Agency View of the Firm and Implications for Knowledge and Skill

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Knowledge

Problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. (von Hayek)

Hierarchy

The likelihood that the top decision maker is so removed from reality is the most fundamental reason for diminishing returns to scale. (Williamson)

Moral Hazard

Incentives are the essence of economics Edward P. Lazear

What are the standard assumptions?

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What are the standard assumptions?

- Goods and services are:
- Specific
- Observable attributes
- Costlessly verifiable

Moral Hazard: definition

Post contractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable
When can it occur
When the standard assumptions are violated.

• What are some examples?

Moral Hazard: Consequences

Efficiency loss: impair mutual agreement Conservative medicine Product quality CEO behavior Debt financing (OPM) Less insurance / loss of social benefit **I**Influence costs

Moral Hard: Solutions

- Goal congruence: incentive contracts and monitoring
 - Risk asymmetry
 - Cost / benefit of incentive and efficiency loss
- Reputation mechanisms
- Bonds
- Bureaucracy

Risk Sharing and Incentives

Principal-agent problem
Shift risk if agent can't be monitored
Informativeness principle
Incentive-intensity principle
Monitor intensity principle
Equal compensation principle

Rents and efficiency

#Quasi-rents

- **#** Value of reputation
- **#** Incentives and monitoring are substitutes
- **#**Reputation requires monitoring
 - Institutional response
- **#** Competition for rents: influence costs

Decentralized Information

Bounded rationality and limited information processing make organizations interesting
 Constrained optimization (satisficing)
 Elucidate the constraints
 Coordination costs (Malone)

Decentralized Information

Non-optimal decision rules
 Complexity
 Garbage Can (Cohen and March)
 Communication constraints and bounded rationality

Fundamental limit is human attention (Simon)

Markets versus Planning

Constrained optimization
 Socialism requires too much information transfer

Firm versus Market

Coase (1937) Nobel prize. Transaction Economics

- Williamson (1975, 1985) Firm boundary and transaction economics.
- Information processing needs lead to decentralization, coordination costs bound the firm (Lawrence and Lorsch)

Computer metaphor

Decomposition economizes on communication and processing.

Communication constraints

- Iterative procedure
- Team theory. Statistical decision theory.
- Pooled information without full disclosure
- Incentive constraints

Computational constraints

Computer metaphor


Decentralized computing

- Trade-off delay and efficiency: serial and parallel processing.
- **#** Capacity utilization
- **#**Coordination costs (dynamic environment)
- # Managerial delay (Robinson, 1958; van Zandt)
- Incomplete contracts (Brynjolfsson)

Jensen and Meckling

Two types of knowledge General: inexpensive Specific: expensive **#** Collocate decision and knowledge **#** Particulars of time and place **#** Alienable rights. Court enforced **#** Firms suppress alienability **Tradeoff between centrality and decentrality**

Total Organizational Costs



Baker and Jorgensen

Question: impact of volatility on incentive contract

Insurance for risk averse

Importance of managerial behavior

Insight: two types of uncertainty

That which impacts decisions (volatility)

That which doesn't (noise)

Autor, Levy, and Murnane

Question: What is it that computers do?
Replace repetitive manual and cognitive tasks.

- Rules-based
- Symbolic processing
- Environmentally constrained

Both low and high skill work is replaced

Economic argument

Insight: repetitive and non-repetitive skills are complements. Decreasing costs of one, increase marginal product of the other.



DOT task definitions **#** Census of who works in what categories **#** Task change, not educational level change **^{^{⁴**} College provides more non-routine} cognitive skill development Types of manual tasks performed do not change. No shift.

Results

Task shifts within industry
 Not between industry employment shift
 Computer technology explains 30-50% increase in the rate of growth. Importance of skilled work was increasing before computers.

Locus of decision making

How do information technologies affect locus of decision making and control?

- Monitoring and contracting. Agency.
- Knowledge (specific, general)
- Information flow
- Coordination
- Noise and volatility

Skill level (Cat's Cradle)

Task type expansion (AI, Expert Systems)
Skill versus Cognition
Complement versus substitute
Design platform

Skill to use.