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PROFESSOR: We have
the privilege today

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of hearing from
Professor Susan Silbey.

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00:00:30,300 --> 00:00:33,120
Professor Silbey
taught this class

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with Professor [? Dysart ?]
and me in the last two years.

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And she is a sociologist,
political scientist,

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anthropologist, head of
the anthropology section.

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And obviously brings a
different perspective

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to a number of these issues than
I, a poor country economist do.

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And as I said last
time, I showed

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you a little bit of the
economics of energy demand,

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and then suggested at
the end of the lecture,

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by talking about
dollars on the sidewalk

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and what picked up in energy
efficiency on the one hand,

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and people aggressively
investing in energy

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efficiency on the other hand.

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Perhaps, the notion of
tangible energy services

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wasn't quite rich enough
to explain energy demand.

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And now, it will
all be explained.

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00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:35,590
SUSAN SILBEY: Well, Hello,
it's rather a tall order.

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But we'll try.

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On Monday, Dick talked to
you about the economics

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of energy demand.

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He talked about how
demand for energy

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is derived from demand
for products and services.

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And so we talk
about it as mediated

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or derived demand, which
requires some adjustments

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in the basic economic models.

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He also mentioned, I
believe, that variations

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in derived demand depend upon
fixed capital investments, as

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well as short and
long run expectations.

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00:02:14,640 --> 00:02:20,160
And that, because of those
short and long run expectations,

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income and price
elasticities are generally

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00:02:23,250 --> 00:02:27,240
limited, unlike in other
products and services,

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and thus, constraining
the ability

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to maximize with
efficient responses.

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00:02:34,060 --> 00:02:35,940
And as Dick just
mentioned again,

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people do not always maximize
or optimize, let me say,

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their decisions.

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There's lots of
possible efficiencies

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that are not pursued.

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And he mentioned, I believe,
on Monday, the leaving

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those dollars on the sidewalk.

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Because of, perhaps,
imperfect information,

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riskiness and uncertainty
of future savings,

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could be a lot of
other reasons too.

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And as he mentioned
again, just now,

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people might be over investing.

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Now, let's think
about what that means.

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To over invest in efficiency
means, by economic models,

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you're not going to get
a specific dollar return,

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the Prius being example.

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But there might be other
reasons why people might do it.

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That is go for more efficiency
than is defined economically.

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So why do we see economically
non-optimal decisions?

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That's the $64,000 question.

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How do people act?

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Why do people do what they do?

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Why are they not, in
the economic model,

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perfectly rational actors?

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Now, it is the mission
of all of social science

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to try to describe
human behavior.

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But the explanations
that come from economics

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are not necessarily
the same that come

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from the other social sciences.

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How many of you have had
a course in economics

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before this one?

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Oh, lots of you, because it's
required for this course.

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That's right.

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But I didn't see every hand.

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I was wondering how accurate
this survey was going to be.

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How many of you have had
a political science class?

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Let me see those hands.

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I can't see, one, two,
three, four, five, six.

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How many-- oh did I
miss some over here?

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Seven, eight.

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OK, how many have
had a history class?

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Wow, that's pretty good.

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How many have had an
anthropology class?

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Zero, right?

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Oh, one, two.

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And we don't offer sociology
here for undergraduates, only

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really for graduate students.

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00:05:04,570 --> 00:05:09,830
So this-- why do
people do what they do?

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It turns out that each
of the social sciences

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has a slightly different answer.

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And so by way of, well,
for those of you who

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have had a political
science class, how is it

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different from economics?

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Nobody wants-- Yeah, Andrew?

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AUDIENCE: No, equations
and stuff like that.

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SUSAN SILBEY: Well, that
turns out not to be true.

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It just isn't in the--

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it's just not in the
undergraduate class.

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00:05:45,080 --> 00:05:46,800
There are plenty of equations.

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There are plenty of
equations in sociology, too,

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not in anthropology.

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OK, so maybe I need to do this.

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So if you think of
the social sciences

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as the study of human behavior,
there is a division of labor.

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Now, this division of labor
can be simply explained,

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but gets a little complicated
when you go into detail.

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So we might think of the
most basic and simplest

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00:06:14,570 --> 00:06:18,320
social science as
psychology, which we almost

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don't have anymore,
which is about

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what goes on inside
people's heads.

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Psychology being the
study of a person,

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and explaining what this
person does by looking inside.

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And we have various terms for
talking about what's inside

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people's heads, their desires,
we talk about the id, which

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is the desires you have, and
the ego, which is the control,

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and the notion of a
constraint on what you do.

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But then we have--

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and I would put psychology
by itself as different

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from the rest of
the social sciences.

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And then we have
sociology, which

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says that it is
interested in what

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goes on between two or more
persons, never a person alone.

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And the unit of analysis, or
the subject, is the interaction.

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Not what's in here,
but what is exchanged

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between the two of them.

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Now, some people would
say that sociology

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is the queen, because
everything follows

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from these interactions.

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Because the interactions
can take various patterns.

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So they can be interactions
about production

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and distribution.

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And then we get economics.

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If you can think about
it as the interactions

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where some people
are making things

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that other people are receiving.

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And it happens through this
thing called the market.

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Which is sort of an
invisible black box.

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Then we might have
interactions that have

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to do with force, violence.

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And when that's
concentrated, we call

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that the state who has
a monopoly of force.

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And that's what political
science studies.

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So here, we have
four social sciences

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leaving the study of the
circulation of the signs.

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This one's more complicated.

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That's probably
why only two of you

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took the classes, because you
don't understand what it is.

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But it's the circulation of the
signs and symbols among people.

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And we call that culture.

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And that's what
anthropology studies,

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the practices, and
the production,

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and circulation of signs.

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So there you have
the social sciences.

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Now, that's a very
simple, easy distinction.

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But like most things in
life, that's too simple.

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And in any place--

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oh, I forgot, you're
not supposed to.

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Oh, I forgot, I
forgot, I forgot.

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No human power here.

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OK, so we have
political science, which

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studies force and the state.

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But it overlaps
with some sociology,

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which looks at the
patterns of interactions.

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And there's something
called political sociology.

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And then some of sociology
studies production

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00:10:01,150 --> 00:10:02,350
and distribution.

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00:10:02,350 --> 00:10:05,050
And we call that
economic sociology.

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And some of economics
is now interested in how

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00:10:10,690 --> 00:10:15,490
people's desires and behaviors
affect their decision making.

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We call that
behavioral economics.

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And that overlaps with
psychology and anthropology.

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So you might just
think about what

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is actually studied as having
normal distributions that

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overlap.

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And depending--
lots of people are

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studying in these places, which
we call interdisciplinary.

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And that's how you
get a class like this.

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00:10:40,480 --> 00:10:47,650
OK, so why do people,
or how do people--

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how do people deal with
these questions about energy?

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How do they make the decisions?

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So what I'm going to try to do
today, and this is my outline,

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is to go through
some basic models,

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00:11:05,200 --> 00:11:09,430
some very general models, about
how people make decisions,

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00:11:09,430 --> 00:11:13,960
the variations and the
motives, we might say,

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00:11:13,960 --> 00:11:16,480
or the vocabularies of motive.

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I'm going to look
at some results

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00:11:19,300 --> 00:11:24,010
from cognitive science and
sociology of decision making,

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00:11:24,010 --> 00:11:26,380
going to look at
a few experiments.

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And then, maybe, we can
end, if time permits,

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00:11:29,320 --> 00:11:32,890
with some discussion
of what happens

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00:11:32,890 --> 00:11:35,590
when we focus on the
individual and the ironies

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00:11:35,590 --> 00:11:36,970
of popular psychology.

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00:11:36,970 --> 00:11:38,470
I'm not sure we'll get there.

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In future classes,
I know you are

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00:11:40,510 --> 00:11:43,480
going to discuss
decision making in firms

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00:11:43,480 --> 00:11:47,530
and organizations, which
are aggregates, patterned

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00:11:47,530 --> 00:11:48,640
aggregates.

200
00:11:48,640 --> 00:11:51,730
Not one, but the pattern
by which people are

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00:11:51,730 --> 00:11:54,350
arranged in their activities.

202
00:11:54,350 --> 00:11:56,590
Those are organizations
and firms.

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00:11:56,590 --> 00:11:59,450
And we will look at
states, or you will,

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00:11:59,450 --> 00:12:03,250
in which we make
public policies.

205
00:12:03,250 --> 00:12:10,580
So how do people make decisions?

206
00:12:10,580 --> 00:12:15,400
How do we make decisions
about right and wrong?

207
00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:17,620
What kind of car to buy?

208
00:12:17,620 --> 00:12:22,810
Why are people buying that
Prius even though they'll never

209
00:12:22,810 --> 00:12:23,875
recoup the savings?

210
00:12:29,520 --> 00:12:35,790
Why do we think that skinny
women are beautiful now?

211
00:12:35,790 --> 00:12:38,550
And 100 years ago, we
thought that heavy women

212
00:12:38,550 --> 00:12:40,380
were beautiful?

213
00:12:40,380 --> 00:12:43,616
Maybe none of you know
that that was the case?

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AUDIENCE: Advertising.

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00:12:45,270 --> 00:12:47,210
SUSAN SILBEY: OK, advertising.

216
00:12:56,250 --> 00:12:58,530
Why might that-- but what
about the advertising?

217
00:12:58,530 --> 00:13:01,350
What did the advertising say?

218
00:13:01,350 --> 00:13:03,660
And was it advertising
100 years ago?

219
00:13:06,560 --> 00:13:08,140
Yeah.

220
00:13:08,140 --> 00:13:10,930
AUDIENCE: There's
some predominately--

221
00:13:10,930 --> 00:13:12,940
fashion advertising
of the '50s and '60s

222
00:13:12,940 --> 00:13:17,185
switched from more
volumptuous sexual icon

223
00:13:17,185 --> 00:13:19,050
to something really skinny.

224
00:13:19,050 --> 00:13:20,700
There's one person
in particular named

225
00:13:20,700 --> 00:13:25,100
Twiggy who kind of became a
very famous, very skinny fashion

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00:13:25,100 --> 00:13:25,600
model.

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00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:27,370
And everyhting from
that kind of followed.

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00:13:27,370 --> 00:13:29,530
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah, but it
was in the 19th century,

229
00:13:29,530 --> 00:13:31,360
before there was advertising.

230
00:13:31,360 --> 00:13:34,014
Yes, David.

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00:13:34,014 --> 00:13:37,140
AUDIENCE: I'd say there's
also a change in the signaling

232
00:13:37,140 --> 00:13:41,440
about what you're buying.

233
00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:44,300
If you go further
back, there are

234
00:13:44,300 --> 00:13:47,680
depictions of larger, heavier
people as being wealthy,

235
00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:50,000
which is something [INAUDIBLE].

236
00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:52,120
Which was, you didn't
have to work in fields.

237
00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:53,620
You had enough to eat.

238
00:13:53,620 --> 00:13:55,975
[INAUDIBLE]

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00:13:55,975 --> 00:13:57,100
SUSAN SILBEY: That's right.

240
00:13:57,100 --> 00:14:01,840
And the signaling was,
in the 19th century,

241
00:14:01,840 --> 00:14:04,990
to have heft on you meant
you were wealthy enough

242
00:14:04,990 --> 00:14:06,010
to eat well.

243
00:14:06,010 --> 00:14:08,090
Because most people did not.

244
00:14:08,090 --> 00:14:10,520
So this is just a
little exercise.

245
00:14:10,520 --> 00:14:12,430
And this is about culture.

246
00:14:12,430 --> 00:14:16,660
This is about the circulating
signs, the signaling.

247
00:14:16,660 --> 00:14:18,820
So you've all got it.

248
00:14:18,820 --> 00:14:19,540
You got it.

249
00:14:19,540 --> 00:14:23,740
The culture encourages
us to want certain things

250
00:14:23,740 --> 00:14:26,170
to think their beautiful.

251
00:14:26,170 --> 00:14:27,550
Is there anything else?

252
00:14:27,550 --> 00:14:29,590
None of you believe--

253
00:14:29,590 --> 00:14:31,140
AUDIENCE: Education as well.

254
00:14:31,140 --> 00:14:35,300
SUSAN SILBEY: You're all so
socialized, it's fantastic.

255
00:14:35,300 --> 00:14:38,380
AUDIENCE: If we put that
slide we had up on Monday

256
00:14:38,380 --> 00:14:41,020
that showed you that you're not
going to make your money back

257
00:14:41,020 --> 00:14:43,103
from buying Prius, I think
that would deter people

258
00:14:43,103 --> 00:14:44,080
from buying them.

259
00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:48,730
And similarly with things
like obesity in the US,

260
00:14:48,730 --> 00:14:53,470
while being as skinny as
Twiggy might not be healthy,

261
00:14:53,470 --> 00:14:55,540
generally, more fit
would be more healthy

262
00:14:55,540 --> 00:14:57,620
due to the knowledge we
have now we might not

263
00:14:57,620 --> 00:14:59,470
have had 100 years ago.

264
00:14:59,470 --> 00:15:01,570
SUSAN SILBEY: That's
right, that's right.

265
00:15:01,570 --> 00:15:02,480
You've got it.

266
00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:05,860
But there's another set of
reasons people often offer.

267
00:15:05,860 --> 00:15:07,720
I'll go back.

268
00:15:07,720 --> 00:15:09,580
Well, you know
the other reasons?

269
00:15:09,580 --> 00:15:14,200
None of you have any other
reasons why we do what we do?

270
00:15:14,200 --> 00:15:17,260
Yeah, is that Matthew?

271
00:15:17,260 --> 00:15:21,050
AUDIENCE: They saw other
people doing the same thing.

272
00:15:21,050 --> 00:15:26,050
[INAUDIBLE]

273
00:15:26,050 --> 00:15:29,740
SUSAN SILBEY: These are
all sociological and

274
00:15:29,740 --> 00:15:31,090
anthropological reasons.

275
00:15:31,090 --> 00:15:34,630
And I just love it, as being
head of that department.

276
00:15:34,630 --> 00:15:38,620
But I usually get, not
necessarily in this class,

277
00:15:38,620 --> 00:15:40,970
I think you've all
learned quite well,

278
00:15:40,970 --> 00:15:46,600
many students tell me
that they are programmed

279
00:15:46,600 --> 00:15:50,320
to want and do certain things.

280
00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:52,830
And I'm so surprised
MIT students

281
00:15:52,830 --> 00:15:53,830
not coming up with that.

282
00:15:53,830 --> 00:15:57,280
Because when I teach sociology
or anthropology class,

283
00:15:57,280 --> 00:16:00,790
this is the one
that comes up first.

284
00:16:00,790 --> 00:16:02,857
None of you believe
that, anymore?

285
00:16:05,780 --> 00:16:08,902
It's not in your DNA.

286
00:16:08,902 --> 00:16:10,390
Fantastic, I love it.

287
00:16:10,390 --> 00:16:10,890
I love it.

288
00:16:13,700 --> 00:16:14,665
I think it's great.

289
00:16:18,130 --> 00:16:20,223
Yeah?

290
00:16:20,223 --> 00:16:22,390
AUDIENCE: I mean, there's
evolutionary psychologists

291
00:16:22,390 --> 00:16:26,640
who would argue that we're
attracted to certain things

292
00:16:26,640 --> 00:16:29,035
based on reproductive purposes.

293
00:16:34,270 --> 00:16:35,640
AUDIENCE: But not a Prius.

294
00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:39,210
AUDIENCE: But not a Prius.

295
00:16:39,210 --> 00:16:43,820
[INAUDIBLE] the hourglass shape.

296
00:16:43,820 --> 00:16:44,772
Wider hips.

297
00:16:49,290 --> 00:16:52,422
[INAUDIBLE]

298
00:16:52,422 --> 00:16:54,630
SUSAN SILBEY: I should have
worn something different.

299
00:16:54,630 --> 00:17:02,598
OK, all right, so what I want to
offer before we go further is.

300
00:17:02,598 --> 00:17:04,140
Oh, did you have
your hand up, David?

301
00:17:04,140 --> 00:17:07,440
AUDIENCE: I was going to say,
you posed the question why

302
00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:11,990
did the appeal change from women
that were rounder to women that

303
00:17:11,990 --> 00:17:14,928
were skinnier?

304
00:17:14,928 --> 00:17:16,470
SUSAN SILBEY: Except
for their boobs.

305
00:17:20,359 --> 00:17:22,609
AUDIENCE: So DNA
kind doesn't account

306
00:17:22,609 --> 00:17:24,979
for that, because your
DNA didn't change over

307
00:17:24,979 --> 00:17:26,910
the course of 50
years or 100 years.

308
00:17:26,910 --> 00:17:33,690
But maybe it is hardcoded
DNA is that [INAUDIBLE]

309
00:17:33,690 --> 00:17:37,920
or able to support themselves,
raise children, or whatever.

310
00:17:37,920 --> 00:17:42,870
So maybe the ideal, what
it is in the social,

311
00:17:42,870 --> 00:17:44,580
this woman is fit.

312
00:17:44,580 --> 00:17:47,160
So that means that
she's more capable?

313
00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:50,910
SUSAN SILBEY: So
maybe it's fit versus

314
00:17:50,910 --> 00:17:55,110
the specific definition of fit.

315
00:17:55,110 --> 00:17:58,650
AUDIENCE: Exactly, yeah so
part of it comes from the DNA

316
00:17:58,650 --> 00:17:59,800
that you're seeking.

317
00:17:59,800 --> 00:18:02,340
But the social kind of
defines what exactly--

318
00:18:02,340 --> 00:18:03,700
SUSAN SILBEY: That means.

319
00:18:03,700 --> 00:18:05,760
Well, that's a very
interesting observation.

320
00:18:05,760 --> 00:18:08,670
Because there's lots
of good social theory

321
00:18:08,670 --> 00:18:11,850
which suggests that
about lots of concepts.

322
00:18:11,850 --> 00:18:16,110
That many-- all
societies have some form

323
00:18:16,110 --> 00:18:21,430
of marriage system and family
system for raising children.

324
00:18:21,430 --> 00:18:28,320
So you might say that there is
a human system of reproduction

325
00:18:28,320 --> 00:18:32,130
in the social relations, in
addition to the biological.

326
00:18:32,130 --> 00:18:34,830
But, so we say there
is something called

327
00:18:34,830 --> 00:18:37,260
the institution of the family.

328
00:18:37,260 --> 00:18:40,560
But that varies from
society to society.

329
00:18:40,560 --> 00:18:43,650
And that's the same kind--
the specificity varies.

330
00:18:43,650 --> 00:18:45,660
Though there could be
something more general.

331
00:18:45,660 --> 00:18:47,340
And that's a good
introduction to what

332
00:18:47,340 --> 00:18:49,320
I want to do for a few minutes.

333
00:18:49,320 --> 00:18:55,050
Is I want to suggest to you that
there are a few general models

334
00:18:55,050 --> 00:19:00,900
of human action, which I sort
of suggested in the differences

335
00:19:00,900 --> 00:19:02,880
among the social sciences.

336
00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:06,300
And we use different
concepts and terminology

337
00:19:06,300 --> 00:19:09,900
to describe what is
observable in human behavior.

338
00:19:09,900 --> 00:19:12,060
And these social
science theories

339
00:19:12,060 --> 00:19:16,560
are not always, as Andrew
suggested at the outset,

340
00:19:16,560 --> 00:19:19,860
quantified into equations.

341
00:19:19,860 --> 00:19:23,790
That economics begins and
ends with those equations.

342
00:19:23,790 --> 00:19:26,190
The other social
sciences haven't all

343
00:19:26,190 --> 00:19:29,590
developed into equations
for most of what they do.

344
00:19:29,590 --> 00:19:32,100
But you will find it in some.

345
00:19:32,100 --> 00:19:34,290
In all of them,
there'll be some.

346
00:19:34,290 --> 00:19:38,350
So I want to show
you, for example,

347
00:19:38,350 --> 00:19:40,830
the equation you had on Monday.

348
00:19:40,830 --> 00:19:44,010
That's an economic one
about derived demand.

349
00:19:44,010 --> 00:19:48,090
Well, here's one you all
you may or may not know.

350
00:19:48,090 --> 00:19:50,220
This is one of my favorite ones.

351
00:19:50,220 --> 00:19:54,420
Because it's the field
that I'm specialist in.

352
00:19:54,420 --> 00:19:59,760
And it says that formal social
control is inversely related

353
00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:04,490
to informal social control.

354
00:20:04,490 --> 00:20:12,500
Social control is what we do to
manage other people's behavior,

355
00:20:12,500 --> 00:20:13,940
or to manage behavior.

356
00:20:13,940 --> 00:20:17,390
And formal social control
simply means government.

357
00:20:17,390 --> 00:20:19,610
And informal means
everything that's

358
00:20:19,610 --> 00:20:23,750
not the government, that's not
the legitimate use of force.

359
00:20:23,750 --> 00:20:29,150
And the more you have
of informal norms,

360
00:20:29,150 --> 00:20:33,560
informal culture, the less
you have of government.

361
00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:35,390
That's what this theory says.

362
00:20:35,390 --> 00:20:37,610
So one varies inversely.

363
00:20:37,610 --> 00:20:39,980
And sociologists
have been trying

364
00:20:39,980 --> 00:20:44,760
to validate this
theory for a long time.

365
00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:50,510
OK, theories without
equations are an organization

366
00:20:50,510 --> 00:20:53,930
of words that are
clearly defined,

367
00:20:53,930 --> 00:20:58,760
that try to make
explicit what is often

368
00:20:58,760 --> 00:21:01,850
tacit, that is unspoken.

369
00:21:01,850 --> 00:21:04,880
And in social
science, our task is

370
00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:11,210
to make explicit and
describable through systematic

371
00:21:11,210 --> 00:21:15,830
observations, through
transparent methods, what

372
00:21:15,830 --> 00:21:17,850
goes on in human behavior.

373
00:21:17,850 --> 00:21:22,100
So Andrew's first answer to
me was more methodological

374
00:21:22,100 --> 00:21:23,870
than it was conceptual.

375
00:21:23,870 --> 00:21:26,960
And what I offered
in my distinctions

376
00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:29,690
in the social science
was more conceptual.

377
00:21:29,690 --> 00:21:33,320
The methods we use turn
out to be almost the same

378
00:21:33,320 --> 00:21:35,180
across all the social sciences.

379
00:21:35,180 --> 00:21:39,290
We observe, we ask, we count.

380
00:21:39,290 --> 00:21:41,690
There are a variety
of ways of doing that.

381
00:21:41,690 --> 00:21:47,630
OK, so how do people
make decisions?

382
00:21:47,630 --> 00:21:53,330
Well, I tired to get from you
two different notions, more

383
00:21:53,330 --> 00:21:58,190
cultural and institutional
versus biological.

384
00:21:58,190 --> 00:22:04,850
But even if you look in the
non-biological explanations,

385
00:22:04,850 --> 00:22:10,280
there are sort of patterns that
come up in the explanations

386
00:22:10,280 --> 00:22:12,020
that people give.

387
00:22:12,020 --> 00:22:17,510
So one pattern is the
psychological one,

388
00:22:17,510 --> 00:22:24,710
that people act on the basis
of individual desires, wills.

389
00:22:24,710 --> 00:22:28,700
That sometimes, this
individual desire and will

390
00:22:28,700 --> 00:22:32,240
is a product of
their DNA, nature,

391
00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:36,020
they made their biography,
their parenthood.

392
00:22:36,020 --> 00:22:38,270
This is what made
them who there.

393
00:22:38,270 --> 00:22:40,740
There are different
kinds of persons.

394
00:22:40,740 --> 00:22:44,900
So this is the biological,
individualistic, personality,

395
00:22:44,900 --> 00:22:48,860
psychology,
evolutionary biology.

396
00:22:48,860 --> 00:22:51,590
Man makes history.

397
00:22:51,590 --> 00:22:55,460
We have an Obama as
president because he's

398
00:22:55,460 --> 00:22:59,100
a unique individual.

399
00:22:59,100 --> 00:23:04,260
We had George Washington
because he was a special person.

400
00:23:04,260 --> 00:23:08,010
Oh, Gandhi was charismatic.

401
00:23:08,010 --> 00:23:09,940
These are the
explanations that say

402
00:23:09,940 --> 00:23:13,560
there is something
about the person that

403
00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:18,190
produces the behavior
and the achievements.

404
00:23:18,190 --> 00:23:21,510
The alternative-- and
so, OK, so they're

405
00:23:21,510 --> 00:23:24,450
unique and independent
individuals.

406
00:23:24,450 --> 00:23:32,110
And society is merely the
aggregate of these individuals.

407
00:23:32,110 --> 00:23:38,260
The philosophers and writers
who exemplify this point of view

408
00:23:38,260 --> 00:23:42,130
include John Locke
in the 17th century,

409
00:23:42,130 --> 00:23:46,720
John Stuart Mill in the 19th
century, Friedrich Hayek

410
00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,140
and Milton Friedman
in the 20th century.

411
00:23:50,140 --> 00:23:53,170
OK, when you come
across these names,

412
00:23:53,170 --> 00:23:55,480
you can now put
them in the box that

413
00:23:55,480 --> 00:24:01,150
says we can explain what
happens in the world, including

414
00:24:01,150 --> 00:24:03,550
the production and
distribution of energy

415
00:24:03,550 --> 00:24:06,470
by looking at
individual behavior.

416
00:24:06,470 --> 00:24:09,340
And that's what we're
going to do today.

417
00:24:09,340 --> 00:24:14,020
But there's a second answer,
or a second kind theory,

418
00:24:14,020 --> 00:24:16,640
which many of you
gave me to start with,

419
00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:21,670
which is that the motives and
the intentions of individuals

420
00:24:21,670 --> 00:24:26,440
are located in a
larger circulation,

421
00:24:26,440 --> 00:24:30,070
whether it's advertising
or education,

422
00:24:30,070 --> 00:24:33,700
that people anticipate
certain things to happen.

423
00:24:33,700 --> 00:24:36,950
That they locate
themselves in a sequence.

424
00:24:36,950 --> 00:24:41,170
And so that it's
not the individual,

425
00:24:41,170 --> 00:24:44,500
but it's what the
individual has learned

426
00:24:44,500 --> 00:24:48,040
over time, and the experiences
that they have had,

427
00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:53,110
and what the philosopher John
Dewey called situated action.

428
00:24:53,110 --> 00:24:55,900
That an action
doesn't mean the same

429
00:24:55,900 --> 00:24:58,100
in one place as in another.

430
00:24:58,100 --> 00:25:03,400
And so therefore, the
action you make or do

431
00:25:03,400 --> 00:25:05,960
isn't the same in
one place or another.

432
00:25:05,960 --> 00:25:08,590
And if you take account
of that variation,

433
00:25:08,590 --> 00:25:11,900
then it isn't the
individual causation.

434
00:25:11,900 --> 00:25:14,120
But it's also the situation.

435
00:25:14,120 --> 00:25:17,650
And the authors who say
these kinds of things

436
00:25:17,650 --> 00:25:19,900
include Pierre Bourdieu.

437
00:25:19,900 --> 00:25:24,250
And he calls this situation,
or these culturally

438
00:25:24,250 --> 00:25:29,290
learned behaviors,
habits, or the habitus.

439
00:25:29,290 --> 00:25:33,430
And Adam Smith, in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments, which

440
00:25:33,430 --> 00:25:38,730
he wrote before he wrote The
Wealth of Nations in 1776,

441
00:25:38,730 --> 00:25:42,990
do you all know The Wealth
of Nations, 1776, OK,

442
00:25:42,990 --> 00:25:45,870
and you all know about
the invisible hand.

443
00:25:45,870 --> 00:25:48,210
OK, yes, no?

444
00:25:48,210 --> 00:25:51,960
Well, look it up on Wikipedia.

445
00:25:51,960 --> 00:25:56,490
But what is important about that
theory, which most people take

446
00:25:56,490 --> 00:25:59,880
as obvious, because the
foundation of the market

447
00:25:59,880 --> 00:26:02,790
is that before he wrote
The Wealth of Nations he,

448
00:26:02,790 --> 00:26:05,640
wrote The Theory of
Moral Sentiments.

449
00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:09,450
And in that book,
what Adam Smith said

450
00:26:09,450 --> 00:26:14,340
is that the person all
people will try to be good.

451
00:26:14,340 --> 00:26:18,030
They will be limited
in their desires, which

452
00:26:18,030 --> 00:26:21,630
is what gets translated
into demand in the market

453
00:26:21,630 --> 00:26:29,620
by the expectation of what their
neighbors will think of them.

454
00:26:29,620 --> 00:26:32,320
That doesn't hold very
true in the modern world,

455
00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:34,690
except if you go
to what some of you

456
00:26:34,690 --> 00:26:36,670
start at the
beginning, advertising,

457
00:26:36,670 --> 00:26:38,900
and signaling, and education.

458
00:26:38,900 --> 00:26:42,130
So what we desire,
Adam Smith said,

459
00:26:42,130 --> 00:26:45,010
will be constrained
by what we think

460
00:26:45,010 --> 00:26:47,050
our neighbors will think of us.

461
00:26:47,050 --> 00:26:52,300
And that's the framework in
which our desires or demands

462
00:26:52,300 --> 00:26:54,880
can shape a market.

463
00:26:54,880 --> 00:27:00,010
So in this second
bifurcated notion,

464
00:27:00,010 --> 00:27:02,620
it's not that history
makes the man.

465
00:27:02,620 --> 00:27:06,480
It's that man makes history.

466
00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:09,240
No, no, I said it backwards.

467
00:27:09,240 --> 00:27:10,860
Erase that.

468
00:27:10,860 --> 00:27:13,830
The second theory,
history makes the man.

469
00:27:13,830 --> 00:27:21,500
So Barack Obama can
get elected in 2008.

470
00:27:21,500 --> 00:27:29,930
He could not have gotten elected
president in 1980, or 1990,

471
00:27:29,930 --> 00:27:31,640
or 2000.

472
00:27:31,640 --> 00:27:36,140
Conditions had to be such,
is how the story would go.

473
00:27:36,140 --> 00:27:41,780
Or that George Washington
would have been a farmer,

474
00:27:41,780 --> 00:27:44,630
and he would have spent
his whole life as a farmer,

475
00:27:44,630 --> 00:27:49,220
were it not for the
American Revolution,

476
00:27:49,220 --> 00:27:53,240
which he did not participate
in until the war started.

477
00:27:53,240 --> 00:27:56,060
He was not one of the
signers of the Declaration

478
00:27:56,060 --> 00:27:57,650
of Independence.

479
00:27:57,650 --> 00:28:00,530
They needed someone
to be a general.

480
00:28:00,530 --> 00:28:03,480
Without that need, he wouldn't
have been the president.

481
00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:10,040
And so this second model is
that personhood, identity, will,

482
00:28:10,040 --> 00:28:17,000
the desires are produced and are
contingent on the opportunities

483
00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:19,340
that exist, and the constraints.

484
00:28:19,340 --> 00:28:21,870
And the authors who write
from this perspective

485
00:28:21,870 --> 00:28:24,620
are Max Weber, Emile
[? Durkheim ?] Karl

486
00:28:24,620 --> 00:28:28,310
Polanyi, Karl Marx,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

487
00:28:28,310 --> 00:28:30,650
So when you encounter
those names,

488
00:28:30,650 --> 00:28:35,810
you can put them as antithesis
to Locke, Mill, Hayek,

489
00:28:35,810 --> 00:28:37,050
and Friedman.

490
00:28:37,050 --> 00:28:40,430
OK, now, I'll put in
a little amendment

491
00:28:40,430 --> 00:28:41,900
that's not in the notes.

492
00:28:41,900 --> 00:28:44,750
That for the most
part, Americans,

493
00:28:44,750 --> 00:28:47,810
when you survey
them and ask them

494
00:28:47,810 --> 00:28:52,430
why things happen as they do,
they give you the first answer.

495
00:28:52,430 --> 00:28:54,990
Because people are special.

496
00:28:54,990 --> 00:28:56,840
That's why what they have.

497
00:28:56,840 --> 00:28:59,540
Or that's why things turn
out the way they are.

498
00:28:59,540 --> 00:29:04,340
We are, in the United States,
a nation of individualists.

499
00:29:04,340 --> 00:29:09,320
We rarely see the
patterns of aggregation.

500
00:29:09,320 --> 00:29:21,780
So now, one more, one more
how do people make decisions.

501
00:29:25,410 --> 00:29:27,840
There's one more
model that I'd like

502
00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:31,440
to present to you, that's
not a binary model.

503
00:29:31,440 --> 00:29:33,600
These have been binaries, right?

504
00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:37,620
Two different views, individual,
biological, collective

505
00:29:37,620 --> 00:29:40,110
and culture.

506
00:29:40,110 --> 00:29:43,380
The sociologist Max
Weber offered us

507
00:29:43,380 --> 00:29:45,780
a more complex notion.

508
00:29:45,780 --> 00:29:50,100
He suggested that
action is social

509
00:29:50,100 --> 00:29:52,650
whenever we take account
of somebody else,

510
00:29:52,650 --> 00:29:55,830
just like Adam Smith's
notion of the moral person.

511
00:29:55,830 --> 00:29:58,740
We care what our
neighbors think.

512
00:29:58,740 --> 00:30:02,250
Now, Weber didn't say we care
what our neighbors think.

513
00:30:02,250 --> 00:30:15,310
He merely said that he will
define action as social when

514
00:30:15,310 --> 00:30:19,640
we take account of another,
when there's more than one.

515
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:24,100
And we anticipate,
or we care, or we

516
00:30:24,100 --> 00:30:29,380
want to say something
about or imagine an other

517
00:30:29,380 --> 00:30:31,120
in relationship to ourselves.

518
00:30:31,120 --> 00:30:32,590
That's what makes it social.

519
00:30:32,590 --> 00:30:34,420
So whenever you hear
the word "social,"

520
00:30:34,420 --> 00:30:37,120
which is bandied about
something terrible,

521
00:30:37,120 --> 00:30:41,240
it always means an
interaction of two or more.

522
00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:46,540
And in his grand theory, which
I'll try to do in five minutes,

523
00:30:46,540 --> 00:30:51,970
this is 1,000 pages, OK, you're
getting it in five minutes,

524
00:30:51,970 --> 00:30:55,270
there are four ways
in which we can

525
00:30:55,270 --> 00:30:58,030
take account of other people.

526
00:30:58,030 --> 00:31:02,080
The first one is what he
called rational action.

527
00:31:02,080 --> 00:31:06,820
And here, we have exactly
the economic model.

528
00:31:06,820 --> 00:31:11,830
That people act
and make decisions

529
00:31:11,830 --> 00:31:17,710
on the basis of reasoning,
of means and ends reasoning.

530
00:31:17,710 --> 00:31:22,900
That they take account of the
objects in the external world,

531
00:31:22,900 --> 00:31:24,370
the situations.

532
00:31:24,370 --> 00:31:27,100
They mobilize logic.

533
00:31:27,100 --> 00:31:31,390
And they try to figure out
how to get from here to there.

534
00:31:31,390 --> 00:31:36,520
They maximize their ends by
figuring out appropriate means.

535
00:31:36,520 --> 00:31:39,950
This is our economic
rational actor model.

536
00:31:39,950 --> 00:31:44,170
And he called that
formal rational action.

537
00:31:44,170 --> 00:31:46,990
But he said there was
another kind of rationality,

538
00:31:46,990 --> 00:31:52,480
in which we were oriented
not to maximizing

539
00:31:52,480 --> 00:31:57,220
means ends efficiencies, but
because there was something

540
00:31:57,220 --> 00:32:01,150
we thought was good,
an absolute value.

541
00:32:01,150 --> 00:32:05,710
This could be a conscious
belief in a God, who tells us

542
00:32:05,710 --> 00:32:06,760
what to do.

543
00:32:06,760 --> 00:32:12,820
It could be some ethical value,
such as do unto others as you

544
00:32:12,820 --> 00:32:14,800
would have them do unto you.

545
00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:17,650
It could be aesthetic
to maximize beauty.

546
00:32:17,650 --> 00:32:21,160
It could be to
maximize equality,

547
00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:28,280
as communism was originally
imagined by Karl Marx.

548
00:32:28,280 --> 00:32:34,480
So that behavior is organized
to maximize or to fulfill

549
00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:36,020
that absolute value.

550
00:32:36,020 --> 00:32:41,290
It's not an efficiency
or logical requirement

551
00:32:41,290 --> 00:32:43,270
of means and ends.

552
00:32:43,270 --> 00:32:46,700
And the third kind of behavior--

553
00:32:46,700 --> 00:32:49,180
so this is virtue.

554
00:32:49,180 --> 00:32:53,170
Could be you want to be
environmentally sustainable,

555
00:32:53,170 --> 00:32:55,550
whether it's efficient or not.

556
00:32:55,550 --> 00:32:59,080
OK, that's an alternative
to efficiency.

557
00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:02,740
The third kind of
behavior he described

558
00:33:02,740 --> 00:33:06,400
was ones which come from our
feelings, from our emotions.

559
00:33:06,400 --> 00:33:11,270
We do things because
it feels good.

560
00:33:11,270 --> 00:33:13,000
Now, you all know
what that's like you

561
00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,650
do a lot of that we all do.

562
00:33:15,650 --> 00:33:18,400
That's why people take
drugs, drink alcohol,

563
00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:22,060
have sex, because it feels good.

564
00:33:22,060 --> 00:33:25,660
It's also the basis
on which we sometimes

565
00:33:25,660 --> 00:33:27,790
convey honor to people.

566
00:33:27,790 --> 00:33:31,930
We say some people are
better than others.

567
00:33:31,930 --> 00:33:37,360
Being seen and celebrity,
this whole TV and internet

568
00:33:37,360 --> 00:33:41,710
world of being there,
people are getting some sort

569
00:33:41,710 --> 00:33:44,560
of emotional satisfaction.

570
00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:48,820
And the fourth kind
of social action

571
00:33:48,820 --> 00:33:52,420
is simply tradition and habit.

572
00:33:52,420 --> 00:33:56,230
We act because we have
always done it this way.

573
00:33:56,230 --> 00:34:01,660
And that, sometimes, is a little
bit of mimicry, but mimicry

574
00:34:01,660 --> 00:34:05,620
of the past, rather than
necessarily something

575
00:34:05,620 --> 00:34:06,910
co-present.

576
00:34:06,910 --> 00:34:11,590
And there are lots of
societies, lots of groups.

577
00:34:11,590 --> 00:34:14,800
And this institution,
MIT, is frequently

578
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:20,120
accused of being
stuck in its ways.

579
00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:26,290
So when we were accredited a
few years ago, or re-accredited,

580
00:34:26,290 --> 00:34:28,510
the re-accreditation
committee said

581
00:34:28,510 --> 00:34:33,850
that MIT had just about come
into the 20th century in terms

582
00:34:33,850 --> 00:34:37,540
of the information systems
in which it managed.

583
00:34:37,540 --> 00:34:40,810
We had hardly made it to
the end of the 20th century,

584
00:34:40,810 --> 00:34:43,659
because we don't change
things too easily.

585
00:34:43,659 --> 00:34:46,969
OK, habit, it's comfortable.

586
00:34:46,969 --> 00:34:57,620
So now, like those overlapping
disciplines, those overlapping

587
00:34:57,620 --> 00:35:01,730
disciplines, all these
concepts have fuzzy borders.

588
00:35:01,730 --> 00:35:07,430
So it's rare that you'll ever
find an empirically observable

589
00:35:07,430 --> 00:35:12,260
action social action that's
just one kind, that's just

590
00:35:12,260 --> 00:35:16,970
rational action, or that's
just affect without habit,

591
00:35:16,970 --> 00:35:17,990
or something else.

592
00:35:17,990 --> 00:35:22,130
And that brings us to exactly
where Dick left off on Monday.

593
00:35:22,130 --> 00:35:25,430
What else, besides
rational action,

594
00:35:25,430 --> 00:35:32,570
besides economic reasoning might
be affecting demand for energy?

595
00:35:32,570 --> 00:35:38,150
OK, so these are the
basic models of--

596
00:35:38,150 --> 00:35:45,380
and habit, or
past, is what those

597
00:35:45,380 --> 00:35:50,840
are historic investments are
that we can't change very much.

598
00:35:50,840 --> 00:35:55,040
That we have suburbs
and automobiles.

599
00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:58,520
That we have
habituated preferences

600
00:35:58,520 --> 00:36:01,340
in our political system
and the individualism

601
00:36:01,340 --> 00:36:06,110
that makes it very hard for us
to change our energy production

602
00:36:06,110 --> 00:36:09,380
and consumption systems.

603
00:36:09,380 --> 00:36:15,010
So what I want-- this
is the big picture,

604
00:36:15,010 --> 00:36:18,360
and now, let's look at some
specific research that wants

605
00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:21,000
to do something with this.

606
00:36:21,000 --> 00:36:23,760
But I would like you to take
away from this the notion

607
00:36:23,760 --> 00:36:28,290
that any human action
involves usually

608
00:36:28,290 --> 00:36:31,830
a combination of
these forms of action.

609
00:36:31,830 --> 00:36:33,360
These are the
categories which we

610
00:36:33,360 --> 00:36:37,590
mix and match to describe it.

611
00:36:37,590 --> 00:36:41,460
So cognitive science
and the sociology

612
00:36:41,460 --> 00:36:48,270
of decisions, these days
there's been a recent marriage.

613
00:36:48,270 --> 00:36:54,920
And it may, in the end, end up
being a marriage of our brain

614
00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:58,230
structure and our behavior.

615
00:36:58,230 --> 00:37:03,320
So what used to be
psychology, asking people

616
00:37:03,320 --> 00:37:06,710
why they do what they do,
watching them in experiments,

617
00:37:06,710 --> 00:37:09,680
treating them just like
rats in experiments,

618
00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:16,760
we now look inside their
brains with PET scans, fMRIs.

619
00:37:16,760 --> 00:37:22,000
The neuroscientists look at
the brains, the architecture

620
00:37:22,000 --> 00:37:25,300
of our brains, the
arrangement of the pieces,

621
00:37:25,300 --> 00:37:29,200
that's about all
they can do, so far.

622
00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:34,300
And look at the physical
matter inside our skulls,

623
00:37:34,300 --> 00:37:39,670
where the psychologist used to
study, we might say, the mind.

624
00:37:39,670 --> 00:37:41,890
Brain scientists
or neuroscientists

625
00:37:41,890 --> 00:37:43,240
study the brain.

626
00:37:43,240 --> 00:37:47,440
And the cognitive scientists
go, try to put the two together.

627
00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:48,430
Is that fair?

628
00:37:48,430 --> 00:37:52,580
Do we have any BCS majors here?

629
00:37:52,580 --> 00:37:54,602
Not a one?

630
00:37:54,602 --> 00:37:58,530
Not one brain and
cognitive science major.

631
00:37:58,530 --> 00:38:00,000
Interesting, I
would have thought

632
00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:02,010
you'd all want to
become brain scientists.

633
00:38:02,010 --> 00:38:03,350
That's the future, folks.

634
00:38:06,570 --> 00:38:09,900
Well, do the brain and cognitive
science of energy decisions.

635
00:38:09,900 --> 00:38:13,650
There you go, there's
a dissertation for you.

636
00:38:13,650 --> 00:38:19,560
OK, so some of this
marriage of mind and brain

637
00:38:19,560 --> 00:38:22,900
has produced some
interesting results.

638
00:38:22,900 --> 00:38:28,320
So that what people used
to think was hard wired,

639
00:38:28,320 --> 00:38:32,610
the neuroscientists have
showed us is quite malleable.

640
00:38:32,610 --> 00:38:38,250
That in fact, oh, I think up
until about the 1980s, doctors

641
00:38:38,250 --> 00:38:41,280
and scientists would
say oh, well, you

642
00:38:41,280 --> 00:38:44,310
might be able to regenerate
muscles if you've

643
00:38:44,310 --> 00:38:48,300
had an accident or damaged it.

644
00:38:48,300 --> 00:38:51,420
But the brain was what it
was and it never changed.

645
00:38:51,420 --> 00:38:54,430
Well, we know that's not true.

646
00:38:54,430 --> 00:38:57,310
Used to think it was
fixed and formed.

647
00:38:57,310 --> 00:39:00,280
But now, we know that
the neurons are always

648
00:39:00,280 --> 00:39:01,150
in the making.

649
00:39:01,150 --> 00:39:03,970
And those circuits are changing.

650
00:39:03,970 --> 00:39:08,680
The neurons and networks,
we have learned,

651
00:39:08,680 --> 00:39:16,330
develop in response to
experience to the inputs.

652
00:39:16,330 --> 00:39:20,190
So that they shape
the capacity to act.

653
00:39:20,190 --> 00:39:24,500
So that it's not
just how you're born.

654
00:39:24,500 --> 00:39:27,430
But the experiences
that you have had

655
00:39:27,430 --> 00:39:30,390
transform your
mental capacities.

656
00:39:30,390 --> 00:39:31,820
Well, you all know that's true.

657
00:39:31,820 --> 00:39:33,980
You wouldn't have
gotten to MIT otherwise.

658
00:39:33,980 --> 00:39:37,220
Unless you all think there
was all these equations

659
00:39:37,220 --> 00:39:41,810
were in there to start with and
they just came out recently.

660
00:39:41,810 --> 00:39:43,280
That you've learned.

661
00:39:43,280 --> 00:39:45,620
You've learned how to
defer gratification.

662
00:39:45,620 --> 00:39:48,650
That's what most successful
college students, to get here,

663
00:39:48,650 --> 00:39:49,790
you learned.

664
00:39:49,790 --> 00:39:54,830
And some people don't have the
experiences which allow that.

665
00:39:54,830 --> 00:39:56,930
What if you're a
child who's never

666
00:39:56,930 --> 00:40:01,790
had gratification of any
bodily or emotional function?

667
00:40:01,790 --> 00:40:03,980
Well then delaying
it is not something

668
00:40:03,980 --> 00:40:07,400
you could learn that
will be rewarded.

669
00:40:07,400 --> 00:40:09,450
You understand what I'm saying?

670
00:40:09,450 --> 00:40:13,550
So if you've never had a
full belly, then when food

671
00:40:13,550 --> 00:40:15,470
is put in front of you,
you're not necessarily

672
00:40:15,470 --> 00:40:18,750
going to wait to eat it
until you're told to eat it.

673
00:40:18,750 --> 00:40:19,830
It's as simple as that.

674
00:40:19,830 --> 00:40:23,150
And the same thing with
cognitive activities.

675
00:40:23,150 --> 00:40:25,070
So there's lots
of work now going

676
00:40:25,070 --> 00:40:30,340
on that is closing
the gap between what

677
00:40:30,340 --> 00:40:35,710
is observable between the inner
states and the external aspects

678
00:40:35,710 --> 00:40:37,700
of culture.

679
00:40:37,700 --> 00:40:43,800
So in this work, in
this scholarship,

680
00:40:43,800 --> 00:40:46,140
scholars, researchers,
have started

681
00:40:46,140 --> 00:40:50,670
to distinguish a fundamental
difference between what

682
00:40:50,670 --> 00:40:56,700
they call automatic cognition
and deliberate cognition.

683
00:40:56,700 --> 00:41:01,650
Automatic cognition is rapid,
effortless, unintentional

684
00:41:01,650 --> 00:41:05,100
thoughts, things which are
those habits, those things we

685
00:41:05,100 --> 00:41:06,690
do without thinking.

686
00:41:06,690 --> 00:41:09,750
And it allows quick
processing of information

687
00:41:09,750 --> 00:41:15,150
without extended thought
or figuring out what to do.

688
00:41:15,150 --> 00:41:20,700
Deliberate cognition is
slow, considered, measured.

689
00:41:20,700 --> 00:41:24,960
Where we can reject or
accept alternatives.

690
00:41:24,960 --> 00:41:31,500
We can consider various
actions to take.

691
00:41:31,500 --> 00:41:35,970
Where we might actively
search for solutions,

692
00:41:35,970 --> 00:41:38,580
for characteristics,
for connections,

693
00:41:38,580 --> 00:41:41,700
for seeing if we can
find relationships.

694
00:41:41,700 --> 00:41:47,670
And where we don't assume,
but we solve, you might say.

695
00:41:47,670 --> 00:41:53,400
So examples of
automatic cognition

696
00:41:53,400 --> 00:41:56,640
are as the example,
male and female.

697
00:41:56,640 --> 00:41:59,490
We look at somebody and we
categorize them like that.

698
00:41:59,490 --> 00:42:03,150
When we can't categorize them
like that, we start to think.

699
00:42:03,150 --> 00:42:06,690
And we frequently, then,
refer to that person

700
00:42:06,690 --> 00:42:09,750
as not usual or not normal.

701
00:42:09,750 --> 00:42:12,870
Age, race, in the
United States is

702
00:42:12,870 --> 00:42:16,170
a fundamental
automatic cognition.

703
00:42:16,170 --> 00:42:19,640
Turns out not to be
that in all cultures.

704
00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:22,700
In many cultures,
it's much more varied.

705
00:42:22,700 --> 00:42:26,360
It's not a binary, like it
is in the United States.

706
00:42:26,360 --> 00:42:33,510
So our habits are examples
of automatic cognition.

707
00:42:33,510 --> 00:42:36,390
It's outside of our
thinking process.

708
00:42:36,390 --> 00:42:38,970
It's outside of consciousness.

709
00:42:38,970 --> 00:42:43,470
And it happens more often
when we're under stress.

710
00:42:43,470 --> 00:42:46,710
The experiments put people
in different conditions.

711
00:42:46,710 --> 00:42:50,970
And how quickly they respond
when they're under stress

712
00:42:50,970 --> 00:42:52,290
is measurable.

713
00:42:52,290 --> 00:42:55,710
In deliberate
cognition, what has

714
00:42:55,710 --> 00:43:00,300
been shown is that people
deliberate and they think

715
00:43:00,300 --> 00:43:03,180
about alternatives
when there has been

716
00:43:03,180 --> 00:43:07,410
a disruption of those
habits, a disruption

717
00:43:07,410 --> 00:43:14,430
of non-thinking-- of
acting without thought.

718
00:43:14,430 --> 00:43:17,910
OK, so I want to give you
some empirical examples

719
00:43:17,910 --> 00:43:19,290
of how this works.

720
00:43:22,410 --> 00:43:27,420
The first example
is by Carol Heimer

721
00:43:27,420 --> 00:43:29,820
at Northwestern
University, where

722
00:43:29,820 --> 00:43:35,710
she did a study of neonatal
care in several hospitals.

723
00:43:35,710 --> 00:43:41,220
She noticed in these
wards for preemie babies

724
00:43:41,220 --> 00:43:44,850
that routines the
hospital had established

725
00:43:44,850 --> 00:43:47,430
were used to manage
what was a very

726
00:43:47,430 --> 00:43:50,460
uncertain medical
situation, very

727
00:43:50,460 --> 00:43:53,550
uncertain for the
families, very stressful.

728
00:43:53,550 --> 00:43:58,710
And that there was a very marked
hierarchy among the staff.

729
00:43:58,710 --> 00:44:02,850
The aides at the bottom,
the doctors at the top,

730
00:44:02,850 --> 00:44:07,080
the surgical nurses higher
up, others lower down.

731
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:11,430
And along with this
hierarchy of persons,

732
00:44:11,430 --> 00:44:16,080
Heimer also identified
a continuum of routines.

733
00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:18,390
At one end of her
spectrum, there

734
00:44:18,390 --> 00:44:22,200
were tasks which were
highly routinized.

735
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:26,410
That there was almost never any
variation for how it was done.

736
00:44:26,410 --> 00:44:28,530
And then there were
other tasks which

737
00:44:28,530 --> 00:44:33,120
varied a lot from patient to
patient and family to family.

738
00:44:33,120 --> 00:44:38,350
She noticed that when
there was either very, very

739
00:44:38,350 --> 00:44:43,510
routinized or very,
very unroutinized,

740
00:44:43,510 --> 00:44:46,360
that there was
deliberate cognition.

741
00:44:46,360 --> 00:44:52,810
There was a great deal of talk,
examination, consideration

742
00:44:52,810 --> 00:44:54,640
of alternatives.

743
00:44:54,640 --> 00:44:58,840
But where there was
moderate routinization,

744
00:44:58,840 --> 00:45:01,240
that things were automatic.

745
00:45:01,240 --> 00:45:05,440
According to Heimer
the overroutinization

746
00:45:05,440 --> 00:45:09,010
triggers deliberate
cognition, because people

747
00:45:09,010 --> 00:45:14,590
are so overwhelmed and
overloaded with routines

748
00:45:14,590 --> 00:45:20,890
that the things they have to
do routinely become a burden.

749
00:45:20,890 --> 00:45:25,030
They become noise,
rather than a signal.

750
00:45:25,030 --> 00:45:28,750
And they cease to focus
attention on the child

751
00:45:28,750 --> 00:45:30,430
or on the situation.

752
00:45:30,430 --> 00:45:34,900
Then because there's so many
things that need to be done,

753
00:45:34,900 --> 00:45:39,538
and need to be done
in a specified way,

754
00:45:39,538 --> 00:45:43,090
they have to think
about how to do it.

755
00:45:43,090 --> 00:45:47,980
In underroutinized
context, they have

756
00:45:47,980 --> 00:45:50,770
to figure out what to do
when there are no routines.

757
00:45:50,770 --> 00:45:52,510
And they have to be inductive.

758
00:45:52,510 --> 00:45:55,220
Is this like one we saw before?

759
00:45:55,220 --> 00:45:58,660
Is this like the four
other cases last week?

760
00:45:58,660 --> 00:46:01,750
So that lots and
lots of routine,

761
00:46:01,750 --> 00:46:04,120
they have to think
about how to manage.

762
00:46:04,120 --> 00:46:06,310
No routine, they have to think.

763
00:46:06,310 --> 00:46:12,190
But simple, not high volume
of routines, and they

764
00:46:12,190 --> 00:46:13,630
act without thought.

765
00:46:13,630 --> 00:46:16,270
So that might be taking blood.

766
00:46:16,270 --> 00:46:20,210
It might be putting
in the injection.

767
00:46:20,210 --> 00:46:23,170
But if they have to do 10
of those things at once,

768
00:46:23,170 --> 00:46:24,800
then they will think about it.

769
00:46:24,800 --> 00:46:28,390
So that's one example.

770
00:46:28,390 --> 00:46:35,140
In a second study about
residents in an Argentinean

771
00:46:35,140 --> 00:46:40,540
shanty town, two scholars,
Auyero and Swistun

772
00:46:40,540 --> 00:46:44,050
studied the ways in which
people handled uncertainty

773
00:46:44,050 --> 00:46:50,410
in risk and especially the
conditions under which--

774
00:46:50,410 --> 00:46:53,410
the conditions which
sustained uncertainty

775
00:46:53,410 --> 00:46:58,550
and sometimes led to assessments
of environmental pollutants.

776
00:46:58,550 --> 00:47:03,730
So they saw that sometimes,
people paid attention

777
00:47:03,730 --> 00:47:05,290
to the pollutants around them.

778
00:47:05,290 --> 00:47:06,730
And sometimes, they didn't.

779
00:47:06,730 --> 00:47:10,630
And they wanted to identify
those different situations.

780
00:47:10,630 --> 00:47:13,450
And the evidence they
collected suggested

781
00:47:13,450 --> 00:47:19,120
that if the polluters
pollute without disrupting

782
00:47:19,120 --> 00:47:24,040
the habits of the community,
the community paid no attention

783
00:47:24,040 --> 00:47:25,330
to the pollution.

784
00:47:25,330 --> 00:47:28,730
But if the pollution
disrupted habits,

785
00:47:28,730 --> 00:47:31,180
such as getting
children to school,

786
00:47:31,180 --> 00:47:35,290
or preparing meals, or being
able to ride on the bus,

787
00:47:35,290 --> 00:47:38,080
then the population mobilized.

788
00:47:38,080 --> 00:47:42,970
The routines encouraged
people to adopt

789
00:47:42,970 --> 00:47:47,470
what we are calling automatic
pilot, or automatic cognition,

790
00:47:47,470 --> 00:47:48,730
to their surroundings.

791
00:47:48,730 --> 00:47:51,370
But when routines
are disrupted, people

792
00:47:51,370 --> 00:47:54,220
began to explore and
try to figure out

793
00:47:54,220 --> 00:47:58,990
what it was in the environment
that was disrupting it.

794
00:47:58,990 --> 00:48:02,620
So in these cases,
familiar routines

795
00:48:02,620 --> 00:48:05,500
combined with
automatic cognition

796
00:48:05,500 --> 00:48:10,450
to restrict the attention
to the pollution.

797
00:48:10,450 --> 00:48:12,790
So that's a second example.

798
00:48:12,790 --> 00:48:19,150
Third example, in a study
of political commitments,

799
00:48:19,150 --> 00:48:23,320
Martin and Desmond found
that when citizens identify

800
00:48:23,320 --> 00:48:27,310
themselves as having strong
political commitments

801
00:48:27,310 --> 00:48:31,480
along a continuum from
liberal to conservative,

802
00:48:31,480 --> 00:48:34,480
so if they were strong
at one end or the other

803
00:48:34,480 --> 00:48:39,190
of the political spectrum,
they spent less time evaluating

804
00:48:39,190 --> 00:48:41,740
the evidence about politics.

805
00:48:41,740 --> 00:48:46,600
The ideological commitments
organized the world for them.

806
00:48:46,600 --> 00:48:49,300
And it made it
effortless and efficient

807
00:48:49,300 --> 00:48:53,860
to know how to interpret
and how to make decisions.

808
00:48:53,860 --> 00:48:59,590
In a study of social
movements, the scholars

809
00:48:59,590 --> 00:49:05,620
found that when movement leaders
use everyday metaphors, that is

810
00:49:05,620 --> 00:49:08,740
ordinary language,
in particular ways,

811
00:49:08,740 --> 00:49:12,610
they generate more
or less support.

812
00:49:12,610 --> 00:49:19,160
So for example, the right
to life movement came up,

813
00:49:19,160 --> 00:49:21,340
that is an
anti-abortion movement,

814
00:49:21,340 --> 00:49:25,180
came up with a simple
phrase, right to life.

815
00:49:25,180 --> 00:49:30,160
And that had more
salience than did choice

816
00:49:30,160 --> 00:49:32,560
for those who were pro-abortion.

817
00:49:32,560 --> 00:49:36,520
And so the metaphors
aligned with a whole set

818
00:49:36,520 --> 00:49:37,950
of other metaphors.

819
00:49:37,950 --> 00:49:42,000
So that people
thought more or less

820
00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:45,480
about the process of abortion.

821
00:49:45,480 --> 00:49:50,880
OK, the same thing with
faith-based labor movements.

822
00:49:50,880 --> 00:49:53,970
In the 19th century,
Mark Steinberg

823
00:49:53,970 --> 00:49:57,300
has written about the
ways in which the cotton

824
00:49:57,300 --> 00:50:00,840
workers in England were
able to mobilize and form

825
00:50:00,840 --> 00:50:04,740
a union because,
this is in the 1830s

826
00:50:04,740 --> 00:50:09,810
to '50s, because they used
the already existing language

827
00:50:09,810 --> 00:50:12,240
of abolition against slavery.

828
00:50:12,240 --> 00:50:18,210
And they identified their work
in the cotton mills as slavery.

829
00:50:18,210 --> 00:50:21,390
And by associating
themselves with slavery,

830
00:50:21,390 --> 00:50:25,020
people didn't pay as much
attention to the differences

831
00:50:25,020 --> 00:50:29,040
and were more likely to
support and join the unions.

832
00:50:29,040 --> 00:50:33,240
More recent research
along this issue

833
00:50:33,240 --> 00:50:39,870
of the metaphors, the signaling,
this is about signaling,

834
00:50:39,870 --> 00:50:45,450
the metaphors that affect
deliberate or automatic

835
00:50:45,450 --> 00:50:52,410
cognition, a study of the
Serbo-Croatian conflict

836
00:50:52,410 --> 00:51:00,270
in the 1990s showed
that the associations

837
00:51:00,270 --> 00:51:05,520
with the past that people used
affected the level of conflict.

838
00:51:05,520 --> 00:51:09,720
Particular words and metaphors
generated associations

839
00:51:09,720 --> 00:51:10,920
with the past.

840
00:51:10,920 --> 00:51:14,130
So that people viewed
the current conflict

841
00:51:14,130 --> 00:51:18,810
as a continuation of hundreds
of years of conflict,

842
00:51:18,810 --> 00:51:21,540
rather than assess
the current conflict

843
00:51:21,540 --> 00:51:23,970
within current conditions.

844
00:51:23,970 --> 00:51:30,870
So simple metaphors
associations encourage

845
00:51:30,870 --> 00:51:36,340
people to think deliberately
or to act automatically.

846
00:51:36,340 --> 00:51:39,600
So finally, the last
example of these differences

847
00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:42,630
between automatic and
deliberate cognition

848
00:51:42,630 --> 00:51:44,790
comes from work on narrative.

849
00:51:44,790 --> 00:51:46,590
So we've gone, I
just want you to see,

850
00:51:46,590 --> 00:51:51,510
from routines, to
disruptive habits,

851
00:51:51,510 --> 00:51:57,240
to language organizing
social movements and wars.

852
00:51:57,240 --> 00:52:02,010
And now we have, from
metaphors, we go to narratives.

853
00:52:02,010 --> 00:52:04,530
So researchers have
not only looked

854
00:52:04,530 --> 00:52:07,620
at these routines,
metaphors, analogies,

855
00:52:07,620 --> 00:52:11,820
for triggering automatic rather
than deliberate cognition,

856
00:52:11,820 --> 00:52:15,600
but also at the structure,
how the metaphors are

857
00:52:15,600 --> 00:52:19,630
organized into a story at
narrative and storytelling.

858
00:52:19,630 --> 00:52:21,690
Some of the very
best research on this

859
00:52:21,690 --> 00:52:23,790
has been done in courtrooms.

860
00:52:23,790 --> 00:52:28,540
So that if witnesses
tell a story

861
00:52:28,540 --> 00:52:35,520
and they leave out little links
in the sequence of action,

862
00:52:35,520 --> 00:52:38,760
the audience, the
jurors, and the judges

863
00:52:38,760 --> 00:52:43,020
are more likely to
fill in those ellipses

864
00:52:43,020 --> 00:52:46,020
with conventional action.

865
00:52:46,020 --> 00:52:50,820
That is what usually is
done in those circumstances.

866
00:52:50,820 --> 00:52:55,200
And it is most often to the
disadvantage of a defendant,

867
00:52:55,200 --> 00:52:59,820
because the defendant is arguing
that this was not routine.

868
00:52:59,820 --> 00:53:02,130
But this was unusual.

869
00:53:02,130 --> 00:53:05,520
So witnessing, in
criminal courts,

870
00:53:05,520 --> 00:53:10,710
makes a difference how
complete your narrative is.

871
00:53:10,710 --> 00:53:13,620
If it is not, then
people automatically

872
00:53:13,620 --> 00:53:16,980
fill in with
routinized information.

873
00:53:16,980 --> 00:53:24,780
In my own work, I have shown
that when a story describes

874
00:53:24,780 --> 00:53:26,850
or fails to describe--
let me put it

875
00:53:26,850 --> 00:53:30,870
this way, when a story fails
to describe how power is

876
00:53:30,870 --> 00:53:35,610
organized, people are less
likely to resist the power

877
00:53:35,610 --> 00:53:38,010
of that organization or person.

878
00:53:38,010 --> 00:53:42,990
But when a story reveals
who holds power and why,

879
00:53:42,990 --> 00:53:46,680
then people are more
likely to resist authority.

880
00:53:46,680 --> 00:53:50,400
So a little bit
of, perhaps, what

881
00:53:50,400 --> 00:53:53,280
was happening last spring
in the Middle East.

882
00:53:53,280 --> 00:53:58,260
As stories circulated on
the internet about what

883
00:53:58,260 --> 00:54:00,630
was happening in
different places,

884
00:54:00,630 --> 00:54:04,200
in villages and towns
in Libya and in Egypt,

885
00:54:04,200 --> 00:54:05,910
those stories spread.

886
00:54:05,910 --> 00:54:08,970
And they told stories,
they were stories,

887
00:54:08,970 --> 00:54:13,140
about what the government
was doing to whom.

888
00:54:13,140 --> 00:54:17,100
And it helped to
mobilize the people.

889
00:54:17,100 --> 00:54:21,390
So that's what cognitive
science is telling us

890
00:54:21,390 --> 00:54:27,730
about how people make deliberate
or automatic decisions.

891
00:54:27,730 --> 00:54:30,880
We have some
experimental data that

892
00:54:30,880 --> 00:54:34,330
helps us to understand
how decisions

893
00:54:34,330 --> 00:54:39,350
can be made specifically
about energy consumption.

894
00:54:39,350 --> 00:54:43,990
So this was the articles you
read, I think, the experiments?

895
00:54:43,990 --> 00:54:49,510
Right, Goldstein,
Cialdini, and Grisk--

896
00:54:49,510 --> 00:54:51,080
I can't say that.

897
00:54:51,080 --> 00:54:54,050
So what did they want to show?

898
00:54:54,050 --> 00:54:56,940
What did they want to show?

899
00:54:56,940 --> 00:54:59,260
Yeah, Veronica?

900
00:54:59,260 --> 00:55:02,580
AUDIENCE: They wanted
to change the wording

901
00:55:02,580 --> 00:55:08,160
that they had to say your
fellow guests are doing it.

902
00:55:08,160 --> 00:55:10,490
Help your fellow guests.

903
00:55:10,490 --> 00:55:11,280
SUSAN SILBEY: Why?

904
00:55:11,280 --> 00:55:12,570
Why did they want to do that?

905
00:55:12,570 --> 00:55:15,780
AUDIENCE: Because subliminally,
that social pressure

906
00:55:15,780 --> 00:55:20,460
would motivate
them more to do it.

907
00:55:20,460 --> 00:55:23,280
And there's examples
given in the other article

908
00:55:23,280 --> 00:55:29,000
about how when people gave
money to the guy playing

909
00:55:29,000 --> 00:55:33,197
guitar or whatever, other
people behind the guy who gave--

910
00:55:33,197 --> 00:55:34,530
SUSAN SILBEY: So those are two--

911
00:55:34,530 --> 00:55:36,370
those are two different norms.

912
00:55:36,370 --> 00:55:39,660
Yes, those are--
looking for norms are

913
00:55:39,660 --> 00:55:42,510
observed patterns of action.

914
00:55:42,510 --> 00:55:43,500
That's what a norm is.

915
00:55:43,500 --> 00:55:46,620
They're looking to
see if they can find

916
00:55:46,620 --> 00:55:49,555
the pattern in human action.

917
00:55:49,555 --> 00:55:50,490
AUDIENCE: Yes, Vivian.

918
00:55:50,490 --> 00:55:51,660
So they did find a pattern.

919
00:55:51,660 --> 00:55:54,510
And I think they just want to
show that this tactic isn't

920
00:55:54,510 --> 00:55:57,270
being used.

921
00:55:57,270 --> 00:55:59,430
Whereas, because
this is something

922
00:55:59,430 --> 00:56:03,170
that we can use to
help people started

923
00:56:03,170 --> 00:56:05,900
making environmentally
conscious decisions,

924
00:56:05,900 --> 00:56:08,540
and it's not being used.

925
00:56:08,540 --> 00:56:11,270
SUSAN SILBEY: I don't want
to be personally critical.

926
00:56:11,270 --> 00:56:13,490
But they don't want
to show anything.

927
00:56:13,490 --> 00:56:15,770
They want to discover something.

928
00:56:15,770 --> 00:56:21,020
OK, let's talk about it in
a way that is fair to them.

929
00:56:21,020 --> 00:56:24,830
They have an aspiration
to understand.

930
00:56:24,830 --> 00:56:27,230
They want to
understand the basis

931
00:56:27,230 --> 00:56:34,750
upon which decisions about
energy use can be affected.

932
00:56:34,750 --> 00:56:39,110
OK, they want to understand
the basis of decision making.

933
00:56:39,110 --> 00:56:42,470
OK, and the assumption
they start with,

934
00:56:42,470 --> 00:56:47,630
the hypothesis is
that people mimic.

935
00:56:47,630 --> 00:56:50,690
They do what other people do.

936
00:56:50,690 --> 00:56:55,670
And they care about
whether they are a member

937
00:56:55,670 --> 00:56:57,470
of one group or another.

938
00:56:57,470 --> 00:56:59,780
That seems they
have an identity.

939
00:56:59,780 --> 00:57:01,430
So let's walk through it.

940
00:57:01,430 --> 00:57:06,050
All right, they're trying to
use, as I have on the screen,

941
00:57:06,050 --> 00:57:11,090
social norms, that's patterns,
to motivate conservation.

942
00:57:11,090 --> 00:57:12,690
Is it possible?

943
00:57:12,690 --> 00:57:18,350
So the question
was, the first one,

944
00:57:18,350 --> 00:57:23,750
would people not put
their towels for laundry

945
00:57:23,750 --> 00:57:25,850
but would reuse their towels?

946
00:57:25,850 --> 00:57:31,550
And the standard message was,
help save the environment.

947
00:57:31,550 --> 00:57:38,460
But the message that they
offered was slightly different.

948
00:57:38,460 --> 00:57:44,520
They said, you should do
this, because everybody else

949
00:57:44,520 --> 00:57:46,142
is doing it.

950
00:57:46,142 --> 00:57:48,420
Does that appeal to you?

951
00:57:48,420 --> 00:57:50,970
Have you seen these signs?

952
00:57:50,970 --> 00:57:52,875
You've never seen
these signs in hotels?

953
00:57:56,517 --> 00:57:58,850
AUDIENCE: I've definitely
seen the signs, more in Europe

954
00:57:58,850 --> 00:57:59,780
than over America.

955
00:57:59,780 --> 00:58:02,930
But it's also not only that
other people are doing it.

956
00:58:02,930 --> 00:58:05,810
I think in this case, it speaks
to anti-environmental movement

957
00:58:05,810 --> 00:58:09,690
that says one towel hanging is
not going to make a difference.

958
00:58:09,690 --> 00:58:11,853
So a lot of people,
their motivation

959
00:58:11,853 --> 00:58:13,520
is brought down,
because they're saying,

960
00:58:13,520 --> 00:58:14,978
I'm going through
all this trouble.

961
00:58:14,978 --> 00:58:15,830
Nobody is around me.

962
00:58:15,830 --> 00:58:16,997
I'm not making a difference.

963
00:58:16,997 --> 00:58:19,490
Why am I going to keep
the self-sacrifice?

964
00:58:19,490 --> 00:58:22,010
So by telling them, it's
not only the bandwagon idea.

965
00:58:22,010 --> 00:58:23,210
But it's also the--

966
00:58:23,210 --> 00:58:24,860
look we're actually
doing it in Europe,

967
00:58:24,860 --> 00:58:27,440
and it's actually
going to go a long way.

968
00:58:27,440 --> 00:58:30,650
SUSAN SILBEY: So trying to say
that each effort aggregates

969
00:58:30,650 --> 00:58:32,553
to a larger effort.

970
00:58:32,553 --> 00:58:33,470
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

971
00:58:33,470 --> 00:58:36,300
SUSAN SILBEY: And that other
people are doing it, too.

972
00:58:36,300 --> 00:58:40,540
So it's not just one
person's effort, right?

973
00:58:40,540 --> 00:58:45,410
OK, so they got 75%
more reuse by simply

974
00:58:45,410 --> 00:58:49,070
saying join your fellow guests.

975
00:58:49,070 --> 00:58:53,960
So then they tried to specify,
is it just all guests?

976
00:58:53,960 --> 00:58:56,835
Or could they get an
even greater result?

977
00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:03,640
So in our Weberian
concepts, this

978
00:59:03,640 --> 00:59:08,630
is sort of a little
bit of be like others.

979
00:59:08,630 --> 00:59:12,230
Enjoy your group membership.

980
00:59:12,230 --> 00:59:16,260
But it's hardly
efficiency, right?

981
00:59:16,260 --> 00:59:19,690
It's not a calculation of
what would be rational action.

982
00:59:19,690 --> 00:59:25,620
So then they first ask the
people who they identify with.

983
00:59:25,620 --> 00:59:31,590
Do you identify with the
people who are male or female,

984
00:59:31,590 --> 00:59:34,920
or are citizens of
the state, or are you

985
00:59:34,920 --> 00:59:37,770
an environmentally
concerned person,

986
00:59:37,770 --> 00:59:42,000
with other hotel guests, or
with guests in this room?

987
00:59:42,000 --> 00:59:46,230
I have to confess I find
this an extraordinary result.

988
00:59:46,230 --> 00:59:53,470
As you see, in the
bottom set, those

989
00:59:53,470 --> 00:59:58,300
with who identified with the
standard environmental message

990
00:59:58,300 --> 01:00:04,960
had less reuse than those where
they said people in this room

991
01:00:04,960 --> 01:00:06,535
didn't reuse their towels.

992
01:00:11,080 --> 01:00:11,800
They did.

993
01:00:11,800 --> 01:00:14,140
I'm sorry, did
reuse their towels.

994
01:00:14,140 --> 01:00:16,675
So you should be like
people in this room.

995
01:00:22,000 --> 01:00:24,370
I think it's bizarre.

996
01:00:24,370 --> 01:00:25,690
Yes.

997
01:00:25,690 --> 01:00:27,580
AUDIENCE: Well,
it's the proximity.

998
01:00:27,580 --> 01:00:31,570
You don't want to be seen
as that one guy who's not

999
01:00:31,570 --> 01:00:34,045
doing his part to contribute.

1000
01:00:34,045 --> 01:00:35,920
SUSAN SILBEY: You think
it's a smaller group.

1001
01:00:35,920 --> 01:00:37,960
And therefore, you'll
be more outstanding.

1002
01:00:40,840 --> 01:00:42,550
AUDIENCE: The
effect of you being

1003
01:00:42,550 --> 01:00:45,910
seen as a pariah
is more immediate,

1004
01:00:45,910 --> 01:00:48,283
because the small room.

1005
01:00:48,283 --> 01:00:50,200
SUSAN SILBEY: But you
don't know those people.

1006
01:00:53,620 --> 01:00:55,800
AUDIENCE: So there's
no one in this room.

1007
01:00:55,800 --> 01:00:57,700
SUSAN SILBEY: He's alone.

1008
01:00:57,700 --> 01:00:58,930
He's alone.

1009
01:00:58,930 --> 01:01:03,080
It's a hotel room,
not a dormitory.

1010
01:01:03,080 --> 01:01:04,580
AUDIENCE: I can't
really articulate.

1011
01:01:04,580 --> 01:01:07,122
I still think proximity has to
do something with it, the fact

1012
01:01:07,122 --> 01:01:08,320
that it was this room.

1013
01:01:08,320 --> 01:01:10,540
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah,
obviously has something,

1014
01:01:10,540 --> 01:01:14,580
but I find it unpersuasive.

1015
01:01:14,580 --> 01:01:15,510
Oh, sorry.

1016
01:01:15,510 --> 01:01:18,990
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
identify themselves

1017
01:01:18,990 --> 01:01:20,890
with the select group
of people who are

1018
01:01:20,890 --> 01:01:22,612
more likely to be in that room.

1019
01:01:22,612 --> 01:01:24,070
SUSAN SILBEY: I
think that's right.

1020
01:01:24,070 --> 01:01:26,110
I think that this room--

1021
01:01:26,110 --> 01:01:29,350
and maybe that's what
he was getting at.

1022
01:01:29,350 --> 01:01:31,850
That's a smaller
group of people.

1023
01:01:31,850 --> 01:01:34,990
I'm more like a person
who would be in this room

1024
01:01:34,990 --> 01:01:42,940
than I am like 350 million
citizens or half of them, male

1025
01:01:42,940 --> 01:01:45,240
or female.

1026
01:01:45,240 --> 01:01:49,440
Or even the number of
environmentally concerned

1027
01:01:49,440 --> 01:01:52,170
citizen.

1028
01:01:52,170 --> 01:01:55,170
So people in this room
is a smaller group.

1029
01:01:55,170 --> 01:01:59,760
And I'm more like those who
stay in this kind of hotel room.

1030
01:01:59,760 --> 01:02:00,835
Yes, Matthew.

1031
01:02:00,835 --> 01:02:04,290
AUDIENCE: Is it saying that the
people who identify themselves

1032
01:02:04,290 --> 01:02:06,300
as environmentally
concerned are least

1033
01:02:06,300 --> 01:02:07,950
likely to recycle the towels?

1034
01:02:07,950 --> 01:02:12,630
SUSAN SILBEY: Than when they
offered the other identities

1035
01:02:12,630 --> 01:02:13,470
to choose.

1036
01:02:13,470 --> 01:02:17,280
AUDIENCE: I think that's the
most surprising on there.

1037
01:02:17,280 --> 01:02:19,080
PROFESSOR: But the
message was presumably

1038
01:02:19,080 --> 01:02:22,980
be environmentally responsible,
recycle, as opposed

1039
01:02:22,980 --> 01:02:25,820
to recycle like people
who stayed in the room.

1040
01:02:25,820 --> 01:02:27,900
AUDIENCE: So it's not
what they identify with.

1041
01:02:27,900 --> 01:02:30,028
It's what they're given.

1042
01:02:30,028 --> 01:02:31,320
SUSAN SILBEY: It's the message.

1043
01:02:31,320 --> 01:02:34,695
Oh, it's the message,
which message got a boost.

1044
01:02:34,695 --> 01:02:36,570
PROFESSOR: The standard
environmental message

1045
01:02:36,570 --> 01:02:40,260
said help save the
environment, use your towels.

1046
01:02:40,260 --> 01:02:42,810
SUSAN SILBEY: And this
one, and for people who--

1047
01:02:42,810 --> 01:02:46,320
OK, but the other one
was be like people

1048
01:02:46,320 --> 01:02:47,682
who were in this room.

1049
01:02:47,682 --> 01:02:49,140
AUDIENCE: I think
you can attribute

1050
01:02:49,140 --> 01:02:51,900
the discrepancy between the
standard environmental message

1051
01:02:51,900 --> 01:02:52,780
and the same room.

1052
01:02:52,780 --> 01:02:55,130
And the whole--

1053
01:02:55,130 --> 01:02:58,350
I think the one to the extreme
right appeals to something

1054
01:02:58,350 --> 01:03:01,860
that's more common among humans,
just the need or the desire

1055
01:03:01,860 --> 01:03:06,975
to appear more fit, or more
civilized, or more respectable,

1056
01:03:06,975 --> 01:03:08,970
even when nobody's
watching, as opposed to just

1057
01:03:08,970 --> 01:03:10,637
standard environmental
message that only

1058
01:03:10,637 --> 01:03:17,720
a small subset of the public
even, I guess, care about,

1059
01:03:17,720 --> 01:03:18,470
acknowledge.

1060
01:03:21,890 --> 01:03:23,030
SUSAN SILBEY: Charlotte?

1061
01:03:23,030 --> 01:03:24,020
AUDIENCE: Could
also be like what

1062
01:03:24,020 --> 01:03:26,280
you were talking about
earlier, with what you register

1063
01:03:26,280 --> 01:03:27,947
and what you just
kind of see something

1064
01:03:27,947 --> 01:03:29,030
that's there all the time.

1065
01:03:29,030 --> 01:03:31,520
So standard environmental
messages are everywhere.

1066
01:03:31,520 --> 01:03:34,130
So it's possible people just
don't really register it.

1067
01:03:34,130 --> 01:03:36,380
But if you see a message
that says something different

1068
01:03:36,380 --> 01:03:39,110
than you're used to seeing,
you may just notice it more

1069
01:03:39,110 --> 01:03:41,000
and respond to it
because of that.

1070
01:03:41,000 --> 01:03:42,950
SUSAN SILBEY: Possible,
disrupted the routine.

1071
01:03:42,950 --> 01:03:44,450
Rachel?

1072
01:03:44,450 --> 01:03:49,290
AUDIENCE: The other thing, too,
is the argument about people

1073
01:03:49,290 --> 01:03:51,760
that have been in that room
doing the same thing, I think

1074
01:03:51,760 --> 01:03:53,460
Cialdini, in his
book, or whatever,

1075
01:03:53,460 --> 01:03:55,752
he talks about people being
more likely to do something

1076
01:03:55,752 --> 01:03:57,270
if someone's watching them.

1077
01:03:57,270 --> 01:03:59,200
And the fact that
they're saying,

1078
01:03:59,200 --> 01:04:01,575
oh, people who've stayed in
this room have been doing it,

1079
01:04:01,575 --> 01:04:05,910
implies the hotel is
watching which guests are.

1080
01:04:05,910 --> 01:04:08,760
SUSAN SILBEY: Yes,
that implies they know.

1081
01:04:08,760 --> 01:04:12,030
Very good, so maybe that
suggested surveillance.

1082
01:04:12,030 --> 01:04:14,730
There was another
hand up over here?

1083
01:04:14,730 --> 01:04:15,285
Yeah.

1084
01:04:15,285 --> 01:04:17,702
AUDIENCE: I was going metnion,
all these were good points.

1085
01:04:17,702 --> 01:04:20,010
But also people like
to be a part of a team.

1086
01:04:20,010 --> 01:04:22,560
That kind of makes you feel
part of a group that's being

1087
01:04:22,560 --> 01:04:24,025
environmentally conscious.

1088
01:04:24,025 --> 01:04:26,400
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah, I think
that's what Ovema and Everson

1089
01:04:26,400 --> 01:04:27,602
was saying, too.

1090
01:04:27,602 --> 01:04:28,560
You're all on the same.

1091
01:04:28,560 --> 01:04:32,100
This business of possibly their
surveillance is a new insight.

1092
01:04:32,100 --> 01:04:33,090
Yes, Andrew?

1093
01:04:35,730 --> 01:04:36,810
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1094
01:04:48,823 --> 01:04:50,240
SUSAN SILBEY: And
so why would you

1095
01:04:50,240 --> 01:04:55,830
get more reuse of the
towels by saying this room?

1096
01:04:55,830 --> 01:04:57,155
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1097
01:05:10,637 --> 01:05:12,970
SUSAN SILBEY: We don't have
a lot of evidence about that

1098
01:05:12,970 --> 01:05:13,595
is the problem.

1099
01:05:16,150 --> 01:05:19,090
That's the
individualist fallacy,

1100
01:05:19,090 --> 01:05:21,820
that there are always people
who want to be different.

1101
01:05:21,820 --> 01:05:24,050
But then there's people
who want to be different.

1102
01:05:24,050 --> 01:05:26,020
It's a group who
wants to be different.

1103
01:05:26,020 --> 01:05:29,973
This search for the
unique is the problem.

1104
01:05:29,973 --> 01:05:32,265
PROFESSOR: Back in the '60s,
there were a lot of rebels

1105
01:05:32,265 --> 01:05:34,420
all together.

1106
01:05:34,420 --> 01:05:37,000
SUSAN SILBEY: All
wanting to be different.

1107
01:05:37,000 --> 01:05:37,940
That's the problem.

1108
01:05:37,940 --> 01:05:39,320
It's social.

1109
01:05:39,320 --> 01:05:40,640
It's not individual.

1110
01:05:40,640 --> 01:05:43,090
That's the issue.

1111
01:05:43,090 --> 01:05:44,410
Yes, Scott?

1112
01:05:44,410 --> 01:05:48,310
AUDIENCE: Somebody pointed out
earlier that someone might not

1113
01:05:48,310 --> 01:05:49,570
want to reuse a towel.

1114
01:05:49,570 --> 01:05:52,030
Because they think that
I'm only one person,

1115
01:05:52,030 --> 01:05:53,030
what's this going to do?

1116
01:05:53,030 --> 01:05:56,620
But I think if you have the
info that, oh, well, everyone

1117
01:05:56,620 --> 01:05:58,630
in this room is using a towel.

1118
01:05:58,630 --> 01:06:00,760
So that you think, oh, if
I'm the one person who's

1119
01:06:00,760 --> 01:06:03,160
not doing it, then, I
am making a difference,

1120
01:06:03,160 --> 01:06:04,510
but it's in a bad way.

1121
01:06:04,510 --> 01:06:07,090
So if you contribute
to it, then you're

1122
01:06:07,090 --> 01:06:08,560
helping make a difference.

1123
01:06:08,560 --> 01:06:11,110
Whereas, it's not you're
just thinking, oh, well,

1124
01:06:11,110 --> 01:06:14,780
one person what's
that going to do?

1125
01:06:14,780 --> 01:06:20,060
SUSAN SILBEY: All right, so what
other norms or incentives might

1126
01:06:20,060 --> 01:06:23,100
we use for energy efficient--

1127
01:06:23,100 --> 01:06:24,410
Oh, let me see.

1128
01:06:24,410 --> 01:06:26,630
Let's take the takeaway
message and then consider

1129
01:06:26,630 --> 01:06:28,050
some alternative.

1130
01:06:28,050 --> 01:06:31,700
So what this cognitive
science research

1131
01:06:31,700 --> 01:06:34,160
and the experimental
research shows

1132
01:06:34,160 --> 01:06:38,990
is that people do follow
the norms of others

1133
01:06:38,990 --> 01:06:42,320
with whom they feel associated,
even if that association

1134
01:06:42,320 --> 01:06:46,040
doesn't seem, on the
outside, terribly meaningful

1135
01:06:46,040 --> 01:06:48,470
as some group identity.

1136
01:06:48,470 --> 01:06:51,770
And in some
circumstances, individuals

1137
01:06:51,770 --> 01:06:57,350
follow norms of a meaningless
and unimportant identity

1138
01:06:57,350 --> 01:07:01,400
rather than a meaningful and
important one if the connection

1139
01:07:01,400 --> 01:07:05,840
is based on an uncommon
characteristic, which is maybe

1140
01:07:05,840 --> 01:07:08,390
helps Andrew's
point a little bit,

1141
01:07:08,390 --> 01:07:11,030
that this is a
smaller group, it's

1142
01:07:11,030 --> 01:07:13,730
an uncommon characteristic.

1143
01:07:13,730 --> 01:07:16,910
And it's the same as Jacob,
and Ovema, and Everson.

1144
01:07:16,910 --> 01:07:20,210
So I can identify
with this group.

1145
01:07:20,210 --> 01:07:26,750
Now, maybe if they
had some other sign,

1146
01:07:26,750 --> 01:07:28,160
they could have done better.

1147
01:07:28,160 --> 01:07:31,580
Have you got any suggestions
of what other norms

1148
01:07:31,580 --> 01:07:33,890
they might try to invoke?

1149
01:07:36,860 --> 01:07:40,715
How might you get people,
if not only in towel reuse?

1150
01:07:44,760 --> 01:07:47,790
How can we get people?

1151
01:07:47,790 --> 01:07:49,260
Yes, Sid.

1152
01:07:49,260 --> 01:07:51,180
AUDIENCE: Give them a
financial statistic,

1153
01:07:51,180 --> 01:07:52,960
nothing coming to me.

1154
01:07:52,960 --> 01:07:55,260
If I have like a number
or something, telling me,

1155
01:07:55,260 --> 01:08:00,120
how much choice A, why choice
is better than choice B.

1156
01:08:00,120 --> 01:08:01,740
SUSAN SILBEY: Tell
them how much?

1157
01:08:01,740 --> 01:08:04,418
AUDIENCE: Well, I tell them
how much they're saving.

1158
01:08:04,418 --> 01:08:06,210
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
now that's interesting.

1159
01:08:06,210 --> 01:08:10,110
Because there was a
story in the news.

1160
01:08:10,110 --> 01:08:11,790
Remember the story
about there was

1161
01:08:11,790 --> 01:08:15,210
a story about how
the hotels were only

1162
01:08:15,210 --> 01:08:19,470
doing this to save money, that
they weren't, in fact, saving

1163
01:08:19,470 --> 01:08:21,090
energy.

1164
01:08:21,090 --> 01:08:24,010
And that had a negative effect.

1165
01:08:24,010 --> 01:08:24,899
So it has to be--

1166
01:08:24,899 --> 01:08:27,060
AUDIENCE: I don't mean
in this, hotel instance,

1167
01:08:27,060 --> 01:08:31,470
I mean when you're just
talking about energy saving.

1168
01:08:31,470 --> 01:08:33,420
if you can find that
discrepancy and you

1169
01:08:33,420 --> 01:08:39,707
can show that choice A is energy
efficient and is saving you--

1170
01:08:39,707 --> 01:08:41,790
SUSAN SILBEY: So you're
arguing that if you put it

1171
01:08:41,790 --> 01:08:44,069
into dollars,
people will behave.

1172
01:08:44,069 --> 01:08:46,859
AUDIENCE: I mean, for me, a
dollar amount says a lot more

1173
01:08:46,859 --> 01:08:50,010
than, perhaps, trying
to I guess group

1174
01:08:50,010 --> 01:08:53,240
me into one group or the other.

1175
01:08:53,240 --> 01:08:54,240
SUSAN SILBEY: That sign?

1176
01:08:56,819 --> 01:08:58,620
It's not too clear.

1177
01:08:58,620 --> 01:09:01,590
But it's how many
miles per gallon

1178
01:09:01,590 --> 01:09:04,590
you'll get is the car stickers.

1179
01:09:04,590 --> 01:09:08,040
So if you by one
car, in city driving,

1180
01:09:08,040 --> 01:09:10,600
you'll get 18 miles per gallon.

1181
01:09:10,600 --> 01:09:13,425
But on the other car, you'll
get 23 miles per gallon.

1182
01:09:16,149 --> 01:09:19,990
Will you buy the car
with the 23 and the 30?

1183
01:09:19,990 --> 01:09:22,995
Is that kind of number helpful?

1184
01:09:22,995 --> 01:09:23,620
AUDIENCE: Sure.

1185
01:09:27,428 --> 01:09:29,470
AUDIENCE: To kind of bounce
off waht he's saying,

1186
01:09:29,470 --> 01:09:31,060
it's a number, but
it doesn't really

1187
01:09:31,060 --> 01:09:33,550
tell you dollars and cents.

1188
01:09:33,550 --> 01:09:35,177
Oh, bigger number is better.

1189
01:09:35,177 --> 01:09:36,760
SUSAN SILBEY: So you
think that should

1190
01:09:36,760 --> 01:09:44,109
say you will save $500
this year on your gasoline,

1191
01:09:44,109 --> 01:09:47,710
on an average of 10,000 miles
a year or something like that?

1192
01:09:53,220 --> 01:09:53,720
Yeah?

1193
01:09:53,720 --> 01:09:56,180
AUDIENCE: And I think
it's important that you

1194
01:09:56,180 --> 01:09:57,937
talking about their savings.

1195
01:09:57,937 --> 01:09:59,520
But that kind of
sounds like the stuff

1196
01:09:59,520 --> 01:10:03,800
that you were saying before, how
people act, they might have--

1197
01:10:03,800 --> 01:10:08,490
habitually or
traditionally and perhaps

1198
01:10:08,490 --> 01:10:11,040
the willingness to
change their habits

1199
01:10:11,040 --> 01:10:15,252
is not as great as
the willingness to--

1200
01:10:15,252 --> 01:10:17,210
SUSAN SILBEY: And so why
do people buy Priuses?

1201
01:10:21,180 --> 01:10:22,650
Yeah, Matt.

1202
01:10:22,650 --> 01:10:25,690
AUDIENCE: I think it's talks
to the point about style

1203
01:10:25,690 --> 01:10:27,330
and a need for individuality.

1204
01:10:27,330 --> 01:10:31,290
That people have
Priuses because they

1205
01:10:31,290 --> 01:10:33,430
think that they're
environmentally friendly,

1206
01:10:33,430 --> 01:10:34,593
but they also want--

1207
01:10:34,593 --> 01:10:36,990
SUSAN SILBEY: Everybody
else to think they are.

1208
01:10:36,990 --> 01:10:38,550
So it's not individuality.

1209
01:10:38,550 --> 01:10:41,400
Let's just get the terminology
clear, because it's--

1210
01:10:41,400 --> 01:10:43,710
because we talk about
individuals a lot.

1211
01:10:43,710 --> 01:10:45,150
People buy Priuses.

1212
01:10:45,150 --> 01:10:47,490
And what you're trying
to say is because they

1213
01:10:47,490 --> 01:10:51,060
want to be seen to
be environmentally?

1214
01:10:51,060 --> 01:10:51,810
No?

1215
01:10:51,810 --> 01:10:54,310
AUDIENCE: Yeah, but in a way
that makes them look effortless

1216
01:10:54,310 --> 01:10:55,450
like they're doing it.

1217
01:10:55,450 --> 01:10:57,480
SUSAN SILBEY: Because
it's just routine.

1218
01:10:57,480 --> 01:10:58,770
I've made a commitment.

1219
01:10:58,770 --> 01:11:01,690
I'm a good person.

1220
01:11:01,690 --> 01:11:03,650
Jessica, and then Charles.

1221
01:11:03,650 --> 01:11:05,650
AUDIENCE: It's got to be
coupled with you go in,

1222
01:11:05,650 --> 01:11:11,075
and you see something that's
got off the charts mileage, MPG

1223
01:11:11,075 --> 01:11:13,023
mileage, and the
sales person there's

1224
01:11:13,023 --> 01:11:14,440
going to tell you
this is the best

1225
01:11:14,440 --> 01:11:15,648
investment I'm going to make.

1226
01:11:15,648 --> 01:11:17,543
I think if they actually
ran the numbers,

1227
01:11:17,543 --> 01:11:19,210
like you did in class,
in front of them,

1228
01:11:19,210 --> 01:11:23,060
and they told them it's never
going to break even, never

1229
01:11:23,060 --> 01:11:23,950
pay for itself.

1230
01:11:23,950 --> 01:11:29,830
I think they might not want
to still be seen [INAUDIBLE]..

1231
01:11:29,830 --> 01:11:33,040
SUSAN SILBEY: I didn't think the
argument was, about the Prius,

1232
01:11:33,040 --> 01:11:34,870
that it wouldn't be
environmentally good.

1233
01:11:34,870 --> 01:11:38,990
They just never get
the savings back.

1234
01:11:38,990 --> 01:11:41,740
But so you two are
not disagreeing.

1235
01:11:41,740 --> 01:11:44,353
You're offering two
different motivations.

1236
01:11:44,353 --> 01:11:47,020
AUDIENCE: I just think their
own economical well-being

1237
01:11:47,020 --> 01:11:49,810
would overpower their
want to be environmental.

1238
01:11:49,810 --> 01:11:51,880
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
that's a hypothesis.

1239
01:11:51,880 --> 01:11:56,140
That's a hypothesis which is
challenged by all the Priuses.

1240
01:11:56,140 --> 01:11:57,730
Oh, you're saying
they don't know.

1241
01:11:57,730 --> 01:11:58,397
They don't know.

1242
01:11:58,397 --> 01:11:59,855
PROFESSOR: There's
also a question,

1243
01:11:59,855 --> 01:12:02,110
there are hybrids available
in other cars that

1244
01:12:02,110 --> 01:12:03,940
aren't distinctly styled.

1245
01:12:03,940 --> 01:12:06,850
You could buy hybrids and
various other vehicles,

1246
01:12:06,850 --> 01:12:09,400
as opposed to the Prius
being a hybrid Corolla,

1247
01:12:09,400 --> 01:12:11,260
looks like a Corolla,
it's distinctive.

1248
01:12:11,260 --> 01:12:14,030
You can buy hybrids in
various Ford and Chevy models

1249
01:12:14,030 --> 01:12:16,990
that are indistinguishable
from a distance.

1250
01:12:16,990 --> 01:12:20,680
SUSAN SILBEY: And that would
not serve Max's reason,

1251
01:12:20,680 --> 01:12:23,990
because everybody has
to know that you are--

1252
01:12:23,990 --> 01:12:25,240
PROFESSOR: Not many people do.

1253
01:12:25,240 --> 01:12:26,657
You don't buy it
for Max's reason,

1254
01:12:26,657 --> 01:12:28,830
because nobody can tell
you made the purchase.

1255
01:12:28,830 --> 01:12:30,900
And the sales are less.

1256
01:12:30,900 --> 01:12:32,580
SUSAN SILBEY: Jacob
and then Charlotte.

1257
01:12:32,580 --> 01:12:34,770
AUDIENCE: I would say
there's kind of a threshold.

1258
01:12:34,770 --> 01:12:36,670
Once so many Priuses
were sold, they

1259
01:12:36,670 --> 01:12:38,580
became a thing in advertising.

1260
01:12:38,580 --> 01:12:40,482
When someone thought,
I need to buy a hybrid.

1261
01:12:40,482 --> 01:12:41,440
They though of a Prius.

1262
01:12:41,440 --> 01:12:42,945
They didn't think
of other hybrids.

1263
01:12:42,945 --> 01:12:44,070
SUSAN SILBEY: I'll confess.

1264
01:12:44,070 --> 01:12:46,740
I didn't know, for a long
time, there were others.

1265
01:12:46,740 --> 01:12:48,600
I just saw the Priuses.

1266
01:12:48,600 --> 01:12:51,690
So I was one of those people who
don't recognize the ones that

1267
01:12:51,690 --> 01:12:55,620
are not styled differently.

1268
01:12:55,620 --> 01:12:56,630
That's right.

1269
01:12:56,630 --> 01:12:57,880
That's right.

1270
01:12:57,880 --> 01:12:59,255
AUDIENCE: I was
just going to say

1271
01:12:59,255 --> 01:13:02,400
that I agree that I think
that economical position comes

1272
01:13:02,400 --> 01:13:03,510
into a lot of part.

1273
01:13:03,510 --> 01:13:06,850
Because the way that Priuses are
advertised, is their advertised

1274
01:13:06,850 --> 01:13:08,650
that gas is really expensive.

1275
01:13:08,650 --> 01:13:10,930
And this is also
environmentally friendly.

1276
01:13:10,930 --> 01:13:11,820
But it's a lot of--

1277
01:13:11,820 --> 01:13:13,810
people think that they're
going to save a lot of money.

1278
01:13:13,810 --> 01:13:15,000
And if you show them the
numbers, they wouldn't.

1279
01:13:15,000 --> 01:13:17,160
But whenever I
was getting a car,

1280
01:13:17,160 --> 01:13:19,192
I was considering buying
a Prius, because it's

1281
01:13:19,192 --> 01:13:20,650
environmentally
friendly, whatever.

1282
01:13:20,650 --> 01:13:23,130
But also because I
live in Oklahoma.

1283
01:13:23,130 --> 01:13:24,040
So I drive a lot.

1284
01:13:24,040 --> 01:13:26,757
And I wanted to not have to
pay a lot of money for gas.

1285
01:13:26,757 --> 01:13:27,840
And that was my reasoning.

1286
01:13:27,840 --> 01:13:30,663
And I would have never
considered running the numbers.

1287
01:13:30,663 --> 01:13:32,580
SUSAN SILBEY: You just
believe what they told.

1288
01:13:32,580 --> 01:13:34,200
AUDIENCE: Yeah,
and then also, just

1289
01:13:34,200 --> 01:13:36,283
because when you
think of hybrid,

1290
01:13:36,283 --> 01:13:38,700
you think of Prius, because
of their advertising strategy.

1291
01:13:38,700 --> 01:13:41,040
It's not like I wasn't
wanting to buy it

1292
01:13:41,040 --> 01:13:43,622
just because I thought it
would make people think that I

1293
01:13:43,622 --> 01:13:44,830
was environmentally friendly.

1294
01:13:44,830 --> 01:13:47,310
It was because I thought, oh,
maybe I wanted a hybrid car.

1295
01:13:47,310 --> 01:13:49,840
I should get a Prius, because
that's the only one I know of.

1296
01:13:49,840 --> 01:13:52,920
SUSAN SILBEY: I want to get on
Max's side for just a moment.

1297
01:13:52,920 --> 01:13:57,060
Because I think that
people don't just

1298
01:13:57,060 --> 01:14:00,210
buy things because
they're efficient,

1299
01:14:00,210 --> 01:14:03,430
or because they're a
better economic deal.

1300
01:14:03,430 --> 01:14:07,050
You cannot explain
the fashion industry.

1301
01:14:07,050 --> 01:14:12,270
You cannot explain celebrity.

1302
01:14:12,270 --> 01:14:15,180
It's not about
economic efficiency.

1303
01:14:15,180 --> 01:14:19,410
I mean, you don't need to
have the number of sweaters

1304
01:14:19,410 --> 01:14:20,580
and shoes.

1305
01:14:20,580 --> 01:14:23,085
They don't wear out.

1306
01:14:23,085 --> 01:14:26,640
You don't have to change
the hems from long to short

1307
01:14:26,640 --> 01:14:28,650
for efficiency.

1308
01:14:28,650 --> 01:14:31,080
Why do people change
their clothes,

1309
01:14:31,080 --> 01:14:33,300
change their hairstyles?

1310
01:14:33,300 --> 01:14:36,270
It's not because it's
economically efficient.

1311
01:14:36,270 --> 01:14:37,875
There is something else.

1312
01:14:37,875 --> 01:14:42,060
PROFESSOR: Cadillac Escalades,
they don't carry much,

1313
01:14:42,060 --> 01:14:46,470
their performance is lousy,
terrible gas mileage.

1314
01:14:46,470 --> 01:14:48,960
SUSAN SILBEY: And why
do people buy them?

1315
01:14:48,960 --> 01:14:51,240
Because

1316
01:14:51,240 --> 01:14:54,252
AUDIENCE: Ford F150 is still the
best selling care in America.

1317
01:14:54,252 --> 01:14:55,710
And people like
trucks, people like

1318
01:14:55,710 --> 01:14:59,540
to be seen in high, big vehicles
to make them look wealthy.

1319
01:14:59,540 --> 01:15:01,200
And they go outdoors--

1320
01:15:01,200 --> 01:15:03,960
SUSAN SILBEY: It's called
status and approval.

1321
01:15:03,960 --> 01:15:06,630
Sid, and then Andrew.

1322
01:15:06,630 --> 01:15:10,080
AUDIENCE: I think has to do with
everyone's personal utility,

1323
01:15:10,080 --> 01:15:12,260
[INAUDIBLE].

1324
01:15:12,260 --> 01:15:14,010
SUSAN SILBEY: So where
did that personal--

1325
01:15:14,010 --> 01:15:16,440
let's get to the
basis of this lecture.

1326
01:15:16,440 --> 01:15:19,860
Where did that personal
utility come from?

1327
01:15:19,860 --> 01:15:23,602
AUDIENCE: I mean, I'm sure like
it has to do with group theory,

1328
01:15:23,602 --> 01:15:25,560
and which group you want
to be associated with.

1329
01:15:25,560 --> 01:15:28,500
But there are different groups.

1330
01:15:28,500 --> 01:15:30,570
And different people
might buy different things

1331
01:15:30,570 --> 01:15:31,810
for different reasons.

1332
01:15:31,810 --> 01:15:36,290
SUSAN SILBEY: And do we choose
all the groups we belong to?

1333
01:15:36,290 --> 01:15:37,400
Come on.

1334
01:15:37,400 --> 01:15:39,560
I mean, no.

1335
01:15:39,560 --> 01:15:41,750
You can't say, just
look around this room,

1336
01:15:41,750 --> 01:15:45,710
you can't say we all choose
the places, the groups we're

1337
01:15:45,710 --> 01:15:47,390
identified with.

1338
01:15:47,390 --> 01:15:48,710
Come on.

1339
01:15:48,710 --> 01:15:52,580
We wouldn't have the wars
we've been having if people all

1340
01:15:52,580 --> 01:15:55,760
chose their group identities.

1341
01:15:55,760 --> 01:15:56,960
Think about it.

1342
01:15:56,960 --> 01:15:59,750
Think what's driving the world.

1343
01:15:59,750 --> 01:16:02,090
And the price of oil.

1344
01:16:02,090 --> 01:16:08,150
Group identities, not rational
decision making, folks.

1345
01:16:08,150 --> 01:16:11,030
It's group identities.

1346
01:16:11,030 --> 01:16:15,320
Habitual, historic,
group identities

1347
01:16:15,320 --> 01:16:19,400
have raised the price
of oil this week.

1348
01:16:19,400 --> 01:16:22,970
Not rational decision making.

1349
01:16:22,970 --> 01:16:25,820
The stock market
went down yesterday,

1350
01:16:25,820 --> 01:16:27,500
and what did the analysts say?

1351
01:16:27,500 --> 01:16:30,650
Fear of oil reserves.

1352
01:16:30,650 --> 01:16:33,050
The oil reserves did
not change yesterday.

1353
01:16:36,110 --> 01:16:38,690
I am sorry to push back at you.

1354
01:16:38,690 --> 01:16:40,370
Make the rest of the argument.

1355
01:16:40,370 --> 01:16:41,420
Part of it's right.

1356
01:16:41,420 --> 01:16:46,860
But those utilities
come from someplace.

1357
01:16:46,860 --> 01:16:48,900
AUDIENCE: Yes, but what
I was trying to say

1358
01:16:48,900 --> 01:16:54,610
is that I think
everyone can reason

1359
01:16:54,610 --> 01:16:56,080
as to why they make a decision.

1360
01:16:56,080 --> 01:16:57,520
And it's like very--

1361
01:16:57,520 --> 01:17:00,100
yes, everyone's
utility is affected

1362
01:17:00,100 --> 01:17:01,840
by the groups around them.

1363
01:17:01,840 --> 01:17:04,750
But all I'm trying
to say is someone

1364
01:17:04,750 --> 01:17:08,380
will buy that Prius to
make a fashion statement.

1365
01:17:08,380 --> 01:17:11,260
But the utility they get out of
making that fashion statement

1366
01:17:11,260 --> 01:17:14,833
is worth more for
them than calculating

1367
01:17:14,833 --> 01:17:17,000
the savings they're going
to make and knowing that--

1368
01:17:17,000 --> 01:17:18,375
SUSAN SILBEY: So
you want to do--

1369
01:17:18,375 --> 01:17:21,250
OK, you want to do a
cost benefit analysis

1370
01:17:21,250 --> 01:17:27,160
and add to the benefit status
rewards and emotional rewards.

1371
01:17:27,160 --> 01:17:29,860
Fine, we're total
heated agreement.

1372
01:17:29,860 --> 01:17:37,120
OK, however, not everybody
can think through.

1373
01:17:37,120 --> 01:17:41,200
There are-- you have to have
the categories to think with.

1374
01:17:41,200 --> 01:17:42,760
That's where culture comes from.

1375
01:17:42,760 --> 01:17:45,145
We have cultures, and
I don't want you to--

1376
01:17:45,145 --> 01:17:48,910
that do not have certain
categories in them.

1377
01:17:48,910 --> 01:17:50,500
They just don't have them.

1378
01:17:50,500 --> 01:17:53,500
You're sitting in
the institution that

1379
01:17:53,500 --> 01:17:56,170
makes categories to think with.

1380
01:17:56,170 --> 01:17:58,150
But not everybody has them.

1381
01:17:58,150 --> 01:18:02,800
So we have to deal with the fact
that we live in an integrated

1382
01:18:02,800 --> 01:18:04,660
world, interconnected.

1383
01:18:04,660 --> 01:18:09,430
And we do not get to
choose all the time.

1384
01:18:09,430 --> 01:18:11,642
So Andrew had his hand.

1385
01:18:11,642 --> 01:18:12,830
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1386
01:18:44,790 --> 01:18:47,310
SUSAN SILBEY: Save the dollar.

1387
01:18:47,310 --> 01:18:49,920
Saving the dollar
is a good idea.

1388
01:18:49,920 --> 01:18:51,050
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1389
01:18:57,900 --> 01:18:59,490
SUSAN SILBEY: To
care about that.

1390
01:18:59,490 --> 01:19:00,570
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1391
01:19:02,970 --> 01:19:05,500
SUSAN SILBEY: To care
about little bits of money.

1392
01:19:05,500 --> 01:19:06,570
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

1393
01:19:10,800 --> 01:19:16,020
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
this has been observed

1394
01:19:16,020 --> 01:19:18,540
about American society.

1395
01:19:18,540 --> 01:19:20,310
If you want, I'll
give you the source,

1396
01:19:20,310 --> 01:19:24,000
Thorstein Veblen was an
observer at the beginning

1397
01:19:24,000 --> 01:19:26,490
of the 20th century
and described

1398
01:19:26,490 --> 01:19:30,580
Americans preoccupation
with these kinds of things.

1399
01:19:30,580 --> 01:19:33,140
OK,

1400
01:19:33,140 --> 01:19:35,780
PROFESSOR: [INAUDIBLE].

1401
01:19:35,780 --> 01:19:37,470
Dallas, Texas, you
would not do that.

1402
01:19:37,470 --> 01:19:41,170
Houston, Texas, you
would not do that.

1403
01:19:41,170 --> 01:19:43,150
SUSAN SILBEY: Well, see you on--

1404
01:19:43,150 --> 01:19:43,700
next week.

1405
01:19:43,700 --> 01:19:45,480
Thank you.