in business, 54 00:03:25,410 --> 00:03:28,890 and also because it's going to be a general equilibrium model, 55 00:03:28,890 --> 00:03:33,120 we're going to get changes in equilibrium wages and interest 56 00:03:33,120 --> 00:03:38,490 rates which have effects even beyond the direct effects, 57 00:03:38,490 --> 00:03:40,860 often quite big. 58 00:03:40,860 --> 00:03:47,460 In fact, there's a debate, depending on which political 59 00:03:47,460 --> 00:03:54,370 position you take, about trickle-down, 60 00:03:54,370 --> 00:03:57,210 which is sometimes taken negatively, 61 00:03:57,210 --> 00:04:00,360 trickle-down meaning only the rich benefit from various 62 00:04:00,360 --> 00:04:02,430 things and the poor-- 63 00:04:02,430 --> 00:04:05,910 workers are lucky to get anything, a better way 64 00:04:05,910 --> 00:04:11,190 to say it is a rising tide raises all boats. 65 00:04:11,190 --> 00:04:13,980 The model kind of takes a stand on these things, 66 00:04:13,980 --> 00:04:16,980 and in particular, the wage, when 67 00:04:16,980 --> 00:04:20,700 you have financial deepening, can go up, 68 00:04:20,700 --> 00:04:25,980 and that is an enormous benefit to poor people, even unskilled 69 00:04:25,980 --> 00:04:29,490 poor people who have better employment and better wage 70 00:04:29,490 --> 00:04:30,690 opportunities. 71 00:04:30,690 --> 00:04:35,570 The second welfare experiment is when, in the second model, 72 00:04:35,570 --> 00:04:39,090 the government takes over the banking system. 73 00:04:39,090 --> 00:04:42,540 I alluded to this at the end of last time, 74 00:04:42,540 --> 00:04:45,395 and again, when they liberalized this system 75 00:04:45,395 --> 00:04:48,750 and turned it back over to the commercial sector, 76 00:04:48,750 --> 00:04:54,070 that also creates welfare gains, which can be quite large, 77 00:04:54,070 --> 00:04:55,290 and we can-- 78 00:04:55,290 --> 00:04:58,510 the point is, we can use each of these models, 79 00:04:58,510 --> 00:05:00,840 if we believe the model and we believe 80 00:05:00,840 --> 00:05:04,200 more or less the numbers we put in for the parameters, 81 00:05:04,200 --> 00:05:06,570 we can quantify these welfare gains and losses. 82 00:05:11,530 --> 00:05:15,165 There's some corollaries that come out of this. 83 00:05:17,720 --> 00:05:19,850 First of all, growth doesn't necessarily 84 00:05:19,850 --> 00:05:23,810 have to go up as the financial system expands. 85 00:05:23,810 --> 00:05:25,940 We reviewed some literature last time 86 00:05:25,940 --> 00:05:30,880 about finance causes growth that seemed plausible and reasonable 87 00:05:30,880 --> 00:05:34,070 and at least at a reduced form since it 88 00:05:34,070 --> 00:05:37,280 seemed to fit the data. 89 00:05:37,280 --> 00:05:41,720 But in the second model, as opportunities expand, 90 00:05:41,720 --> 00:05:45,800 you can create endogenously more financial infrastructure, 91 00:05:45,800 --> 00:05:47,800 but it comes at a cost. 92 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:51,020 And just like anything else, investment not 93 00:05:51,020 --> 00:05:53,700 may not pay off right away. 94 00:05:53,700 --> 00:05:55,550 So some resources, quote-unquote, 95 00:05:55,550 --> 00:05:59,420 disappear in this creation of financial infrastructure, 96 00:05:59,420 --> 00:06:03,140 and so in effect, the growth rate levels go down 97 00:06:03,140 --> 00:06:06,110 and growth rates are slower for a while 98 00:06:06,110 --> 00:06:10,520 than they would have been without the liberalization. 99 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:13,520 Another caveat coming from the model 100 00:06:13,520 --> 00:06:17,630 is, both models today are transition models-- 101 00:06:17,630 --> 00:06:21,050 that is to say, they are not yet in steady-state, 102 00:06:21,050 --> 00:06:24,500 although if I remember, I'll try to say something 103 00:06:24,500 --> 00:06:27,990 about the steady states of each of these. 104 00:06:27,990 --> 00:06:30,920 And so in some respects, the models 105 00:06:30,920 --> 00:06:35,090 are not generating stationary time series. 106 00:06:35,090 --> 00:06:40,580 Implicitly when you run a regression, OLS and so on, 107 00:06:40,580 --> 00:06:43,610 you're kind of assuming you're getting data drawn 108 00:06:43,610 --> 00:06:46,895 from as stationary time series. 109 00:06:49,620 --> 00:06:54,320 So we run regressions on some of these model-generated data 110 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:58,130 where we know exactly what's going on, and sure enough, 111 00:06:58,130 --> 00:07:02,870 you get kind of spurious, bogus, or erratic coefficients 112 00:07:02,870 --> 00:07:05,840 on the very same regressions that the literature has 113 00:07:05,840 --> 00:07:09,480 been running with actual cross-country data. 114 00:07:09,480 --> 00:07:12,972 So it's sort of a caution. 115 00:07:12,972 --> 00:07:20,330 Now toward the end, there's a tendency to, in any class, 116 00:07:20,330 --> 00:07:24,650 any lecture for any course, you see models and you'll see, 117 00:07:24,650 --> 00:07:28,550 oh, there's a model, let's learn how to manipulate that one 118 00:07:28,550 --> 00:07:31,640 and maybe do a few extensions of it, 119 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:35,090 or a second class with a second model. 120 00:07:35,090 --> 00:07:36,920 Toward the end, I will deliberately 121 00:07:36,920 --> 00:07:41,000 try to engage you in a comparison of these two models 122 00:07:41,000 --> 00:07:44,720 to make the point that the real research that goes on 123 00:07:44,720 --> 00:07:48,770 is trying to decide not just how to an extent a given model, 124 00:07:48,770 --> 00:07:51,560 but sort of what we learn overall. 125 00:07:51,560 --> 00:07:55,040 It's not typically published, this stuff, actually. 126 00:07:55,040 --> 00:07:58,640 Mostly these conversations take place in offices and hallways 127 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:05,870 or over beer and so on, but it's actually a big part 128 00:08:05,870 --> 00:08:08,540 of the research process. 129 00:08:08,540 --> 00:08:16,710 So as an introduction overall, a few words from a paper I 130 00:08:16,710 --> 00:08:28,490 wrote with Hyeok Jeong, which repeats 131 00:08:28,490 --> 00:08:29,630 all what I've said already. 132 00:08:29,630 --> 00:08:32,600 Basically we're not grabbing parameters out of thin air, 133 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:36,200 we're going to estimate them with the micro data. 134 00:08:36,200 --> 00:08:38,600 We compare the predictions of the model 135 00:08:38,600 --> 00:08:39,739 with the actual dynamics. 136 00:08:44,179 --> 00:08:50,390 There is a well-established tradition in other sciences 137 00:08:50,390 --> 00:08:54,200 that has to do with model validation. 138 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:58,310 So it's quite common to basically calibrate 139 00:08:58,310 --> 00:09:03,620 the machine or the model or the process, and then 140 00:09:03,620 --> 00:09:06,950 sort of simulate and see how well it works 141 00:09:06,950 --> 00:09:10,455 without being recalibrated. 142 00:09:10,455 --> 00:09:12,830 Or put another way, if you have enough degrees of freedom 143 00:09:12,830 --> 00:09:16,490 and enough parameters and you're constantly tinkering, 144 00:09:16,490 --> 00:09:20,230 there's a tendency to be able to fit stuff. 145 00:09:20,230 --> 00:09:25,150 You've seen this probably in your first course in statistics 146 00:09:25,150 --> 00:09:26,830 and ordinary least squares. 147 00:09:26,830 --> 00:09:29,530 If you run out of degrees of-- 148 00:09:29,530 --> 00:09:35,580 you can fit-- align two points, you can perfectly well-- 149 00:09:35,580 --> 00:09:42,580 or you can fit a polynomial even with nonlinear data, 150 00:09:42,580 --> 00:09:46,090 but then out of sample, you want to predict some more 151 00:09:46,090 --> 00:09:49,460 and it's just crazy, it's just completely off. 152 00:09:49,460 --> 00:09:52,180 So here, we followed the tradition of kind of not-- 153 00:09:52,180 --> 00:09:56,530 deliberately not using all of the data. 154 00:09:56,530 --> 00:10:00,040 It is a matter of choice, though, what data to use 155 00:10:00,040 --> 00:10:04,570 and what to set aside, and I could imagine more, quote, 156 00:10:04,570 --> 00:10:06,880 experiments than we actually did. 157 00:10:06,880 --> 00:10:10,150 So there isn't a fixed rule for how to do this, 158 00:10:10,150 --> 00:10:13,090 and it's not even as commonly used in economics 159 00:10:13,090 --> 00:10:16,090 as I think it probably ought to be. 160 00:10:22,770 --> 00:10:24,850 And I guess you know the main theme 161 00:10:24,850 --> 00:10:32,460 today is this marriage of theory and data. 162 00:10:32,460 --> 00:10:37,690 Frisch very early on in the '30s was a big champion 163 00:10:37,690 --> 00:10:41,860 of the mutual penetration of quantitative economic theory 164 00:10:41,860 --> 00:10:44,920 with statistical observations. 165 00:10:44,920 --> 00:10:52,000 I think that's actually on the econometric cover, if not 166 00:10:52,000 --> 00:10:53,500 their website. 167 00:10:53,500 --> 00:11:00,210 And in particular, we're somewhere between theory 168 00:11:00,210 --> 00:11:04,520 without measurement and measurement without theory. 169 00:11:04,520 --> 00:11:08,920 A big controversy in business cycle analysis 170 00:11:08,920 --> 00:11:13,870 along that line, a big debate between [INAUDIBLE] and Burns 171 00:11:13,870 --> 00:11:16,240 and Mitchell. 172 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:17,260 OK. 173 00:11:17,260 --> 00:11:22,390 So we're going to do these two papers that 174 00:11:22,390 --> 00:11:25,630 came from the literature. 175 00:11:25,630 --> 00:11:28,990 It's kind of a plus and a minus. 176 00:11:28,990 --> 00:11:32,330 One is Lloyd-Ellis and Dan Bernhardt, 177 00:11:32,330 --> 00:11:35,170 and the other is Greenwood and Jovanovic. 178 00:11:35,170 --> 00:11:37,750 Each tell a plausible story about what 179 00:11:37,750 --> 00:11:41,380 lies behind the growth process and the relationship 180 00:11:41,380 --> 00:11:45,370 between growth and equality, financial deepening, 181 00:11:45,370 --> 00:11:49,386 and those other variables that I listed. 182 00:11:49,386 --> 00:11:51,720 And we're going to try to estimate those models. 183 00:11:51,720 --> 00:11:53,370 Well, the negative part of this thing 184 00:11:53,370 --> 00:11:57,570 is we learned how to do statistics and econometrics 185 00:11:57,570 --> 00:11:59,760 in part through the lens of these models 186 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:05,160 by realizing how problematic certain parts of those models 187 00:12:05,160 --> 00:12:06,390 are. 188 00:12:06,390 --> 00:12:11,940 And I would not start this way if I were starting over. 189 00:12:14,740 --> 00:12:16,340 And as I go through the lecture, I 190 00:12:16,340 --> 00:12:21,770 will try to point out which particularly worrisome 191 00:12:21,770 --> 00:12:25,610 or problematic parts I have in mind in terms 192 00:12:25,610 --> 00:12:27,530 of taking these models to the data. 193 00:12:27,530 --> 00:12:30,330 But anyway, again, back on the positive side, 194 00:12:30,330 --> 00:12:31,670 that's literally what we did. 195 00:12:31,670 --> 00:12:37,040 We adopted wholesale, without any modification 196 00:12:37,040 --> 00:12:40,940 or qualification, exactly the equations 197 00:12:40,940 --> 00:12:44,766 that these theoretical authors used in their models. 198 00:12:44,766 --> 00:12:48,240 Uh oh. 199 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:49,060 That's not good. 200 00:13:05,180 --> 00:13:12,240 So Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, LEB for short, 201 00:13:12,240 --> 00:13:14,630 there are three occupations-- 202 00:13:14,630 --> 00:13:20,840 farmers, workers, and entrepreneurs, and it's 203 00:13:20,840 --> 00:13:23,780 costly to set up a firm. 204 00:13:23,780 --> 00:13:27,320 But these costs are like talent, they vary with the individual. 205 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:31,670 The more talented you are, the less costly it is. 206 00:13:31,670 --> 00:13:37,190 It's assumed that the cumulative distribution of talent 207 00:13:37,190 --> 00:13:39,530 is distributed according to capital H 208 00:13:39,530 --> 00:13:43,040 here where x is the level of cost. 209 00:13:46,730 --> 00:13:51,680 And you have to be careful with the notation 210 00:13:51,680 --> 00:13:53,330 where we're talking about densities 211 00:13:53,330 --> 00:13:56,870 versus cumulative distributions, so just kind of bear 212 00:13:56,870 --> 00:13:58,270 that in mind. 213 00:13:58,270 --> 00:14:01,370 There's also an initial distribution of wealth 214 00:14:01,370 --> 00:14:07,910 that starts off the model, G of b where b is sort of bequest. 215 00:14:07,910 --> 00:14:11,870 Just to alert you, this model has a relatively naive 216 00:14:11,870 --> 00:14:14,060 dynamic part. 217 00:14:14,060 --> 00:14:17,270 People essentially live for two periods-- they eat today 218 00:14:17,270 --> 00:14:20,060 and they leave money for their kids 219 00:14:20,060 --> 00:14:27,260 or their tomorrow's next period as if leaving a bequest, hence 220 00:14:27,260 --> 00:14:31,520 the notation b for a Bequest. 221 00:14:31,520 --> 00:14:35,780 So what earnings two people have in a given period? 222 00:14:35,780 --> 00:14:41,640 Farmers earn kind of a subsistence living in farming, 223 00:14:41,640 --> 00:14:44,270 and they carry their wealth over and have it 224 00:14:44,270 --> 00:14:46,940 at the end of the period. 225 00:14:46,940 --> 00:14:54,890 Workers earn wages-- excuse me-- and entrepreneurs make profits. 226 00:14:54,890 --> 00:14:57,440 Everybody has this initial wealth 227 00:14:57,440 --> 00:14:59,720 which can vary across individuals 228 00:14:59,720 --> 00:15:06,860 carried over to the end of the period, essentially. 229 00:15:06,860 --> 00:15:10,700 A little bit of an exception for the entrepreneurs. 230 00:15:10,700 --> 00:15:14,810 When Dan wrote his model, he kind of 231 00:15:14,810 --> 00:15:17,930 had in mind an earlier development literature 232 00:15:17,930 --> 00:15:20,240 which makes agriculture out there 233 00:15:20,240 --> 00:15:26,330 in the rural areas versus factories and manufacturing 234 00:15:26,330 --> 00:15:26,930 in the cities. 235 00:15:26,930 --> 00:15:32,090 So they had in mind a kind of cost of living adjustment, 236 00:15:32,090 --> 00:15:37,970 so basically workers earn their wage, 237 00:15:37,970 --> 00:15:40,730 but they have to pay this cost of living, which 238 00:15:40,730 --> 00:15:45,920 gives a little bit advantage to being in the subsistence 239 00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:47,090 sector. 240 00:15:47,090 --> 00:15:53,480 Actually, you can see it right away down here, 241 00:15:53,480 --> 00:16:00,260 if sort of in equilibrium to have both farmers and workers 242 00:16:00,260 --> 00:16:06,030 coexisting, these two equations have to be equal to each other. 243 00:16:06,030 --> 00:16:09,740 So as long as the wage does not exceed-- 244 00:16:09,740 --> 00:16:13,460 the wage less this cost of living does not exceed gamma, 245 00:16:13,460 --> 00:16:16,040 then a household would be indifferent 246 00:16:16,040 --> 00:16:19,430 about whether to migrate to the city for a wage 247 00:16:19,430 --> 00:16:22,830 and pay that cost versus stay in farming. 248 00:16:22,830 --> 00:16:23,330 Yes? 249 00:16:23,330 --> 00:16:24,525 AUDIENCE: So is this going to be abstracting 250 00:16:24,525 --> 00:16:25,945 all the way from land markets? 251 00:16:25,945 --> 00:16:27,070 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Yes it is. 252 00:16:33,380 --> 00:16:37,170 And-- OK, let's get to the firm. 253 00:16:37,170 --> 00:16:39,940 Well, let me just follow up on that. 254 00:16:39,940 --> 00:16:43,230 The model as estimated and calibrated 255 00:16:43,230 --> 00:16:47,340 will actually deliver the fact that for fairly long periods 256 00:16:47,340 --> 00:16:51,000 of time, the wage stays relatively low 257 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:54,600 and you have all three sectors coexisting, although there will 258 00:16:54,600 --> 00:16:58,650 come this knife-edge time where the wage starts to pop up, 259 00:16:58,650 --> 00:17:01,230 and then quite unrealistically there 260 00:17:01,230 --> 00:17:04,140 should be no more farmers. 261 00:17:04,140 --> 00:17:05,700 You would think this model is doomed 262 00:17:05,700 --> 00:17:08,849 to fail with that kind of knife edge, 263 00:17:08,849 --> 00:17:15,240 but surprisingly in Thailand, there are still farmers, 264 00:17:15,240 --> 00:17:23,920 but the wage did stay relatively flat for quite a long time 265 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:26,319 and then grew rather quickly. 266 00:17:26,319 --> 00:17:27,290 What about firms? 267 00:17:27,290 --> 00:17:31,270 So firms maximize basically profit. 268 00:17:31,270 --> 00:17:33,960 The price of the output or the consumption goods 269 00:17:33,960 --> 00:17:36,130 is normalized to 1. 270 00:17:36,130 --> 00:17:38,950 So firms have output, which is produced 271 00:17:38,950 --> 00:17:43,060 using capital and labor. 272 00:17:43,060 --> 00:17:44,380 Labor can be hired. 273 00:17:44,380 --> 00:17:48,310 Those are the workers, you have to pay them a wage. 274 00:17:48,310 --> 00:17:57,470 And capital, basically, is coming out of initial wealth. 275 00:17:57,470 --> 00:18:00,680 So capital and consumption are kind of 1 to 1. 276 00:18:03,230 --> 00:18:07,700 So you have your sort of initial wealth, 277 00:18:07,700 --> 00:18:10,850 and the capital has to be financed by that. 278 00:18:10,850 --> 00:18:15,410 Capital cannot exceed that amount. 279 00:18:15,410 --> 00:18:17,150 And actually, there's this fixed cost, 280 00:18:17,150 --> 00:18:20,300 and that also has to get paid. 281 00:18:20,300 --> 00:18:22,910 There's a lot going on right here, 282 00:18:22,910 --> 00:18:26,330 because there's two constraints. 283 00:18:26,330 --> 00:18:28,950 One is you have to pay x to get started, 284 00:18:28,950 --> 00:18:35,300 and the second is that you can't borrow at all. 285 00:18:35,300 --> 00:18:39,050 All the investment is basically self-financed. 286 00:18:39,050 --> 00:18:42,950 Now that said, you could imagine kind of weakening this a bit 287 00:18:42,950 --> 00:18:45,500 and allowing the amount you could be borrowing 288 00:18:45,500 --> 00:18:52,020 to be some multiple of a b, and next class, 289 00:18:52,020 --> 00:18:54,410 we'll talk about many models that 290 00:18:54,410 --> 00:18:57,200 do something exactly like that. 291 00:18:59,760 --> 00:19:01,850 But for now, no credit at all. 292 00:19:04,900 --> 00:19:07,410 So this just-- these costs just subtract right off 293 00:19:07,410 --> 00:19:12,060 of output as if at the end of the period, 294 00:19:12,060 --> 00:19:15,900 or b minus these things is what you 295 00:19:15,900 --> 00:19:18,862 have at the end of the period. 296 00:19:18,862 --> 00:19:21,195 Then you get you get the output and you pay the workers. 297 00:19:26,810 --> 00:19:29,570 So the key in this paper and so many 298 00:19:29,570 --> 00:19:34,580 other papers is an occupation choice map that really 299 00:19:34,580 --> 00:19:44,890 summarizes the possibilities. 300 00:19:44,890 --> 00:19:49,050 So the two key variables from a household's point of view 301 00:19:49,050 --> 00:19:50,760 is the initial wealth that they have 302 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:52,960 at the beginning of the period-- 303 00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:54,930 it could be high or low-- 304 00:19:54,930 --> 00:20:00,830 and the setup cost x to running a business. 305 00:20:00,830 --> 00:20:06,120 And naturally, if your wealth is high and your costs are low, 306 00:20:06,120 --> 00:20:10,350 you're a talented person, you're, say, not only 307 00:20:10,350 --> 00:20:15,000 likely to go into business, but that finance constraint is not 308 00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:17,470 going to be binding either. 309 00:20:17,470 --> 00:20:22,450 You're going to run the marginal product of capital down to 1, 310 00:20:22,450 --> 00:20:24,402 and you still have more money left over, 311 00:20:24,402 --> 00:20:26,610 so you kind of carry it off to the end of the period. 312 00:20:29,420 --> 00:20:34,320 There is a region of lower wealth, 313 00:20:34,320 --> 00:20:36,420 but yet somewhat talented people who 314 00:20:36,420 --> 00:20:39,150 are constrained entrepreneurs, they 315 00:20:39,150 --> 00:20:44,330 would actually like to employ higher levels of capital k 316 00:20:44,330 --> 00:20:48,450 than they are able to finance out of their own wealth. 317 00:20:48,450 --> 00:20:52,110 They would borrow if they could, but there's no credit yet. 318 00:20:52,110 --> 00:20:57,960 And actually, this straight line is when they can't even 319 00:20:57,960 --> 00:21:00,460 cover their setup costs, or on the margin, 320 00:21:00,460 --> 00:21:03,630 they're just able to cover their setup cost 321 00:21:03,630 --> 00:21:07,240 x out of their wealth b, and there's nothing left over, 322 00:21:07,240 --> 00:21:12,150 so they can't even run the firm on the intensive margin. 323 00:21:12,150 --> 00:21:14,970 And then the rest of the guys, they're 324 00:21:14,970 --> 00:21:20,360 kind of workers or agriculturalists. 325 00:21:20,360 --> 00:21:26,590 So the shape of this is intuitively reasonable, right? 326 00:21:26,590 --> 00:21:28,280 The higher is wealth and the lower 327 00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:31,910 is talent, the more likely you'd be a firm or an unconstrained 328 00:21:31,910 --> 00:21:32,870 for a more-- 329 00:21:32,870 --> 00:21:38,000 the lower is your wealth and the more likely 330 00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:39,710 you are to be a worker. 331 00:21:39,710 --> 00:21:44,720 And the thing is, even when your talent is low, 332 00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:48,650 if your wealth is quite low, you can't be in business. 333 00:21:48,650 --> 00:21:51,770 These are potentially profitable entrepreneurs 334 00:21:51,770 --> 00:21:55,100 who are constrained on the extensive margin 335 00:21:55,100 --> 00:21:57,260 at these parameter values. 336 00:21:57,260 --> 00:21:59,420 Now you say, what parameter values? 337 00:21:59,420 --> 00:22:02,390 Well, I drew some lines. 338 00:22:02,390 --> 00:22:05,630 The point of the micro estimation 339 00:22:05,630 --> 00:22:11,990 is to actually be able to draw those lines based 340 00:22:11,990 --> 00:22:13,130 on the micro data. 341 00:22:16,820 --> 00:22:18,800 So-- oh my goodness. 342 00:22:25,408 --> 00:22:27,200 I don't know how often this is going to be. 343 00:22:32,270 --> 00:22:40,760 So let me just grab three equations 344 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:44,570 and let you focus on this. 345 00:22:44,570 --> 00:22:47,960 Here are the functions, the structural functions 346 00:22:47,960 --> 00:22:49,220 of the model. 347 00:22:49,220 --> 00:22:52,160 There is a trade-off between consumption and bequests 348 00:22:52,160 --> 00:22:54,380 under this utility function. 349 00:22:54,380 --> 00:22:57,170 It's basically top Douglas in today's consumption 350 00:22:57,170 --> 00:22:58,910 and tomorrow's wealth. 351 00:22:58,910 --> 00:23:01,580 This little parameter here is omega. 352 00:23:01,580 --> 00:23:06,290 Omega is basically going to determine the savings rate. 353 00:23:06,290 --> 00:23:08,810 And we're going to have to calibrate it. 354 00:23:11,420 --> 00:23:15,800 This production function is ugly. 355 00:23:15,800 --> 00:23:20,690 It was meant to be general, which sounds good. 356 00:23:20,690 --> 00:23:22,910 So it has capital, it has labor, it 357 00:23:22,910 --> 00:23:26,570 has the square of each of them, and it has an interaction term. 358 00:23:26,570 --> 00:23:29,270 Unfortunate-- so it's like translog. 359 00:23:29,270 --> 00:23:32,930 Approximately-- it can approximate almost any function 360 00:23:32,930 --> 00:23:35,350 reasonably well, but the problem is, 361 00:23:35,350 --> 00:23:38,450 it carries with it five parameters. 362 00:23:38,450 --> 00:23:48,883 Alpha, beta, xi, rho, and an unreadable script, I'm sorry. 363 00:23:48,883 --> 00:23:51,175 I thought it was sigma, but it doesn't look like sigma. 364 00:23:54,640 --> 00:24:00,940 And this is one of the regrets that I 365 00:24:00,940 --> 00:24:03,940 have about pushing so hard in these models, 366 00:24:03,940 --> 00:24:08,540 because it turns out in hindsight, 367 00:24:08,540 --> 00:24:14,590 we generated data from that production function 368 00:24:14,590 --> 00:24:16,230 knowing the model, and it's still 369 00:24:16,230 --> 00:24:17,910 hard to recover these parameters. 370 00:24:17,910 --> 00:24:22,440 That's something you should get into the habit of doing. 371 00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:26,550 It's hard enough with real data, and you already 372 00:24:26,550 --> 00:24:30,168 know, the actual world is not like your model, 373 00:24:30,168 --> 00:24:31,710 it's an abstraction, but at least you 374 00:24:31,710 --> 00:24:33,200 ought to make sure that-- 375 00:24:33,200 --> 00:24:35,910 and that you can't really do too, 376 00:24:35,910 --> 00:24:38,640 too much about, because you have to make decisions 377 00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:39,995 about your model. 378 00:24:39,995 --> 00:24:41,370 But at least you should make sure 379 00:24:41,370 --> 00:24:44,910 your estimation routine works well if the model-- 380 00:24:44,910 --> 00:24:47,190 if the world were exactly like the model 381 00:24:47,190 --> 00:24:51,550 and generated the data that you're about to use. 382 00:24:51,550 --> 00:24:55,020 Anyway, we did the best we could on that. 383 00:24:55,020 --> 00:25:00,030 And this is this distribution of setup costs, 384 00:25:00,030 --> 00:25:02,220 the cumulative distribution. 385 00:25:02,220 --> 00:25:05,340 The easiest way to disentangle this is to say, 386 00:25:05,340 --> 00:25:09,660 suppose m is equal to 0, then this disappears, 387 00:25:09,660 --> 00:25:15,300 and the cumulative distribution is just rising linearly in x. 388 00:25:15,300 --> 00:25:18,510 In other words, the density is flat. 389 00:25:18,510 --> 00:25:22,680 So this is just a standard uniform distribution. 390 00:25:22,680 --> 00:25:29,860 That's also kind of nice on the diagram, 391 00:25:29,860 --> 00:25:33,880 because although I don't want to enlarge this, basically 392 00:25:33,880 --> 00:25:37,120 you want to know how many people of a certain x 393 00:25:37,120 --> 00:25:42,010 there are given a certain b how many people of a certain x 394 00:25:42,010 --> 00:25:46,260 there are before you go from firms to workers. 395 00:25:46,260 --> 00:25:48,940 And that's just the length of that line, 396 00:25:48,940 --> 00:25:59,100 and so a uniform density is convenient for the sort of-- 397 00:25:59,100 --> 00:26:02,800 the geometry of that figure. 398 00:26:02,800 --> 00:26:05,590 However, if m is you know more than 0, 399 00:26:05,590 --> 00:26:07,360 then you get that squared term. 400 00:26:07,360 --> 00:26:12,880 It just means the distribution of talent is skewed to the-- 401 00:26:12,880 --> 00:26:15,620 really, the distribution of cost is skewed to the right, 402 00:26:15,620 --> 00:26:19,870 so there are some very untalented people, 403 00:26:19,870 --> 00:26:23,440 and conversely when m is below 0. 404 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:28,180 Now all this big to-do about micro underpinnings, 405 00:26:28,180 --> 00:26:30,760 what do we see in the data? 406 00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:34,290 Well let's imagine we see the wage, 407 00:26:34,290 --> 00:26:37,320 and we also see sort of the net worth 408 00:26:37,320 --> 00:26:44,790 or wealth of the household, and we know their occupation. 409 00:26:44,790 --> 00:26:49,160 So what does the model predict? 410 00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:55,030 The model predicts that the occupation is, say, firm-- 411 00:26:55,030 --> 00:26:59,170 or yi equals 1 in a binary sense-- 412 00:26:59,170 --> 00:27:01,730 when that distribution of cost is-- 413 00:27:01,730 --> 00:27:04,600 this is-- you should read this as an x-- 414 00:27:04,600 --> 00:27:11,520 is on or below that partition between workers and firms. 415 00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:15,970 So you add up, as I was just doing, all those households 416 00:27:15,970 --> 00:27:18,200 with talent less than that. 417 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:21,790 Likewise, if you're not going to be yi equal to 1, 418 00:27:21,790 --> 00:27:24,820 you're going to be yi equal to 0 and a wage earner, 419 00:27:24,820 --> 00:27:27,190 and that's the rest of the residual mass 420 00:27:27,190 --> 00:27:29,110 or 1 minus this probability. 421 00:27:32,210 --> 00:27:34,900 So what is the likelihood? 422 00:27:34,900 --> 00:27:40,780 So just quick review, imagine you have a coin, 423 00:27:40,780 --> 00:27:44,980 and usually coins are fair coins, so-- 424 00:27:44,980 --> 00:27:48,310 I'm not sure about the Super Bowl-- 425 00:27:48,310 --> 00:27:51,520 equal probability of being heads or tails, 426 00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:57,490 and you see a bunch of data, 4 heads and 6 tails, 427 00:27:57,490 --> 00:27:59,600 and you say, well what were the odds of that? 428 00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:01,540 Actually, it's a bit more interesting 429 00:28:01,540 --> 00:28:06,370 if the coin is not fair, because then it's 430 00:28:06,370 --> 00:28:10,210 not probability 1/2 for everything that turns up. 431 00:28:10,210 --> 00:28:13,150 But you just basically take the data, 432 00:28:13,150 --> 00:28:16,240 which is heads, tails, tails, heads, and so on, or a worker, 433 00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:21,470 firm, firm, worker, and start adding up the probabilities. 434 00:28:21,470 --> 00:28:22,595 They're independent events. 435 00:28:25,770 --> 00:28:29,360 So this says log here, but if you undid the log, 436 00:28:29,360 --> 00:28:34,790 you would have the probability of being a firm, 437 00:28:34,790 --> 00:28:38,960 and then this yi would just be the 0 or 1, 438 00:28:38,960 --> 00:28:40,520 and when it's equal to 1, you're just 439 00:28:40,520 --> 00:28:43,760 getting the number of, say, heads or the number of firms 440 00:28:43,760 --> 00:28:48,675 in the sample, and likewise for the number of workers. 441 00:28:48,675 --> 00:28:50,300 It's very convenient to take the logs-- 442 00:28:52,940 --> 00:28:57,403 and it takes this form because logs bring the exponent down 443 00:28:57,403 --> 00:28:58,445 in front of the variable. 444 00:29:04,410 --> 00:29:06,090 It's a cute trick, too, because you want 445 00:29:06,090 --> 00:29:08,460 to maximize the likelihood. 446 00:29:08,460 --> 00:29:11,828 Logs and levels or monotone in each other, 447 00:29:11,828 --> 00:29:13,370 you find the max of one, you're going 448 00:29:13,370 --> 00:29:14,790 to find the max of the other. 449 00:29:14,790 --> 00:29:19,380 So econometricians usually maximize logs 450 00:29:19,380 --> 00:29:23,320 for reasons like this. 451 00:29:23,320 --> 00:29:27,030 And it turns out with all that algebra, 452 00:29:27,030 --> 00:29:30,450 those particular functional forms, 453 00:29:30,450 --> 00:29:33,630 for any set of parameters in the production function-- 454 00:29:33,630 --> 00:29:36,750 alpha, beta, rho, sigma, xi, et cetera, right? 455 00:29:36,750 --> 00:29:41,620 You can draw all those lines, and therefore, 456 00:29:41,620 --> 00:29:44,570 determine all these probabilities. 457 00:29:44,570 --> 00:29:46,930 So for a given guess about the parameters, 458 00:29:46,930 --> 00:29:50,330 you'll have a certain value for the log likelihood, 459 00:29:50,330 --> 00:29:54,580 and then you just maximize that log likelihood 460 00:29:54,580 --> 00:29:55,910 by choosing those parameters. 461 00:29:55,910 --> 00:29:59,170 Essentially the data come first there on the diagram, 462 00:29:59,170 --> 00:30:01,210 you have sort of wealth-- 463 00:30:01,210 --> 00:30:04,060 thousands of data points, but you have wealth. 464 00:30:04,060 --> 00:30:10,090 And you don't see talent, that's an unobservable, 465 00:30:10,090 --> 00:30:12,100 but you do see their occupation. 466 00:30:12,100 --> 00:30:13,600 So you're moving those curves around 467 00:30:13,600 --> 00:30:16,520 to try to fit as many data points as possible. 468 00:30:16,520 --> 00:30:19,190 Here are the estimated parameters. 469 00:30:19,190 --> 00:30:22,300 Alpha, beta, xi, rho, sigma, et cetera, and it's 470 00:30:22,300 --> 00:30:25,702 also estimated naturally, because that's 471 00:30:25,702 --> 00:30:27,160 kind of telling you whether there's 472 00:30:27,160 --> 00:30:32,356 a large mass of high or low cost people in the population. 473 00:30:32,356 --> 00:30:34,921 AUDIENCE: So the line of matter is just the boundary 474 00:30:34,921 --> 00:30:36,870 between [INAUDIBLE] right? 475 00:30:36,870 --> 00:30:40,660 Divide [INAUDIBLE] doesn't matter for-- 476 00:30:40,660 --> 00:30:42,660 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Not in this case, no we didn't. 477 00:30:42,660 --> 00:30:46,360 Now if I had from the data households answering-- or firms 478 00:30:46,360 --> 00:30:50,190 answering the question, are we constrained? 479 00:30:50,190 --> 00:30:52,560 And you could even get more sophisticated. 480 00:30:52,560 --> 00:30:54,150 Running businesses, would we like 481 00:30:54,150 --> 00:30:58,110 to invest more given this shadow price? 482 00:30:58,110 --> 00:31:00,040 I've asked questions like that. 483 00:31:00,040 --> 00:31:03,210 Alp in the macro lecture half an hour 484 00:31:03,210 --> 00:31:09,460 ago was describing something like that in the US for firms 485 00:31:09,460 --> 00:31:11,070 right before the-- 486 00:31:11,070 --> 00:31:13,470 during the financial crisis. 487 00:31:13,470 --> 00:31:16,440 And you could even do something on the extensive margin 488 00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:18,360 in principle. 489 00:31:18,360 --> 00:31:21,930 You're worried that those are lousy questions, like are you 490 00:31:21,930 --> 00:31:22,710 constrained? 491 00:31:26,040 --> 00:31:27,060 But anyway. 492 00:31:27,060 --> 00:31:30,180 It seems to actually work better in practice 493 00:31:30,180 --> 00:31:33,720 than you think it might in reality-- 494 00:31:33,720 --> 00:31:35,110 in the classroom. 495 00:31:35,110 --> 00:31:40,170 Calibration, not everything can be gotten from those occupation 496 00:31:40,170 --> 00:31:42,490 choice diagrams. 497 00:31:42,490 --> 00:31:46,950 So-- and actually, we changed the model just slightly. 498 00:31:46,950 --> 00:31:49,980 We're going to allow a very slight growth 499 00:31:49,980 --> 00:31:52,110 rate in subsistence income as if there 500 00:31:52,110 --> 00:31:55,500 were some technological progress in agriculture. 501 00:32:00,660 --> 00:32:07,260 That savings rate is not estimable from the micro data 502 00:32:07,260 --> 00:32:09,870 the way we were doing it, and neither is the subsistence 503 00:32:09,870 --> 00:32:11,550 income in farming. 504 00:32:11,550 --> 00:32:13,470 The level of subsistence income we 505 00:32:13,470 --> 00:32:18,870 get from a socioeconomic survey done in Thailand in 1976, 506 00:32:18,870 --> 00:32:24,740 basically matching to the reservation wage, 507 00:32:24,740 --> 00:32:26,150 there is a slight growth-- 508 00:32:26,150 --> 00:32:30,480 very small trend over time in that wage rate, 509 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:35,450 so we let it grow exogenously at 5.5% per year-- 510 00:32:35,450 --> 00:32:36,020 less than 1%. 511 00:32:41,490 --> 00:32:44,280 And the Cobb-Douglas says the savings rate-- and again, 512 00:32:44,280 --> 00:32:45,420 we're going to get-- 513 00:32:45,420 --> 00:32:51,690 we're going to set it high, basically, at basically 1/4, 514 00:32:51,690 --> 00:32:55,390 but that matches evidence-- and you'll see this in China 515 00:32:55,390 --> 00:32:57,390 and many of the countries you're about to study, 516 00:32:57,390 --> 00:33:01,130 the savings rates are very high in these countries. 517 00:33:01,130 --> 00:33:02,630 So that's actually realistic. 518 00:33:10,650 --> 00:33:11,610 Learning by doing. 519 00:33:15,750 --> 00:33:24,730 So from the original Bernhardt and Lloyd-Ellis paper, 520 00:33:24,730 --> 00:33:26,800 you begin to see a little bit of the dynamics 521 00:33:26,800 --> 00:33:29,710 and also their take on the development literature 522 00:33:29,710 --> 00:33:32,050 at the time they wrote the paper. 523 00:33:36,040 --> 00:33:41,320 First of all, why that myopic savings rate? 524 00:33:41,320 --> 00:33:44,830 Why just care about today and then tomorrow? 525 00:33:44,830 --> 00:33:48,430 Well, it just helps enormously in computing the solutions 526 00:33:48,430 --> 00:33:49,970 to these models. 527 00:33:49,970 --> 00:33:52,510 It's like every day is a new day. 528 00:33:52,510 --> 00:33:54,520 Here's your wealth. 529 00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:55,810 How much am I going to save? 530 00:33:55,810 --> 00:33:58,570 That's a number, that's the fraction of wealth you're 531 00:33:58,570 --> 00:34:01,450 going to save, and the rest of it you know you've 532 00:34:01,450 --> 00:34:03,730 got available for consumption. 533 00:34:03,730 --> 00:34:07,480 So after you make your occupation decision. 534 00:34:07,480 --> 00:34:09,940 So every period, you kind of have 535 00:34:09,940 --> 00:34:13,360 like a static model where you're deciding on the occupation. 536 00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:15,580 How well you do, et cetera, depending 537 00:34:15,580 --> 00:34:17,469 on your occupation choice and your talent, 538 00:34:17,469 --> 00:34:20,889 determines your end-of-period wealth, and that you carry over 539 00:34:20,889 --> 00:34:22,469 to tomorrow. 540 00:34:22,469 --> 00:34:25,630 And tomorrow's a new day, the whole thing starts over again. 541 00:34:25,630 --> 00:34:29,230 No, I don't believe these guys only live two periods. 542 00:34:29,230 --> 00:34:31,420 Although you will see, this tension 543 00:34:31,420 --> 00:34:35,469 in the literature between realism and tractability, 544 00:34:35,469 --> 00:34:39,429 people still use quite heavily overlapping generations models, 545 00:34:39,429 --> 00:34:41,199 and some-- 546 00:34:41,199 --> 00:34:42,850 and I mean like with three periods. 547 00:34:45,730 --> 00:34:49,239 So it's kind of hard to match year-to-year data that way, 548 00:34:49,239 --> 00:34:52,090 but you can tell interesting stories 549 00:34:52,090 --> 00:34:54,760 about the distribution of wealth and the impact of credit 550 00:34:54,760 --> 00:34:57,610 constraints. 551 00:34:57,610 --> 00:35:00,010 So this is an extreme version of that. 552 00:35:00,010 --> 00:35:02,860 This is like Rostow's take-off, you remember? 553 00:35:02,860 --> 00:35:05,170 He worked for Kennedy and-- 554 00:35:05,170 --> 00:35:09,940 so this-- he says at first nothing much is happening, 555 00:35:09,940 --> 00:35:12,670 and then you get in this transition, 556 00:35:12,670 --> 00:35:16,750 wages begin to rise, but income and wealth are still 557 00:35:16,750 --> 00:35:18,190 growing first order, and then you 558 00:35:18,190 --> 00:35:21,820 get the advanced economic development and wages take off, 559 00:35:21,820 --> 00:35:27,310 and incomes and wealth basically really, really become 560 00:35:27,310 --> 00:35:29,080 quite high. 561 00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:31,540 And I'll forget to say it, but if you 562 00:35:31,540 --> 00:35:33,420 let this model run long enough, it 563 00:35:33,420 --> 00:35:37,540 will converge to a steady state in which there's 564 00:35:37,540 --> 00:35:40,060 no more any growth in wealth. 565 00:35:40,060 --> 00:35:43,320 It's no longer a growth economy. 566 00:35:43,320 --> 00:35:47,170 And that steady state, because of this weird assumption 567 00:35:47,170 --> 00:35:51,460 about two periods and these costs, 568 00:35:51,460 --> 00:35:55,380 you will see people making transitions. 569 00:35:55,380 --> 00:35:57,180 They will have a certain wealth and they're 570 00:35:57,180 --> 00:36:00,150 going to be talented or not talented in certain things, 571 00:36:00,150 --> 00:36:02,280 and they will decide to, say, forget 572 00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:05,440 what they were doing last period and do something new today. 573 00:36:05,440 --> 00:36:09,000 So you'll see a lot of churning in the occupation distribution, 574 00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:11,010 but you will not see any trends in anything 575 00:36:11,010 --> 00:36:13,010 in their steady state. 576 00:36:13,010 --> 00:36:14,760 This is going to be a recurrent theme when 577 00:36:14,760 --> 00:36:17,760 we go through these papers as to which ones are essentially 578 00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:23,490 in steady state, and maybe we're looking across a cross-section 579 00:36:23,490 --> 00:36:28,110 of economies that vary in some way, each of which country 580 00:36:28,110 --> 00:36:30,450 is in a steady state versus transitions. 581 00:36:30,450 --> 00:36:33,060 Today is about transitions, and I'm not 582 00:36:33,060 --> 00:36:35,730 going to spend a lot of attention 583 00:36:35,730 --> 00:36:38,040 to this steady state of this model, which is probably 584 00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:42,040 relatively uninteresting. 585 00:36:42,040 --> 00:36:47,640 OK so now we get to the financial deepening part. 586 00:36:50,230 --> 00:36:56,380 So what we do is create an exogenous financial sector 587 00:36:56,380 --> 00:36:58,300 under which everybody's intermediated. 588 00:37:01,400 --> 00:37:04,880 It's like one of these dual economies, 589 00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:09,120 except for us, it's like you have free banks and access 590 00:37:09,120 --> 00:37:11,030 or you have zero access. 591 00:37:11,030 --> 00:37:13,210 It's very extreme. 592 00:37:13,210 --> 00:37:15,160 In the banking sector, so to speak, 593 00:37:15,160 --> 00:37:18,560 it's not just about credit, it's about lending. 594 00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:21,220 So there's an equilibrium interest rate that's 595 00:37:21,220 --> 00:37:24,730 going to clear the market. 596 00:37:24,730 --> 00:37:28,330 More savings is equal to borrowing. 597 00:37:28,330 --> 00:37:32,590 And now you look at the return to farmers, 598 00:37:32,590 --> 00:37:34,918 farmers have their subsistence income, 599 00:37:34,918 --> 00:37:36,460 but they put their money in the bank, 600 00:37:36,460 --> 00:37:40,800 so they get 1 plus little r or big R rate of return on that. 601 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:45,610 Everybody-- when you have complete-- 602 00:37:45,610 --> 00:37:49,560 there's no uncertainty here, essentially. 603 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:51,850 So you have a neoclassical separation 604 00:37:51,850 --> 00:37:57,760 between households and firms, which essentially means 605 00:37:57,760 --> 00:37:59,990 the financing decisions of firms have nothing 606 00:37:59,990 --> 00:38:01,350 to do with households. 607 00:38:01,350 --> 00:38:04,880 Another way to put this is, just put all your money in the bank 608 00:38:04,880 --> 00:38:09,350 and then borrow what you need if you need to borrow it all. 609 00:38:09,350 --> 00:38:11,300 So all these guys are putting their money 610 00:38:11,300 --> 00:38:14,690 in the bank, including the firms, 611 00:38:14,690 --> 00:38:18,060 and then they borrow back what they need. 612 00:38:18,060 --> 00:38:20,790 Now it is true that the borrowing and lending 613 00:38:20,790 --> 00:38:22,710 rate are the same here, and that's how 614 00:38:22,710 --> 00:38:26,670 on getting away with this trick. 615 00:38:26,670 --> 00:38:31,140 Two lectures from now we'll have a paper focusing quite a bit 616 00:38:31,140 --> 00:38:34,080 on the spread between borrowing and lending 617 00:38:34,080 --> 00:38:37,650 as a measure of the cost of intermediation. 618 00:38:37,650 --> 00:38:39,900 This paper doesn't have that, this paper just 619 00:38:39,900 --> 00:38:43,800 assumes perfectly costless intermediation, 620 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:47,420 and these rates are the same. 621 00:38:47,420 --> 00:38:47,920 OK. 622 00:38:47,920 --> 00:38:58,550 So then alpha fraction of households 623 00:38:58,550 --> 00:39:01,850 are in this intermediate sector at this date. 624 00:39:01,850 --> 00:39:05,540 So how much is in the savings accounts? 625 00:39:05,540 --> 00:39:09,080 So you take the total population, 626 00:39:09,080 --> 00:39:11,990 alpha fraction of the population intermediated, 627 00:39:11,990 --> 00:39:13,700 everybody's putting-- 628 00:39:13,700 --> 00:39:15,530 in that sector putting b in the bank. 629 00:39:15,530 --> 00:39:18,740 So alpha times b is the saving. 630 00:39:18,740 --> 00:39:25,070 And what's basically the borrowing level? 631 00:39:25,070 --> 00:39:27,890 Well firms, if you are firm, you're 632 00:39:27,890 --> 00:39:29,990 going to borrow to finance both your setup 633 00:39:29,990 --> 00:39:34,370 costs and your capital. 634 00:39:34,370 --> 00:39:40,790 So basically we add up or integrate up 635 00:39:40,790 --> 00:39:43,220 over the two characteristics-- 636 00:39:43,220 --> 00:39:48,320 that is to say the setup costs themselves as well as wealth. 637 00:39:51,830 --> 00:39:55,400 You will only integrate up over firms 638 00:39:55,400 --> 00:39:58,280 when x is below some threshold. 639 00:39:58,280 --> 00:40:01,760 Now this threshold no long-- 640 00:40:01,760 --> 00:40:04,550 I should actually have drawn it on the other diagram. 641 00:40:04,550 --> 00:40:07,460 It's a completely flat line. 642 00:40:07,460 --> 00:40:09,530 Whether or not you're a firm or a worker-- 643 00:40:09,530 --> 00:40:12,260 I said this-- has nothing to do with your wealth, 644 00:40:12,260 --> 00:40:14,940 it just has to do with your cost. 645 00:40:14,940 --> 00:40:19,070 So if your costs are high, above this threshold, 646 00:40:19,070 --> 00:40:20,870 you're not going to be a firm. 647 00:40:20,870 --> 00:40:22,693 And if it's below, you are. 648 00:40:22,693 --> 00:40:24,110 If you don't have a lot of wealth, 649 00:40:24,110 --> 00:40:25,652 you're going to have to borrow a lot. 650 00:40:25,652 --> 00:40:28,610 So this is sort of the demand for funds. 651 00:40:28,610 --> 00:40:34,810 And then basically you're going to set the demand for funds 652 00:40:34,810 --> 00:40:38,380 equal to the supply for funds and find an interest rate that 653 00:40:38,380 --> 00:40:41,190 does that. 654 00:40:41,190 --> 00:40:44,020 There is an inequality here only because, again, 655 00:40:44,020 --> 00:40:47,200 the 1 plus little r could go to 1, basically, 656 00:40:47,200 --> 00:40:49,090 so the cost of funds is basically 657 00:40:49,090 --> 00:40:52,510 like storing grain in the backyard, in which case 658 00:40:52,510 --> 00:40:55,150 there's some indeterminacy you might as well just carry it 659 00:40:55,150 --> 00:40:59,320 over rather than put it in a bank. 660 00:40:59,320 --> 00:41:03,050 But interest rates can be higher than that. 661 00:41:03,050 --> 00:41:07,660 And likewise, employment, we've got-- 662 00:41:07,660 --> 00:41:10,180 we just integrate up the demand for work. 663 00:41:14,690 --> 00:41:17,000 Employment is tricky. 664 00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:19,640 People have jobs. 665 00:41:19,640 --> 00:41:21,080 You're either going to be a farmer 666 00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:23,960 or a worker or an entrepreneur. 667 00:41:23,960 --> 00:41:28,460 There's only so many people in the population. 668 00:41:28,460 --> 00:41:34,170 So if the size of the population is normalized to 1, 669 00:41:34,170 --> 00:41:36,570 you've got basically the number of entrepreneurs 670 00:41:36,570 --> 00:41:41,200 and the number of work workers. 671 00:41:41,200 --> 00:41:43,120 The number of workers, it just comes 672 00:41:43,120 --> 00:41:45,880 from the employment of the existing firms 673 00:41:45,880 --> 00:41:52,290 where l is the labor hired of a firm, facing R 674 00:41:52,290 --> 00:41:54,390 is the interest rate, and w is the wage. 675 00:41:57,140 --> 00:41:59,380 There's two sectors here, intermediated and 676 00:41:59,380 --> 00:42:01,090 non-intermediated. 677 00:42:01,090 --> 00:42:03,040 They're different from each other, 678 00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:06,350 but the labor market is perfect. 679 00:42:06,350 --> 00:42:11,610 Again, not so credible, but makes it much easier. 680 00:42:11,610 --> 00:42:14,370 So you can work for any firm, there's 681 00:42:14,370 --> 00:42:16,680 not even any real migration cost-- maybe 682 00:42:16,680 --> 00:42:20,780 that cost of living costs, and that's it. 683 00:42:20,780 --> 00:42:24,360 So you'll be indifferent at a given wage where you work. 684 00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:27,350 So you would just add up all the employment, 685 00:42:27,350 --> 00:42:30,230 add up the number of firms, and again, 686 00:42:30,230 --> 00:42:32,412 lots of the time, this thing will be equal to 1, 687 00:42:32,412 --> 00:42:35,120 you used up all the people, and you'll 688 00:42:35,120 --> 00:42:38,900 have to find a wage that equates the demand and the supply 689 00:42:38,900 --> 00:42:41,420 for workers. 690 00:42:41,420 --> 00:42:45,860 So on Friday, Yan will kind of talk you through a bit more. 691 00:42:45,860 --> 00:42:49,070 Easy to say, maybe not so easy to do. 692 00:42:49,070 --> 00:42:52,040 Even though it's a static model, you 693 00:42:52,040 --> 00:42:55,610 have to find these equilibrium interest rates and wages that 694 00:42:55,610 --> 00:42:56,510 clear the market. 695 00:42:56,510 --> 00:42:58,420 You need an algorithm for doing that. 696 00:42:58,420 --> 00:43:01,540 You need to have a good guess about how to search 697 00:43:01,540 --> 00:43:05,630 and how to iterate. 698 00:43:05,630 --> 00:43:06,570 AUDIENCE: Question? 699 00:43:06,570 --> 00:43:07,507 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Yes? 700 00:43:07,507 --> 00:43:09,090 AUDIENCE: This may be in all of these. 701 00:43:09,090 --> 00:43:11,340 So I want to think about investments in human capital. 702 00:43:11,340 --> 00:43:12,530 Should we think of that as-- 703 00:43:12,530 --> 00:43:13,988 that goes into x or should we think 704 00:43:13,988 --> 00:43:16,302 of that as a different kind of investment which-- 705 00:43:16,302 --> 00:43:17,760 ROBERT TOWNSEND: There really isn't 706 00:43:17,760 --> 00:43:20,180 any realistic human capital in this model. 707 00:43:22,920 --> 00:43:25,000 These guys are choosing whether to be-- 708 00:43:25,000 --> 00:43:27,200 set up a firm or have-- 709 00:43:27,200 --> 00:43:28,200 or what occupation. 710 00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:31,730 You could imagine a model where the choice is 711 00:43:31,730 --> 00:43:36,280 whether or not to go to school, but it's just not here. 712 00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:38,240 And it's not even realistic in the sense 713 00:43:38,240 --> 00:43:41,030 that those x's, you might say, well I went to school, 714 00:43:41,030 --> 00:43:44,540 I'm pretty talented, and I know how to run a business, 715 00:43:44,540 --> 00:43:46,010 might want to do that. 716 00:43:46,010 --> 00:43:48,930 But that talent can change from one period to the next, 717 00:43:48,930 --> 00:43:52,085 so it's not great for human capital. 718 00:43:56,310 --> 00:43:57,210 OK. 719 00:43:57,210 --> 00:44:01,650 So here are income, savings, labor share, 720 00:44:01,650 --> 00:44:04,410 the fraction of entrepreneurs, and a measure of inequality-- 721 00:44:04,410 --> 00:44:05,910 the Gini-- 722 00:44:05,910 --> 00:44:08,430 as both predicted by the model and what 723 00:44:08,430 --> 00:44:12,330 is actually in the data. 724 00:44:12,330 --> 00:44:14,610 The data are up here, actually. 725 00:44:14,610 --> 00:44:17,130 So this didn't work too well. 726 00:44:17,130 --> 00:44:21,930 Income growth in the model is always less 727 00:44:21,930 --> 00:44:25,320 than it is in the actual data. 728 00:44:25,320 --> 00:44:27,510 Remember my little bit for science? 729 00:44:27,510 --> 00:44:31,890 Where I said let's see how well a model does? 730 00:44:31,890 --> 00:44:34,110 Yeah, we can match these things much better 731 00:44:34,110 --> 00:44:37,090 if we also choose the parameters to try to match them, 732 00:44:37,090 --> 00:44:40,200 but we didn't do that, we're completely under-- 733 00:44:40,200 --> 00:44:42,060 it's amazing, it's doing in some sense, 734 00:44:42,060 --> 00:44:44,400 as well as it does at all-- 735 00:44:44,400 --> 00:44:46,230 like look at inequality, for example. 736 00:44:46,230 --> 00:44:48,370 You can't probably tell from the back row 737 00:44:48,370 --> 00:44:52,530 the difference between the model and the data. 738 00:44:52,530 --> 00:44:54,570 There's some intervals here. 739 00:44:54,570 --> 00:44:57,360 Basically, when you estimate things, 740 00:44:57,360 --> 00:44:59,910 you have standard errors on the parameter estimate. 741 00:44:59,910 --> 00:45:02,310 So there's a whole confidence interval 742 00:45:02,310 --> 00:45:05,460 around all those curves I'm drawing on the occupation 743 00:45:05,460 --> 00:45:06,510 choice. 744 00:45:06,510 --> 00:45:10,500 So we generated lots of different paths drawing 745 00:45:10,500 --> 00:45:16,480 parameters within standard confidence intervals. 746 00:45:16,480 --> 00:45:19,350 But the actual mean path is right here 747 00:45:19,350 --> 00:45:21,700 and the actual Thai data is right here. 748 00:45:21,700 --> 00:45:31,680 So this inequality kind of is basically very well-tracked, 749 00:45:31,680 --> 00:45:33,990 and eventually goes down. 750 00:45:33,990 --> 00:45:36,720 When does this start going down? 751 00:45:36,720 --> 00:45:39,570 That's when there are no more farms. 752 00:45:39,570 --> 00:45:42,550 Well that's kind of the model version of it. 753 00:45:42,550 --> 00:45:45,090 There's a sharp increase in the wage 754 00:45:45,090 --> 00:45:49,970 at around 1992 in Thailand. 755 00:45:49,970 --> 00:45:54,090 I think-- I don't know when the turning point was in China. 756 00:45:54,090 --> 00:45:55,370 But this is pretty typical. 757 00:46:00,500 --> 00:46:02,720 Fraction of entrepreneurs we're underpredicting, 758 00:46:02,720 --> 00:46:04,310 although eventually it rises. 759 00:46:04,310 --> 00:46:10,430 Labor share would do quite well, and so on. 760 00:46:17,020 --> 00:46:21,400 So now with the model with its pluses and minuses, 761 00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:30,890 we can do some welfare experiments. 762 00:46:30,890 --> 00:46:35,340 And what I want to do essentially 763 00:46:35,340 --> 00:46:39,430 is a couple of experiments. 764 00:46:39,430 --> 00:46:39,930 RCTs. 765 00:46:42,630 --> 00:46:46,530 One partial equilibrium and one general equilibrium. 766 00:46:46,530 --> 00:46:51,480 So here's my randomized control trial for partial equilibrium. 767 00:46:51,480 --> 00:46:54,360 I'm going to take a household and move it 768 00:46:54,360 --> 00:46:56,760 from the non-intermediated it sector 769 00:46:56,760 --> 00:47:00,160 and put it in the intermediated sector 770 00:47:00,160 --> 00:47:01,960 and then look at the welfare gains. 771 00:47:05,930 --> 00:47:18,870 Now actually, before 1992, the wage in Thailand is the same, 772 00:47:18,870 --> 00:47:21,500 it's still at the subsistence level 773 00:47:21,500 --> 00:47:25,530 regardless of this expanding financial sector. 774 00:47:25,530 --> 00:47:28,448 So it's both a partial and a general equilibrium model, 775 00:47:28,448 --> 00:47:30,740 but I don't have to worry about the general equilibrium 776 00:47:30,740 --> 00:47:32,700 effects of the wage. 777 00:47:32,700 --> 00:47:38,450 It's not like I'm giving the economy intermediation or not. 778 00:47:38,450 --> 00:47:41,720 Or it's equivalent with having a guy moved 779 00:47:41,720 --> 00:47:45,800 from autarky to financial intermediation, 780 00:47:45,800 --> 00:47:48,030 because a wage is the same. 781 00:47:48,030 --> 00:47:52,090 So what the hell is this? 782 00:47:52,090 --> 00:47:56,620 This huge spike here are basically 783 00:47:56,620 --> 00:48:05,310 the gains equivalent-- 784 00:48:05,310 --> 00:48:08,580 consumption gains or wealth gains 785 00:48:08,580 --> 00:48:13,920 for households of low wealth but high talent. 786 00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:20,670 So I pinpointed them earlier in the occupation choice diagram. 787 00:48:20,670 --> 00:48:22,410 So they are no longer constrained. 788 00:48:22,410 --> 00:48:24,150 So there are some very talented people 789 00:48:24,150 --> 00:48:29,640 who will now set up businesses and even hire workers and make 790 00:48:29,640 --> 00:48:31,880 a lot of money. 791 00:48:31,880 --> 00:48:36,450 After all, the flip side of the wage being low 792 00:48:36,450 --> 00:48:40,290 is that when you're a firm, you don't have to pay high costs. 793 00:48:40,290 --> 00:48:41,460 You make a ton of money. 794 00:48:44,310 --> 00:48:50,790 So these gains are so big that they make the other things 795 00:48:50,790 --> 00:48:52,320 small in comparison. 796 00:48:52,320 --> 00:48:57,270 Actually, these sort of orangey people 797 00:48:57,270 --> 00:49:02,490 are switching from workers to firms, and these blue-- 798 00:49:02,490 --> 00:49:05,785 light-blue people, those were-- 799 00:49:05,785 --> 00:49:07,410 I don't know if this will surprise you, 800 00:49:07,410 --> 00:49:11,610 those are inefficient firms going out of business. 801 00:49:11,610 --> 00:49:17,190 I mean, they're an autarky, not much to do with their money, 802 00:49:17,190 --> 00:49:20,310 throw it back into the business, drive the marginal return down 803 00:49:20,310 --> 00:49:25,890 to the carrying costs of grain, and that's 804 00:49:25,890 --> 00:49:34,800 the best thing other than being a farmer that you can do. 805 00:49:34,800 --> 00:49:37,970 But when the interest rate goes up early on-- 806 00:49:37,970 --> 00:49:39,920 and early on the interest rate in this economy 807 00:49:39,920 --> 00:49:44,560 will be high, because there isn't that much wealth, 808 00:49:44,560 --> 00:49:47,880 and there's relatively high marginal product in production. 809 00:49:47,880 --> 00:49:52,430 So these lazy, untalented, richer people-- 810 00:49:52,430 --> 00:49:54,110 sorry, lazy was excessive. 811 00:49:56,923 --> 00:49:58,340 They don't have a choice about it, 812 00:49:58,340 --> 00:50:01,730 they're just not good at anything. 813 00:50:01,730 --> 00:50:06,192 They take their money and they put it in the bank 814 00:50:06,192 --> 00:50:07,400 and they get a higher return. 815 00:50:11,420 --> 00:50:14,210 We'll come back to this later in the class when we actually 816 00:50:14,210 --> 00:50:18,820 come back to RCTs and IV and all of that, 817 00:50:18,820 --> 00:50:20,780 but there is already a caution here-- 818 00:50:20,780 --> 00:50:23,170 some things are not monotonic. 819 00:50:23,170 --> 00:50:26,900 The treatment effect is not monotonic in this model. 820 00:50:26,900 --> 00:50:29,360 Intermediation it's a good thing in the sense 821 00:50:29,360 --> 00:50:33,350 that everyone can earn higher income at least when there are 822 00:50:33,350 --> 00:50:36,600 no general equilibrium effects. 823 00:50:36,600 --> 00:50:38,670 But the way in which you earn higher income 824 00:50:38,670 --> 00:50:41,040 may involve occupation shifts-- 825 00:50:41,040 --> 00:50:43,380 some people going into business and some people 826 00:50:43,380 --> 00:50:45,700 going out of business. 827 00:50:45,700 --> 00:50:47,850 So in a very simple way, you can see 828 00:50:47,850 --> 00:50:55,280 how you would lose monotonicity of the treatment. 829 00:50:55,280 --> 00:50:57,080 We'll come back to that in a later day. 830 00:51:00,950 --> 00:51:03,530 So this is a prediction-- 831 00:51:03,530 --> 00:51:06,070 oh, now let's jump countries. 832 00:51:06,070 --> 00:51:07,200 I'll go to Mexico. 833 00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:10,160 Actually, I think the next slide is-- 834 00:51:10,160 --> 00:51:12,260 oh, how annoying. 835 00:51:12,260 --> 00:51:13,140 OK, I'm learning. 836 00:51:15,880 --> 00:51:17,260 We won't have this-- 837 00:51:17,260 --> 00:51:19,240 I'll try to avoid this problem in the future. 838 00:51:23,390 --> 00:51:29,300 In Mexico, the fractions of basically 839 00:51:29,300 --> 00:51:34,640 wage earners, the fraction of agriculturalists or subsistence 840 00:51:34,640 --> 00:51:37,970 people, and the fraction of entrepreneurs. 841 00:51:37,970 --> 00:51:41,900 And the earlier one I didn't show you on that scale 842 00:51:41,900 --> 00:51:44,030 actually shows these can be slightly different, 843 00:51:44,030 --> 00:51:47,450 but on this scale with all the occupations, 844 00:51:47,450 --> 00:51:49,670 it works quite well. 845 00:51:49,670 --> 00:51:51,010 So yes? 846 00:51:51,010 --> 00:51:54,600 AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] imagine the fractions 847 00:51:54,600 --> 00:51:56,720 in each occupation. 848 00:51:56,720 --> 00:51:58,500 You mentioned some of that-- 849 00:51:58,500 --> 00:52:01,060 there's a lot of movement in cross-occupation type. 850 00:52:01,060 --> 00:52:04,373 That probably is a [INAUDIBLE] from the data. 851 00:52:04,373 --> 00:52:05,790 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Yeah, we're not-- 852 00:52:05,790 --> 00:52:06,872 AUDIENCE: Times the time. 853 00:52:06,872 --> 00:52:07,830 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Right. 854 00:52:07,830 --> 00:52:13,800 We're not actually looking at the panel of a given household 855 00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:17,520 at their career choice or occupation choice 856 00:52:17,520 --> 00:52:18,930 over many time periods. 857 00:52:18,930 --> 00:52:21,900 We're just only using the cross-section 858 00:52:21,900 --> 00:52:23,190 to do the estimation. 859 00:52:28,390 --> 00:52:31,030 So even though-- I think your point is-- even though this 860 00:52:31,030 --> 00:52:34,000 seems to fit well, beneath this picture, 861 00:52:34,000 --> 00:52:39,430 there may be households flipping from one to the other 862 00:52:39,430 --> 00:52:41,110 and the model doesn't say they should. 863 00:52:44,750 --> 00:52:47,690 Actually, when we get to Buera and Shin and so on, 864 00:52:47,690 --> 00:52:50,570 that will be at center stage. 865 00:52:50,570 --> 00:52:53,150 They're going to be more realistic about the talent 866 00:52:53,150 --> 00:52:56,900 distribution, and they're going to even have forward-looking 867 00:52:56,900 --> 00:53:00,050 dynamics so you'll-- they'll anticipate the way in which 868 00:53:00,050 --> 00:53:06,410 their talent may evolve in the future and it will remedy this 869 00:53:06,410 --> 00:53:08,130 shortcoming. 870 00:53:08,130 --> 00:53:11,400 Now it looks like I'm claiming a big success here 871 00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:14,220 in the sense of jumping New Mexico and all 872 00:53:14,220 --> 00:53:17,040 of a sudden showing you the outcome after all 873 00:53:17,040 --> 00:53:20,220 the same steps, but let me show you something else. 874 00:53:32,640 --> 00:53:39,540 So this line is the model predicted number 875 00:53:39,540 --> 00:53:42,420 of entrepreneurs in the sector without credit, 876 00:53:42,420 --> 00:53:45,970 and this is the one with credit. 877 00:53:45,970 --> 00:53:46,840 It's bad news. 878 00:53:46,840 --> 00:53:49,540 It's kind of the opposite of what you think. 879 00:53:49,540 --> 00:53:57,660 Financial autarky turns out to be better in this sense. 880 00:53:57,660 --> 00:54:02,220 Now normal people don't show you this stuff. 881 00:54:05,060 --> 00:54:07,760 But I'm showing it to you for a reason. 882 00:54:07,760 --> 00:54:10,340 And it's in that book that I mentioned, the one 883 00:54:10,340 --> 00:54:12,680 we're writing on Mexico. 884 00:54:12,680 --> 00:54:14,840 So what went wrong? 885 00:54:14,840 --> 00:54:17,150 Well I went back and I've been worried about this 886 00:54:17,150 --> 00:54:19,110 for quite a long time. 887 00:54:19,110 --> 00:54:22,480 I went back and looked at the chapters again. 888 00:54:22,480 --> 00:54:26,800 Am I going to put this book in the trash can? 889 00:54:26,800 --> 00:54:30,490 And what I realized was that occupation choice 890 00:54:30,490 --> 00:54:34,400 where you do these probits of-- 891 00:54:34,400 --> 00:54:37,280 the variables like credit weren't even showing up there 892 00:54:37,280 --> 00:54:42,980 as being significant, whereas they do in Thailand. 893 00:54:42,980 --> 00:54:46,820 So the data-- the micro data were essentially speaking to me 894 00:54:46,820 --> 00:54:50,770 and I wasn't hearing it for a while. 895 00:54:50,770 --> 00:54:52,380 It makes the point of the lecture, 896 00:54:52,380 --> 00:54:57,300 which is you've got to take the micro underpinning seriously. 897 00:54:57,300 --> 00:55:01,500 And I followed an algorithm as if I'd figured something out 898 00:55:01,500 --> 00:55:03,840 in Thailand and I could do it in Mexico. 899 00:55:03,840 --> 00:55:07,410 But now I know why it wasn't working so well in Mexico. 900 00:55:07,410 --> 00:55:10,230 It doesn't tell you what the next step is, by the way, 901 00:55:10,230 --> 00:55:14,526 but clearly LEB isn't going to work there very well. 902 00:55:14,526 --> 00:55:19,810 AUDIENCE: But isn't the firm bigger In the credit sector? 903 00:55:19,810 --> 00:55:21,060 ROBERT TOWNSEND: In the model? 904 00:55:21,060 --> 00:55:21,700 AUDIENCE: Yeah. 905 00:55:21,700 --> 00:55:22,358 The firm is-- 906 00:55:22,358 --> 00:55:24,275 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Yeah, the model doesn't work. 907 00:55:24,275 --> 00:55:26,250 AUDIENCE: No, but-- so if there is a lower 908 00:55:26,250 --> 00:55:28,260 percentage [INAUDIBLE] but the firm's bigger, 909 00:55:28,260 --> 00:55:29,210 that's fine, right? 910 00:55:29,210 --> 00:55:30,680 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Oh. 911 00:55:30,680 --> 00:55:34,170 All right, I don't have firm size. 912 00:55:34,170 --> 00:55:36,720 I'll go back and look if we actually-- 913 00:55:36,720 --> 00:55:40,440 oh, I should say also something related. 914 00:55:40,440 --> 00:55:43,140 We have-- like I have for Thailand, 915 00:55:43,140 --> 00:55:45,840 and it's available to you on Dataverse, 916 00:55:45,840 --> 00:55:48,690 we have a massive archive of Mexican data. 917 00:55:51,390 --> 00:55:56,510 It should be on Dataverse, and I meant to include-- 918 00:55:56,510 --> 00:56:00,530 I hope there is included already Jorge Moreno's summary 919 00:56:00,530 --> 00:56:03,930 of the Mexican data. 920 00:56:03,930 --> 00:56:06,030 And this book will kind of give you 921 00:56:06,030 --> 00:56:09,270 a sense of the great variety of data we have and-- 922 00:56:09,270 --> 00:56:12,360 I can go back and look and see whether we actually 923 00:56:12,360 --> 00:56:13,710 plotted firm size. 924 00:56:21,310 --> 00:56:23,390 OK, another model. 925 00:56:23,390 --> 00:56:28,210 So this is the one with endogenous financial deepening, 926 00:56:28,210 --> 00:56:33,430 and I'm leading off with a picture that should remind you 927 00:56:33,430 --> 00:56:36,530 of the lecture of last time, which is this trade-off 928 00:56:36,530 --> 00:56:37,030 between-- 929 00:56:40,300 --> 00:56:45,280 potentially between growth and levels and also 930 00:56:45,280 --> 00:56:47,560 the variability of growth. 931 00:56:50,380 --> 00:56:59,070 In this case, at low levels of income, 932 00:56:59,070 --> 00:57:01,950 you have higher variability, which 933 00:57:01,950 --> 00:57:07,060 is kind of a fact that seems to be true in the data. 934 00:57:07,060 --> 00:57:09,900 However, this is a model-generated path 935 00:57:09,900 --> 00:57:15,540 in which over time, per-capita income is going to be changing, 936 00:57:15,540 --> 00:57:17,670 and from those points on, is going 937 00:57:17,670 --> 00:57:20,460 to change the statistics of the model 938 00:57:20,460 --> 00:57:24,930 in terms of expected future growth and the variance 939 00:57:24,930 --> 00:57:27,040 of the growth. 940 00:57:27,040 --> 00:57:29,830 So how does this model work? 941 00:57:29,830 --> 00:57:34,240 Well it is-- this one is forward-looking. 942 00:57:34,240 --> 00:57:37,440 So households don't just care about today and tomorrow, 943 00:57:37,440 --> 00:57:43,150 they care about the discounted expected future, 944 00:57:43,150 --> 00:57:46,860 and they care about, in this case, the log of consumption 945 00:57:46,860 --> 00:57:49,120 at every date. 946 00:57:49,120 --> 00:57:51,550 In a minute we're going to talk about some-- only 947 00:57:51,550 --> 00:57:53,730 slightly more general power functions. 948 00:57:53,730 --> 00:58:01,150 Beta is the discount rate, and we're 949 00:58:01,150 --> 00:58:05,230 going to simplify sectors and occupation choices, 950 00:58:05,230 --> 00:58:12,790 almost like telling the usual riskless and risky asset. 951 00:58:12,790 --> 00:58:15,490 Rather than thinking of them as occupations, 952 00:58:15,490 --> 00:58:17,150 there's a riskless asset. 953 00:58:17,150 --> 00:58:21,250 So when you invest at t minus 1 a certain amount, 954 00:58:21,250 --> 00:58:26,850 you get delta times that amount back in the following period. 955 00:58:26,850 --> 00:58:32,470 A constant rate of return, and the risky technology 956 00:58:32,470 --> 00:58:37,261 when you invest at the amount i at t minus 1, 957 00:58:37,261 --> 00:58:43,290 you get it back plus or minus 2 components. 958 00:58:43,290 --> 00:58:46,780 There's an aggregate shock, theta t, no i on it. 959 00:58:46,780 --> 00:58:50,200 It's common across every household. 960 00:58:50,200 --> 00:58:52,360 It's like aggregate risk. 961 00:58:52,360 --> 00:58:54,790 And there's an epsilon, which does have-- 962 00:58:58,100 --> 00:59:00,980 this is household j, sorry, not i. 963 00:59:00,980 --> 00:59:03,310 i as investment, j is household. 964 00:59:03,310 --> 00:59:06,160 This epsilon j is the idiosyncratic shock 965 00:59:06,160 --> 00:59:09,640 that's hitting household j, and definitely 966 00:59:09,640 --> 00:59:11,980 different across different households. 967 00:59:16,240 --> 00:59:21,810 So if you're lucky enough or you've 968 00:59:21,810 --> 00:59:30,240 paid the money to be in the club of the financial intermediary, 969 00:59:30,240 --> 00:59:33,130 there's an advantage-- 970 00:59:33,130 --> 00:59:36,120 two advantages, actually. 971 00:59:36,120 --> 00:59:42,790 Information and pooling of idiosyncratic risk. 972 00:59:42,790 --> 00:59:49,860 So the return you get at t minus 1 for carrying stuff over 973 00:59:49,860 --> 00:59:55,230 is the maximum, largely, of either the safe return 974 00:59:55,230 --> 00:59:56,880 or the risky return. 975 00:59:56,880 --> 01:00:00,120 But the risky return isn't risky anymore. 976 01:00:00,120 --> 01:00:03,240 This model goes too far, you see it perfectly in advance, 977 01:00:03,240 --> 01:00:06,410 so you can kind of pick off what to do. 978 01:00:06,410 --> 01:00:10,610 It's an extreme version of intermediaries 979 01:00:10,610 --> 01:00:13,610 have an information advantage and they can advise clients 980 01:00:13,610 --> 01:00:16,430 because they have that advantage. 981 01:00:19,790 --> 01:00:22,040 Well not quite, there's kind of an intermediation 982 01:00:22,040 --> 01:00:24,900 cost and that's gamma. 983 01:00:24,900 --> 01:00:28,260 So this is a wedge, this is in inefficiency-- 984 01:00:28,260 --> 01:00:33,210 it's not modeled in a deep way, but it uses up resources. 985 01:00:33,210 --> 01:00:36,010 And we'll come back to that momentarily. 986 01:00:36,010 --> 01:00:40,390 And the other thing is, it's costly to get 987 01:00:40,390 --> 01:00:46,600 into the investment club, and it cost basically alpha. 988 01:00:46,600 --> 01:00:51,090 Not the alpha of the previous slide, just some new number. 989 01:00:51,090 --> 01:00:53,950 There's perfect competition among financial intermediaries, 990 01:00:53,950 --> 01:00:57,100 they might be tempted to try to make profits, 991 01:00:57,100 --> 01:00:58,840 but they're going to be driven down 992 01:00:58,840 --> 01:01:02,440 to basically making people pay the fixed cost 993 01:01:02,440 --> 01:01:05,350 to enter the financial system at the true cost 994 01:01:05,350 --> 01:01:11,520 and to give them a return that exactly covers the wedge 995 01:01:11,520 --> 01:01:14,440 and is otherwise equal to the real rate of return 996 01:01:14,440 --> 01:01:16,080 on the investment. 997 01:01:16,080 --> 01:01:17,860 So where did the epsilon go? 998 01:01:21,247 --> 01:01:22,330 I said they got the risk-- 999 01:01:25,340 --> 01:01:27,740 I didn't quite say it right. 1000 01:01:27,740 --> 01:01:30,830 You get the risky thing for sure, 1001 01:01:30,830 --> 01:01:34,910 not only because theta, but because these epsilons 1002 01:01:34,910 --> 01:01:36,320 disappear. 1003 01:01:36,320 --> 01:01:38,900 And the epsilons are pooling across 1004 01:01:38,900 --> 01:01:40,440 many, many, many households. 1005 01:01:40,440 --> 01:01:44,330 It's IID, essentially, so it goes to 0 1006 01:01:44,330 --> 01:01:46,020 as you have more and more households. 1007 01:01:46,020 --> 01:01:49,620 So it's like a mutual fund. 1008 01:01:49,620 --> 01:01:52,820 It's not just a bank with fixed borrowing, 1009 01:01:52,820 --> 01:01:53,960 it's more like equity. 1010 01:01:57,390 --> 01:01:59,370 You put your money in the bank, it 1011 01:01:59,370 --> 01:02:03,120 gets kind of the average return on the bank's portfolio, 1012 01:02:03,120 --> 01:02:05,910 you might want to borrow some to finance investment, 1013 01:02:05,910 --> 01:02:07,597 but that's kind of separate. 1014 01:02:11,580 --> 01:02:13,810 So this looks like a discrete choice problem. 1015 01:02:18,860 --> 01:02:25,190 And if you bear with me, It's not as bad as it may seem. 1016 01:02:25,190 --> 01:02:27,980 Suppose at day t, you've already made the decision 1017 01:02:27,980 --> 01:02:31,620 to keep yourself out of the financial system. 1018 01:02:31,620 --> 01:02:34,520 So then you have a value function 1019 01:02:34,520 --> 01:02:38,670 that depends on your wealth, which is not 1020 01:02:38,670 --> 01:02:42,720 b here, but k at day t, and you're going 1021 01:02:42,720 --> 01:02:44,220 to decide what to do with that. 1022 01:02:44,220 --> 01:02:49,140 You can save some of it, and the difference between what you had 1023 01:02:49,140 --> 01:02:52,160 and what you save, you eat. 1024 01:02:52,160 --> 01:02:58,945 And the amount that you save, you get to put into-- 1025 01:03:04,080 --> 01:03:07,200 some fraction into the risky thing and some fraction 1026 01:03:07,200 --> 01:03:08,670 into the safe thing. 1027 01:03:08,670 --> 01:03:11,400 Now you're not in the bank by the decision 1028 01:03:11,400 --> 01:03:13,890 here, so you're definitely going to be experiencing 1029 01:03:13,890 --> 01:03:17,056 this idiosyncratic risk. 1030 01:03:17,056 --> 01:03:24,730 It may make the save return more attractive, but we'll see. 1031 01:03:24,730 --> 01:03:32,060 OK, so then the next period rolls around, 1032 01:03:32,060 --> 01:03:34,050 and then at the very, very beginning, 1033 01:03:34,050 --> 01:03:36,030 you kind of get to decide whether to join 1034 01:03:36,030 --> 01:03:39,410 the financial system or not at that date. 1035 01:03:39,410 --> 01:03:43,510 You're forward-looking. 1036 01:03:43,510 --> 01:03:49,470 So the value to, say, not joining the financial system 1037 01:03:49,470 --> 01:03:52,800 is this W that was over here. 1038 01:03:52,800 --> 01:03:57,300 W means withdrawn or not participating. 1039 01:03:57,300 --> 01:04:00,300 But if you do decide to join, you're 1040 01:04:00,300 --> 01:04:04,560 going to get the other branch, the value of participating, 1041 01:04:04,560 --> 01:04:10,340 and that's basically going to be something called V. However, 1042 01:04:10,340 --> 01:04:14,040 not quite V, because that instant that you join, 1043 01:04:14,040 --> 01:04:16,700 you're going to have to subtract off those fixed costs q. 1044 01:04:19,560 --> 01:04:23,190 And in this model, it's once and never more, actually. 1045 01:04:23,190 --> 01:04:27,520 Once you pay to be in, you stay in forever. 1046 01:04:27,520 --> 01:04:31,200 So this could have been a simpler slide in the sense 1047 01:04:31,200 --> 01:04:34,170 that once you join and you join the V branch, 1048 01:04:34,170 --> 01:04:38,700 you'll never again have to choose to withdraw, 1049 01:04:38,700 --> 01:04:40,860 you'll just stay in the financial system-- you reap 1050 01:04:40,860 --> 01:04:44,908 all the advantages of information and risk pooling 1051 01:04:44,908 --> 01:04:46,200 and there's no reason to leave. 1052 01:04:46,200 --> 01:04:51,650 You'd have to change this model to get disintermediation. 1053 01:04:51,650 --> 01:04:55,970 But the focus here was on increasing intermediation. 1054 01:05:01,810 --> 01:05:07,220 So this is probably something you've seen-- 1055 01:05:07,220 --> 01:05:08,990 I'm not quite so sure what you've 1056 01:05:08,990 --> 01:05:10,640 had in your other courses. 1057 01:05:10,640 --> 01:05:12,890 This is a dynamic discrete choice model. 1058 01:05:17,400 --> 01:05:26,240 And basically, you have this value function W 1059 01:05:26,240 --> 01:05:27,560 for low wealth. 1060 01:05:27,560 --> 01:05:30,078 It's the highest curve, and then you 1061 01:05:30,078 --> 01:05:31,370 say, no, well this is above it. 1062 01:05:31,370 --> 01:05:35,030 No, not really, because at the instant you join, 1063 01:05:35,030 --> 01:05:37,320 you have to subtract q. 1064 01:05:37,320 --> 01:05:40,740 So you take this V and subtract q off 1065 01:05:40,740 --> 01:05:43,780 of the capital level that brings the whole curve down. 1066 01:05:43,780 --> 01:05:46,490 So where these-- to this. 1067 01:05:46,490 --> 01:05:49,520 So where this thing crosses, that's 1068 01:05:49,520 --> 01:05:51,820 kind of the key entry point. 1069 01:05:51,820 --> 01:05:56,090 At k at 15, given the way I've drawn these curves, 1070 01:05:56,090 --> 01:05:58,790 to the left of 15, you won't be participating, 1071 01:05:58,790 --> 01:06:00,590 and to the right a 15, you will be. 1072 01:06:03,480 --> 01:06:06,040 Now remember, there's not a whole lot of heterogeneity 1073 01:06:06,040 --> 01:06:09,370 either, sort of wealth is the key unique state 1074 01:06:09,370 --> 01:06:11,390 variable at the beginning of the period, 1075 01:06:11,390 --> 01:06:15,970 so wealth alone is going to predict if the model is 1076 01:06:15,970 --> 01:06:21,340 accurate, whether or not you're in the financial system, 1077 01:06:21,340 --> 01:06:23,520 and I'll come back to that. 1078 01:06:23,520 --> 01:06:29,860 Here, here are these savings functions and portfolio 1079 01:06:29,860 --> 01:06:32,540 choices, and 15-- 1080 01:06:32,540 --> 01:06:36,725 or I guess I said this is kind of the key mark. 1081 01:06:39,250 --> 01:06:42,940 One thing that makes sense is the dynamics, which is you're 1082 01:06:42,940 --> 01:06:48,070 saving up more and more in advance for this eventual entry 1083 01:06:48,070 --> 01:06:50,530 into the financial system. 1084 01:06:50,530 --> 01:06:52,600 Exactly when you will go in depends 1085 01:06:52,600 --> 01:06:54,640 on the sequence of shocks that you experience, 1086 01:06:54,640 --> 01:06:58,120 and you may experience setbacks that push your wealth down 1087 01:06:58,120 --> 01:07:00,790 even though ex ante your investment decision made sense. 1088 01:07:00,790 --> 01:07:02,950 But kind of slowly over time, there's 1089 01:07:02,950 --> 01:07:07,530 this pressure moving off to the right. 1090 01:07:07,530 --> 01:07:11,272 So it makes-- but there's discounting, right? 1091 01:07:11,272 --> 01:07:13,230 So you don't want to save up too much early on, 1092 01:07:13,230 --> 01:07:15,000 you kind of want to be close, and then you 1093 01:07:15,000 --> 01:07:16,830 don't want to take all that fixed cost out 1094 01:07:16,830 --> 01:07:21,870 of your wealth at that date, you save up to finance it. 1095 01:07:21,870 --> 01:07:26,580 This is unexpected ex ante. 1096 01:07:26,580 --> 01:07:31,500 So the closer you get, the riskier you go. 1097 01:07:31,500 --> 01:07:34,260 So you would think people who can't 1098 01:07:34,260 --> 01:07:36,810 diversify outside the financial system would 1099 01:07:36,810 --> 01:07:38,820 be doing the safe thing. 1100 01:07:38,820 --> 01:07:43,050 But actually, this fixed cost is creating a non-convexity. 1101 01:07:43,050 --> 01:07:44,670 If you remember way back when you 1102 01:07:44,670 --> 01:07:49,060 see Friedman and Savage, sort of that utility function 1103 01:07:49,060 --> 01:07:53,160 which is not concave everywhere, well you've got two branches. 1104 01:07:53,160 --> 01:07:56,310 You've got this value function for participating 1105 01:07:56,310 --> 01:07:59,010 and the value function for not participating. 1106 01:07:59,010 --> 01:08:03,010 And in principle, they kind of cross like a butterfly, right? 1107 01:08:03,010 --> 01:08:08,010 So then you're getting this non-concave part in the middle, 1108 01:08:08,010 --> 01:08:12,480 and that's creating this kind of risk behavior where they start 1109 01:08:12,480 --> 01:08:15,480 doing riskier or risky things that kind of span-- 1110 01:08:15,480 --> 01:08:18,090 take a chance of grabbing the brass ring 1111 01:08:18,090 --> 01:08:22,620 and bootstrapping up to a higher level. 1112 01:08:22,620 --> 01:08:24,120 We didn't see that coming. 1113 01:08:24,120 --> 01:08:28,590 Actually, those diagrams look like they paced smoothly 1114 01:08:28,590 --> 01:08:31,950 into one another in those value functions. 1115 01:08:31,950 --> 01:08:37,130 That's after this randomization is going on. 1116 01:08:37,130 --> 01:08:38,899 Otherwise-- and so the butterfly kind of 1117 01:08:38,899 --> 01:08:43,760 disappears, but only after this randomization. 1118 01:08:55,420 --> 01:09:00,810 So let me just say a few more in terms of the actual functional 1119 01:09:00,810 --> 01:09:02,310 forms. 1120 01:09:02,310 --> 01:09:07,250 Constant relative risk aversion of essentially degree sigma. 1121 01:09:07,250 --> 01:09:10,319 Beta, I said, was the discount rate. 1122 01:09:10,319 --> 01:09:15,090 Sorry, this is now xi rather than theta. 1123 01:09:15,090 --> 01:09:18,569 But in any event, we have to specify-- 1124 01:09:18,569 --> 01:09:21,300 and they're uniformly distributed-- again, 1125 01:09:21,300 --> 01:09:24,840 not my favorite choice anymore. 1126 01:09:24,840 --> 01:09:26,640 If something is uniformly distributed, 1127 01:09:26,640 --> 01:09:29,380 you have to have an upper and lower bound. 1128 01:09:29,380 --> 01:09:33,600 So we have picked up two more parameters for the epsilon 1129 01:09:33,600 --> 01:09:43,890 distribution, and even something for the risky distribution. 1130 01:09:57,440 --> 01:10:01,700 So discrete choice-- d for, I guess, discrete choice, 1131 01:10:01,700 --> 01:10:03,380 basically you're going to enter or not 1132 01:10:03,380 --> 01:10:06,470 enter depending on whether your value of participating 1133 01:10:06,470 --> 01:10:10,160 is higher than not participating and vice versa. 1134 01:10:10,160 --> 01:10:13,100 The model that those parameters is 1135 01:10:13,100 --> 01:10:17,270 going to give you the k star, which, again in the example, 1136 01:10:17,270 --> 01:10:19,010 was 15. 1137 01:10:19,010 --> 01:10:22,880 In general, k star is going to depend on this-- 1138 01:10:22,880 --> 01:10:27,440 all these list of parameters, and this list of parameters-- 1139 01:10:27,440 --> 01:10:33,080 the fixed cost, the discount rate, aversion and utility, 1140 01:10:33,080 --> 01:10:35,840 the wedge in intermediation, the upper 1141 01:10:35,840 --> 01:10:39,770 and lower bounds on those distributions, 1142 01:10:39,770 --> 01:10:41,390 all of those things-- 1143 01:10:41,390 --> 01:10:45,760 theta for GI-- basically determine k star. 1144 01:10:45,760 --> 01:10:54,830 And k star is going to determine whether you at a given wealth 1145 01:10:54,830 --> 01:10:56,600 choose to enter or not enter. 1146 01:10:56,600 --> 01:11:00,110 So I'll skip this, but basically there's 1147 01:11:00,110 --> 01:11:03,500 a complicated way in which the parameters 1148 01:11:03,500 --> 01:11:06,620 of the model through the lens of the model 1149 01:11:06,620 --> 01:11:12,030 are generating this sort of threshold value. 1150 01:11:12,030 --> 01:11:17,610 And likewise, therefore, you can imagine, if at a given wealth, 1151 01:11:17,610 --> 01:11:20,190 you kind of see the fractions participating and not 1152 01:11:20,190 --> 01:11:23,040 participating in the cross-section, 1153 01:11:23,040 --> 01:11:28,380 that you would be able to sort of invert things 1154 01:11:28,380 --> 01:11:31,180 and estimate these parameters. 1155 01:11:31,180 --> 01:11:34,650 It's a bit tricky because that theta, the level 1156 01:11:34,650 --> 01:11:37,120 of the aggregate shock kind of matters, 1157 01:11:37,120 --> 01:11:39,690 so we have to integrate up over that, too. 1158 01:11:39,690 --> 01:11:44,660 But when we do the estimation using a socioeconomic survey, 1159 01:11:44,660 --> 01:11:48,150 the papers online, we ended up estimating-- 1160 01:11:48,150 --> 01:11:52,080 and actually, comfortingly, a lot of the parameters 1161 01:11:52,080 --> 01:11:53,040 make sense. 1162 01:11:53,040 --> 01:11:56,640 The discount rate's close to 1, but not exactly. 1163 01:11:56,640 --> 01:12:01,890 A degree of risk aversion is like almost the log case 1164 01:12:01,890 --> 01:12:06,600 and the depreciation rate was 4% and so on and so forth, 1165 01:12:06,600 --> 01:12:07,730 quite remarkable. 1166 01:12:07,730 --> 01:12:08,230 Yes? 1167 01:12:08,230 --> 01:12:10,640 AUDIENCE: And so is that-- am I reading this correctly? 1168 01:12:10,640 --> 01:12:12,140 Is that gamma was estimated to be 1? 1169 01:12:15,132 --> 01:12:16,590 ROBERT TOWNSEND: In this case, yes. 1170 01:12:16,590 --> 01:12:17,132 AUDIENCE: OK. 1171 01:12:17,132 --> 01:12:19,720 So with that imply efficient-- like there's no wedge? 1172 01:12:19,720 --> 01:12:22,250 ROBERT TOWNSEND: Yeah, no wedge. 1173 01:12:22,250 --> 01:12:25,871 Yeah, that-- I'll come back to that momentarily. 1174 01:12:33,970 --> 01:12:36,100 So again, we can simulate the model-- 1175 01:12:36,100 --> 01:12:42,910 and under various estimated or robustness checks, 1176 01:12:42,910 --> 01:12:44,560 parameter values-- 1177 01:12:44,560 --> 01:12:47,050 to get the growth rate, the participation rate, 1178 01:12:47,050 --> 01:12:52,000 and the tile index of inequality. 1179 01:12:52,000 --> 01:12:55,220 Now one caution on the growth rate, 1180 01:12:55,220 --> 01:12:57,580 and I always have to check to make sure-- 1181 01:12:57,580 --> 01:13:00,850 this model has aggregate shocks. 1182 01:13:00,850 --> 01:13:04,040 So if you integrate out over the expected shocks, 1183 01:13:04,040 --> 01:13:05,790 you're going to get a smoother growth rate 1184 01:13:05,790 --> 01:13:08,340 path than in the actual data. 1185 01:13:08,340 --> 01:13:09,855 And what is it that I have to check? 1186 01:13:09,855 --> 01:13:11,730 I always have to go back and see whether this 1187 01:13:11,730 --> 01:13:15,030 was one where we use simulated values of theta 1188 01:13:15,030 --> 01:13:16,755 or we took the average over those thetas. 1189 01:13:19,640 --> 01:13:23,000 We missed this upturn here and the growth rate, 1190 01:13:23,000 --> 01:13:26,180 and that's related to the fact that financial participation 1191 01:13:26,180 --> 01:13:28,530 goes flat right here. 1192 01:13:28,530 --> 01:13:31,180 This model's great at the trends. 1193 01:13:31,180 --> 01:13:36,240 It gives you this very smooth, ever-increasing participation 1194 01:13:36,240 --> 01:13:39,120 in the financial system, and actually, it 1195 01:13:39,120 --> 01:13:42,060 gives you for a while a good shot 1196 01:13:42,060 --> 01:13:46,140 at the increasing inequality as those firms made 1197 01:13:46,140 --> 01:13:50,300 a lot more money, but it misses the downturn. 1198 01:13:50,300 --> 01:13:52,070 In fact, there are no real prices, 1199 01:13:52,070 --> 01:13:54,230 there's nothing like a wage or an interest rate, 1200 01:13:54,230 --> 01:13:56,060 that's a defect. 1201 01:13:56,060 --> 01:14:01,640 And so it's almost like a linear world, in some sense, 1202 01:14:01,640 --> 01:14:04,470 and we can't get inequality to go down in this model, 1203 01:14:04,470 --> 01:14:07,850 but we can get the trends right for a while. 1204 01:14:07,850 --> 01:14:10,150 This participation thing is going 1205 01:14:10,150 --> 01:14:12,620 to bring me back to the wedge. 1206 01:14:20,570 --> 01:14:22,780 So what do we do? 1207 01:14:22,780 --> 01:14:28,650 We're going to do a policy experiment, basically. 1208 01:14:35,830 --> 01:14:40,060 We look at the government's control of the banking system 1209 01:14:40,060 --> 01:14:43,610 in terms of the ratio of credit. 1210 01:14:43,610 --> 01:14:45,950 It's moving around a bit, but essentially it's flat, 1211 01:14:45,950 --> 01:14:48,380 it goes up, and then it comes down again. 1212 01:14:48,380 --> 01:14:51,830 This is the liberalization and this is the retrenchment 1213 01:14:51,830 --> 01:14:53,960 that happened before it. 1214 01:14:53,960 --> 01:15:00,100 So what we do is, we vary that parameter gamma. 1215 01:15:00,100 --> 01:15:03,297 It's not going to be costless intermediation. 1216 01:15:03,297 --> 01:15:04,880 In fact, we're going to subtract off-- 1217 01:15:04,880 --> 01:15:11,410 I think it was something like 3% or 4% 1218 01:15:11,410 --> 01:15:14,470 when the intermediation is being done by government banks. 1219 01:15:17,150 --> 01:15:20,970 And we don't change the model otherwise. 1220 01:15:20,970 --> 01:15:27,270 And amazingly, we get this almost perfectly right. 1221 01:15:27,270 --> 01:15:32,250 So we can actually get the slowdown in the economy 1222 01:15:32,250 --> 01:15:37,740 as a function of this, quote, bad policy experiment where 1223 01:15:37,740 --> 01:15:40,380 the government, for one reason or another, 1224 01:15:40,380 --> 01:15:42,840 essentially took over the banking system. 1225 01:15:42,840 --> 01:15:48,930 By the way, we don't do very well with growth differences 1226 01:15:48,930 --> 01:15:53,930 even after liberalization, and we can-- 1227 01:15:53,930 --> 01:15:57,670 and the reason is partly because, at least through 1228 01:15:57,670 --> 01:16:00,580 the lens of OLS regressions, it's-- 1229 01:16:00,580 --> 01:16:02,830 I've alluded to this before-- 1230 01:16:02,830 --> 01:16:04,540 it's just basically junk. 1231 01:16:04,540 --> 01:16:07,600 I mean, it's not a stationary model. 1232 01:16:07,600 --> 01:16:09,070 The decision rules are stationary, 1233 01:16:09,070 --> 01:16:12,420 but aggregates like growth rates are not. 1234 01:16:12,420 --> 01:16:15,970 And you can use this value functions 1235 01:16:15,970 --> 01:16:19,330 to back out the welfare gains. 1236 01:16:19,330 --> 01:16:21,020 There are a number of ways to do that. 1237 01:16:21,020 --> 01:16:23,110 One thing we could do is just surprise people. 1238 01:16:23,110 --> 01:16:26,470 They think the banking system is going to stay restricted, 1239 01:16:26,470 --> 01:16:28,900 and they've made their dynamic plans, 1240 01:16:28,900 --> 01:16:33,757 and then we surprise them and liberalize. 1241 01:16:33,757 --> 01:16:36,340 And they're better off, and we can calculate through the value 1242 01:16:36,340 --> 01:16:38,500 functions. 1243 01:16:38,500 --> 01:16:40,150 It's a bit complicated and I'm not 1244 01:16:40,150 --> 01:16:41,775 going to take you through these slides, 1245 01:16:41,775 --> 01:16:45,170 but the welfare gains can be quite large. 1246 01:16:45,170 --> 01:16:47,530 Now we can imagine surprising them, 1247 01:16:47,530 --> 01:16:50,980 like varying that wedge or varying the fixed cost and it 1248 01:16:50,980 --> 01:16:55,810 actually matters a bit, and we can take this model to Mexico 1249 01:16:55,810 --> 01:17:02,640 and it does pretty well with the trend of the growth rate, 1250 01:17:02,640 --> 01:17:10,480 but around 1992, Mexico had yet another crisis. 1251 01:17:10,480 --> 01:17:14,280 And not surprising, this model is just very ill-equipped 1252 01:17:14,280 --> 01:17:17,550 to handle that kind of stuff. 1253 01:17:17,550 --> 01:17:20,190 Actually, things started going better 1254 01:17:20,190 --> 01:17:23,130 with Vicente Fox around 2002. 1255 01:17:23,130 --> 01:17:27,810 We could restart the model over here and it will do well. 1256 01:17:27,810 --> 01:17:30,930 But it's not going to explain-- 1257 01:17:30,930 --> 01:17:33,810 this is why Mexico is still poor. 1258 01:17:33,810 --> 01:17:35,880 I mean, they go upstairs, they go upstairs, 1259 01:17:35,880 --> 01:17:37,410 and then they fall down again. 1260 01:17:37,410 --> 01:17:40,925 And they've been doing this since the early '80s, you know? 1261 01:17:40,925 --> 01:17:43,050 Now hopefully they're not going to fall down again. 1262 01:17:43,050 --> 01:17:44,850 But the model-- 1263 01:17:44,850 --> 01:17:46,920 I promised you shortcomings, right? 1264 01:17:46,920 --> 01:17:52,620 This model is not designed to get at sudden stops or things 1265 01:17:52,620 --> 01:17:53,750 along that line. 1266 01:18:01,490 --> 01:18:08,020 So the last thing I want to show you quickly 1267 01:18:08,020 --> 01:18:13,450 is another kind of experiment. 1268 01:18:13,450 --> 01:18:15,640 Instead of going to a new country like Mexico, 1269 01:18:15,640 --> 01:18:19,210 we started to look interior to the country of Thailand. 1270 01:18:19,210 --> 01:18:24,510 This is a picture of basically wealth 1271 01:18:24,510 --> 01:18:27,550 using a principal component. 1272 01:18:27,550 --> 01:18:29,380 You can see in and around Bangkok 1273 01:18:29,380 --> 01:18:31,840 and going north to Chiang Mai-- 1274 01:18:31,840 --> 01:18:35,380 the wealth corridor, if you want, of the country, 1275 01:18:35,380 --> 01:18:40,180 these green things are the provinces of my survey. 1276 01:18:40,180 --> 01:18:44,560 And looking at them again, you can actually 1277 01:18:44,560 --> 01:18:47,125 see where the villages are, you can see the road network, 1278 01:18:47,125 --> 01:18:52,340 at least on major highways, you can see the district centers. 1279 01:18:52,340 --> 01:18:55,850 And I promised I would ask you this. 1280 01:18:55,850 --> 01:18:57,560 I mentioned it before. 1281 01:18:57,560 --> 01:19:01,310 If you have an interest in going through some of the GIS 1282 01:19:01,310 --> 01:19:05,360 capabilities, I'm more than happy to schedule 1283 01:19:05,360 --> 01:19:07,490 an extra session. 1284 01:19:07,490 --> 01:19:09,400 I have to check my GIS person. 1285 01:19:09,400 --> 01:19:11,110 I see some of you shaking your heads. 1286 01:19:11,110 --> 01:19:14,320 You don't all have to go, so that's enough for me. 1287 01:19:14,320 --> 01:19:17,770 So let me check with her and maybe we can possibly 1288 01:19:17,770 --> 01:19:21,970 do that Friday of next week, but it 1289 01:19:21,970 --> 01:19:24,790 would be over and above the regular recitation section. 1290 01:19:27,730 --> 01:19:30,760 And so here is a picture of where 1291 01:19:30,760 --> 01:19:33,190 the businesses are in Thailand. 1292 01:19:35,800 --> 01:19:40,000 And through this GIS, something called the Moran, 1293 01:19:40,000 --> 01:19:44,500 you can see whether areas, which have high levels of enterprise, 1294 01:19:44,500 --> 01:19:49,840 are surrounded by other areas with high levels of enterprise 1295 01:19:49,840 --> 01:19:53,230 or low levels surrounded by low. 1296 01:19:53,230 --> 01:19:59,695 And so you see this quite salient geographic picture. 1297 01:20:02,290 --> 01:20:13,660 And here, we took levels of enterprise in 1986 1298 01:20:13,660 --> 01:20:17,410 and looked at the growth rate of enterprise 1299 01:20:17,410 --> 01:20:22,570 between 1986 and 1996. 1300 01:20:22,570 --> 01:20:26,550 This area in here, the colors are a bit pale-- 1301 01:20:26,550 --> 01:20:28,430 it doesn't come out too well-- 1302 01:20:28,430 --> 01:20:30,700 are areas of convergence in the sense 1303 01:20:30,700 --> 01:20:32,830 that they started at high levels but then they 1304 01:20:32,830 --> 01:20:33,925 shrink to lower levels. 1305 01:20:37,520 --> 01:20:40,910 This area around it, though, these reds, those 1306 01:20:40,910 --> 01:20:42,500 are areas of agglomeration. 1307 01:20:42,500 --> 01:20:45,550 They have high levels and high growth rates. 1308 01:20:45,550 --> 01:20:51,140 There's an ever-increasing concentration of enterprise. 1309 01:20:51,140 --> 01:20:56,660 These pink areas are catch-up areas along the corridor which 1310 01:20:56,660 --> 01:21:00,980 had low levels, and now they're gaining a lot of enterprise. 1311 01:21:00,980 --> 01:21:04,910 And these blue areas out here are kind of like the boonies. 1312 01:21:04,910 --> 01:21:09,070 They have low levels and low growth rates. 1313 01:21:09,070 --> 01:21:11,130 So it's not a uniform picture. 1314 01:21:11,130 --> 01:21:15,030 In fact, you can take this down to the provinces 1315 01:21:15,030 --> 01:21:19,980 and look in the data at the areas of agglomeration 1316 01:21:19,980 --> 01:21:26,040 and relative low levels, and then that 1317 01:21:26,040 --> 01:21:27,960 looks like almost the same picture. 1318 01:21:27,960 --> 01:21:30,900 That's a model-generated picture. 1319 01:21:30,900 --> 01:21:35,610 So we actually projected-- took Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt 1320 01:21:35,610 --> 01:21:39,090 and projected it down at the village level, 1321 01:21:39,090 --> 01:21:41,760 and here you can see agglomeration. 1322 01:21:41,760 --> 01:21:45,040 It's not exactly identical. 1323 01:21:45,040 --> 01:21:47,790 There are certain predictions in the model 1324 01:21:47,790 --> 01:21:51,990 that don't happen in the data, but largely 1325 01:21:51,990 --> 01:21:54,620 these sort of favorable areas-- 1326 01:21:54,620 --> 01:21:58,200 a subset of the candidate of favorable areas 1327 01:21:58,200 --> 01:22:01,140 are the ones that actually start growing like crazy in Thailand. 1328 01:22:04,140 --> 01:22:07,810 And here at that same level is Greenwood in Jovanovic. 1329 01:22:11,130 --> 01:22:14,490 And here, these red areas are areas 1330 01:22:14,490 --> 01:22:17,700 where the model overpredicts the data, 1331 01:22:17,700 --> 01:22:19,980 and the green areas are places where 1332 01:22:19,980 --> 01:22:21,480 the model is underpredicting. 1333 01:22:21,480 --> 01:22:24,150 In other words, these red areas, which turn out 1334 01:22:24,150 --> 01:22:28,630 to be the same urban areas, Greenwood and Jovanovic 1335 01:22:28,630 --> 01:22:32,460 is predicting they should have more banks than they actually 1336 01:22:32,460 --> 01:22:34,680 do. 1337 01:22:34,680 --> 01:22:37,020 So in some sense, even though they're higher wealth, 1338 01:22:37,020 --> 01:22:40,930 they're underserved relative to what the model would predict. 1339 01:22:40,930 --> 01:22:44,280 And these green areas, those are areas 1340 01:22:44,280 --> 01:22:48,660 where there's more access to credit than Greenwood 1341 01:22:48,660 --> 01:22:50,360 and Jovanovic would predict. 1342 01:22:50,360 --> 01:22:53,340 Now it turns out this story has to do 1343 01:22:53,340 --> 01:22:56,250 with the interplay between commercial banks 1344 01:22:56,250 --> 01:23:00,210 that operate in urban areas and the bank for agriculture which 1345 01:23:00,210 --> 01:23:02,220 is operating in rural areas, and we'll 1346 01:23:02,220 --> 01:23:06,340 come back to that in the last lecture of the class. 1347 01:23:06,340 --> 01:23:10,200 So I'm done, essentially. 1348 01:23:10,200 --> 01:23:13,380 I'll just point you to the rest of the slides. 1349 01:23:13,380 --> 01:23:18,660 Basically we did kind of a rigorous comparison 1350 01:23:18,660 --> 01:23:23,940 of the successes and the failures. 1351 01:23:23,940 --> 01:23:26,100 So you can actually go through each of the models 1352 01:23:26,100 --> 01:23:29,700 and see on which data which model's doing well 1353 01:23:29,700 --> 01:23:34,950 and which data models are doing poorly, 1354 01:23:34,950 --> 01:23:39,240 which feeds into the issue of model selection 1355 01:23:39,240 --> 01:23:40,810 and next steps in the research. 1356 01:23:40,810 --> 01:23:45,680 So OK, with that, I'm slightly two minutes beyond.