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PROFESSOR: We have
the privilege today

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of hearing from
Professor Susan Silbey.

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Professor Silbey
taught this class

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with Professor [? Dysart ?]
and me in the last two years.

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And she is a sociologist,
political scientist,

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anthropologist, head of
the anthropology section.

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And obviously brings a
different perspective

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to a number of these issues than
I, a poor country economist do.

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And as I said last
time, I showed

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you a little bit of the
economics of energy demand,

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and then suggested at
the end of the lecture,

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by talking about
dollars on the sidewalk

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and what picked up in energy
efficiency on the one hand,

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and people aggressively
investing in energy

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efficiency on the other hand.

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Perhaps, the notion of
tangible energy services

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wasn't quite rich enough
to explain energy demand.

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And now, it will
all be explained.

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SUSAN SILBEY: Well, Hello,
it's rather a tall order.

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But we'll try.

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On Monday, Dick talked to
you about the economics

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of energy demand.

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He talked about how
demand for energy

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is derived from demand
for products and services.

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And so we talk
about it as mediated

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or derived demand, which
requires some adjustments

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in the basic economic models.

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He also mentioned, I
believe, that variations

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in derived demand depend upon
fixed capital investments, as

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well as short and
long run expectations.

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And that, because of those
short and long run expectations,

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income and price
elasticities are generally

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limited, unlike in other
products and services,

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and thus, constraining
the ability

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to maximize with
efficient responses.

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And as Dick just
mentioned again,

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people do not always maximize
or optimize, let me say,

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their decisions.

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There's lots of
possible efficiencies

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that are not pursued.

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And he mentioned, I believe,
on Monday, the leaving

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those dollars on the sidewalk.

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Because of, perhaps,
imperfect information,

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riskiness and uncertainty
of future savings,

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could be a lot of
other reasons too.

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And as he mentioned
again, just now,

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people might be over investing.

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Now, let's think
about what that means.

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To over invest in efficiency
means, by economic models,

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you're not going to get
a specific dollar return,

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the Prius being example.

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But there might be other
reasons why people might do it.

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That is go for more efficiency
than is defined economically.

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So why do we see economically
non-optimal decisions?

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That's the $64,000 question.

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How do people act?

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Why do people do what they do?

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Why are they not, in
the economic model,

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perfectly rational actors?

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Now, it is the mission
of all of social science

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to try to describe
human behavior.

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But the explanations
that come from economics

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are not necessarily
the same that come

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from the other social sciences.

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How many of you have had
a course in economics

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before this one?

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Oh, lots of you, because it's
required for this course.

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That's right.

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But I didn't see every hand.

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I was wondering how accurate
this survey was going to be.

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How many of you have had
a political science class?

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Let me see those hands.

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I can't see, one, two,
three, four, five, six.

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How many-- oh did I
miss some over here?

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Seven, eight.

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OK, how many have
had a history class?

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Wow, that's pretty good.

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How many have had an
anthropology class?

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Zero, right?

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Oh, one, two.

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And we don't offer sociology
here for undergraduates, only

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really for graduate students.

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So this-- why do
people do what they do?

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It turns out that each
of the social sciences

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has a slightly different answer.

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And so by way of, well,
for those of you who

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have had a political
science class, how is it

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different from economics?

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Nobody wants-- Yeah, Andrew?

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AUDIENCE: No, equations
and stuff like that.

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SUSAN SILBEY: Well, that
turns out not to be true.

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It just isn't in the--

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it's just not in the
undergraduate class.

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There are plenty of equations.

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There are plenty of
equations in sociology, too,

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not in anthropology.

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OK, so maybe I need to do this.

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So if you think of
the social sciences

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as the study of human behavior,
there is a division of labor.

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Now, this division of labor
can be simply explained,

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but gets a little complicated
when you go into detail.

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So we might think of the
most basic and simplest

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social science as
psychology, which we almost

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don't have anymore,
which is about

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what goes on inside
people's heads.

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Psychology being the
study of a person,

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and explaining what this
person does by looking inside.

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And we have various terms for
talking about what's inside

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people's heads, their desires,
we talk about the id, which

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is the desires you have, and
the ego, which is the control,

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and the notion of a
constraint on what you do.

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But then we have--

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and I would put psychology
by itself as different

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from the rest of
the social sciences.

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And then we have
sociology, which

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says that it is
interested in what

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goes on between two or more
persons, never a person alone.

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And the unit of analysis, or
the subject, is the interaction.

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Not what's in here,
but what is exchanged

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between the two of them.

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Now, some people would
say that sociology

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is the queen, because
everything follows

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from these interactions.

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Because the interactions
can take various patterns.

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So they can be interactions
about production

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and distribution.

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And then we get economics.

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If you can think about
it as the interactions

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where some people
are making things

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that other people are receiving.

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And it happens through this
thing called the market.

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Which is sort of an
invisible black box.

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Then we might have
interactions that have

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to do with force, violence.

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And when that's
concentrated, we call

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that the state who has
a monopoly of force.

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And that's what political
science studies.

00:08:27.850 --> 00:08:32.650
So here, we have
four social sciences

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leaving the study of the
circulation of the signs.

00:08:41.020 --> 00:08:42.669
This one's more complicated.

00:08:42.669 --> 00:08:44.230
That's probably
why only two of you

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took the classes, because you
don't understand what it is.

00:08:47.470 --> 00:08:53.140
But it's the circulation of the
signs and symbols among people.

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And we call that culture.

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And that's what
anthropology studies,

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the practices, and
the production,

00:09:01.600 --> 00:09:04.510
and circulation of signs.

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So there you have
the social sciences.

00:09:07.330 --> 00:09:10.720
Now, that's a very
simple, easy distinction.

00:09:10.720 --> 00:09:16.660
But like most things in
life, that's too simple.

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And in any place--

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oh, I forgot, you're
not supposed to.

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Oh, I forgot, I
forgot, I forgot.

00:09:27.850 --> 00:09:29.470
No human power here.

00:09:32.920 --> 00:09:41.500
OK, so we have
political science, which

00:09:41.500 --> 00:09:46.270
studies force and the state.

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But it overlaps
with some sociology,

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which looks at the
patterns of interactions.

00:09:52.630 --> 00:09:55.300
And there's something
called political sociology.

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And then some of sociology
studies production

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and distribution.

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And we call that
economic sociology.

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And some of economics
is now interested in how

00:10:10.690 --> 00:10:15.490
people's desires and behaviors
affect their decision making.

00:10:15.490 --> 00:10:18.820
We call that
behavioral economics.

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And that overlaps with
psychology and anthropology.

00:10:23.480 --> 00:10:25.000
So you might just
think about what

00:10:25.000 --> 00:10:29.530
is actually studied as having
normal distributions that

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overlap.

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And depending--
lots of people are

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studying in these places, which
we call interdisciplinary.

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And that's how you
get a class like this.

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OK, so why do people,
or how do people--

00:10:47.650 --> 00:10:53.950
how do people deal with
these questions about energy?

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How do they make the decisions?

00:10:56.270 --> 00:11:01.090
So what I'm going to try to do
today, and this is my outline,

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is to go through
some basic models,

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some very general models, about
how people make decisions,

00:11:09.430 --> 00:11:13.960
the variations and the
motives, we might say,

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or the vocabularies of motive.

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I'm going to look
at some results

00:11:19.300 --> 00:11:24.010
from cognitive science and
sociology of decision making,

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going to look at
a few experiments.

00:11:26.380 --> 00:11:29.320
And then, maybe, we can
end, if time permits,

00:11:29.320 --> 00:11:32.890
with some discussion
of what happens

00:11:32.890 --> 00:11:35.590
when we focus on the
individual and the ironies

00:11:35.590 --> 00:11:36.970
of popular psychology.

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I'm not sure we'll get there.

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In future classes,
I know you are

00:11:40.510 --> 00:11:43.480
going to discuss
decision making in firms

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and organizations, which
are aggregates, patterned

00:11:47.530 --> 00:11:48.640
aggregates.

00:11:48.640 --> 00:11:51.730
Not one, but the pattern
by which people are

00:11:51.730 --> 00:11:54.350
arranged in their activities.

00:11:54.350 --> 00:11:56.590
Those are organizations
and firms.

00:11:56.590 --> 00:11:59.450
And we will look at
states, or you will,

00:11:59.450 --> 00:12:03.250
in which we make
public policies.

00:12:03.250 --> 00:12:10.580
So how do people make decisions?

00:12:10.580 --> 00:12:15.400
How do we make decisions
about right and wrong?

00:12:15.400 --> 00:12:17.620
What kind of car to buy?

00:12:17.620 --> 00:12:22.810
Why are people buying that
Prius even though they'll never

00:12:22.810 --> 00:12:23.875
recoup the savings?

00:12:29.520 --> 00:12:35.790
Why do we think that skinny
women are beautiful now?

00:12:35.790 --> 00:12:38.550
And 100 years ago, we
thought that heavy women

00:12:38.550 --> 00:12:40.380
were beautiful?

00:12:40.380 --> 00:12:43.616
Maybe none of you know
that that was the case?

00:12:43.616 --> 00:12:45.270
AUDIENCE: Advertising.

00:12:45.270 --> 00:12:47.210
SUSAN SILBEY: OK, advertising.

00:12:56.250 --> 00:12:58.530
Why might that-- but what
about the advertising?

00:12:58.530 --> 00:13:01.350
What did the advertising say?

00:13:01.350 --> 00:13:03.660
And was it advertising
100 years ago?

00:13:06.560 --> 00:13:08.140
Yeah.

00:13:08.140 --> 00:13:10.930
AUDIENCE: There's
some predominately--

00:13:10.930 --> 00:13:12.940
fashion advertising
of the '50s and '60s

00:13:12.940 --> 00:13:17.185
switched from more
volumptuous sexual icon

00:13:17.185 --> 00:13:19.050
to something really skinny.

00:13:19.050 --> 00:13:20.700
There's one person
in particular named

00:13:20.700 --> 00:13:25.100
Twiggy who kind of became a
very famous, very skinny fashion

00:13:25.100 --> 00:13:25.600
model.

00:13:25.600 --> 00:13:27.370
And everyhting from
that kind of followed.

00:13:27.370 --> 00:13:29.530
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah, but it
was in the 19th century,

00:13:29.530 --> 00:13:31.360
before there was advertising.

00:13:31.360 --> 00:13:34.014
Yes, David.

00:13:34.014 --> 00:13:37.140
AUDIENCE: I'd say there's
also a change in the signaling

00:13:37.140 --> 00:13:41.440
about what you're buying.

00:13:41.440 --> 00:13:44.300
If you go further
back, there are

00:13:44.300 --> 00:13:47.680
depictions of larger, heavier
people as being wealthy,

00:13:47.680 --> 00:13:50.000
which is something [INAUDIBLE].

00:13:50.000 --> 00:13:52.120
Which was, you didn't
have to work in fields.

00:13:52.120 --> 00:13:53.620
You had enough to eat.

00:13:53.620 --> 00:13:55.975
[INAUDIBLE]

00:13:55.975 --> 00:13:57.100
SUSAN SILBEY: That's right.

00:13:57.100 --> 00:14:01.840
And the signaling was,
in the 19th century,

00:14:01.840 --> 00:14:04.990
to have heft on you meant
you were wealthy enough

00:14:04.990 --> 00:14:06.010
to eat well.

00:14:06.010 --> 00:14:08.090
Because most people did not.

00:14:08.090 --> 00:14:10.520
So this is just a
little exercise.

00:14:10.520 --> 00:14:12.430
And this is about culture.

00:14:12.430 --> 00:14:16.660
This is about the circulating
signs, the signaling.

00:14:16.660 --> 00:14:18.820
So you've all got it.

00:14:18.820 --> 00:14:19.540
You got it.

00:14:19.540 --> 00:14:23.740
The culture encourages
us to want certain things

00:14:23.740 --> 00:14:26.170
to think their beautiful.

00:14:26.170 --> 00:14:27.550
Is there anything else?

00:14:27.550 --> 00:14:29.590
None of you believe--

00:14:29.590 --> 00:14:31.140
AUDIENCE: Education as well.

00:14:31.140 --> 00:14:35.300
SUSAN SILBEY: You're all so
socialized, it's fantastic.

00:14:35.300 --> 00:14:38.380
AUDIENCE: If we put that
slide we had up on Monday

00:14:38.380 --> 00:14:41.020
that showed you that you're not
going to make your money back

00:14:41.020 --> 00:14:43.103
from buying Prius, I think
that would deter people

00:14:43.103 --> 00:14:44.080
from buying them.

00:14:44.080 --> 00:14:48.730
And similarly with things
like obesity in the US,

00:14:48.730 --> 00:14:53.470
while being as skinny as
Twiggy might not be healthy,

00:14:53.470 --> 00:14:55.540
generally, more fit
would be more healthy

00:14:55.540 --> 00:14:57.620
due to the knowledge we
have now we might not

00:14:57.620 --> 00:14:59.470
have had 100 years ago.

00:14:59.470 --> 00:15:01.570
SUSAN SILBEY: That's
right, that's right.

00:15:01.570 --> 00:15:02.480
You've got it.

00:15:02.480 --> 00:15:05.860
But there's another set of
reasons people often offer.

00:15:05.860 --> 00:15:07.720
I'll go back.

00:15:07.720 --> 00:15:09.580
Well, you know
the other reasons?

00:15:09.580 --> 00:15:14.200
None of you have any other
reasons why we do what we do?

00:15:14.200 --> 00:15:17.260
Yeah, is that Matthew?

00:15:17.260 --> 00:15:21.050
AUDIENCE: They saw other
people doing the same thing.

00:15:21.050 --> 00:15:26.050
[INAUDIBLE]

00:15:26.050 --> 00:15:29.740
SUSAN SILBEY: These are
all sociological and

00:15:29.740 --> 00:15:31.090
anthropological reasons.

00:15:31.090 --> 00:15:34.630
And I just love it, as being
head of that department.

00:15:34.630 --> 00:15:38.620
But I usually get, not
necessarily in this class,

00:15:38.620 --> 00:15:40.970
I think you've all
learned quite well,

00:15:40.970 --> 00:15:46.600
many students tell me
that they are programmed

00:15:46.600 --> 00:15:50.320
to want and do certain things.

00:15:50.320 --> 00:15:52.830
And I'm so surprised
MIT students

00:15:52.830 --> 00:15:53.830
not coming up with that.

00:15:53.830 --> 00:15:57.280
Because when I teach sociology
or anthropology class,

00:15:57.280 --> 00:16:00.790
this is the one
that comes up first.

00:16:00.790 --> 00:16:02.857
None of you believe
that, anymore?

00:16:05.780 --> 00:16:08.902
It's not in your DNA.

00:16:08.902 --> 00:16:10.390
Fantastic, I love it.

00:16:10.390 --> 00:16:10.890
I love it.

00:16:13.700 --> 00:16:14.665
I think it's great.

00:16:18.130 --> 00:16:20.223
Yeah?

00:16:20.223 --> 00:16:22.390
AUDIENCE: I mean, there's
evolutionary psychologists

00:16:22.390 --> 00:16:26.640
who would argue that we're
attracted to certain things

00:16:26.640 --> 00:16:29.035
based on reproductive purposes.

00:16:34.270 --> 00:16:35.640
AUDIENCE: But not a Prius.

00:16:35.640 --> 00:16:39.210
AUDIENCE: But not a Prius.

00:16:39.210 --> 00:16:43.820
[INAUDIBLE] the hourglass shape.

00:16:43.820 --> 00:16:44.772
Wider hips.

00:16:49.290 --> 00:16:52.422
[INAUDIBLE]

00:16:52.422 --> 00:16:54.630
SUSAN SILBEY: I should have
worn something different.

00:16:54.630 --> 00:17:02.598
OK, all right, so what I want to
offer before we go further is.

00:17:02.598 --> 00:17:04.140
Oh, did you have
your hand up, David?

00:17:04.140 --> 00:17:07.440
AUDIENCE: I was going to say,
you posed the question why

00:17:07.440 --> 00:17:11.990
did the appeal change from women
that were rounder to women that

00:17:11.990 --> 00:17:14.928
were skinnier?

00:17:14.928 --> 00:17:16.470
SUSAN SILBEY: Except
for their boobs.

00:17:20.359 --> 00:17:22.609
AUDIENCE: So DNA
kind doesn't account

00:17:22.609 --> 00:17:24.979
for that, because your
DNA didn't change over

00:17:24.979 --> 00:17:26.910
the course of 50
years or 100 years.

00:17:26.910 --> 00:17:33.690
But maybe it is hardcoded
DNA is that [INAUDIBLE]

00:17:33.690 --> 00:17:37.920
or able to support themselves,
raise children, or whatever.

00:17:37.920 --> 00:17:42.870
So maybe the ideal, what
it is in the social,

00:17:42.870 --> 00:17:44.580
this woman is fit.

00:17:44.580 --> 00:17:47.160
So that means that
she's more capable?

00:17:47.160 --> 00:17:50.910
SUSAN SILBEY: So
maybe it's fit versus

00:17:50.910 --> 00:17:55.110
the specific definition of fit.

00:17:55.110 --> 00:17:58.650
AUDIENCE: Exactly, yeah so
part of it comes from the DNA

00:17:58.650 --> 00:17:59.800
that you're seeking.

00:17:59.800 --> 00:18:02.340
But the social kind of
defines what exactly--

00:18:02.340 --> 00:18:03.700
SUSAN SILBEY: That means.

00:18:03.700 --> 00:18:05.760
Well, that's a very
interesting observation.

00:18:05.760 --> 00:18:08.670
Because there's lots
of good social theory

00:18:08.670 --> 00:18:11.850
which suggests that
about lots of concepts.

00:18:11.850 --> 00:18:16.110
That many-- all
societies have some form

00:18:16.110 --> 00:18:21.430
of marriage system and family
system for raising children.

00:18:21.430 --> 00:18:28.320
So you might say that there is
a human system of reproduction

00:18:28.320 --> 00:18:32.130
in the social relations, in
addition to the biological.

00:18:32.130 --> 00:18:34.830
But, so we say there
is something called

00:18:34.830 --> 00:18:37.260
the institution of the family.

00:18:37.260 --> 00:18:40.560
But that varies from
society to society.

00:18:40.560 --> 00:18:43.650
And that's the same kind--
the specificity varies.

00:18:43.650 --> 00:18:45.660
Though there could be
something more general.

00:18:45.660 --> 00:18:47.340
And that's a good
introduction to what

00:18:47.340 --> 00:18:49.320
I want to do for a few minutes.

00:18:49.320 --> 00:18:55.050
Is I want to suggest to you that
there are a few general models

00:18:55.050 --> 00:19:00.900
of human action, which I sort
of suggested in the differences

00:19:00.900 --> 00:19:02.880
among the social sciences.

00:19:02.880 --> 00:19:06.300
And we use different
concepts and terminology

00:19:06.300 --> 00:19:09.900
to describe what is
observable in human behavior.

00:19:09.900 --> 00:19:12.060
And these social
science theories

00:19:12.060 --> 00:19:16.560
are not always, as Andrew
suggested at the outset,

00:19:16.560 --> 00:19:19.860
quantified into equations.

00:19:19.860 --> 00:19:23.790
That economics begins and
ends with those equations.

00:19:23.790 --> 00:19:26.190
The other social
sciences haven't all

00:19:26.190 --> 00:19:29.590
developed into equations
for most of what they do.

00:19:29.590 --> 00:19:32.100
But you will find it in some.

00:19:32.100 --> 00:19:34.290
In all of them,
there'll be some.

00:19:34.290 --> 00:19:38.350
So I want to show
you, for example,

00:19:38.350 --> 00:19:40.830
the equation you had on Monday.

00:19:40.830 --> 00:19:44.010
That's an economic one
about derived demand.

00:19:44.010 --> 00:19:48.090
Well, here's one you all
you may or may not know.

00:19:48.090 --> 00:19:50.220
This is one of my favorite ones.

00:19:50.220 --> 00:19:54.420
Because it's the field
that I'm specialist in.

00:19:54.420 --> 00:19:59.760
And it says that formal social
control is inversely related

00:19:59.760 --> 00:20:04.490
to informal social control.

00:20:04.490 --> 00:20:12.500
Social control is what we do to
manage other people's behavior,

00:20:12.500 --> 00:20:13.940
or to manage behavior.

00:20:13.940 --> 00:20:17.390
And formal social control
simply means government.

00:20:17.390 --> 00:20:19.610
And informal means
everything that's

00:20:19.610 --> 00:20:23.750
not the government, that's not
the legitimate use of force.

00:20:23.750 --> 00:20:29.150
And the more you have
of informal norms,

00:20:29.150 --> 00:20:33.560
informal culture, the less
you have of government.

00:20:33.560 --> 00:20:35.390
That's what this theory says.

00:20:35.390 --> 00:20:37.610
So one varies inversely.

00:20:37.610 --> 00:20:39.980
And sociologists
have been trying

00:20:39.980 --> 00:20:44.760
to validate this
theory for a long time.

00:20:44.760 --> 00:20:50.510
OK, theories without
equations are an organization

00:20:50.510 --> 00:20:53.930
of words that are
clearly defined,

00:20:53.930 --> 00:20:58.760
that try to make
explicit what is often

00:20:58.760 --> 00:21:01.850
tacit, that is unspoken.

00:21:01.850 --> 00:21:04.880
And in social
science, our task is

00:21:04.880 --> 00:21:11.210
to make explicit and
describable through systematic

00:21:11.210 --> 00:21:15.830
observations, through
transparent methods, what

00:21:15.830 --> 00:21:17.850
goes on in human behavior.

00:21:17.850 --> 00:21:22.100
So Andrew's first answer to
me was more methodological

00:21:22.100 --> 00:21:23.870
than it was conceptual.

00:21:23.870 --> 00:21:26.960
And what I offered
in my distinctions

00:21:26.960 --> 00:21:29.690
in the social science
was more conceptual.

00:21:29.690 --> 00:21:33.320
The methods we use turn
out to be almost the same

00:21:33.320 --> 00:21:35.180
across all the social sciences.

00:21:35.180 --> 00:21:39.290
We observe, we ask, we count.

00:21:39.290 --> 00:21:41.690
There are a variety
of ways of doing that.

00:21:41.690 --> 00:21:47.630
OK, so how do people
make decisions?

00:21:47.630 --> 00:21:53.330
Well, I tired to get from you
two different notions, more

00:21:53.330 --> 00:21:58.190
cultural and institutional
versus biological.

00:21:58.190 --> 00:22:04.850
But even if you look in the
non-biological explanations,

00:22:04.850 --> 00:22:10.280
there are sort of patterns that
come up in the explanations

00:22:10.280 --> 00:22:12.020
that people give.

00:22:12.020 --> 00:22:17.510
So one pattern is the
psychological one,

00:22:17.510 --> 00:22:24.710
that people act on the basis
of individual desires, wills.

00:22:24.710 --> 00:22:28.700
That sometimes, this
individual desire and will

00:22:28.700 --> 00:22:32.240
is a product of
their DNA, nature,

00:22:32.240 --> 00:22:36.020
they made their biography,
their parenthood.

00:22:36.020 --> 00:22:38.270
This is what made
them who there.

00:22:38.270 --> 00:22:40.740
There are different
kinds of persons.

00:22:40.740 --> 00:22:44.900
So this is the biological,
individualistic, personality,

00:22:44.900 --> 00:22:48.860
psychology,
evolutionary biology.

00:22:48.860 --> 00:22:51.590
Man makes history.

00:22:51.590 --> 00:22:55.460
We have an Obama as
president because he's

00:22:55.460 --> 00:22:59.100
a unique individual.

00:22:59.100 --> 00:23:04.260
We had George Washington
because he was a special person.

00:23:04.260 --> 00:23:08.010
Oh, Gandhi was charismatic.

00:23:08.010 --> 00:23:09.940
These are the
explanations that say

00:23:09.940 --> 00:23:13.560
there is something
about the person that

00:23:13.560 --> 00:23:18.190
produces the behavior
and the achievements.

00:23:18.190 --> 00:23:21.510
The alternative-- and
so, OK, so they're

00:23:21.510 --> 00:23:24.450
unique and independent
individuals.

00:23:24.450 --> 00:23:32.110
And society is merely the
aggregate of these individuals.

00:23:32.110 --> 00:23:38.260
The philosophers and writers
who exemplify this point of view

00:23:38.260 --> 00:23:42.130
include John Locke
in the 17th century,

00:23:42.130 --> 00:23:46.720
John Stuart Mill in the 19th
century, Friedrich Hayek

00:23:46.720 --> 00:23:50.140
and Milton Friedman
in the 20th century.

00:23:50.140 --> 00:23:53.170
OK, when you come
across these names,

00:23:53.170 --> 00:23:55.480
you can now put
them in the box that

00:23:55.480 --> 00:24:01.150
says we can explain what
happens in the world, including

00:24:01.150 --> 00:24:03.550
the production and
distribution of energy

00:24:03.550 --> 00:24:06.470
by looking at
individual behavior.

00:24:06.470 --> 00:24:09.340
And that's what we're
going to do today.

00:24:09.340 --> 00:24:14.020
But there's a second answer,
or a second kind theory,

00:24:14.020 --> 00:24:16.640
which many of you
gave me to start with,

00:24:16.640 --> 00:24:21.670
which is that the motives and
the intentions of individuals

00:24:21.670 --> 00:24:26.440
are located in a
larger circulation,

00:24:26.440 --> 00:24:30.070
whether it's advertising
or education,

00:24:30.070 --> 00:24:33.700
that people anticipate
certain things to happen.

00:24:33.700 --> 00:24:36.950
That they locate
themselves in a sequence.

00:24:36.950 --> 00:24:41.170
And so that it's
not the individual,

00:24:41.170 --> 00:24:44.500
but it's what the
individual has learned

00:24:44.500 --> 00:24:48.040
over time, and the experiences
that they have had,

00:24:48.040 --> 00:24:53.110
and what the philosopher John
Dewey called situated action.

00:24:53.110 --> 00:24:55.900
That an action
doesn't mean the same

00:24:55.900 --> 00:24:58.100
in one place as in another.

00:24:58.100 --> 00:25:03.400
And so therefore, the
action you make or do

00:25:03.400 --> 00:25:05.960
isn't the same in
one place or another.

00:25:05.960 --> 00:25:08.590
And if you take account
of that variation,

00:25:08.590 --> 00:25:11.900
then it isn't the
individual causation.

00:25:11.900 --> 00:25:14.120
But it's also the situation.

00:25:14.120 --> 00:25:17.650
And the authors who say
these kinds of things

00:25:17.650 --> 00:25:19.900
include Pierre Bourdieu.

00:25:19.900 --> 00:25:24.250
And he calls this situation,
or these culturally

00:25:24.250 --> 00:25:29.290
learned behaviors,
habits, or the habitus.

00:25:29.290 --> 00:25:33.430
And Adam Smith, in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments, which

00:25:33.430 --> 00:25:38.730
he wrote before he wrote The
Wealth of Nations in 1776,

00:25:38.730 --> 00:25:42.990
do you all know The Wealth
of Nations, 1776, OK,

00:25:42.990 --> 00:25:45.870
and you all know about
the invisible hand.

00:25:45.870 --> 00:25:48.210
OK, yes, no?

00:25:48.210 --> 00:25:51.960
Well, look it up on Wikipedia.

00:25:51.960 --> 00:25:56.490
But what is important about that
theory, which most people take

00:25:56.490 --> 00:25:59.880
as obvious, because the
foundation of the market

00:25:59.880 --> 00:26:02.790
is that before he wrote
The Wealth of Nations he,

00:26:02.790 --> 00:26:05.640
wrote The Theory of
Moral Sentiments.

00:26:05.640 --> 00:26:09.450
And in that book,
what Adam Smith said

00:26:09.450 --> 00:26:14.340
is that the person all
people will try to be good.

00:26:14.340 --> 00:26:18.030
They will be limited
in their desires, which

00:26:18.030 --> 00:26:21.630
is what gets translated
into demand in the market

00:26:21.630 --> 00:26:29.620
by the expectation of what their
neighbors will think of them.

00:26:29.620 --> 00:26:32.320
That doesn't hold very
true in the modern world,

00:26:32.320 --> 00:26:34.690
except if you go
to what some of you

00:26:34.690 --> 00:26:36.670
start at the
beginning, advertising,

00:26:36.670 --> 00:26:38.900
and signaling, and education.

00:26:38.900 --> 00:26:42.130
So what we desire,
Adam Smith said,

00:26:42.130 --> 00:26:45.010
will be constrained
by what we think

00:26:45.010 --> 00:26:47.050
our neighbors will think of us.

00:26:47.050 --> 00:26:52.300
And that's the framework in
which our desires or demands

00:26:52.300 --> 00:26:54.880
can shape a market.

00:26:54.880 --> 00:27:00.010
So in this second
bifurcated notion,

00:27:00.010 --> 00:27:02.620
it's not that history
makes the man.

00:27:02.620 --> 00:27:06.480
It's that man makes history.

00:27:06.480 --> 00:27:09.240
No, no, I said it backwards.

00:27:09.240 --> 00:27:10.860
Erase that.

00:27:10.860 --> 00:27:13.830
The second theory,
history makes the man.

00:27:13.830 --> 00:27:21.500
So Barack Obama can
get elected in 2008.

00:27:21.500 --> 00:27:29.930
He could not have gotten elected
president in 1980, or 1990,

00:27:29.930 --> 00:27:31.640
or 2000.

00:27:31.640 --> 00:27:36.140
Conditions had to be such,
is how the story would go.

00:27:36.140 --> 00:27:41.780
Or that George Washington
would have been a farmer,

00:27:41.780 --> 00:27:44.630
and he would have spent
his whole life as a farmer,

00:27:44.630 --> 00:27:49.220
were it not for the
American Revolution,

00:27:49.220 --> 00:27:53.240
which he did not participate
in until the war started.

00:27:53.240 --> 00:27:56.060
He was not one of the
signers of the Declaration

00:27:56.060 --> 00:27:57.650
of Independence.

00:27:57.650 --> 00:28:00.530
They needed someone
to be a general.

00:28:00.530 --> 00:28:03.480
Without that need, he wouldn't
have been the president.

00:28:03.480 --> 00:28:10.040
And so this second model is
that personhood, identity, will,

00:28:10.040 --> 00:28:17.000
the desires are produced and are
contingent on the opportunities

00:28:17.000 --> 00:28:19.340
that exist, and the constraints.

00:28:19.340 --> 00:28:21.870
And the authors who write
from this perspective

00:28:21.870 --> 00:28:24.620
are Max Weber, Emile
[? Durkheim ?] Karl

00:28:24.620 --> 00:28:28.310
Polanyi, Karl Marx,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

00:28:28.310 --> 00:28:30.650
So when you encounter
those names,

00:28:30.650 --> 00:28:35.810
you can put them as antithesis
to Locke, Mill, Hayek,

00:28:35.810 --> 00:28:37.050
and Friedman.

00:28:37.050 --> 00:28:40.430
OK, now, I'll put in
a little amendment

00:28:40.430 --> 00:28:41.900
that's not in the notes.

00:28:41.900 --> 00:28:44.750
That for the most
part, Americans,

00:28:44.750 --> 00:28:47.810
when you survey
them and ask them

00:28:47.810 --> 00:28:52.430
why things happen as they do,
they give you the first answer.

00:28:52.430 --> 00:28:54.990
Because people are special.

00:28:54.990 --> 00:28:56.840
That's why what they have.

00:28:56.840 --> 00:28:59.540
Or that's why things turn
out the way they are.

00:28:59.540 --> 00:29:04.340
We are, in the United States,
a nation of individualists.

00:29:04.340 --> 00:29:09.320
We rarely see the
patterns of aggregation.

00:29:09.320 --> 00:29:21.780
So now, one more, one more
how do people make decisions.

00:29:25.410 --> 00:29:27.840
There's one more
model that I'd like

00:29:27.840 --> 00:29:31.440
to present to you, that's
not a binary model.

00:29:31.440 --> 00:29:33.600
These have been binaries, right?

00:29:33.600 --> 00:29:37.620
Two different views, individual,
biological, collective

00:29:37.620 --> 00:29:40.110
and culture.

00:29:40.110 --> 00:29:43.380
The sociologist Max
Weber offered us

00:29:43.380 --> 00:29:45.780
a more complex notion.

00:29:45.780 --> 00:29:50.100
He suggested that
action is social

00:29:50.100 --> 00:29:52.650
whenever we take account
of somebody else,

00:29:52.650 --> 00:29:55.830
just like Adam Smith's
notion of the moral person.

00:29:55.830 --> 00:29:58.740
We care what our
neighbors think.

00:29:58.740 --> 00:30:02.250
Now, Weber didn't say we care
what our neighbors think.

00:30:02.250 --> 00:30:15.310
He merely said that he will
define action as social when

00:30:15.310 --> 00:30:19.640
we take account of another,
when there's more than one.

00:30:19.640 --> 00:30:24.100
And we anticipate,
or we care, or we

00:30:24.100 --> 00:30:29.380
want to say something
about or imagine an other

00:30:29.380 --> 00:30:31.120
in relationship to ourselves.

00:30:31.120 --> 00:30:32.590
That's what makes it social.

00:30:32.590 --> 00:30:34.420
So whenever you hear
the word "social,"

00:30:34.420 --> 00:30:37.120
which is bandied about
something terrible,

00:30:37.120 --> 00:30:41.240
it always means an
interaction of two or more.

00:30:41.240 --> 00:30:46.540
And in his grand theory, which
I'll try to do in five minutes,

00:30:46.540 --> 00:30:51.970
this is 1,000 pages, OK, you're
getting it in five minutes,

00:30:51.970 --> 00:30:55.270
there are four ways
in which we can

00:30:55.270 --> 00:30:58.030
take account of other people.

00:30:58.030 --> 00:31:02.080
The first one is what he
called rational action.

00:31:02.080 --> 00:31:06.820
And here, we have exactly
the economic model.

00:31:06.820 --> 00:31:11.830
That people act
and make decisions

00:31:11.830 --> 00:31:17.710
on the basis of reasoning,
of means and ends reasoning.

00:31:17.710 --> 00:31:22.900
That they take account of the
objects in the external world,

00:31:22.900 --> 00:31:24.370
the situations.

00:31:24.370 --> 00:31:27.100
They mobilize logic.

00:31:27.100 --> 00:31:31.390
And they try to figure out
how to get from here to there.

00:31:31.390 --> 00:31:36.520
They maximize their ends by
figuring out appropriate means.

00:31:36.520 --> 00:31:39.950
This is our economic
rational actor model.

00:31:39.950 --> 00:31:44.170
And he called that
formal rational action.

00:31:44.170 --> 00:31:46.990
But he said there was
another kind of rationality,

00:31:46.990 --> 00:31:52.480
in which we were oriented
not to maximizing

00:31:52.480 --> 00:31:57.220
means ends efficiencies, but
because there was something

00:31:57.220 --> 00:32:01.150
we thought was good,
an absolute value.

00:32:01.150 --> 00:32:05.710
This could be a conscious
belief in a God, who tells us

00:32:05.710 --> 00:32:06.760
what to do.

00:32:06.760 --> 00:32:12.820
It could be some ethical value,
such as do unto others as you

00:32:12.820 --> 00:32:14.800
would have them do unto you.

00:32:14.800 --> 00:32:17.650
It could be aesthetic
to maximize beauty.

00:32:17.650 --> 00:32:21.160
It could be to
maximize equality,

00:32:21.160 --> 00:32:28.280
as communism was originally
imagined by Karl Marx.

00:32:28.280 --> 00:32:34.480
So that behavior is organized
to maximize or to fulfill

00:32:34.480 --> 00:32:36.020
that absolute value.

00:32:36.020 --> 00:32:41.290
It's not an efficiency
or logical requirement

00:32:41.290 --> 00:32:43.270
of means and ends.

00:32:43.270 --> 00:32:46.700
And the third kind of behavior--

00:32:46.700 --> 00:32:49.180
so this is virtue.

00:32:49.180 --> 00:32:53.170
Could be you want to be
environmentally sustainable,

00:32:53.170 --> 00:32:55.550
whether it's efficient or not.

00:32:55.550 --> 00:32:59.080
OK, that's an alternative
to efficiency.

00:32:59.080 --> 00:33:02.740
The third kind of
behavior he described

00:33:02.740 --> 00:33:06.400
was ones which come from our
feelings, from our emotions.

00:33:06.400 --> 00:33:11.270
We do things because
it feels good.

00:33:11.270 --> 00:33:13.000
Now, you all know
what that's like you

00:33:13.000 --> 00:33:15.650
do a lot of that we all do.

00:33:15.650 --> 00:33:18.400
That's why people take
drugs, drink alcohol,

00:33:18.400 --> 00:33:22.060
have sex, because it feels good.

00:33:22.060 --> 00:33:25.660
It's also the basis
on which we sometimes

00:33:25.660 --> 00:33:27.790
convey honor to people.

00:33:27.790 --> 00:33:31.930
We say some people are
better than others.

00:33:31.930 --> 00:33:37.360
Being seen and celebrity,
this whole TV and internet

00:33:37.360 --> 00:33:41.710
world of being there,
people are getting some sort

00:33:41.710 --> 00:33:44.560
of emotional satisfaction.

00:33:44.560 --> 00:33:48.820
And the fourth kind
of social action

00:33:48.820 --> 00:33:52.420
is simply tradition and habit.

00:33:52.420 --> 00:33:56.230
We act because we have
always done it this way.

00:33:56.230 --> 00:34:01.660
And that, sometimes, is a little
bit of mimicry, but mimicry

00:34:01.660 --> 00:34:05.620
of the past, rather than
necessarily something

00:34:05.620 --> 00:34:06.910
co-present.

00:34:06.910 --> 00:34:11.590
And there are lots of
societies, lots of groups.

00:34:11.590 --> 00:34:14.800
And this institution,
MIT, is frequently

00:34:14.800 --> 00:34:20.120
accused of being
stuck in its ways.

00:34:20.120 --> 00:34:26.290
So when we were accredited a
few years ago, or re-accredited,

00:34:26.290 --> 00:34:28.510
the re-accreditation
committee said

00:34:28.510 --> 00:34:33.850
that MIT had just about come
into the 20th century in terms

00:34:33.850 --> 00:34:37.540
of the information systems
in which it managed.

00:34:37.540 --> 00:34:40.810
We had hardly made it to
the end of the 20th century,

00:34:40.810 --> 00:34:43.659
because we don't change
things too easily.

00:34:43.659 --> 00:34:46.969
OK, habit, it's comfortable.

00:34:46.969 --> 00:34:57.620
So now, like those overlapping
disciplines, those overlapping

00:34:57.620 --> 00:35:01.730
disciplines, all these
concepts have fuzzy borders.

00:35:01.730 --> 00:35:07.430
So it's rare that you'll ever
find an empirically observable

00:35:07.430 --> 00:35:12.260
action social action that's
just one kind, that's just

00:35:12.260 --> 00:35:16.970
rational action, or that's
just affect without habit,

00:35:16.970 --> 00:35:17.990
or something else.

00:35:17.990 --> 00:35:22.130
And that brings us to exactly
where Dick left off on Monday.

00:35:22.130 --> 00:35:25.430
What else, besides
rational action,

00:35:25.430 --> 00:35:32.570
besides economic reasoning might
be affecting demand for energy?

00:35:32.570 --> 00:35:38.150
OK, so these are the
basic models of--

00:35:38.150 --> 00:35:45.380
and habit, or
past, is what those

00:35:45.380 --> 00:35:50.840
are historic investments are
that we can't change very much.

00:35:50.840 --> 00:35:55.040
That we have suburbs
and automobiles.

00:35:55.040 --> 00:35:58.520
That we have
habituated preferences

00:35:58.520 --> 00:36:01.340
in our political system
and the individualism

00:36:01.340 --> 00:36:06.110
that makes it very hard for us
to change our energy production

00:36:06.110 --> 00:36:09.380
and consumption systems.

00:36:09.380 --> 00:36:15.010
So what I want-- this
is the big picture,

00:36:15.010 --> 00:36:18.360
and now, let's look at some
specific research that wants

00:36:18.360 --> 00:36:21.000
to do something with this.

00:36:21.000 --> 00:36:23.760
But I would like you to take
away from this the notion

00:36:23.760 --> 00:36:28.290
that any human action
involves usually

00:36:28.290 --> 00:36:31.830
a combination of
these forms of action.

00:36:31.830 --> 00:36:33.360
These are the
categories which we

00:36:33.360 --> 00:36:37.590
mix and match to describe it.

00:36:37.590 --> 00:36:41.460
So cognitive science
and the sociology

00:36:41.460 --> 00:36:48.270
of decisions, these days
there's been a recent marriage.

00:36:48.270 --> 00:36:54.920
And it may, in the end, end up
being a marriage of our brain

00:36:54.920 --> 00:36:58.230
structure and our behavior.

00:36:58.230 --> 00:37:03.320
So what used to be
psychology, asking people

00:37:03.320 --> 00:37:06.710
why they do what they do,
watching them in experiments,

00:37:06.710 --> 00:37:09.680
treating them just like
rats in experiments,

00:37:09.680 --> 00:37:16.760
we now look inside their
brains with PET scans, fMRIs.

00:37:16.760 --> 00:37:22.000
The neuroscientists look at
the brains, the architecture

00:37:22.000 --> 00:37:25.300
of our brains, the
arrangement of the pieces,

00:37:25.300 --> 00:37:29.200
that's about all
they can do, so far.

00:37:29.200 --> 00:37:34.300
And look at the physical
matter inside our skulls,

00:37:34.300 --> 00:37:39.670
where the psychologist used to
study, we might say, the mind.

00:37:39.670 --> 00:37:41.890
Brain scientists
or neuroscientists

00:37:41.890 --> 00:37:43.240
study the brain.

00:37:43.240 --> 00:37:47.440
And the cognitive scientists
go, try to put the two together.

00:37:47.440 --> 00:37:48.430
Is that fair?

00:37:48.430 --> 00:37:52.580
Do we have any BCS majors here?

00:37:52.580 --> 00:37:54.602
Not a one?

00:37:54.602 --> 00:37:58.530
Not one brain and
cognitive science major.

00:37:58.530 --> 00:38:00.000
Interesting, I
would have thought

00:38:00.000 --> 00:38:02.010
you'd all want to
become brain scientists.

00:38:02.010 --> 00:38:03.350
That's the future, folks.

00:38:06.570 --> 00:38:09.900
Well, do the brain and cognitive
science of energy decisions.

00:38:09.900 --> 00:38:13.650
There you go, there's
a dissertation for you.

00:38:13.650 --> 00:38:19.560
OK, so some of this
marriage of mind and brain

00:38:19.560 --> 00:38:22.900
has produced some
interesting results.

00:38:22.900 --> 00:38:28.320
So that what people used
to think was hard wired,

00:38:28.320 --> 00:38:32.610
the neuroscientists have
showed us is quite malleable.

00:38:32.610 --> 00:38:38.250
That in fact, oh, I think up
until about the 1980s, doctors

00:38:38.250 --> 00:38:41.280
and scientists would
say oh, well, you

00:38:41.280 --> 00:38:44.310
might be able to regenerate
muscles if you've

00:38:44.310 --> 00:38:48.300
had an accident or damaged it.

00:38:48.300 --> 00:38:51.420
But the brain was what it
was and it never changed.

00:38:51.420 --> 00:38:54.430
Well, we know that's not true.

00:38:54.430 --> 00:38:57.310
Used to think it was
fixed and formed.

00:38:57.310 --> 00:39:00.280
But now, we know that
the neurons are always

00:39:00.280 --> 00:39:01.150
in the making.

00:39:01.150 --> 00:39:03.970
And those circuits are changing.

00:39:03.970 --> 00:39:08.680
The neurons and networks,
we have learned,

00:39:08.680 --> 00:39:16.330
develop in response to
experience to the inputs.

00:39:16.330 --> 00:39:20.190
So that they shape
the capacity to act.

00:39:20.190 --> 00:39:24.500
So that it's not
just how you're born.

00:39:24.500 --> 00:39:27.430
But the experiences
that you have had

00:39:27.430 --> 00:39:30.390
transform your
mental capacities.

00:39:30.390 --> 00:39:31.820
Well, you all know that's true.

00:39:31.820 --> 00:39:33.980
You wouldn't have
gotten to MIT otherwise.

00:39:33.980 --> 00:39:37.220
Unless you all think there
was all these equations

00:39:37.220 --> 00:39:41.810
were in there to start with and
they just came out recently.

00:39:41.810 --> 00:39:43.280
That you've learned.

00:39:43.280 --> 00:39:45.620
You've learned how to
defer gratification.

00:39:45.620 --> 00:39:48.650
That's what most successful
college students, to get here,

00:39:48.650 --> 00:39:49.790
you learned.

00:39:49.790 --> 00:39:54.830
And some people don't have the
experiences which allow that.

00:39:54.830 --> 00:39:56.930
What if you're a
child who's never

00:39:56.930 --> 00:40:01.790
had gratification of any
bodily or emotional function?

00:40:01.790 --> 00:40:03.980
Well then delaying
it is not something

00:40:03.980 --> 00:40:07.400
you could learn that
will be rewarded.

00:40:07.400 --> 00:40:09.450
You understand what I'm saying?

00:40:09.450 --> 00:40:13.550
So if you've never had a
full belly, then when food

00:40:13.550 --> 00:40:15.470
is put in front of you,
you're not necessarily

00:40:15.470 --> 00:40:18.750
going to wait to eat it
until you're told to eat it.

00:40:18.750 --> 00:40:19.830
It's as simple as that.

00:40:19.830 --> 00:40:23.150
And the same thing with
cognitive activities.

00:40:23.150 --> 00:40:25.070
So there's lots
of work now going

00:40:25.070 --> 00:40:30.340
on that is closing
the gap between what

00:40:30.340 --> 00:40:35.710
is observable between the inner
states and the external aspects

00:40:35.710 --> 00:40:37.700
of culture.

00:40:37.700 --> 00:40:43.800
So in this work, in
this scholarship,

00:40:43.800 --> 00:40:46.140
scholars, researchers,
have started

00:40:46.140 --> 00:40:50.670
to distinguish a fundamental
difference between what

00:40:50.670 --> 00:40:56.700
they call automatic cognition
and deliberate cognition.

00:40:56.700 --> 00:41:01.650
Automatic cognition is rapid,
effortless, unintentional

00:41:01.650 --> 00:41:05.100
thoughts, things which are
those habits, those things we

00:41:05.100 --> 00:41:06.690
do without thinking.

00:41:06.690 --> 00:41:09.750
And it allows quick
processing of information

00:41:09.750 --> 00:41:15.150
without extended thought
or figuring out what to do.

00:41:15.150 --> 00:41:20.700
Deliberate cognition is
slow, considered, measured.

00:41:20.700 --> 00:41:24.960
Where we can reject or
accept alternatives.

00:41:24.960 --> 00:41:31.500
We can consider various
actions to take.

00:41:31.500 --> 00:41:35.970
Where we might actively
search for solutions,

00:41:35.970 --> 00:41:38.580
for characteristics,
for connections,

00:41:38.580 --> 00:41:41.700
for seeing if we can
find relationships.

00:41:41.700 --> 00:41:47.670
And where we don't assume,
but we solve, you might say.

00:41:47.670 --> 00:41:53.400
So examples of
automatic cognition

00:41:53.400 --> 00:41:56.640
are as the example,
male and female.

00:41:56.640 --> 00:41:59.490
We look at somebody and we
categorize them like that.

00:41:59.490 --> 00:42:03.150
When we can't categorize them
like that, we start to think.

00:42:03.150 --> 00:42:06.690
And we frequently, then,
refer to that person

00:42:06.690 --> 00:42:09.750
as not usual or not normal.

00:42:09.750 --> 00:42:12.870
Age, race, in the
United States is

00:42:12.870 --> 00:42:16.170
a fundamental
automatic cognition.

00:42:16.170 --> 00:42:19.640
Turns out not to be
that in all cultures.

00:42:19.640 --> 00:42:22.700
In many cultures,
it's much more varied.

00:42:22.700 --> 00:42:26.360
It's not a binary, like it
is in the United States.

00:42:26.360 --> 00:42:33.510
So our habits are examples
of automatic cognition.

00:42:33.510 --> 00:42:36.390
It's outside of our
thinking process.

00:42:36.390 --> 00:42:38.970
It's outside of consciousness.

00:42:38.970 --> 00:42:43.470
And it happens more often
when we're under stress.

00:42:43.470 --> 00:42:46.710
The experiments put people
in different conditions.

00:42:46.710 --> 00:42:50.970
And how quickly they respond
when they're under stress

00:42:50.970 --> 00:42:52.290
is measurable.

00:42:52.290 --> 00:42:55.710
In deliberate
cognition, what has

00:42:55.710 --> 00:43:00.300
been shown is that people
deliberate and they think

00:43:00.300 --> 00:43:03.180
about alternatives
when there has been

00:43:03.180 --> 00:43:07.410
a disruption of those
habits, a disruption

00:43:07.410 --> 00:43:14.430
of non-thinking-- of
acting without thought.

00:43:14.430 --> 00:43:17.910
OK, so I want to give you
some empirical examples

00:43:17.910 --> 00:43:19.290
of how this works.

00:43:22.410 --> 00:43:27.420
The first example
is by Carol Heimer

00:43:27.420 --> 00:43:29.820
at Northwestern
University, where

00:43:29.820 --> 00:43:35.710
she did a study of neonatal
care in several hospitals.

00:43:35.710 --> 00:43:41.220
She noticed in these
wards for preemie babies

00:43:41.220 --> 00:43:44.850
that routines the
hospital had established

00:43:44.850 --> 00:43:47.430
were used to manage
what was a very

00:43:47.430 --> 00:43:50.460
uncertain medical
situation, very

00:43:50.460 --> 00:43:53.550
uncertain for the
families, very stressful.

00:43:53.550 --> 00:43:58.710
And that there was a very marked
hierarchy among the staff.

00:43:58.710 --> 00:44:02.850
The aides at the bottom,
the doctors at the top,

00:44:02.850 --> 00:44:07.080
the surgical nurses higher
up, others lower down.

00:44:07.080 --> 00:44:11.430
And along with this
hierarchy of persons,

00:44:11.430 --> 00:44:16.080
Heimer also identified
a continuum of routines.

00:44:16.080 --> 00:44:18.390
At one end of her
spectrum, there

00:44:18.390 --> 00:44:22.200
were tasks which were
highly routinized.

00:44:22.200 --> 00:44:26.410
That there was almost never any
variation for how it was done.

00:44:26.410 --> 00:44:28.530
And then there were
other tasks which

00:44:28.530 --> 00:44:33.120
varied a lot from patient to
patient and family to family.

00:44:33.120 --> 00:44:38.350
She noticed that when
there was either very, very

00:44:38.350 --> 00:44:43.510
routinized or very,
very unroutinized,

00:44:43.510 --> 00:44:46.360
that there was
deliberate cognition.

00:44:46.360 --> 00:44:52.810
There was a great deal of talk,
examination, consideration

00:44:52.810 --> 00:44:54.640
of alternatives.

00:44:54.640 --> 00:44:58.840
But where there was
moderate routinization,

00:44:58.840 --> 00:45:01.240
that things were automatic.

00:45:01.240 --> 00:45:05.440
According to Heimer
the overroutinization

00:45:05.440 --> 00:45:09.010
triggers deliberate
cognition, because people

00:45:09.010 --> 00:45:14.590
are so overwhelmed and
overloaded with routines

00:45:14.590 --> 00:45:20.890
that the things they have to
do routinely become a burden.

00:45:20.890 --> 00:45:25.030
They become noise,
rather than a signal.

00:45:25.030 --> 00:45:28.750
And they cease to focus
attention on the child

00:45:28.750 --> 00:45:30.430
or on the situation.

00:45:30.430 --> 00:45:34.900
Then because there's so many
things that need to be done,

00:45:34.900 --> 00:45:39.538
and need to be done
in a specified way,

00:45:39.538 --> 00:45:43.090
they have to think
about how to do it.

00:45:43.090 --> 00:45:47.980
In underroutinized
context, they have

00:45:47.980 --> 00:45:50.770
to figure out what to do
when there are no routines.

00:45:50.770 --> 00:45:52.510
And they have to be inductive.

00:45:52.510 --> 00:45:55.220
Is this like one we saw before?

00:45:55.220 --> 00:45:58.660
Is this like the four
other cases last week?

00:45:58.660 --> 00:46:01.750
So that lots and
lots of routine,

00:46:01.750 --> 00:46:04.120
they have to think
about how to manage.

00:46:04.120 --> 00:46:06.310
No routine, they have to think.

00:46:06.310 --> 00:46:12.190
But simple, not high volume
of routines, and they

00:46:12.190 --> 00:46:13.630
act without thought.

00:46:13.630 --> 00:46:16.270
So that might be taking blood.

00:46:16.270 --> 00:46:20.210
It might be putting
in the injection.

00:46:20.210 --> 00:46:23.170
But if they have to do 10
of those things at once,

00:46:23.170 --> 00:46:24.800
then they will think about it.

00:46:24.800 --> 00:46:28.390
So that's one example.

00:46:28.390 --> 00:46:35.140
In a second study about
residents in an Argentinean

00:46:35.140 --> 00:46:40.540
shanty town, two scholars,
Auyero and Swistun

00:46:40.540 --> 00:46:44.050
studied the ways in which
people handled uncertainty

00:46:44.050 --> 00:46:50.410
in risk and especially the
conditions under which--

00:46:50.410 --> 00:46:53.410
the conditions which
sustained uncertainty

00:46:53.410 --> 00:46:58.550
and sometimes led to assessments
of environmental pollutants.

00:46:58.550 --> 00:47:03.730
So they saw that sometimes,
people paid attention

00:47:03.730 --> 00:47:05.290
to the pollutants around them.

00:47:05.290 --> 00:47:06.730
And sometimes, they didn't.

00:47:06.730 --> 00:47:10.630
And they wanted to identify
those different situations.

00:47:10.630 --> 00:47:13.450
And the evidence they
collected suggested

00:47:13.450 --> 00:47:19.120
that if the polluters
pollute without disrupting

00:47:19.120 --> 00:47:24.040
the habits of the community,
the community paid no attention

00:47:24.040 --> 00:47:25.330
to the pollution.

00:47:25.330 --> 00:47:28.730
But if the pollution
disrupted habits,

00:47:28.730 --> 00:47:31.180
such as getting
children to school,

00:47:31.180 --> 00:47:35.290
or preparing meals, or being
able to ride on the bus,

00:47:35.290 --> 00:47:38.080
then the population mobilized.

00:47:38.080 --> 00:47:42.970
The routines encouraged
people to adopt

00:47:42.970 --> 00:47:47.470
what we are calling automatic
pilot, or automatic cognition,

00:47:47.470 --> 00:47:48.730
to their surroundings.

00:47:48.730 --> 00:47:51.370
But when routines
are disrupted, people

00:47:51.370 --> 00:47:54.220
began to explore and
try to figure out

00:47:54.220 --> 00:47:58.990
what it was in the environment
that was disrupting it.

00:47:58.990 --> 00:48:02.620
So in these cases,
familiar routines

00:48:02.620 --> 00:48:05.500
combined with
automatic cognition

00:48:05.500 --> 00:48:10.450
to restrict the attention
to the pollution.

00:48:10.450 --> 00:48:12.790
So that's a second example.

00:48:12.790 --> 00:48:19.150
Third example, in a study
of political commitments,

00:48:19.150 --> 00:48:23.320
Martin and Desmond found
that when citizens identify

00:48:23.320 --> 00:48:27.310
themselves as having strong
political commitments

00:48:27.310 --> 00:48:31.480
along a continuum from
liberal to conservative,

00:48:31.480 --> 00:48:34.480
so if they were strong
at one end or the other

00:48:34.480 --> 00:48:39.190
of the political spectrum,
they spent less time evaluating

00:48:39.190 --> 00:48:41.740
the evidence about politics.

00:48:41.740 --> 00:48:46.600
The ideological commitments
organized the world for them.

00:48:46.600 --> 00:48:49.300
And it made it
effortless and efficient

00:48:49.300 --> 00:48:53.860
to know how to interpret
and how to make decisions.

00:48:53.860 --> 00:48:59.590
In a study of social
movements, the scholars

00:48:59.590 --> 00:49:05.620
found that when movement leaders
use everyday metaphors, that is

00:49:05.620 --> 00:49:08.740
ordinary language,
in particular ways,

00:49:08.740 --> 00:49:12.610
they generate more
or less support.

00:49:12.610 --> 00:49:19.160
So for example, the right
to life movement came up,

00:49:19.160 --> 00:49:21.340
that is an
anti-abortion movement,

00:49:21.340 --> 00:49:25.180
came up with a simple
phrase, right to life.

00:49:25.180 --> 00:49:30.160
And that had more
salience than did choice

00:49:30.160 --> 00:49:32.560
for those who were pro-abortion.

00:49:32.560 --> 00:49:36.520
And so the metaphors
aligned with a whole set

00:49:36.520 --> 00:49:37.950
of other metaphors.

00:49:37.950 --> 00:49:42.000
So that people
thought more or less

00:49:42.000 --> 00:49:45.480
about the process of abortion.

00:49:45.480 --> 00:49:50.880
OK, the same thing with
faith-based labor movements.

00:49:50.880 --> 00:49:53.970
In the 19th century,
Mark Steinberg

00:49:53.970 --> 00:49:57.300
has written about the
ways in which the cotton

00:49:57.300 --> 00:50:00.840
workers in England were
able to mobilize and form

00:50:00.840 --> 00:50:04.740
a union because,
this is in the 1830s

00:50:04.740 --> 00:50:09.810
to '50s, because they used
the already existing language

00:50:09.810 --> 00:50:12.240
of abolition against slavery.

00:50:12.240 --> 00:50:18.210
And they identified their work
in the cotton mills as slavery.

00:50:18.210 --> 00:50:21.390
And by associating
themselves with slavery,

00:50:21.390 --> 00:50:25.020
people didn't pay as much
attention to the differences

00:50:25.020 --> 00:50:29.040
and were more likely to
support and join the unions.

00:50:29.040 --> 00:50:33.240
More recent research
along this issue

00:50:33.240 --> 00:50:39.870
of the metaphors, the signaling,
this is about signaling,

00:50:39.870 --> 00:50:45.450
the metaphors that affect
deliberate or automatic

00:50:45.450 --> 00:50:52.410
cognition, a study of the
Serbo-Croatian conflict

00:50:52.410 --> 00:51:00.270
in the 1990s showed
that the associations

00:51:00.270 --> 00:51:05.520
with the past that people used
affected the level of conflict.

00:51:05.520 --> 00:51:09.720
Particular words and metaphors
generated associations

00:51:09.720 --> 00:51:10.920
with the past.

00:51:10.920 --> 00:51:14.130
So that people viewed
the current conflict

00:51:14.130 --> 00:51:18.810
as a continuation of hundreds
of years of conflict,

00:51:18.810 --> 00:51:21.540
rather than assess
the current conflict

00:51:21.540 --> 00:51:23.970
within current conditions.

00:51:23.970 --> 00:51:30.870
So simple metaphors
associations encourage

00:51:30.870 --> 00:51:36.340
people to think deliberately
or to act automatically.

00:51:36.340 --> 00:51:39.600
So finally, the last
example of these differences

00:51:39.600 --> 00:51:42.630
between automatic and
deliberate cognition

00:51:42.630 --> 00:51:44.790
comes from work on narrative.

00:51:44.790 --> 00:51:46.590
So we've gone, I
just want you to see,

00:51:46.590 --> 00:51:51.510
from routines, to
disruptive habits,

00:51:51.510 --> 00:51:57.240
to language organizing
social movements and wars.

00:51:57.240 --> 00:52:02.010
And now we have, from
metaphors, we go to narratives.

00:52:02.010 --> 00:52:04.530
So researchers have
not only looked

00:52:04.530 --> 00:52:07.620
at these routines,
metaphors, analogies,

00:52:07.620 --> 00:52:11.820
for triggering automatic rather
than deliberate cognition,

00:52:11.820 --> 00:52:15.600
but also at the structure,
how the metaphors are

00:52:15.600 --> 00:52:19.630
organized into a story at
narrative and storytelling.

00:52:19.630 --> 00:52:21.690
Some of the very
best research on this

00:52:21.690 --> 00:52:23.790
has been done in courtrooms.

00:52:23.790 --> 00:52:28.540
So that if witnesses
tell a story

00:52:28.540 --> 00:52:35.520
and they leave out little links
in the sequence of action,

00:52:35.520 --> 00:52:38.760
the audience, the
jurors, and the judges

00:52:38.760 --> 00:52:43.020
are more likely to
fill in those ellipses

00:52:43.020 --> 00:52:46.020
with conventional action.

00:52:46.020 --> 00:52:50.820
That is what usually is
done in those circumstances.

00:52:50.820 --> 00:52:55.200
And it is most often to the
disadvantage of a defendant,

00:52:55.200 --> 00:52:59.820
because the defendant is arguing
that this was not routine.

00:52:59.820 --> 00:53:02.130
But this was unusual.

00:53:02.130 --> 00:53:05.520
So witnessing, in
criminal courts,

00:53:05.520 --> 00:53:10.710
makes a difference how
complete your narrative is.

00:53:10.710 --> 00:53:13.620
If it is not, then
people automatically

00:53:13.620 --> 00:53:16.980
fill in with
routinized information.

00:53:16.980 --> 00:53:24.780
In my own work, I have shown
that when a story describes

00:53:24.780 --> 00:53:26.850
or fails to describe--
let me put it

00:53:26.850 --> 00:53:30.870
this way, when a story fails
to describe how power is

00:53:30.870 --> 00:53:35.610
organized, people are less
likely to resist the power

00:53:35.610 --> 00:53:38.010
of that organization or person.

00:53:38.010 --> 00:53:42.990
But when a story reveals
who holds power and why,

00:53:42.990 --> 00:53:46.680
then people are more
likely to resist authority.

00:53:46.680 --> 00:53:50.400
So a little bit
of, perhaps, what

00:53:50.400 --> 00:53:53.280
was happening last spring
in the Middle East.

00:53:53.280 --> 00:53:58.260
As stories circulated on
the internet about what

00:53:58.260 --> 00:54:00.630
was happening in
different places,

00:54:00.630 --> 00:54:04.200
in villages and towns
in Libya and in Egypt,

00:54:04.200 --> 00:54:05.910
those stories spread.

00:54:05.910 --> 00:54:08.970
And they told stories,
they were stories,

00:54:08.970 --> 00:54:13.140
about what the government
was doing to whom.

00:54:13.140 --> 00:54:17.100
And it helped to
mobilize the people.

00:54:17.100 --> 00:54:21.390
So that's what cognitive
science is telling us

00:54:21.390 --> 00:54:27.730
about how people make deliberate
or automatic decisions.

00:54:27.730 --> 00:54:30.880
We have some
experimental data that

00:54:30.880 --> 00:54:34.330
helps us to understand
how decisions

00:54:34.330 --> 00:54:39.350
can be made specifically
about energy consumption.

00:54:39.350 --> 00:54:43.990
So this was the articles you
read, I think, the experiments?

00:54:43.990 --> 00:54:49.510
Right, Goldstein,
Cialdini, and Grisk--

00:54:49.510 --> 00:54:51.080
I can't say that.

00:54:51.080 --> 00:54:54.050
So what did they want to show?

00:54:54.050 --> 00:54:56.940
What did they want to show?

00:54:56.940 --> 00:54:59.260
Yeah, Veronica?

00:54:59.260 --> 00:55:02.580
AUDIENCE: They wanted
to change the wording

00:55:02.580 --> 00:55:08.160
that they had to say your
fellow guests are doing it.

00:55:08.160 --> 00:55:10.490
Help your fellow guests.

00:55:10.490 --> 00:55:11.280
SUSAN SILBEY: Why?

00:55:11.280 --> 00:55:12.570
Why did they want to do that?

00:55:12.570 --> 00:55:15.780
AUDIENCE: Because subliminally,
that social pressure

00:55:15.780 --> 00:55:20.460
would motivate
them more to do it.

00:55:20.460 --> 00:55:23.280
And there's examples
given in the other article

00:55:23.280 --> 00:55:29.000
about how when people gave
money to the guy playing

00:55:29.000 --> 00:55:33.197
guitar or whatever, other
people behind the guy who gave--

00:55:33.197 --> 00:55:34.530
SUSAN SILBEY: So those are two--

00:55:34.530 --> 00:55:36.370
those are two different norms.

00:55:36.370 --> 00:55:39.660
Yes, those are--
looking for norms are

00:55:39.660 --> 00:55:42.510
observed patterns of action.

00:55:42.510 --> 00:55:43.500
That's what a norm is.

00:55:43.500 --> 00:55:46.620
They're looking to
see if they can find

00:55:46.620 --> 00:55:49.555
the pattern in human action.

00:55:49.555 --> 00:55:50.490
AUDIENCE: Yes, Vivian.

00:55:50.490 --> 00:55:51.660
So they did find a pattern.

00:55:51.660 --> 00:55:54.510
And I think they just want to
show that this tactic isn't

00:55:54.510 --> 00:55:57.270
being used.

00:55:57.270 --> 00:55:59.430
Whereas, because
this is something

00:55:59.430 --> 00:56:03.170
that we can use to
help people started

00:56:03.170 --> 00:56:05.900
making environmentally
conscious decisions,

00:56:05.900 --> 00:56:08.540
and it's not being used.

00:56:08.540 --> 00:56:11.270
SUSAN SILBEY: I don't want
to be personally critical.

00:56:11.270 --> 00:56:13.490
But they don't want
to show anything.

00:56:13.490 --> 00:56:15.770
They want to discover something.

00:56:15.770 --> 00:56:21.020
OK, let's talk about it in
a way that is fair to them.

00:56:21.020 --> 00:56:24.830
They have an aspiration
to understand.

00:56:24.830 --> 00:56:27.230
They want to
understand the basis

00:56:27.230 --> 00:56:34.750
upon which decisions about
energy use can be affected.

00:56:34.750 --> 00:56:39.110
OK, they want to understand
the basis of decision making.

00:56:39.110 --> 00:56:42.470
OK, and the assumption
they start with,

00:56:42.470 --> 00:56:47.630
the hypothesis is
that people mimic.

00:56:47.630 --> 00:56:50.690
They do what other people do.

00:56:50.690 --> 00:56:55.670
And they care about
whether they are a member

00:56:55.670 --> 00:56:57.470
of one group or another.

00:56:57.470 --> 00:56:59.780
That seems they
have an identity.

00:56:59.780 --> 00:57:01.430
So let's walk through it.

00:57:01.430 --> 00:57:06.050
All right, they're trying to
use, as I have on the screen,

00:57:06.050 --> 00:57:11.090
social norms, that's patterns,
to motivate conservation.

00:57:11.090 --> 00:57:12.690
Is it possible?

00:57:12.690 --> 00:57:18.350
So the question
was, the first one,

00:57:18.350 --> 00:57:23.750
would people not put
their towels for laundry

00:57:23.750 --> 00:57:25.850
but would reuse their towels?

00:57:25.850 --> 00:57:31.550
And the standard message was,
help save the environment.

00:57:31.550 --> 00:57:38.460
But the message that they
offered was slightly different.

00:57:38.460 --> 00:57:44.520
They said, you should do
this, because everybody else

00:57:44.520 --> 00:57:46.142
is doing it.

00:57:46.142 --> 00:57:48.420
Does that appeal to you?

00:57:48.420 --> 00:57:50.970
Have you seen these signs?

00:57:50.970 --> 00:57:52.875
You've never seen
these signs in hotels?

00:57:56.517 --> 00:57:58.850
AUDIENCE: I've definitely
seen the signs, more in Europe

00:57:58.850 --> 00:57:59.780
than over America.

00:57:59.780 --> 00:58:02.930
But it's also not only that
other people are doing it.

00:58:02.930 --> 00:58:05.810
I think in this case, it speaks
to anti-environmental movement

00:58:05.810 --> 00:58:09.690
that says one towel hanging is
not going to make a difference.

00:58:09.690 --> 00:58:11.853
So a lot of people,
their motivation

00:58:11.853 --> 00:58:13.520
is brought down,
because they're saying,

00:58:13.520 --> 00:58:14.978
I'm going through
all this trouble.

00:58:14.978 --> 00:58:15.830
Nobody is around me.

00:58:15.830 --> 00:58:16.997
I'm not making a difference.

00:58:16.997 --> 00:58:19.490
Why am I going to keep
the self-sacrifice?

00:58:19.490 --> 00:58:22.010
So by telling them, it's
not only the bandwagon idea.

00:58:22.010 --> 00:58:23.210
But it's also the--

00:58:23.210 --> 00:58:24.860
look we're actually
doing it in Europe,

00:58:24.860 --> 00:58:27.440
and it's actually
going to go a long way.

00:58:27.440 --> 00:58:30.650
SUSAN SILBEY: So trying to say
that each effort aggregates

00:58:30.650 --> 00:58:32.553
to a larger effort.

00:58:32.553 --> 00:58:33.470
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

00:58:33.470 --> 00:58:36.300
SUSAN SILBEY: And that other
people are doing it, too.

00:58:36.300 --> 00:58:40.540
So it's not just one
person's effort, right?

00:58:40.540 --> 00:58:45.410
OK, so they got 75%
more reuse by simply

00:58:45.410 --> 00:58:49.070
saying join your fellow guests.

00:58:49.070 --> 00:58:53.960
So then they tried to specify,
is it just all guests?

00:58:53.960 --> 00:58:56.835
Or could they get an
even greater result?

00:59:00.400 --> 00:59:03.640
So in our Weberian
concepts, this

00:59:03.640 --> 00:59:08.630
is sort of a little
bit of be like others.

00:59:08.630 --> 00:59:12.230
Enjoy your group membership.

00:59:12.230 --> 00:59:16.260
But it's hardly
efficiency, right?

00:59:16.260 --> 00:59:19.690
It's not a calculation of
what would be rational action.

00:59:19.690 --> 00:59:25.620
So then they first ask the
people who they identify with.

00:59:25.620 --> 00:59:31.590
Do you identify with the
people who are male or female,

00:59:31.590 --> 00:59:34.920
or are citizens of
the state, or are you

00:59:34.920 --> 00:59:37.770
an environmentally
concerned person,

00:59:37.770 --> 00:59:42.000
with other hotel guests, or
with guests in this room?

00:59:42.000 --> 00:59:46.230
I have to confess I find
this an extraordinary result.

00:59:46.230 --> 00:59:53.470
As you see, in the
bottom set, those

00:59:53.470 --> 00:59:58.300
with who identified with the
standard environmental message

00:59:58.300 --> 01:00:04.960
had less reuse than those where
they said people in this room

01:00:04.960 --> 01:00:06.535
didn't reuse their towels.

01:00:11.080 --> 01:00:11.800
They did.

01:00:11.800 --> 01:00:14.140
I'm sorry, did
reuse their towels.

01:00:14.140 --> 01:00:16.675
So you should be like
people in this room.

01:00:22.000 --> 01:00:24.370
I think it's bizarre.

01:00:24.370 --> 01:00:25.690
Yes.

01:00:25.690 --> 01:00:27.580
AUDIENCE: Well,
it's the proximity.

01:00:27.580 --> 01:00:31.570
You don't want to be seen
as that one guy who's not

01:00:31.570 --> 01:00:34.045
doing his part to contribute.

01:00:34.045 --> 01:00:35.920
SUSAN SILBEY: You think
it's a smaller group.

01:00:35.920 --> 01:00:37.960
And therefore, you'll
be more outstanding.

01:00:40.840 --> 01:00:42.550
AUDIENCE: The
effect of you being

01:00:42.550 --> 01:00:45.910
seen as a pariah
is more immediate,

01:00:45.910 --> 01:00:48.283
because the small room.

01:00:48.283 --> 01:00:50.200
SUSAN SILBEY: But you
don't know those people.

01:00:53.620 --> 01:00:55.800
AUDIENCE: So there's
no one in this room.

01:00:55.800 --> 01:00:57.700
SUSAN SILBEY: He's alone.

01:00:57.700 --> 01:00:58.930
He's alone.

01:00:58.930 --> 01:01:03.080
It's a hotel room,
not a dormitory.

01:01:03.080 --> 01:01:04.580
AUDIENCE: I can't
really articulate.

01:01:04.580 --> 01:01:07.122
I still think proximity has to
do something with it, the fact

01:01:07.122 --> 01:01:08.320
that it was this room.

01:01:08.320 --> 01:01:10.540
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah,
obviously has something,

01:01:10.540 --> 01:01:14.580
but I find it unpersuasive.

01:01:14.580 --> 01:01:15.510
Oh, sorry.

01:01:15.510 --> 01:01:18.990
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
identify themselves

01:01:18.990 --> 01:01:20.890
with the select group
of people who are

01:01:20.890 --> 01:01:22.612
more likely to be in that room.

01:01:22.612 --> 01:01:24.070
SUSAN SILBEY: I
think that's right.

01:01:24.070 --> 01:01:26.110
I think that this room--

01:01:26.110 --> 01:01:29.350
and maybe that's what
he was getting at.

01:01:29.350 --> 01:01:31.850
That's a smaller
group of people.

01:01:31.850 --> 01:01:34.990
I'm more like a person
who would be in this room

01:01:34.990 --> 01:01:42.940
than I am like 350 million
citizens or half of them, male

01:01:42.940 --> 01:01:45.240
or female.

01:01:45.240 --> 01:01:49.440
Or even the number of
environmentally concerned

01:01:49.440 --> 01:01:52.170
citizen.

01:01:52.170 --> 01:01:55.170
So people in this room
is a smaller group.

01:01:55.170 --> 01:01:59.760
And I'm more like those who
stay in this kind of hotel room.

01:01:59.760 --> 01:02:00.835
Yes, Matthew.

01:02:00.835 --> 01:02:04.290
AUDIENCE: Is it saying that the
people who identify themselves

01:02:04.290 --> 01:02:06.300
as environmentally
concerned are least

01:02:06.300 --> 01:02:07.950
likely to recycle the towels?

01:02:07.950 --> 01:02:12.630
SUSAN SILBEY: Than when they
offered the other identities

01:02:12.630 --> 01:02:13.470
to choose.

01:02:13.470 --> 01:02:17.280
AUDIENCE: I think that's the
most surprising on there.

01:02:17.280 --> 01:02:19.080
PROFESSOR: But the
message was presumably

01:02:19.080 --> 01:02:22.980
be environmentally responsible,
recycle, as opposed

01:02:22.980 --> 01:02:25.820
to recycle like people
who stayed in the room.

01:02:25.820 --> 01:02:27.900
AUDIENCE: So it's not
what they identify with.

01:02:27.900 --> 01:02:30.028
It's what they're given.

01:02:30.028 --> 01:02:31.320
SUSAN SILBEY: It's the message.

01:02:31.320 --> 01:02:34.695
Oh, it's the message,
which message got a boost.

01:02:34.695 --> 01:02:36.570
PROFESSOR: The standard
environmental message

01:02:36.570 --> 01:02:40.260
said help save the
environment, use your towels.

01:02:40.260 --> 01:02:42.810
SUSAN SILBEY: And this
one, and for people who--

01:02:42.810 --> 01:02:46.320
OK, but the other one
was be like people

01:02:46.320 --> 01:02:47.682
who were in this room.

01:02:47.682 --> 01:02:49.140
AUDIENCE: I think
you can attribute

01:02:49.140 --> 01:02:51.900
the discrepancy between the
standard environmental message

01:02:51.900 --> 01:02:52.780
and the same room.

01:02:52.780 --> 01:02:55.130
And the whole--

01:02:55.130 --> 01:02:58.350
I think the one to the extreme
right appeals to something

01:02:58.350 --> 01:03:01.860
that's more common among humans,
just the need or the desire

01:03:01.860 --> 01:03:06.975
to appear more fit, or more
civilized, or more respectable,

01:03:06.975 --> 01:03:08.970
even when nobody's
watching, as opposed to just

01:03:08.970 --> 01:03:10.637
standard environmental
message that only

01:03:10.637 --> 01:03:17.720
a small subset of the public
even, I guess, care about,

01:03:17.720 --> 01:03:18.470
acknowledge.

01:03:21.890 --> 01:03:23.030
SUSAN SILBEY: Charlotte?

01:03:23.030 --> 01:03:24.020
AUDIENCE: Could
also be like what

01:03:24.020 --> 01:03:26.280
you were talking about
earlier, with what you register

01:03:26.280 --> 01:03:27.947
and what you just
kind of see something

01:03:27.947 --> 01:03:29.030
that's there all the time.

01:03:29.030 --> 01:03:31.520
So standard environmental
messages are everywhere.

01:03:31.520 --> 01:03:34.130
So it's possible people just
don't really register it.

01:03:34.130 --> 01:03:36.380
But if you see a message
that says something different

01:03:36.380 --> 01:03:39.110
than you're used to seeing,
you may just notice it more

01:03:39.110 --> 01:03:41.000
and respond to it
because of that.

01:03:41.000 --> 01:03:42.950
SUSAN SILBEY: Possible,
disrupted the routine.

01:03:42.950 --> 01:03:44.450
Rachel?

01:03:44.450 --> 01:03:49.290
AUDIENCE: The other thing, too,
is the argument about people

01:03:49.290 --> 01:03:51.760
that have been in that room
doing the same thing, I think

01:03:51.760 --> 01:03:53.460
Cialdini, in his
book, or whatever,

01:03:53.460 --> 01:03:55.752
he talks about people being
more likely to do something

01:03:55.752 --> 01:03:57.270
if someone's watching them.

01:03:57.270 --> 01:03:59.200
And the fact that
they're saying,

01:03:59.200 --> 01:04:01.575
oh, people who've stayed in
this room have been doing it,

01:04:01.575 --> 01:04:05.910
implies the hotel is
watching which guests are.

01:04:05.910 --> 01:04:08.760
SUSAN SILBEY: Yes,
that implies they know.

01:04:08.760 --> 01:04:12.030
Very good, so maybe that
suggested surveillance.

01:04:12.030 --> 01:04:14.730
There was another
hand up over here?

01:04:14.730 --> 01:04:15.285
Yeah.

01:04:15.285 --> 01:04:17.702
AUDIENCE: I was going metnion,
all these were good points.

01:04:17.702 --> 01:04:20.010
But also people like
to be a part of a team.

01:04:20.010 --> 01:04:22.560
That kind of makes you feel
part of a group that's being

01:04:22.560 --> 01:04:24.025
environmentally conscious.

01:04:24.025 --> 01:04:26.400
SUSAN SILBEY: Yeah, I think
that's what Ovema and Everson

01:04:26.400 --> 01:04:27.602
was saying, too.

01:04:27.602 --> 01:04:28.560
You're all on the same.

01:04:28.560 --> 01:04:32.100
This business of possibly their
surveillance is a new insight.

01:04:32.100 --> 01:04:33.090
Yes, Andrew?

01:04:35.730 --> 01:04:36.810
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:04:48.823 --> 01:04:50.240
SUSAN SILBEY: And
so why would you

01:04:50.240 --> 01:04:55.830
get more reuse of the
towels by saying this room?

01:04:55.830 --> 01:04:57.155
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:05:10.637 --> 01:05:12.970
SUSAN SILBEY: We don't have
a lot of evidence about that

01:05:12.970 --> 01:05:13.595
is the problem.

01:05:16.150 --> 01:05:19.090
That's the
individualist fallacy,

01:05:19.090 --> 01:05:21.820
that there are always people
who want to be different.

01:05:21.820 --> 01:05:24.050
But then there's people
who want to be different.

01:05:24.050 --> 01:05:26.020
It's a group who
wants to be different.

01:05:26.020 --> 01:05:29.973
This search for the
unique is the problem.

01:05:29.973 --> 01:05:32.265
PROFESSOR: Back in the '60s,
there were a lot of rebels

01:05:32.265 --> 01:05:34.420
all together.

01:05:34.420 --> 01:05:37.000
SUSAN SILBEY: All
wanting to be different.

01:05:37.000 --> 01:05:37.940
That's the problem.

01:05:37.940 --> 01:05:39.320
It's social.

01:05:39.320 --> 01:05:40.640
It's not individual.

01:05:40.640 --> 01:05:43.090
That's the issue.

01:05:43.090 --> 01:05:44.410
Yes, Scott?

01:05:44.410 --> 01:05:48.310
AUDIENCE: Somebody pointed out
earlier that someone might not

01:05:48.310 --> 01:05:49.570
want to reuse a towel.

01:05:49.570 --> 01:05:52.030
Because they think that
I'm only one person,

01:05:52.030 --> 01:05:53.030
what's this going to do?

01:05:53.030 --> 01:05:56.620
But I think if you have the
info that, oh, well, everyone

01:05:56.620 --> 01:05:58.630
in this room is using a towel.

01:05:58.630 --> 01:06:00.760
So that you think, oh, if
I'm the one person who's

01:06:00.760 --> 01:06:03.160
not doing it, then, I
am making a difference,

01:06:03.160 --> 01:06:04.510
but it's in a bad way.

01:06:04.510 --> 01:06:07.090
So if you contribute
to it, then you're

01:06:07.090 --> 01:06:08.560
helping make a difference.

01:06:08.560 --> 01:06:11.110
Whereas, it's not you're
just thinking, oh, well,

01:06:11.110 --> 01:06:14.780
one person what's
that going to do?

01:06:14.780 --> 01:06:20.060
SUSAN SILBEY: All right, so what
other norms or incentives might

01:06:20.060 --> 01:06:23.100
we use for energy efficient--

01:06:23.100 --> 01:06:24.410
Oh, let me see.

01:06:24.410 --> 01:06:26.630
Let's take the takeaway
message and then consider

01:06:26.630 --> 01:06:28.050
some alternative.

01:06:28.050 --> 01:06:31.700
So what this cognitive
science research

01:06:31.700 --> 01:06:34.160
and the experimental
research shows

01:06:34.160 --> 01:06:38.990
is that people do follow
the norms of others

01:06:38.990 --> 01:06:42.320
with whom they feel associated,
even if that association

01:06:42.320 --> 01:06:46.040
doesn't seem, on the
outside, terribly meaningful

01:06:46.040 --> 01:06:48.470
as some group identity.

01:06:48.470 --> 01:06:51.770
And in some
circumstances, individuals

01:06:51.770 --> 01:06:57.350
follow norms of a meaningless
and unimportant identity

01:06:57.350 --> 01:07:01.400
rather than a meaningful and
important one if the connection

01:07:01.400 --> 01:07:05.840
is based on an uncommon
characteristic, which is maybe

01:07:05.840 --> 01:07:08.390
helps Andrew's
point a little bit,

01:07:08.390 --> 01:07:11.030
that this is a
smaller group, it's

01:07:11.030 --> 01:07:13.730
an uncommon characteristic.

01:07:13.730 --> 01:07:16.910
And it's the same as Jacob,
and Ovema, and Everson.

01:07:16.910 --> 01:07:20.210
So I can identify
with this group.

01:07:20.210 --> 01:07:26.750
Now, maybe if they
had some other sign,

01:07:26.750 --> 01:07:28.160
they could have done better.

01:07:28.160 --> 01:07:31.580
Have you got any suggestions
of what other norms

01:07:31.580 --> 01:07:33.890
they might try to invoke?

01:07:36.860 --> 01:07:40.715
How might you get people,
if not only in towel reuse?

01:07:44.760 --> 01:07:47.790
How can we get people?

01:07:47.790 --> 01:07:49.260
Yes, Sid.

01:07:49.260 --> 01:07:51.180
AUDIENCE: Give them a
financial statistic,

01:07:51.180 --> 01:07:52.960
nothing coming to me.

01:07:52.960 --> 01:07:55.260
If I have like a number
or something, telling me,

01:07:55.260 --> 01:08:00.120
how much choice A, why choice
is better than choice B.

01:08:00.120 --> 01:08:01.740
SUSAN SILBEY: Tell
them how much?

01:08:01.740 --> 01:08:04.418
AUDIENCE: Well, I tell them
how much they're saving.

01:08:04.418 --> 01:08:06.210
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
now that's interesting.

01:08:06.210 --> 01:08:10.110
Because there was a
story in the news.

01:08:10.110 --> 01:08:11.790
Remember the story
about there was

01:08:11.790 --> 01:08:15.210
a story about how
the hotels were only

01:08:15.210 --> 01:08:19.470
doing this to save money, that
they weren't, in fact, saving

01:08:19.470 --> 01:08:21.090
energy.

01:08:21.090 --> 01:08:24.010
And that had a negative effect.

01:08:24.010 --> 01:08:24.899
So it has to be--

01:08:24.899 --> 01:08:27.060
AUDIENCE: I don't mean
in this, hotel instance,

01:08:27.060 --> 01:08:31.470
I mean when you're just
talking about energy saving.

01:08:31.470 --> 01:08:33.420
if you can find that
discrepancy and you

01:08:33.420 --> 01:08:39.707
can show that choice A is energy
efficient and is saving you--

01:08:39.707 --> 01:08:41.790
SUSAN SILBEY: So you're
arguing that if you put it

01:08:41.790 --> 01:08:44.069
into dollars,
people will behave.

01:08:44.069 --> 01:08:46.859
AUDIENCE: I mean, for me, a
dollar amount says a lot more

01:08:46.859 --> 01:08:50.010
than, perhaps, trying
to I guess group

01:08:50.010 --> 01:08:53.240
me into one group or the other.

01:08:53.240 --> 01:08:54.240
SUSAN SILBEY: That sign?

01:08:56.819 --> 01:08:58.620
It's not too clear.

01:08:58.620 --> 01:09:01.590
But it's how many
miles per gallon

01:09:01.590 --> 01:09:04.590
you'll get is the car stickers.

01:09:04.590 --> 01:09:08.040
So if you by one
car, in city driving,

01:09:08.040 --> 01:09:10.600
you'll get 18 miles per gallon.

01:09:10.600 --> 01:09:13.425
But on the other car, you'll
get 23 miles per gallon.

01:09:16.149 --> 01:09:19.990
Will you buy the car
with the 23 and the 30?

01:09:19.990 --> 01:09:22.995
Is that kind of number helpful?

01:09:22.995 --> 01:09:23.620
AUDIENCE: Sure.

01:09:27.428 --> 01:09:29.470
AUDIENCE: To kind of bounce
off waht he's saying,

01:09:29.470 --> 01:09:31.060
it's a number, but
it doesn't really

01:09:31.060 --> 01:09:33.550
tell you dollars and cents.

01:09:33.550 --> 01:09:35.177
Oh, bigger number is better.

01:09:35.177 --> 01:09:36.760
SUSAN SILBEY: So you
think that should

01:09:36.760 --> 01:09:44.109
say you will save $500
this year on your gasoline,

01:09:44.109 --> 01:09:47.710
on an average of 10,000 miles
a year or something like that?

01:09:53.220 --> 01:09:53.720
Yeah?

01:09:53.720 --> 01:09:56.180
AUDIENCE: And I think
it's important that you

01:09:56.180 --> 01:09:57.937
talking about their savings.

01:09:57.937 --> 01:09:59.520
But that kind of
sounds like the stuff

01:09:59.520 --> 01:10:03.800
that you were saying before, how
people act, they might have--

01:10:03.800 --> 01:10:08.490
habitually or
traditionally and perhaps

01:10:08.490 --> 01:10:11.040
the willingness to
change their habits

01:10:11.040 --> 01:10:15.252
is not as great as
the willingness to--

01:10:15.252 --> 01:10:17.210
SUSAN SILBEY: And so why
do people buy Priuses?

01:10:21.180 --> 01:10:22.650
Yeah, Matt.

01:10:22.650 --> 01:10:25.690
AUDIENCE: I think it's talks
to the point about style

01:10:25.690 --> 01:10:27.330
and a need for individuality.

01:10:27.330 --> 01:10:31.290
That people have
Priuses because they

01:10:31.290 --> 01:10:33.430
think that they're
environmentally friendly,

01:10:33.430 --> 01:10:34.593
but they also want--

01:10:34.593 --> 01:10:36.990
SUSAN SILBEY: Everybody
else to think they are.

01:10:36.990 --> 01:10:38.550
So it's not individuality.

01:10:38.550 --> 01:10:41.400
Let's just get the terminology
clear, because it's--

01:10:41.400 --> 01:10:43.710
because we talk about
individuals a lot.

01:10:43.710 --> 01:10:45.150
People buy Priuses.

01:10:45.150 --> 01:10:47.490
And what you're trying
to say is because they

01:10:47.490 --> 01:10:51.060
want to be seen to
be environmentally?

01:10:51.060 --> 01:10:51.810
No?

01:10:51.810 --> 01:10:54.310
AUDIENCE: Yeah, but in a way
that makes them look effortless

01:10:54.310 --> 01:10:55.450
like they're doing it.

01:10:55.450 --> 01:10:57.480
SUSAN SILBEY: Because
it's just routine.

01:10:57.480 --> 01:10:58.770
I've made a commitment.

01:10:58.770 --> 01:11:01.690
I'm a good person.

01:11:01.690 --> 01:11:03.650
Jessica, and then Charles.

01:11:03.650 --> 01:11:05.650
AUDIENCE: It's got to be
coupled with you go in,

01:11:05.650 --> 01:11:11.075
and you see something that's
got off the charts mileage, MPG

01:11:11.075 --> 01:11:13.023
mileage, and the
sales person there's

01:11:13.023 --> 01:11:14.440
going to tell you
this is the best

01:11:14.440 --> 01:11:15.648
investment I'm going to make.

01:11:15.648 --> 01:11:17.543
I think if they actually
ran the numbers,

01:11:17.543 --> 01:11:19.210
like you did in class,
in front of them,

01:11:19.210 --> 01:11:23.060
and they told them it's never
going to break even, never

01:11:23.060 --> 01:11:23.950
pay for itself.

01:11:23.950 --> 01:11:29.830
I think they might not want
to still be seen [INAUDIBLE]..

01:11:29.830 --> 01:11:33.040
SUSAN SILBEY: I didn't think the
argument was, about the Prius,

01:11:33.040 --> 01:11:34.870
that it wouldn't be
environmentally good.

01:11:34.870 --> 01:11:38.990
They just never get
the savings back.

01:11:38.990 --> 01:11:41.740
But so you two are
not disagreeing.

01:11:41.740 --> 01:11:44.353
You're offering two
different motivations.

01:11:44.353 --> 01:11:47.020
AUDIENCE: I just think their
own economical well-being

01:11:47.020 --> 01:11:49.810
would overpower their
want to be environmental.

01:11:49.810 --> 01:11:51.880
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
that's a hypothesis.

01:11:51.880 --> 01:11:56.140
That's a hypothesis which is
challenged by all the Priuses.

01:11:56.140 --> 01:11:57.730
Oh, you're saying
they don't know.

01:11:57.730 --> 01:11:58.397
They don't know.

01:11:58.397 --> 01:11:59.855
PROFESSOR: There's
also a question,

01:11:59.855 --> 01:12:02.110
there are hybrids available
in other cars that

01:12:02.110 --> 01:12:03.940
aren't distinctly styled.

01:12:03.940 --> 01:12:06.850
You could buy hybrids and
various other vehicles,

01:12:06.850 --> 01:12:09.400
as opposed to the Prius
being a hybrid Corolla,

01:12:09.400 --> 01:12:11.260
looks like a Corolla,
it's distinctive.

01:12:11.260 --> 01:12:14.030
You can buy hybrids in
various Ford and Chevy models

01:12:14.030 --> 01:12:16.990
that are indistinguishable
from a distance.

01:12:16.990 --> 01:12:20.680
SUSAN SILBEY: And that would
not serve Max's reason,

01:12:20.680 --> 01:12:23.990
because everybody has
to know that you are--

01:12:23.990 --> 01:12:25.240
PROFESSOR: Not many people do.

01:12:25.240 --> 01:12:26.657
You don't buy it
for Max's reason,

01:12:26.657 --> 01:12:28.830
because nobody can tell
you made the purchase.

01:12:28.830 --> 01:12:30.900
And the sales are less.

01:12:30.900 --> 01:12:32.580
SUSAN SILBEY: Jacob
and then Charlotte.

01:12:32.580 --> 01:12:34.770
AUDIENCE: I would say
there's kind of a threshold.

01:12:34.770 --> 01:12:36.670
Once so many Priuses
were sold, they

01:12:36.670 --> 01:12:38.580
became a thing in advertising.

01:12:38.580 --> 01:12:40.482
When someone thought,
I need to buy a hybrid.

01:12:40.482 --> 01:12:41.440
They though of a Prius.

01:12:41.440 --> 01:12:42.945
They didn't think
of other hybrids.

01:12:42.945 --> 01:12:44.070
SUSAN SILBEY: I'll confess.

01:12:44.070 --> 01:12:46.740
I didn't know, for a long
time, there were others.

01:12:46.740 --> 01:12:48.600
I just saw the Priuses.

01:12:48.600 --> 01:12:51.690
So I was one of those people who
don't recognize the ones that

01:12:51.690 --> 01:12:55.620
are not styled differently.

01:12:55.620 --> 01:12:56.630
That's right.

01:12:56.630 --> 01:12:57.880
That's right.

01:12:57.880 --> 01:12:59.255
AUDIENCE: I was
just going to say

01:12:59.255 --> 01:13:02.400
that I agree that I think
that economical position comes

01:13:02.400 --> 01:13:03.510
into a lot of part.

01:13:03.510 --> 01:13:06.850
Because the way that Priuses are
advertised, is their advertised

01:13:06.850 --> 01:13:08.650
that gas is really expensive.

01:13:08.650 --> 01:13:10.930
And this is also
environmentally friendly.

01:13:10.930 --> 01:13:11.820
But it's a lot of--

01:13:11.820 --> 01:13:13.810
people think that they're
going to save a lot of money.

01:13:13.810 --> 01:13:15.000
And if you show them the
numbers, they wouldn't.

01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:17.160
But whenever I
was getting a car,

01:13:17.160 --> 01:13:19.192
I was considering buying
a Prius, because it's

01:13:19.192 --> 01:13:20.650
environmentally
friendly, whatever.

01:13:20.650 --> 01:13:23.130
But also because I
live in Oklahoma.

01:13:23.130 --> 01:13:24.040
So I drive a lot.

01:13:24.040 --> 01:13:26.757
And I wanted to not have to
pay a lot of money for gas.

01:13:26.757 --> 01:13:27.840
And that was my reasoning.

01:13:27.840 --> 01:13:30.663
And I would have never
considered running the numbers.

01:13:30.663 --> 01:13:32.580
SUSAN SILBEY: You just
believe what they told.

01:13:32.580 --> 01:13:34.200
AUDIENCE: Yeah,
and then also, just

01:13:34.200 --> 01:13:36.283
because when you
think of hybrid,

01:13:36.283 --> 01:13:38.700
you think of Prius, because
of their advertising strategy.

01:13:38.700 --> 01:13:41.040
It's not like I wasn't
wanting to buy it

01:13:41.040 --> 01:13:43.622
just because I thought it
would make people think that I

01:13:43.622 --> 01:13:44.830
was environmentally friendly.

01:13:44.830 --> 01:13:47.310
It was because I thought, oh,
maybe I wanted a hybrid car.

01:13:47.310 --> 01:13:49.840
I should get a Prius, because
that's the only one I know of.

01:13:49.840 --> 01:13:52.920
SUSAN SILBEY: I want to get on
Max's side for just a moment.

01:13:52.920 --> 01:13:57.060
Because I think that
people don't just

01:13:57.060 --> 01:14:00.210
buy things because
they're efficient,

01:14:00.210 --> 01:14:03.430
or because they're a
better economic deal.

01:14:03.430 --> 01:14:07.050
You cannot explain
the fashion industry.

01:14:07.050 --> 01:14:12.270
You cannot explain celebrity.

01:14:12.270 --> 01:14:15.180
It's not about
economic efficiency.

01:14:15.180 --> 01:14:19.410
I mean, you don't need to
have the number of sweaters

01:14:19.410 --> 01:14:20.580
and shoes.

01:14:20.580 --> 01:14:23.085
They don't wear out.

01:14:23.085 --> 01:14:26.640
You don't have to change
the hems from long to short

01:14:26.640 --> 01:14:28.650
for efficiency.

01:14:28.650 --> 01:14:31.080
Why do people change
their clothes,

01:14:31.080 --> 01:14:33.300
change their hairstyles?

01:14:33.300 --> 01:14:36.270
It's not because it's
economically efficient.

01:14:36.270 --> 01:14:37.875
There is something else.

01:14:37.875 --> 01:14:42.060
PROFESSOR: Cadillac Escalades,
they don't carry much,

01:14:42.060 --> 01:14:46.470
their performance is lousy,
terrible gas mileage.

01:14:46.470 --> 01:14:48.960
SUSAN SILBEY: And why
do people buy them?

01:14:48.960 --> 01:14:51.240
Because

01:14:51.240 --> 01:14:54.252
AUDIENCE: Ford F150 is still the
best selling care in America.

01:14:54.252 --> 01:14:55.710
And people like
trucks, people like

01:14:55.710 --> 01:14:59.540
to be seen in high, big vehicles
to make them look wealthy.

01:14:59.540 --> 01:15:01.200
And they go outdoors--

01:15:01.200 --> 01:15:03.960
SUSAN SILBEY: It's called
status and approval.

01:15:03.960 --> 01:15:06.630
Sid, and then Andrew.

01:15:06.630 --> 01:15:10.080
AUDIENCE: I think has to do with
everyone's personal utility,

01:15:10.080 --> 01:15:12.260
[INAUDIBLE].

01:15:12.260 --> 01:15:14.010
SUSAN SILBEY: So where
did that personal--

01:15:14.010 --> 01:15:16.440
let's get to the
basis of this lecture.

01:15:16.440 --> 01:15:19.860
Where did that personal
utility come from?

01:15:19.860 --> 01:15:23.602
AUDIENCE: I mean, I'm sure like
it has to do with group theory,

01:15:23.602 --> 01:15:25.560
and which group you want
to be associated with.

01:15:25.560 --> 01:15:28.500
But there are different groups.

01:15:28.500 --> 01:15:30.570
And different people
might buy different things

01:15:30.570 --> 01:15:31.810
for different reasons.

01:15:31.810 --> 01:15:36.290
SUSAN SILBEY: And do we choose
all the groups we belong to?

01:15:36.290 --> 01:15:37.400
Come on.

01:15:37.400 --> 01:15:39.560
I mean, no.

01:15:39.560 --> 01:15:41.750
You can't say, just
look around this room,

01:15:41.750 --> 01:15:45.710
you can't say we all choose
the places, the groups we're

01:15:45.710 --> 01:15:47.390
identified with.

01:15:47.390 --> 01:15:48.710
Come on.

01:15:48.710 --> 01:15:52.580
We wouldn't have the wars
we've been having if people all

01:15:52.580 --> 01:15:55.760
chose their group identities.

01:15:55.760 --> 01:15:56.960
Think about it.

01:15:56.960 --> 01:15:59.750
Think what's driving the world.

01:15:59.750 --> 01:16:02.090
And the price of oil.

01:16:02.090 --> 01:16:08.150
Group identities, not rational
decision making, folks.

01:16:08.150 --> 01:16:11.030
It's group identities.

01:16:11.030 --> 01:16:15.320
Habitual, historic,
group identities

01:16:15.320 --> 01:16:19.400
have raised the price
of oil this week.

01:16:19.400 --> 01:16:22.970
Not rational decision making.

01:16:22.970 --> 01:16:25.820
The stock market
went down yesterday,

01:16:25.820 --> 01:16:27.500
and what did the analysts say?

01:16:27.500 --> 01:16:30.650
Fear of oil reserves.

01:16:30.650 --> 01:16:33.050
The oil reserves did
not change yesterday.

01:16:36.110 --> 01:16:38.690
I am sorry to push back at you.

01:16:38.690 --> 01:16:40.370
Make the rest of the argument.

01:16:40.370 --> 01:16:41.420
Part of it's right.

01:16:41.420 --> 01:16:46.860
But those utilities
come from someplace.

01:16:46.860 --> 01:16:48.900
AUDIENCE: Yes, but what
I was trying to say

01:16:48.900 --> 01:16:54.610
is that I think
everyone can reason

01:16:54.610 --> 01:16:56.080
as to why they make a decision.

01:16:56.080 --> 01:16:57.520
And it's like very--

01:16:57.520 --> 01:17:00.100
yes, everyone's
utility is affected

01:17:00.100 --> 01:17:01.840
by the groups around them.

01:17:01.840 --> 01:17:04.750
But all I'm trying
to say is someone

01:17:04.750 --> 01:17:08.380
will buy that Prius to
make a fashion statement.

01:17:08.380 --> 01:17:11.260
But the utility they get out of
making that fashion statement

01:17:11.260 --> 01:17:14.833
is worth more for
them than calculating

01:17:14.833 --> 01:17:17.000
the savings they're going
to make and knowing that--

01:17:17.000 --> 01:17:18.375
SUSAN SILBEY: So
you want to do--

01:17:18.375 --> 01:17:21.250
OK, you want to do a
cost benefit analysis

01:17:21.250 --> 01:17:27.160
and add to the benefit status
rewards and emotional rewards.

01:17:27.160 --> 01:17:29.860
Fine, we're total
heated agreement.

01:17:29.860 --> 01:17:37.120
OK, however, not everybody
can think through.

01:17:37.120 --> 01:17:41.200
There are-- you have to have
the categories to think with.

01:17:41.200 --> 01:17:42.760
That's where culture comes from.

01:17:42.760 --> 01:17:45.145
We have cultures, and
I don't want you to--

01:17:45.145 --> 01:17:48.910
that do not have certain
categories in them.

01:17:48.910 --> 01:17:50.500
They just don't have them.

01:17:50.500 --> 01:17:53.500
You're sitting in
the institution that

01:17:53.500 --> 01:17:56.170
makes categories to think with.

01:17:56.170 --> 01:17:58.150
But not everybody has them.

01:17:58.150 --> 01:18:02.800
So we have to deal with the fact
that we live in an integrated

01:18:02.800 --> 01:18:04.660
world, interconnected.

01:18:04.660 --> 01:18:09.430
And we do not get to
choose all the time.

01:18:09.430 --> 01:18:11.642
So Andrew had his hand.

01:18:11.642 --> 01:18:12.830
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:18:44.790 --> 01:18:47.310
SUSAN SILBEY: Save the dollar.

01:18:47.310 --> 01:18:49.920
Saving the dollar
is a good idea.

01:18:49.920 --> 01:18:51.050
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:18:57.900 --> 01:18:59.490
SUSAN SILBEY: To
care about that.

01:18:59.490 --> 01:19:00.570
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:19:02.970 --> 01:19:05.500
SUSAN SILBEY: To care
about little bits of money.

01:19:05.500 --> 01:19:06.570
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

01:19:10.800 --> 01:19:16.020
SUSAN SILBEY: Well,
this has been observed

01:19:16.020 --> 01:19:18.540
about American society.

01:19:18.540 --> 01:19:20.310
If you want, I'll
give you the source,

01:19:20.310 --> 01:19:24.000
Thorstein Veblen was an
observer at the beginning

01:19:24.000 --> 01:19:26.490
of the 20th century
and described

01:19:26.490 --> 01:19:30.580
Americans preoccupation
with these kinds of things.

01:19:30.580 --> 01:19:33.140
OK,

01:19:33.140 --> 01:19:35.780
PROFESSOR: [INAUDIBLE].

01:19:35.780 --> 01:19:37.470
Dallas, Texas, you
would not do that.

01:19:37.470 --> 01:19:41.170
Houston, Texas, you
would not do that.

01:19:41.170 --> 01:19:43.150
SUSAN SILBEY: Well, see you on--

01:19:43.150 --> 01:19:43.700
next week.

01:19:43.700 --> 01:19:45.480
Thank you.