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PROFESSOR: The engines,
the aircraft engines,

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have a lot of sensors on them
because the engines really

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need to work reliably.

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So it tends to be more sort of
thermal structural components.

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And my sense is in cars, you
monitor more electronics,

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how many--

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AUDIENCE: Emissions.

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PROFESSOR: --certainly
admissions.

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It's slightly different
what's being monitored,

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and the sensors are different.

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Even the companies that
provide these sensors

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and health-monitoring equipment
tend to be different as well.

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I think, there are
similar trends,

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but they're somewhat parallel.

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I don't think one
came before the other.

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AUDIENCE: OK.

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Yeah.

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PROFESSOR: Hey,
Volcker, do you want

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to mention something about
health monitoring in general

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for operations?

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GUEST SPEAKER: I just sent
you a link on your email

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because we've been for six
years monitoring the health

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of [INAUDIBLE] that's up there.

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And it's live link,
so I don't know

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if you are able from
your computer to open it.

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I just sent you the
link on your email.

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00:01:27,880 --> 00:01:29,360
Right?

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00:01:29,360 --> 00:01:31,610
So actually, into
the first satellite

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00:01:31,610 --> 00:01:35,240
that we both [INAUDIBLE]
few years ago,

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00:01:35,240 --> 00:01:36,890
we figured we want
to know everything.

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So the primary [? dom ?]
system were all

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sent on every telemetry data
the same [? dom ?] at every path

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00:01:46,210 --> 00:01:48,050
and kept actual.

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00:01:48,050 --> 00:01:52,310
So maybe after break or
whenever there's a chance,

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go to the link, and you can see
the actual housekeeping data.

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And you'll see that the
battery, the voltage,

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is the only one
that's [INAUDIBLE]..

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00:02:02,110 --> 00:02:05,790
Likely, [INAUDIBLE] of
the six years, which

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is not bad for a VC system.

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PROFESSOR: Yup, OK, I'll
pull it up during the break.

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Thanks for that.

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That'll be interesting.

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00:02:13,580 --> 00:02:16,790
OK, let's move on.

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00:02:16,790 --> 00:02:19,760
So unfortunately, I
would say the F-18,

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00:02:19,760 --> 00:02:22,350
and there's a lot of systems
that were designed with

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operational excellence in mind--

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maintainability,
high reliability.

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That was a big thing.

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I did mention this
before, I think,

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but I just want to say that
it's not always the case.

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So this is one of the
counter-examples, the space

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shuttle.

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And I have a lot of respect.

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00:02:39,850 --> 00:02:41,420
Don't misunderstand me.

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00:02:41,420 --> 00:02:44,360
I think people that worked on
the shuttle did an amazing job.

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It was an amazing vehicle.

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But things turned
out quite differently

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than what was promised.

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I think that everybody
will agree with that.

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So this is a paper
that was actually

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a very short paper
published believe it or not

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in nature in 2011 right after
the retirement of the shuttle

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and by Pilcke et al.

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And what they did is,
they looked at the costs

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of the shuttle program.

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And the cost is well
known because this

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is all public money.

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This is all money that was
appropriated by Congress.

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And then the light blue
bars are the number

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of launches that happen
in a particular year.

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So you can see the
maximum was nine--

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nine launches in 1984--

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not a launch a week that
Congress had been told.

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And so we have about
10 years of design,

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build, test until initial
operating capability.

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And then we have about 30
years of actually usage

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and operations.

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And this is true for any system.

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The operational phase is much
longer than the design phase.

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So in this case, the
operational phase

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was 30 years right, three times
longer than the actual design

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00:03:55,260 --> 00:03:57,660
phase, which was about a decade.

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00:03:57,660 --> 00:04:00,660
The Vision was a partially
reusable space vehicle,

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00:04:00,660 --> 00:04:03,120
quick turnaround,
high flight rate.

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What we actually got is a
complex and fragile vehicle

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00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:10,890
with an average cost of
about $1.5 billion for flight

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and a workforce of
about 20,000 people

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00:04:13,740 --> 00:04:16,829
to keep the shuttle flying.

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00:04:16,829 --> 00:04:19,740
And I think I've shown
you this before, right?

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00:04:19,740 --> 00:04:21,300
Did I show you this before?

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00:04:21,300 --> 00:04:24,210
So this is an
original illustration

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00:04:24,210 --> 00:04:27,270
from the proposal to Congress.

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00:04:27,270 --> 00:04:29,950
It kind of looks like the
F-18 that I just showed you.

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00:04:29,950 --> 00:04:35,070
It's a hangar,
pristine, a few people,

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00:04:35,070 --> 00:04:37,830
a couple of ground
support equipment carts--

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00:04:37,830 --> 00:04:40,890
this is kind of like an
airplane, like an airliner.

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00:04:40,890 --> 00:04:43,080
And then this is
what we actually got.

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00:04:43,080 --> 00:04:46,080
This is a picture taken in the
Orbiter Processing Facility

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00:04:46,080 --> 00:04:47,790
at the Kennedy Space Center.

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00:04:47,790 --> 00:04:50,220
And you can't even see
the shuttle, right?

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00:04:50,220 --> 00:04:53,360
It's hidden behind
the scaffolding,

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00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:55,560
and the main systems
that required

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00:04:55,560 --> 00:04:57,510
a lot of work between
flights were the shuttle

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00:04:57,510 --> 00:05:00,900
main engine and of course the
TPS, the thermal protection

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00:05:00,900 --> 00:05:01,770
system.

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00:05:01,770 --> 00:05:05,460
Now, you can say, well why such
a big discrepancy between what

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00:05:05,460 --> 00:05:09,384
was promised, the Vision, and
what's actually delivered?

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00:05:09,384 --> 00:05:11,050
And people will have
different opinions.

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00:05:11,050 --> 00:05:14,920
My opinion is, certainly
over-optimism was a part of it.

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00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:19,540
But also Congress kept
the research development

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00:05:19,540 --> 00:05:23,330
costs for the Orbiter in
particular to about 5.1,

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00:05:23,330 --> 00:05:23,980
5 billion.

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00:05:23,980 --> 00:05:25,660
There was actually
an act of Congress

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00:05:25,660 --> 00:05:30,040
that said those shall not
spend more 5.1, 5 billion

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00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:31,960
on development of the Orbiter.

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00:05:31,960 --> 00:05:36,550
So then, when it was clear, 24
metric tons to low-earth orbit.

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00:05:36,550 --> 00:05:40,970
If you can't achieve that,
the system will not satisfy.

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00:05:40,970 --> 00:05:44,620
So performance is king,
and of course, this

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00:05:44,620 --> 00:05:46,930
was also a politically
challenging

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00:05:46,930 --> 00:05:48,730
because there were
military requirements

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00:05:48,730 --> 00:05:51,100
and civilian requirements
that had to be met.

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And then maintainability,
like I said,

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00:05:53,880 --> 00:05:56,120
just doesn't happen
automatically.

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You have to actually
write requirements

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for maintainability.

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How long should it take?

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How many hours of work?

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How many actions or procedures
to do certain maintenance

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actions?

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It has to be designed
into the system, therefore

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the need for requirements.

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00:06:12,370 --> 00:06:17,320
And then no realistic lifecycle
cost or value optimization.

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So that's, I think,
the counter-example.

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00:06:20,990 --> 00:06:23,950
But again, I am not blaming
individuals for this.

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I'm blaming the system for this.

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Yes?

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AUDIENCE: To what
extent do you think

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00:06:29,700 --> 00:06:32,170
that kind of problems
within shuttle

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00:06:32,170 --> 00:06:36,250
can be traced to effectively
a failure to stop

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00:06:36,250 --> 00:06:37,780
defining the requirements?

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00:06:37,780 --> 00:06:41,100
I feel like when you look
at commercial launch systems

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kind of as a comparison point.

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And I understand
they're not reusable.

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And they're not being
designed to necessarily

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the same specifications
as shuttle.

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But I feel like because the
commercial launch industry

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has had standards set by
NASA and the Air Force

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that they needed
to meet, that they

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had a very clear
set of requirements

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from the beginning.

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Whereas the
development of shuttle,

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like the failure to design
for maintainability,

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00:07:05,410 --> 00:07:07,030
when I look at the
development cycle,

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00:07:07,030 --> 00:07:09,280
it looks like they continue
to refine requirements

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00:07:09,280 --> 00:07:11,730
as they went and kind of
discovered new things.

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00:07:11,730 --> 00:07:14,022
And then said, OK, so we need
to do it this way instead

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of saying from the beginning,
these departments we

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00:07:16,104 --> 00:07:17,030
know we have to meet.

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Let's design to that.

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PROFESSOR: Right, though I--

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AUDIENCE: It look
like they kind of

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00:07:19,690 --> 00:07:21,400
crept through the
development phase

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00:07:21,400 --> 00:07:23,295
to me, that there
was no hard stop.

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00:07:23,295 --> 00:07:25,921
So I was just wondering if you
could comment on that kind of--

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PROFESSOR: It's
definitely true that there

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00:07:27,670 --> 00:07:29,520
was sort of reacting to--

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00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:30,760
and after the first few--

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00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:34,930
so an interesting history there
is the shuttle main engines.

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00:07:34,930 --> 00:07:38,350
They were completely
disassembled and inspected

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00:07:38,350 --> 00:07:40,450
after the first
couple of flights.

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But that wasn't supposed
to be done every flight.

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00:07:42,660 --> 00:07:44,784
It was supposed to be,
you're going to launch them,

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00:07:44,784 --> 00:07:47,380
I think, like five times
before you actually

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00:07:47,380 --> 00:07:49,240
do big inspections.

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00:07:49,240 --> 00:07:50,980
But they had already
done inspections

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00:07:50,980 --> 00:07:52,600
after every test flight.

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00:07:52,600 --> 00:07:54,670
And then they just
kept doing it.

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00:07:54,670 --> 00:07:59,500
So something that was supposed
to be only a maintenance

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00:07:59,500 --> 00:08:02,860
action or inspection
during test flights

187
00:08:02,860 --> 00:08:06,390
became or crept into becoming
an operational requirement.

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00:08:06,390 --> 00:08:08,650
And of course, you
have a big workforce

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00:08:08,650 --> 00:08:10,910
and there's jobs and so forth.

190
00:08:10,910 --> 00:08:12,160
So there's that too.

191
00:08:12,160 --> 00:08:15,340
But it was never intended
that the shuttle main engines

192
00:08:15,340 --> 00:08:18,370
would be disassembled and
rebuilt after every flight.

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00:08:18,370 --> 00:08:22,030
AUDIENCE: Why was
that permitted?

194
00:08:22,030 --> 00:08:24,100
PROFESSOR: Well,
I guess, the sense

195
00:08:24,100 --> 00:08:26,736
was that it would
be safer to do that,

196
00:08:26,736 --> 00:08:28,360
and that you really
want to know what's

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00:08:28,360 --> 00:08:30,100
the state of these engines.

198
00:08:30,100 --> 00:08:34,030
And I will say this, I
mean at the contractual,

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00:08:34,030 --> 00:08:35,710
there's jobs there.

200
00:08:35,710 --> 00:08:36,970
There's money there.

201
00:08:36,970 --> 00:08:40,539
And so the more maintenance
actions you can do,

202
00:08:40,539 --> 00:08:42,580
the more of a business this is.

203
00:08:42,580 --> 00:08:44,780
But of course, that's
not what the Vision was.

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00:08:44,780 --> 00:08:48,430
The Vision was a very lean,
operations, few people.

205
00:08:48,430 --> 00:08:52,512
So there's a socioeconomic
things tied up with it as well.

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00:08:52,512 --> 00:08:54,720
AUDIENCE: Do you think that
because that's inherently

207
00:08:54,720 --> 00:08:57,166
a government project
that's part of the reason?

208
00:08:57,166 --> 00:08:58,540
Like whereas a
commercial company

209
00:08:58,540 --> 00:09:00,520
is looking to cut as many
employees as possible

210
00:09:00,520 --> 00:09:02,050
to increase profit margin?

211
00:09:02,050 --> 00:09:03,400
PROFESSOR: I think that
that's a part of it.

212
00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:03,700
AUDIENCE: OK.

213
00:09:03,700 --> 00:09:05,700
PROFESSOR: Yeah, I do
think that's a part of it.

214
00:09:07,870 --> 00:09:12,230
Yeah, absolutely, it's a
really interesting history.

215
00:09:12,230 --> 00:09:14,290
There's a lot to be
learned from this.

216
00:09:14,290 --> 00:09:16,960
OK, so let me move on.

217
00:09:16,960 --> 00:09:21,370
So this is kind of a list, not
a checklist really, but a list

218
00:09:21,370 --> 00:09:23,560
of operational considerations
that you should think

219
00:09:23,560 --> 00:09:25,570
about when you design a system.

220
00:09:25,570 --> 00:09:27,550
So how will it be operated?

221
00:09:27,550 --> 00:09:31,100
And of course, we've done
the CONOPS a while ago,

222
00:09:31,100 --> 00:09:33,280
but this is sort of more
detailed than the CONOPS.

223
00:09:33,280 --> 00:09:35,380
How will you inspect the system?

224
00:09:35,380 --> 00:09:38,140
How will you maintain it?

225
00:09:38,140 --> 00:09:41,920
What insights do the operators
need into the system status?

226
00:09:41,920 --> 00:09:44,110
So when you are
operating the system,

227
00:09:44,110 --> 00:09:46,270
how much about the
internal workings

228
00:09:46,270 --> 00:09:47,530
do you really need to know?

229
00:09:47,530 --> 00:09:53,164
This is the internal telemetry
temperatures, pressures,

230
00:09:53,164 --> 00:09:56,410
in the avionics, the electrical.

231
00:09:56,410 --> 00:09:58,630
I think the example of the
electrical bus was good,

232
00:09:58,630 --> 00:10:04,180
the cryogenics system example,
how much insight do you need?

233
00:10:04,180 --> 00:10:06,910
Before turning over to the
operators, what checks do

234
00:10:06,910 --> 00:10:08,280
you need to perform?

235
00:10:08,280 --> 00:10:10,270
How might the system fail?

236
00:10:10,270 --> 00:10:13,030
Think about failure,
and you of course

237
00:10:13,030 --> 00:10:15,670
need to think about that
as early as possible.

238
00:10:15,670 --> 00:10:17,740
What are the options
available to you

239
00:10:17,740 --> 00:10:19,180
in case you have failures?

240
00:10:19,180 --> 00:10:21,040
And you will have failures.

241
00:10:21,040 --> 00:10:23,830
What spares are needed
to repair the system?

242
00:10:23,830 --> 00:10:27,190
Will this system still perform
even under partial failure?

243
00:10:27,190 --> 00:10:29,950
So maybe something failed
but not catastrophically.

244
00:10:29,950 --> 00:10:31,270
It's a partial failure.

245
00:10:31,270 --> 00:10:33,340
Can you keep going
with the system?

246
00:10:33,340 --> 00:10:37,270
How far can you push the system?

247
00:10:37,270 --> 00:10:41,184
I think if you think about this
is like five questions here,

248
00:10:41,184 --> 00:10:43,600
but I think, they are five of
the most important questions

249
00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:46,400
for operations.

250
00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,340
Now in terms of
the NASA lifecycle,

251
00:10:49,340 --> 00:10:51,800
we're talking Phase E
here, just to be clear.

252
00:10:51,800 --> 00:10:55,460
So Phase E is called
Operations and Sustainment.

253
00:10:55,460 --> 00:10:59,510
And depending on what
mission you're talking about,

254
00:10:59,510 --> 00:11:01,970
this could be short--

255
00:11:01,970 --> 00:11:06,170
like the Apollo missions, like
two weeks and they're back

256
00:11:06,170 --> 00:11:07,940
home--

257
00:11:07,940 --> 00:11:10,760
ISS, six months rotations.

258
00:11:10,760 --> 00:11:14,450
Or it could be
something like Voyager.

259
00:11:14,450 --> 00:11:18,720
Voyager was launched
when in '76?

260
00:11:18,720 --> 00:11:21,650
Voyager's been
flying for 40 years,

261
00:11:21,650 --> 00:11:24,920
and we're still getting data
and telemetry at very low data

262
00:11:24,920 --> 00:11:27,770
rates, like 100 bits per
second or something like this.

263
00:11:27,770 --> 00:11:29,990
But still, that's
remarkable, right?

264
00:11:29,990 --> 00:11:33,930
So Phase E, in that
case, is very long.

265
00:11:33,930 --> 00:11:37,190
So it's worth really
thinking about this.

266
00:11:37,190 --> 00:11:39,930
All right, let me talk
about commissioning.

267
00:11:39,930 --> 00:11:42,870
So commissioning is
essentially the transition

268
00:11:42,870 --> 00:11:45,360
from Phase D to
Phase E. So Phase D

269
00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:49,290
is System Assembly,
Integration, Test, and Launch,

270
00:11:49,290 --> 00:11:51,310
and Transition to Use.

271
00:11:51,310 --> 00:11:54,030
And Phase E is then
Operations and Sustainment.

272
00:11:54,030 --> 00:11:57,420
So to conduct the mission, meet
the initially-identified need,

273
00:11:57,420 --> 00:11:59,640
maintain support,
and then implement

274
00:11:59,640 --> 00:12:01,500
your mission operations plan.

275
00:12:01,500 --> 00:12:04,590
So commissioning,
essentially, is transitioning

276
00:12:04,590 --> 00:12:08,130
from Phase D to
Phase E. And usually,

277
00:12:08,130 --> 00:12:11,580
the people that will operate
the system day in, day out,

278
00:12:11,580 --> 00:12:14,790
tend to be different
people than the people who

279
00:12:14,790 --> 00:12:18,330
design the system, who build the
system, who launch the system.

280
00:12:18,330 --> 00:12:21,630
So usually, you have some
kind of a handoff or handover

281
00:12:21,630 --> 00:12:25,830
of the system from the
designers, builders

282
00:12:25,830 --> 00:12:27,240
to the operators.

283
00:12:27,240 --> 00:12:31,050
And that handover is very
important that it be done well.

284
00:12:31,050 --> 00:12:34,580
And that's what we
call commissioning.

285
00:12:34,580 --> 00:12:37,820
Or in this case, this is
the-- do you remember this?

286
00:12:37,820 --> 00:12:39,800
We haven't shown
this for a while.

287
00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:43,340
Remember what do we call
this, this thing here?

288
00:12:43,340 --> 00:12:44,150
The engine, right?

289
00:12:44,150 --> 00:12:47,320
The system's engineering
engine at every level.

290
00:12:47,320 --> 00:12:51,770
So this is Step 9, Product
Transitioning Process.

291
00:12:51,770 --> 00:12:55,040
And then there has to
be a flow chart, right?

292
00:12:55,040 --> 00:12:57,410
Can't do without a flow chart.

293
00:12:57,410 --> 00:13:00,680
It's not particularly
fancy or anything,

294
00:13:00,680 --> 00:13:03,710
but the idea is that
you have inputs,

295
00:13:03,710 --> 00:13:07,880
which are the end product,
ready to be used, documentation.

296
00:13:07,880 --> 00:13:12,140
So when I ask you about
the cryogenic system--

297
00:13:12,140 --> 00:13:13,970
you mentioned the
cryogenic system--

298
00:13:13,970 --> 00:13:16,970
I ask you, do you have
a user manual for it?

299
00:13:16,970 --> 00:13:19,640
So that would be here, in this
box here, on the left side--

300
00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:22,880
the documentation that
goes with the end product.

301
00:13:22,880 --> 00:13:25,647
And then any product
transition-enabling products,

302
00:13:25,647 --> 00:13:27,230
so those would be
things that you only

303
00:13:27,230 --> 00:13:31,940
use during the transition,
like equipment or facilities

304
00:13:31,940 --> 00:13:35,750
that you just use for this
transitioning process.

305
00:13:35,750 --> 00:13:39,330
And then you don't use
them during operations.

306
00:13:39,330 --> 00:13:41,760
You can think of
examples of that.

307
00:13:41,760 --> 00:13:44,820
And then you go through
this multiple steps.

308
00:13:44,820 --> 00:13:47,390
There may be multiple sites
that you have to prepare,

309
00:13:47,390 --> 00:13:49,310
multiple locations.

310
00:13:49,310 --> 00:13:53,120
And at the end of it, you've
delivered the end product.

311
00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:56,900
It's operational,
transition work products,

312
00:13:56,900 --> 00:14:00,500
and you're essentially
operational.

313
00:14:00,500 --> 00:14:04,190
So what it means in
practice is deploying

314
00:14:04,190 --> 00:14:07,820
the system in the field,
transitioning to the operators,

315
00:14:07,820 --> 00:14:09,890
physically and legally also--

316
00:14:09,890 --> 00:14:11,040
I should point this out.

317
00:14:11,040 --> 00:14:12,710
This is really important.

318
00:14:12,710 --> 00:14:18,020
So usually, in this
commissioning phase,

319
00:14:18,020 --> 00:14:20,510
the legal ownership of
the product or the asset

320
00:14:20,510 --> 00:14:23,360
is transferred from one
organization to the other.

321
00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:26,180
So if it breaks now,
it's your problem.

322
00:14:26,180 --> 00:14:27,230
It's not my problem.

323
00:14:27,230 --> 00:14:28,770
You've already taken ownership.

324
00:14:28,770 --> 00:14:30,195
You've signed off on it.

325
00:14:30,195 --> 00:14:33,920
And for insurance purposes,
this is a very big deal.

326
00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:36,830
So at what point
does legal ownership

327
00:14:36,830 --> 00:14:38,380
of the asset transition?

328
00:14:38,380 --> 00:14:40,680
You really have to know that.

329
00:14:40,680 --> 00:14:42,920
And then, of course,
the training.

330
00:14:42,920 --> 00:14:46,730
Checkout-- checkout means
turning on all your systems

331
00:14:46,730 --> 00:14:50,090
and subsystems, making
sure everything works,

332
00:14:50,090 --> 00:14:53,210
making sure there's no emergent
behaviors, weird behaviors,

333
00:14:53,210 --> 00:14:54,950
unexpected behaviors.

334
00:14:54,950 --> 00:14:57,740
Comparing the
predicted parameters

335
00:14:57,740 --> 00:14:59,300
against the actual behaviors.

336
00:14:59,300 --> 00:15:02,140
Does the system behave
as we had predicted,

337
00:15:02,140 --> 00:15:04,280
based on calculations?

338
00:15:04,280 --> 00:15:07,250
These days, we usually
build simulations.

339
00:15:07,250 --> 00:15:10,550
We build a pretty realistic
simulation of the system,

340
00:15:10,550 --> 00:15:14,990
and there's the concept
of digital twin.

341
00:15:14,990 --> 00:15:16,060
Who's heard this before?

342
00:15:16,060 --> 00:15:17,360
Digital twin.

343
00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:18,680
Who's heard this before?

344
00:15:18,680 --> 00:15:20,300
Oh, nobody, OK.

345
00:15:20,300 --> 00:15:23,270
So the idea of a digital
twin is that here's

346
00:15:23,270 --> 00:15:27,770
your physical system,
airplane, satellite, cube sat,

347
00:15:27,770 --> 00:15:30,470
whatever it is, medical device.

348
00:15:30,470 --> 00:15:33,080
And there's a
digital twin of it.

349
00:15:33,080 --> 00:15:38,720
There's a in silico
version, a simulated twin,

350
00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:41,810
of that system that
exists somewhere.

351
00:15:41,810 --> 00:15:45,320
And before you turn the system
on and do operations on it,

352
00:15:45,320 --> 00:15:48,110
you do it on the
digital twin to see

353
00:15:48,110 --> 00:15:50,330
what will happen and
predict everything--

354
00:15:50,330 --> 00:15:53,300
all the parameters,
the position, velocity,

355
00:15:53,300 --> 00:15:56,460
accelerations,
temperatures, pressures.

356
00:15:56,460 --> 00:15:59,270
So if things look good
in the digital twin,

357
00:15:59,270 --> 00:16:01,320
then you actually do
it in the real system.

358
00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:05,550
So for example, JPL with their
Mars rovers, they will do that.

359
00:16:05,550 --> 00:16:08,000
They have a digital twin,
they have a digital version.

360
00:16:08,000 --> 00:16:10,760
They actually have
a physical twin too.

361
00:16:10,760 --> 00:16:13,310
But they typically only use
that if there's problems,

362
00:16:13,310 --> 00:16:15,640
like stuck in a sand dune
or something like that.

363
00:16:15,640 --> 00:16:19,670
So you actually
simulate commands

364
00:16:19,670 --> 00:16:21,530
that you're going to
send to the spacecraft

365
00:16:21,530 --> 00:16:25,310
on your digital twin, make sure
that the command sequence is

366
00:16:25,310 --> 00:16:28,790
correct, that things will--

367
00:16:28,790 --> 00:16:31,250
and then you do it
on the real system.

368
00:16:31,250 --> 00:16:33,080
That's what we mean here.

369
00:16:33,080 --> 00:16:35,267
And during checkout,
you do it initially.

370
00:16:35,267 --> 00:16:37,100
But actually, if it's
a very complex system,

371
00:16:37,100 --> 00:16:40,760
you might do this as
a matter of routine.

372
00:16:40,760 --> 00:16:43,790
And then sustainment is
the third thing here.

373
00:16:43,790 --> 00:16:46,940
So sustainment means
maintenance, both preventative

374
00:16:46,940 --> 00:16:48,176
and corrective.

375
00:16:48,176 --> 00:16:49,550
So preventative
maintenance means

376
00:16:49,550 --> 00:16:52,340
you're taking actions
before the system breaks.

377
00:16:52,340 --> 00:16:55,610
Corrective action means you're
taking maintenance actions

378
00:16:55,610 --> 00:16:59,720
after you have failures of
different kind-- spare parts

379
00:16:59,720 --> 00:17:03,680
management, reconfiguring
system during use

380
00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:06,079
for different purposes,
upgrading system,

381
00:17:06,079 --> 00:17:07,730
and then retrofits.

382
00:17:07,730 --> 00:17:11,540
So what is a retrofit?

383
00:17:11,540 --> 00:17:12,990
Anybody know?

384
00:17:12,990 --> 00:17:15,736
At EPFL, are you familiar
with the term retrofit?

385
00:17:15,736 --> 00:17:17,069
Have you heard this word before?

386
00:17:19,609 --> 00:17:23,030
Volcker, do you want to
explain what it means?

387
00:17:23,030 --> 00:17:24,461
GUEST SPEAKER: Absolutely.

388
00:17:24,461 --> 00:17:28,810
So for example, let's take your
[INAUDIBLE] system, the system

389
00:17:28,810 --> 00:17:30,600
volt's M109.

390
00:17:30,600 --> 00:17:32,970
Ours says from USA.

391
00:17:32,970 --> 00:17:37,634
Back in the '60s, '70s, then
these things are aluminum,

392
00:17:37,634 --> 00:17:40,130
launch self-propelled.

393
00:17:40,130 --> 00:17:44,470
And in the '80s, '90s, they
decided to not throw them away.

394
00:17:44,470 --> 00:17:45,890
They don't rust.

395
00:17:45,890 --> 00:17:49,570
But to retrofit them, to
put guidance navigation

396
00:17:49,570 --> 00:17:51,022
system, new cam.

397
00:17:51,022 --> 00:17:52,740
So waiting through
a retrofit program,

398
00:17:52,740 --> 00:17:55,856
meaning you sort of
break down everything,

399
00:17:55,856 --> 00:17:59,690
down to the lowest elements,
you decide what you can keep.

400
00:17:59,690 --> 00:18:03,080
You throw away the
obsolete stuff.

401
00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:04,905
You buy new things,
and you try to make it.

402
00:18:04,905 --> 00:18:05,530
PROFESSOR: Yup.

403
00:18:05,530 --> 00:18:07,290
GUEST SPEAKER: And
then you reconfigure.

404
00:18:07,290 --> 00:18:09,510
PROFESSOR: So retrofit
typically means

405
00:18:09,510 --> 00:18:11,640
you physically go
out in the field,

406
00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:14,760
and you physically
change the system.

407
00:18:14,760 --> 00:18:16,530
Like Volcker said,
you remove things,

408
00:18:16,530 --> 00:18:18,540
you typically add new things.

409
00:18:18,540 --> 00:18:21,480
So now you have like old
generation and new generation

410
00:18:21,480 --> 00:18:23,760
stuff mixed up in the system.

411
00:18:23,760 --> 00:18:27,330
Retrofitting is a huge deal,
particularly in the military,

412
00:18:27,330 --> 00:18:34,110
but in other domains as well,
like hospitals, infrastructure,

413
00:18:34,110 --> 00:18:35,910
train systems.

414
00:18:35,910 --> 00:18:41,269
You go there, and you
see a mix of old stuff

415
00:18:41,269 --> 00:18:43,560
from when the system was
originally built and deployed,

416
00:18:43,560 --> 00:18:47,040
and then new stuff layered on
top of it through retrofits.

417
00:18:47,040 --> 00:18:50,910
And the key question, of course,
when you do a retrofit is,

418
00:18:50,910 --> 00:18:53,720
you want the retrofit
not to interfere.

419
00:18:53,720 --> 00:18:56,100
You want it to actually
be value added as opposed

420
00:18:56,100 --> 00:18:57,740
to causing more problems.

421
00:18:57,740 --> 00:18:59,040
Yeah, go ahead.

422
00:18:59,040 --> 00:19:03,720
AUDIENCE: Is retrofit the
same as medium-life up grade?

423
00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:05,220
PROFESSOR: I would
say it this way--

424
00:19:05,220 --> 00:19:10,170
a medium-life or
middle-of-the-life upgrade is

425
00:19:10,170 --> 00:19:13,800
a particular type of retrofit
that you do roughly halfway

426
00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:15,830
through the nominal
mission life.

427
00:19:15,830 --> 00:19:21,510
Yes, and do you have
experience with such upgrade?

428
00:19:21,510 --> 00:19:25,800
AUDIENCE: Yes, actually we have
both F-5 and AMX in Brazil.

429
00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:29,897
We have the medium-life upgrade
and both performed by Embraer.

430
00:19:29,897 --> 00:19:30,480
PROFESSOR: OK.

431
00:19:30,480 --> 00:19:32,938
AUDIENCE: So it's interesting
because the F-5, for example,

432
00:19:32,938 --> 00:19:33,480
is Northrop.

433
00:19:33,480 --> 00:19:36,150
And the medium-life upgrade
was performed by Embraer.

434
00:19:36,150 --> 00:19:38,520
And we had lots of
issues about it.

435
00:19:38,520 --> 00:19:41,230
PROFESSOR: So what was
done to the airplane?

436
00:19:41,230 --> 00:19:45,120
AUDIENCE: Completely change
of the dashboard panels

437
00:19:45,120 --> 00:19:48,855
and new electronic
warfare equipment.

438
00:19:48,855 --> 00:19:54,450
But they kept the old
hydraulics engine and--

439
00:19:54,450 --> 00:19:55,950
actually, hydraulics and engine.

440
00:19:55,950 --> 00:19:58,269
The electrical system
was changed as well.

441
00:19:58,269 --> 00:19:59,560
PROFESSOR: Was changed as well.

442
00:19:59,560 --> 00:20:02,190
So you keep the
frame, the engine--

443
00:20:02,190 --> 00:20:04,290
AUDIENCE: And you change
the radar, the antennas,

444
00:20:04,290 --> 00:20:05,494
and lots of different stuff.

445
00:20:05,494 --> 00:20:06,660
PROFESSOR: That makes sense.

446
00:20:06,660 --> 00:20:07,368
That makes sense.

447
00:20:07,368 --> 00:20:11,100
AUDIENCE: A new head-up display,
a new helmet, stuff like that.

448
00:20:11,100 --> 00:20:12,880
PROFESSOR: The
interesting discussion,

449
00:20:12,880 --> 00:20:15,880
which I think in the
US for much equipment,

450
00:20:15,880 --> 00:20:17,520
and Switzerland
same discussions,

451
00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:22,020
is by the time you start
adding up the cost of a midlife

452
00:20:22,020 --> 00:20:25,890
upgrade or retrofit, you start
adding all these things up,

453
00:20:25,890 --> 00:20:27,690
pretty quickly you
come to the question,

454
00:20:27,690 --> 00:20:29,670
well, wow that's
pretty expensive.

455
00:20:29,670 --> 00:20:34,080
Is it really worth it,
investing x millions or billions

456
00:20:34,080 --> 00:20:39,200
to squeeze another 10, 15
years out of this platform?

457
00:20:39,200 --> 00:20:42,740
Or should we just buy a new
one and retire this one?

458
00:20:42,740 --> 00:20:45,330
And you'll have very
vigorous debates about that.

459
00:20:45,330 --> 00:20:46,417
Yeah?

460
00:20:46,417 --> 00:20:48,500
AUDIENCE: Just how does
the funding structure ever

461
00:20:48,500 --> 00:20:51,380
come into play when
determining how sustainable,

462
00:20:51,380 --> 00:20:53,170
or how you're going
to retrofit something?

463
00:20:53,170 --> 00:20:55,790
I know sometimes,
where you worked

464
00:20:55,790 --> 00:20:57,830
funding ends this time
and something else

465
00:20:57,830 --> 00:20:58,840
starts up this time.

466
00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:00,230
So sometimes, you kind
of design a little bit

467
00:21:00,230 --> 00:21:01,063
around those things.

468
00:21:01,063 --> 00:21:03,070
Is that ever taken
into consideration?

469
00:21:03,070 --> 00:21:05,810
PROFESSOR: Well, I think
enlightened companies,

470
00:21:05,810 --> 00:21:11,030
enlightened organizations will
actually build in retrofit

471
00:21:11,030 --> 00:21:14,390
and upgrade costs into
their original budgets.

472
00:21:14,390 --> 00:21:19,190
But does it happen often?

473
00:21:19,190 --> 00:21:21,680
I think it's a minority of
organizations who really

474
00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:25,170
are honest to think about
the full lifecycle cost,

475
00:21:25,170 --> 00:21:27,170
including upgrades
and retrofits.

476
00:21:27,170 --> 00:21:30,410
And to be honest,
sometimes, these retrofits,

477
00:21:30,410 --> 00:21:32,360
it's hard to know about
them ahead of time.

478
00:21:32,360 --> 00:21:36,260
In some cases you can predict
them, but in many cases,

479
00:21:36,260 --> 00:21:37,460
it's more reactive.

480
00:21:37,460 --> 00:21:43,370
In fact, I'll tell you
a story about the F-18.

481
00:21:43,370 --> 00:21:46,640
These retrofits often come
in bundles or packages

482
00:21:46,640 --> 00:21:51,830
called ECPs, Engineering
Change Proposals.

483
00:21:51,830 --> 00:21:54,200
They're sort of
packages of changes.

484
00:21:54,200 --> 00:21:57,920
And it's almost
blackmail, but it's

485
00:21:57,920 --> 00:22:03,110
like, here's a bundle of changes
that is x million dollars.

486
00:22:03,110 --> 00:22:07,890
And it's up to you whether you
want to implement that or not.

487
00:22:07,890 --> 00:22:09,630
But if you choose
not to implement,

488
00:22:09,630 --> 00:22:12,870
then the warranty is void.

489
00:22:12,870 --> 00:22:18,390
Or you're losing compatibility
with any future upgrades.

490
00:22:18,390 --> 00:22:19,950
Do you see what I'm saying?

491
00:22:19,950 --> 00:22:23,400
So the configurations
then start to diverge.

492
00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:26,830
And then you have to
make a tough decision.

493
00:22:26,830 --> 00:22:30,690
Do you spend money on an upgrade
that maybe you don't absolutely

494
00:22:30,690 --> 00:22:34,770
need, but some other
customers wanted?

495
00:22:34,770 --> 00:22:36,780
And if you say no,
we don't want this.

496
00:22:36,780 --> 00:22:38,460
We're going to freeze
the configuration

497
00:22:38,460 --> 00:22:39,870
where we are today.

498
00:22:39,870 --> 00:22:43,260
Then, you might lose the
option for future upgrades.

499
00:22:43,260 --> 00:22:45,090
And if you then choose
to upgrade later,

500
00:22:45,090 --> 00:22:46,960
it could be much more expensive.

501
00:22:46,960 --> 00:22:52,650
And that's systems
engineering too.

502
00:22:52,650 --> 00:22:55,800
And it gets into technical
issue, financial issues,

503
00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:57,540
strategic issues.

504
00:22:57,540 --> 00:23:02,040
So I hope you're getting a
sense here that this is all

505
00:23:02,040 --> 00:23:03,300
happening during operations.

506
00:23:03,300 --> 00:23:04,890
This is fascinating stuff.

507
00:23:04,890 --> 00:23:06,180
This is not boring.

508
00:23:06,180 --> 00:23:09,260
This is not just
routine operations.

509
00:23:09,260 --> 00:23:16,700
OK, so in operations, we have
launch for spacecraft science

510
00:23:16,700 --> 00:23:21,230
operations, safehold, anomaly
resolution, and so forth.

511
00:23:21,230 --> 00:23:24,110
And I just want to show
you a quick video here

512
00:23:24,110 --> 00:23:28,280
about the James Webb--
this is a one-minute video

513
00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:31,520
about the anticipated deployment
of the James Webb Space

514
00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:32,484
Telescope.

515
00:23:32,484 --> 00:23:33,650
I think, I mentioned to you.

516
00:23:33,650 --> 00:23:37,550
I've worked on this
as a Master's student.

517
00:23:37,550 --> 00:23:40,020
This is supposed
to happen in 2018,

518
00:23:40,020 --> 00:23:42,410
launch from Kourou
on an Ariane rocket.

519
00:23:42,410 --> 00:23:48,380
This is a NASA-ISA
collaboration.

520
00:23:48,380 --> 00:23:51,540
You can see right now, the
spacecraft has been launched.

521
00:23:51,540 --> 00:23:54,710
It's deploying its sunshield.

522
00:23:54,710 --> 00:23:56,630
These are very thin membranes.

523
00:23:56,630 --> 00:23:59,720
The purpose of the sunshield
is to keep the optics cold.

524
00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:01,910
The optics are on the top here.

525
00:24:01,910 --> 00:24:06,920
And there's spreaders, and
there shouldn't be any wrinkles.

526
00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:08,280
And there's multiple layers.

527
00:24:08,280 --> 00:24:09,360
You can see the layers.

528
00:24:09,360 --> 00:24:11,940
Now, first you spread
it out horizontally.

529
00:24:11,940 --> 00:24:14,060
Now, the layers are
being spread to be

530
00:24:14,060 --> 00:24:16,490
right at the right angles.

531
00:24:16,490 --> 00:24:20,430
And I don't know what's
happening right now.

532
00:24:20,430 --> 00:24:30,170
But the last step
that should happen--

533
00:24:30,170 --> 00:24:32,510
I guess it didn't quite
play until the end.

534
00:24:32,510 --> 00:24:33,980
But the last thing
that happens is

535
00:24:33,980 --> 00:24:35,660
the optics are then deployed.

536
00:24:35,660 --> 00:24:40,580
And the optical deployment
is also very, very involved

537
00:24:40,580 --> 00:24:43,250
and has to be very precise.

538
00:24:43,250 --> 00:24:47,410
So let me just minimize this.

539
00:24:47,410 --> 00:24:51,250
So and then after that,
you have a commissioning.

540
00:24:51,250 --> 00:24:53,530
I should also mention
that the James Webb State,

541
00:24:53,530 --> 00:24:56,500
when I worked on it, it
was a $500-million mission.

542
00:24:56,500 --> 00:24:59,900
It's now become an
$8-billion mission.

543
00:24:59,900 --> 00:25:01,520
But the purpose
of this instrument

544
00:25:01,520 --> 00:25:06,050
is to look back in time to
what's known as the dark ages.

545
00:25:06,050 --> 00:25:10,370
It's basically like 300,000
years to about 100 million

546
00:25:10,370 --> 00:25:12,140
years after the Big Bang.

547
00:25:12,140 --> 00:25:15,080
The formation of the very
first Pluto galaxies.

548
00:25:15,080 --> 00:25:18,350
We can't observe that right now
with Hubble or from the ground,

549
00:25:18,350 --> 00:25:20,930
mainly because these
are so far away because

550
00:25:20,930 --> 00:25:24,380
of the expansion of the
universe that the radiation is

551
00:25:24,380 --> 00:25:25,400
redshifted.

552
00:25:25,400 --> 00:25:27,300
And this is all in the infrared.

553
00:25:27,300 --> 00:25:30,560
So you to have a very quiet,
very cold instrument to

554
00:25:30,560 --> 00:25:33,480
see these first
proto-galaxies being formed.

555
00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:37,040
So I know we can argue, is
it worth spending 8 billion

556
00:25:37,040 --> 00:25:39,410
to see the very first
galaxy being formed or not?

557
00:25:39,410 --> 00:25:40,360
People will debate it.

558
00:25:40,360 --> 00:25:43,520
But the fact is, it's happening.

559
00:25:43,520 --> 00:25:45,225
James Webb will launch.

560
00:25:45,225 --> 00:25:47,600
And then, it's going to go
through a commissioning phase,

561
00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:49,290
like I just talked about.

562
00:25:49,290 --> 00:25:52,910
So I want you to answer
this question here.

563
00:25:52,910 --> 00:25:55,190
How long do you think
the commissioning

564
00:25:55,190 --> 00:25:58,750
phase of the James Webb
Space Telescope will take?

565
00:25:58,750 --> 00:26:00,070
Three days, a week--

566
00:26:00,070 --> 00:26:02,140
in orbit that is.

567
00:26:02,140 --> 00:26:05,270
Three days, a week, three
weeks, a month, three months,

568
00:26:05,270 --> 00:26:07,180
six months, or you're not sure.

569
00:26:07,180 --> 00:26:09,850
So answer that question, and
then we'll take a short break,

570
00:26:09,850 --> 00:26:15,272
like five minutes, and
look at the answer.

571
00:26:15,272 --> 00:26:16,706
Yup?

572
00:26:16,706 --> 00:26:21,180
AUDIENCE: Are they still on
schedule with the telescope?

573
00:26:21,180 --> 00:26:22,870
Or do you have any
idea on whether that

574
00:26:22,870 --> 00:26:24,314
will slip some more?

575
00:26:24,314 --> 00:26:25,730
PROFESSOR: When I
worked on it, it

576
00:26:25,730 --> 00:26:32,450
was supposed to launch in 2008.

577
00:26:32,450 --> 00:26:33,380
But I do think--

578
00:26:33,380 --> 00:26:36,080
I mean, the spacecraft is
being integrated right now

579
00:26:36,080 --> 00:26:37,970
at Northrop Grumman.

580
00:26:37,970 --> 00:26:39,980
We saw it in January.

581
00:26:39,980 --> 00:26:42,440
So they're not lying
to us, I think.

582
00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:44,900
They're actually
putting things together.

583
00:26:44,900 --> 00:26:50,180
And I think, it's
going to launch in 20--

584
00:26:50,180 --> 00:26:52,190
maybe slip by another
six months, or maybe

585
00:26:52,190 --> 00:26:53,630
a year but not more.

586
00:26:53,630 --> 00:26:55,280
I don't think so.

587
00:26:55,280 --> 00:26:58,430
Basically, how long does
it take from what you just

588
00:26:58,430 --> 00:27:03,255
saw in the video until
PIs, Principal Investigator

589
00:27:03,255 --> 00:27:03,755
scientists--

590
00:27:03,755 --> 00:27:04,100
[INTERPOSING VOICES]

591
00:27:04,100 --> 00:27:05,330
AUDIENCE: Can start using it.

592
00:27:05,330 --> 00:27:07,610
PROFESSOR: --can start
using it for real science.

593
00:27:07,610 --> 00:27:09,440
How long will that take?

594
00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:12,160
So who wants to respond?

595
00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:16,400
Who thinks it's like a
month, three weeks, a week?

596
00:27:16,400 --> 00:27:17,620
A month or less?

597
00:27:17,620 --> 00:27:20,020
Who responded to
that, a month or less.

598
00:27:20,020 --> 00:27:21,810
Go ahead.

599
00:27:21,810 --> 00:27:22,910
What were you thinking?

600
00:27:25,790 --> 00:27:27,344
AUDIENCE: No specific idea.

601
00:27:27,344 --> 00:27:28,760
PROFESSOR: What
were you imagining

602
00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:29,759
would happen in a month?

603
00:27:29,759 --> 00:27:32,060
AUDIENCE: I thought that
it couldn't be very, very

604
00:27:32,060 --> 00:27:38,880
long because if the objective
is to collect the data,

605
00:27:38,880 --> 00:27:41,750
you can't wait that much
before you start using it.

606
00:27:41,750 --> 00:27:44,360
But I had no specific ideas.

607
00:27:44,360 --> 00:27:46,730
PROFESSOR: No, I think
that's a good answer.

608
00:27:46,730 --> 00:27:53,210
You deploy the solar panels,
the sunshield, the optics,

609
00:27:53,210 --> 00:27:54,710
the spacecraft's
at the right place.

610
00:27:54,710 --> 00:27:56,580
By the way, this is
going to launch too

611
00:27:56,580 --> 00:28:00,020
in Earth-trailing orbit,
like Earth-Sun L2, kind

612
00:28:00,020 --> 00:28:01,220
of trailing orbit.

613
00:28:01,220 --> 00:28:05,000
So it's kind of away from the
Earth, from albedo, all that.

614
00:28:05,000 --> 00:28:07,640
So you deployed it,
let's get on with it.

615
00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:08,540
[LAUGHTER]

616
00:28:08,540 --> 00:28:11,360
Yeah, I agree.

617
00:28:11,360 --> 00:28:14,120
And then I think, 37%
of you, a third of you

618
00:28:14,120 --> 00:28:18,590
thought maybe three months,
and then 40% about six months.

619
00:28:18,590 --> 00:28:22,480
All right, so let's look
at the current plans.

620
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:25,280
And I took some slides here--

621
00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:27,770
I referenced it--
from a lady that

622
00:28:27,770 --> 00:28:30,920
works at the Space Telescope
Science Institute that's

623
00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:34,460
located in Baltimore,
the NASA's Goddard Space

624
00:28:34,460 --> 00:28:35,480
Center of Baltimore.

625
00:28:35,480 --> 00:28:37,410
This is from last year.

626
00:28:37,410 --> 00:28:41,180
So here's the plan to
launch in October of 2018,

627
00:28:41,180 --> 00:28:42,500
and then do the deployment.

628
00:28:42,500 --> 00:28:45,440
And the answer is
right now six months.

629
00:28:45,440 --> 00:28:47,940
Six months commissioning phase--

630
00:28:47,940 --> 00:28:50,080
and then, there's
different cycles

631
00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:53,300
of-- so GO stands
for guest observer.

632
00:28:53,300 --> 00:28:55,260
So you have primary PIs.

633
00:28:55,260 --> 00:28:56,990
They usually get first dibs.

634
00:28:56,990 --> 00:29:02,390
And then you have observing
time for guest observers.

635
00:29:02,390 --> 00:29:04,310
Here's another little
bit more detail.

636
00:29:04,310 --> 00:29:07,730
So full schedule of deployment
and check-out activities,

637
00:29:07,730 --> 00:29:09,960
a limited set of
science calibration

638
00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:13,340
ops possible, science
observations highly unlikely

639
00:29:13,340 --> 00:29:15,230
during this six-months phase.

640
00:29:15,230 --> 00:29:18,040
And then, you have this
Guest Observer Program,

641
00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:22,430
and there's a budget, actually,
Guaranteed Time Observation

642
00:29:22,430 --> 00:29:26,070
Program from April of 2019--

643
00:29:26,070 --> 00:29:31,460
a total of 3,960 hours
allocated in the first 30 months

644
00:29:31,460 --> 00:29:34,230
after commissioning, OK?

645
00:29:34,230 --> 00:29:38,810
And so those 3,960 hours are--

646
00:29:38,810 --> 00:29:40,160
people will fight over this.

647
00:29:40,160 --> 00:29:41,900
And there's a very
detailed process

648
00:29:41,900 --> 00:29:46,280
for how to allocate and compete
for that observation time.

649
00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:47,870
But the answer
here is six months.

650
00:29:47,870 --> 00:29:50,780
And it really surprised
me too that it's

651
00:29:50,780 --> 00:29:56,660
going to take this long but
the reason it takes so long

652
00:29:56,660 --> 00:29:59,030
is mainly calibration.

653
00:29:59,030 --> 00:30:00,650
Calibration is a big thing.

654
00:30:00,650 --> 00:30:03,770
You want to make sure that
all the observations you're

655
00:30:03,770 --> 00:30:05,840
going to take are correct.

656
00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:08,180
And in order to do a
proper calibration,

657
00:30:08,180 --> 00:30:11,870
you have to essentially image
things that have already

658
00:30:11,870 --> 00:30:15,050
been imaged before by other
instruments that were also

659
00:30:15,050 --> 00:30:16,640
properly calibrated.

660
00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:19,310
So that for a known
set of targets,

661
00:30:19,310 --> 00:30:21,350
you know you're getting
the same answer.

662
00:30:21,350 --> 00:30:23,510
And that just takes time.

663
00:30:23,510 --> 00:30:25,700
I think, in a nutshell,
that's the main reason it

664
00:30:25,700 --> 00:30:27,070
takes so long.

665
00:30:27,070 --> 00:30:28,130
GUEST SPEAKER: Pardon me?

666
00:30:28,130 --> 00:30:30,021
PROFESSOR: Yup, go ahead.

667
00:30:30,021 --> 00:30:31,770
GUEST SPEAKER: There's
also the one aspect

668
00:30:31,770 --> 00:30:35,620
with this observatory is that
you have to be stabilized.

669
00:30:35,620 --> 00:30:39,050
And as you get to bring it
up from Earth, even though it

670
00:30:39,050 --> 00:30:42,194
was pulled together in a
clean, very high [INAUDIBLE],,

671
00:30:42,194 --> 00:30:43,402
it's going to have to deploy.

672
00:30:43,402 --> 00:30:46,250
And then, just to get to
the chemical stabilization,

673
00:30:46,250 --> 00:30:49,740
it's going to spend weeks
before they even can start

674
00:30:49,740 --> 00:30:51,346
to calibrate the instruments.

675
00:30:51,346 --> 00:30:52,820
So for you to get
the outgassing,

676
00:30:52,820 --> 00:30:55,170
the whole volatile
substances and get

677
00:30:55,170 --> 00:30:58,232
that they move far away, not
from the spacecraft, that they

678
00:30:58,232 --> 00:31:02,035
dilute in space, get
stabilization of temperature,

679
00:31:02,035 --> 00:31:04,512
and then you can only
start checking instruments.

680
00:31:04,512 --> 00:31:05,470
PROFESSOR: Great point.

681
00:31:05,470 --> 00:31:08,070
So thermal stability,
outgassing--

682
00:31:08,070 --> 00:31:10,100
so really everything
is very stable.

683
00:31:10,100 --> 00:31:12,060
Yeah, very good point.

684
00:31:12,060 --> 00:31:15,280
OK, so let me talk briefly.

685
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:17,580
I'm going to go through
two examples of research

686
00:31:17,580 --> 00:31:18,540
in operations.

687
00:31:18,540 --> 00:31:22,190
And then, we'll talk about
the post-flight review.

688
00:31:22,190 --> 00:31:26,060
All right, so the first thing
is, each of these two examples

689
00:31:26,060 --> 00:31:26,980
are based on papers.

690
00:31:26,980 --> 00:31:29,900
So "Spare parts requirements
for space missions

691
00:31:29,900 --> 00:31:32,570
with reconfigurability
and commonality."

692
00:31:32,570 --> 00:31:35,880
This is based on a paper
in Journal of Spacecraft

693
00:31:35,880 --> 00:31:37,910
and Rockets, 2007.

694
00:31:37,910 --> 00:31:43,190
So and this work was done during
the Constellation Program which

695
00:31:43,190 --> 00:31:46,760
was, we're going to
go back to the moon.

696
00:31:46,760 --> 00:31:49,850
We will re-establish a
human presence on the moon.

697
00:31:49,850 --> 00:31:52,400
And we're going to bring
a whole bunch of stuff

698
00:31:52,400 --> 00:31:54,800
with us, more than we did
during Apollo to do this.

699
00:31:54,800 --> 00:31:56,720
So the picture on
the upper-right,

700
00:31:56,720 --> 00:32:00,290
you see a habitat on
top of a Lander stage.

701
00:32:00,290 --> 00:32:03,020
You see an Ascent Vehicle
with a Lander stage.

702
00:32:03,020 --> 00:32:06,480
You see a Rover that looks kind
of similar to the Lunar Rover,

703
00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:08,990
but there's also a
pressurized version of it.

704
00:32:08,990 --> 00:32:11,640
So we're going to bring
a whole bunch of stuff.

705
00:32:11,640 --> 00:32:16,370
And the challenge is during
operations, things will break.

706
00:32:16,370 --> 00:32:19,070
So you need to bring spare
parts to support all this.

707
00:32:19,070 --> 00:32:21,800
And some recent research
we've done in my group

708
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:24,560
shows that for Mars,
it's the same problem.

709
00:32:24,560 --> 00:32:26,570
You're going to stay
there a long time.

710
00:32:26,570 --> 00:32:28,320
You don't know exactly
what will break.

711
00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:30,470
But if you want a
high probability

712
00:32:30,470 --> 00:32:33,110
of being able to
successfully operate,

713
00:32:33,110 --> 00:32:35,120
you do need to bring spares.

714
00:32:35,120 --> 00:32:39,260
So the idea that was explored
here is, what if those spares

715
00:32:39,260 --> 00:32:41,180
could be common
or reconfigurable

716
00:32:41,180 --> 00:32:43,310
and you can do scavenging?

717
00:32:43,310 --> 00:32:46,850
So the idea is that, instead
of bringing a dedicated spare--

718
00:32:46,850 --> 00:32:48,560
if you give these
three systems that

719
00:32:48,560 --> 00:32:51,760
are shown here, The Habitat, the
Ascent Vehicle, and the Rover,

720
00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:54,260
to three different
companies to build,

721
00:32:54,260 --> 00:32:55,940
and they don't
talk to each other,

722
00:32:55,940 --> 00:32:58,400
and you don't impose any
commonality requirements,

723
00:32:58,400 --> 00:33:01,410
you're going to get very
different solutions.

724
00:33:01,410 --> 00:33:03,320
What's the classic
example of this

725
00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:06,460
in spaceflight,
human spaceflight?

726
00:33:06,460 --> 00:33:07,330
Apollo 13.

727
00:33:07,330 --> 00:33:08,730
What happened in Apollo 13?

728
00:33:11,430 --> 00:33:14,320
The cartridges for
the CO2 scrubbing,

729
00:33:14,320 --> 00:33:16,470
square cartridges
versus round cartridges.

730
00:33:16,470 --> 00:33:19,457
The two different contractors,
they didn't talk to each other.

731
00:33:19,457 --> 00:33:21,790
The government didn't say you
have to make these common,

732
00:33:21,790 --> 00:33:23,290
so they weren't common.

733
00:33:23,290 --> 00:33:25,630
So the idea here is,
what is the effect

734
00:33:25,630 --> 00:33:30,710
of reconfigurable and common
spares on system availability

735
00:33:30,710 --> 00:33:34,670
if you allow temporary
scavenging and cannibalization

736
00:33:34,670 --> 00:33:36,550
of systems that aren't used?

737
00:33:36,550 --> 00:33:40,930
And so one thing you need for
that is an operational profile

738
00:33:40,930 --> 00:33:42,280
for each element.

739
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:44,200
And that's shown
in the lower left.

740
00:33:44,200 --> 00:33:46,510
So this is essentially a binary.

741
00:33:46,510 --> 00:33:50,860
Zero means that particular
element is dormant

742
00:33:50,860 --> 00:33:52,320
or not being used.

743
00:33:52,320 --> 00:33:54,280
It's kind of in slumber mode.

744
00:33:54,280 --> 00:33:57,310
And 1 means it's
actively being used.

745
00:33:57,310 --> 00:34:01,720
And so then we have at each
of these time periods, T1, T2,

746
00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:03,310
T3--

747
00:34:03,310 --> 00:34:05,200
our time periods where
there is a change

748
00:34:05,200 --> 00:34:07,750
in the operational status
of a particular element.

749
00:34:07,750 --> 00:34:11,530
Either it goes from sleeping
mode to active mode,

750
00:34:11,530 --> 00:34:14,650
or from active mode
to inactive mode.

751
00:34:14,650 --> 00:34:17,620
And so knowing these
cycles' operational profiles

752
00:34:17,620 --> 00:34:19,510
is very important
to do the analysis.

753
00:34:22,710 --> 00:34:24,519
So this is a little
bit of math here.

754
00:34:24,519 --> 00:34:26,310
I'm not going to go
through this in detail.

755
00:34:26,310 --> 00:34:30,960
But basically, when you
do classical sparing,

756
00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:33,150
and maintainability,
and failure analysis,

757
00:34:33,150 --> 00:34:38,080
you assume that failures arrive
according to a Poisson process.

758
00:34:38,080 --> 00:34:43,480
So this is the equation
for a Poisson distribution.

759
00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:46,540
And then you can see the various
variables that are used here.

760
00:34:46,540 --> 00:34:51,070
So your lambda is
your failure rate.

761
00:34:51,070 --> 00:34:56,850
P of n is the probability
they have exactly n failures.

762
00:34:56,850 --> 00:35:01,080
And then, down here,
we have the spares

763
00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:02,190
that are available to you.

764
00:35:02,190 --> 00:35:09,070
And really spares can come
from two different sources.

765
00:35:09,070 --> 00:35:12,180
One is, you bring spares
with you from Earth.

766
00:35:12,180 --> 00:35:15,570
So this is a spares from
repository, s sub i.

767
00:35:15,570 --> 00:35:19,620
These are spares you brought
with you as a pool of spares.

768
00:35:19,620 --> 00:35:23,400
And then s sub e are spares
that you take out of elements

769
00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:25,140
that are not being used.

770
00:35:25,140 --> 00:35:28,380
So these are spares that
are scavenged temporarily

771
00:35:28,380 --> 00:35:29,580
from inactive elements.

772
00:35:29,580 --> 00:35:33,210
That's s sub e
minus n sub f, which

773
00:35:33,210 --> 00:35:37,970
is the number of failures that
have occurred up to that point.

774
00:35:37,970 --> 00:35:40,570
So the total number of
spares available at any given

775
00:35:40,570 --> 00:35:43,870
point in time is your
initial spares pool

776
00:35:43,870 --> 00:35:46,720
plus spares you can
scavenge from other inactive

777
00:35:46,720 --> 00:35:51,520
elements in the
system, minus elements

778
00:35:51,520 --> 00:35:53,410
that have already failed.

779
00:35:53,410 --> 00:35:58,840
And this is assuming no
repair, so you can't repair.

780
00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:01,240
And it assumes that you
know ahead of time what

781
00:36:01,240 --> 00:36:03,110
the operational profile is.

782
00:36:03,110 --> 00:36:05,170
So there's spares
available from elements

783
00:36:05,170 --> 00:36:07,940
from scavenging is
this equation here.

784
00:36:07,940 --> 00:36:11,500
It's essentially the sum
over all the elements,

785
00:36:11,500 --> 00:36:16,390
E. E is the number of
elements in your architecture.

786
00:36:16,390 --> 00:36:20,650
Q sub E is something known as
quantity per application, QPA

787
00:36:20,650 --> 00:36:21,880
also.

788
00:36:21,880 --> 00:36:25,570
So basically, if you have
like a mission computer

789
00:36:25,570 --> 00:36:30,130
or in like UAVs, we have servos.

790
00:36:30,130 --> 00:36:31,900
Like, this particular
element has

791
00:36:31,900 --> 00:36:34,340
six servos, identical servos.

792
00:36:34,340 --> 00:36:36,110
They're used on the vehicle.

793
00:36:36,110 --> 00:36:40,520
So QPA, this QE would be 6.

794
00:36:40,520 --> 00:36:42,610
So if that element
isn't used, we

795
00:36:42,610 --> 00:36:46,090
could go in, take out a servo,
put it in somewhere else.

796
00:36:46,090 --> 00:36:48,580
And so we can treat that
as a spare, at least

797
00:36:48,580 --> 00:36:51,130
during the period where
that UAV isn't used.

798
00:36:51,130 --> 00:36:53,230
Does that make sense?

799
00:36:53,230 --> 00:36:56,650
OK, so the difference
then is that in the kind

800
00:36:56,650 --> 00:36:59,980
of classic way of doing it,
we have dedicated spares.

801
00:36:59,980 --> 00:37:04,300
Each element, one element
1, element i, element E,

802
00:37:04,300 --> 00:37:08,095
has dedicated spares that
only work on that vehicle.

803
00:37:11,050 --> 00:37:13,240
There's no swapping,
there's no scavenging,

804
00:37:13,240 --> 00:37:15,040
there's no communality.

805
00:37:15,040 --> 00:37:18,490
And therefore, your spares
repository, s sub i,

806
00:37:18,490 --> 00:37:20,290
is going to be pretty
big because there's

807
00:37:20,290 --> 00:37:22,550
no commonality, no sparing.

808
00:37:22,550 --> 00:37:27,520
In this new situation, you have
reconfigurable or common parts.

809
00:37:27,520 --> 00:37:29,950
So we still have a
spares repository.

810
00:37:29,950 --> 00:37:33,970
But now those spares can be
deployed across all or a subset

811
00:37:33,970 --> 00:37:37,190
of the elements,
plus we can treat--

812
00:37:37,190 --> 00:37:39,280
and this is this
dashed line here--

813
00:37:39,280 --> 00:37:44,840
we can treat elements that
are part of idle elements.

814
00:37:44,840 --> 00:37:47,060
We can treat them
temporarily as being

815
00:37:47,060 --> 00:37:49,070
part of the spares repository.

816
00:37:49,070 --> 00:37:51,140
Does that make sense?

817
00:37:51,140 --> 00:37:55,970
So that's a much more, in
a sense, smarter way to do.

818
00:37:55,970 --> 00:38:00,020
And the question is,
what's the benefit of this?

819
00:38:00,020 --> 00:38:05,750
So in order to calculate
the benefits for this,

820
00:38:05,750 --> 00:38:07,410
we essentially--

821
00:38:07,410 --> 00:38:08,660
we have some constraints.

822
00:38:08,660 --> 00:38:11,480
So for example, the number
of failures that you can have

823
00:38:11,480 --> 00:38:12,680
is between--

824
00:38:12,680 --> 00:38:14,570
if you have zero
failures, that's great.

825
00:38:14,570 --> 00:38:16,160
That's your lower floor.

826
00:38:16,160 --> 00:38:19,040
And then N is the
total number of units

827
00:38:19,040 --> 00:38:21,590
you have in your
architecture, including

828
00:38:21,590 --> 00:38:24,890
the ones in the inventory,
in the initial inventory,

829
00:38:24,890 --> 00:38:28,190
and plus the ones that are
built into all the vehicles.

830
00:38:28,190 --> 00:38:31,370
And then, the key here is what's
known as back-order level.

831
00:38:31,370 --> 00:38:36,260
So back-order essentially
is the number of spares

832
00:38:36,260 --> 00:38:40,130
that you would
need but may not--

833
00:38:40,130 --> 00:38:43,700
so when the back-order level
becomes larger than zero,

834
00:38:43,700 --> 00:38:47,690
it essentially means that
your number of failures

835
00:38:47,690 --> 00:38:51,620
have exceeded the number
of spares that you have.

836
00:38:51,620 --> 00:38:53,840
You don't have enough
spares to satisfy

837
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:55,520
all your operational needs.

838
00:38:55,520 --> 00:39:00,920
So this is this conditional
back-order at spares level s.

839
00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:03,140
And you sum that
essentially then

840
00:39:03,140 --> 00:39:06,770
over all the possible failure
states that you could see.

841
00:39:06,770 --> 00:39:07,880
And why is that useful?

842
00:39:07,880 --> 00:39:10,250
Because you can then
calculate essentially

843
00:39:10,250 --> 00:39:12,120
your element availability.

844
00:39:12,120 --> 00:39:16,640
So a is your availability
of at time ti.

845
00:39:16,640 --> 00:39:19,610
And then your probability
of the whole system

846
00:39:19,610 --> 00:39:23,720
is the minimum of your system
availability at any time

847
00:39:23,720 --> 00:39:26,930
and point during your mission
horizon, your mission time,

848
00:39:26,930 --> 00:39:29,510
T. Do you see how that works?

849
00:39:29,510 --> 00:39:32,570
So you have your spares.

850
00:39:32,570 --> 00:39:36,230
You have failures of the
spares, which are random.

851
00:39:36,230 --> 00:39:37,880
And then you can
calculate, are you

852
00:39:37,880 --> 00:39:41,120
going to have enough spares to
operate every element that you

853
00:39:41,120 --> 00:39:45,410
need to operate when it's
supposed to be operational?

854
00:39:45,410 --> 00:39:50,090
And the back-order level, this
number b here, is what you use.

855
00:39:50,090 --> 00:39:52,950
You look at your back-order
level across the whole mission

856
00:39:52,950 --> 00:39:57,930
timeline to see what your
system availability will be.

857
00:39:57,930 --> 00:40:04,320
And there's a closed form
approximation of this.

858
00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:08,660
And then for a larger number
of elements and different QPAs

859
00:40:08,660 --> 00:40:11,790
and so forth, you typically then
have to switch to simulation,

860
00:40:11,790 --> 00:40:14,100
like Monte Carlo simulations.

861
00:40:14,100 --> 00:40:17,200
So what are the results here?

862
00:40:17,200 --> 00:40:19,320
So this was applied to--

863
00:40:19,320 --> 00:40:23,130
the example here is a
co-located mission elements.

864
00:40:23,130 --> 00:40:26,130
This is for, I think,
it was a lunar mission.

865
00:40:26,130 --> 00:40:30,430
And you define essentially
the operational time profile,

866
00:40:30,430 --> 00:40:32,590
quantity per application,
and so forth.

867
00:40:32,590 --> 00:40:35,520
And the example that was used
was an electronic control unit,

868
00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:40,560
and ECU, with a meantime to
failure of 100,000 hours.

869
00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:43,440
So failure rate is 1
over meantime to failure.

870
00:40:43,440 --> 00:40:46,020
Lambda is the
expected failure rate

871
00:40:46,020 --> 00:40:48,370
is 1 over meantime to failure.

872
00:40:48,370 --> 00:40:50,700
So pretty reliable,
100,000 hours

873
00:40:50,700 --> 00:40:55,590
of operation meantime to
failure is pretty reliable.

874
00:40:55,590 --> 00:40:57,850
But of course, you're
far from Earth.

875
00:40:57,850 --> 00:41:01,140
This is a 600-day
timeline, and you

876
00:41:01,140 --> 00:41:03,330
can see here the
operational profiles

877
00:41:03,330 --> 00:41:04,760
for your various
mission elements.

878
00:41:04,760 --> 00:41:07,590
So this is actually kind of
reminds you of The Martian,

879
00:41:07,590 --> 00:41:08,500
right?

880
00:41:08,500 --> 00:41:11,342
Anybody seen the movie
The Martian recently?

881
00:41:11,342 --> 00:41:12,300
Who's seen The Martian?

882
00:41:12,300 --> 00:41:15,030
Who's not seen The Martian?

883
00:41:15,030 --> 00:41:16,230
You've got to go.

884
00:41:16,230 --> 00:41:17,850
You're the only one in the room.

885
00:41:17,850 --> 00:41:19,080
It's a great movie.

886
00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:24,720
So he does scavenging
and even things

887
00:41:24,720 --> 00:41:26,830
that weren't supposed
to be scavenged.

888
00:41:26,830 --> 00:41:30,240
And so we have
four elements here.

889
00:41:30,240 --> 00:41:35,220
We have the PR, which is the
Pressurized Rover, the Habitat,

890
00:41:35,220 --> 00:41:39,780
the All-Terrain
Vehicle, and then

891
00:41:39,780 --> 00:41:42,660
the ATV, which is the
Ascent-Descent Vehicle.

892
00:41:42,660 --> 00:41:45,720
In this case, it's the same
vehicle for ascent and descent.

893
00:41:45,720 --> 00:41:47,850
And so the
Ascent-Descent Vehicle,

894
00:41:47,850 --> 00:41:51,000
you only need it when you
land and when you depart.

895
00:41:51,000 --> 00:41:53,170
The rest of the
time it's dormant.

896
00:41:53,170 --> 00:41:55,470
The Habitat is used while
you're on the surface.

897
00:41:55,470 --> 00:41:57,840
The ATV is used while
you're on the surface.

898
00:41:57,840 --> 00:42:00,372
And then, the Pressurized
Rover is used--

899
00:42:00,372 --> 00:42:01,830
the assumption here
is you're going

900
00:42:01,830 --> 00:42:05,550
to operate for like 100
days very close to the base.

901
00:42:05,550 --> 00:42:07,470
And only after 100
days are you going

902
00:42:07,470 --> 00:42:11,490
to start going further away
with the Pressurized Rover.

903
00:42:11,490 --> 00:42:13,340
So those are the
operational profiles.

904
00:42:13,340 --> 00:42:14,140
Yeah?

905
00:42:14,140 --> 00:42:16,140
AUDIENCE: Is there an
argument that you wouldn't

906
00:42:16,140 --> 00:42:19,325
want to be scavenging parts
from your Ascent-Descent Vehicle

907
00:42:19,325 --> 00:42:20,490
at all?

908
00:42:20,490 --> 00:42:22,010
PROFESSOR: That's a good point.

909
00:42:22,010 --> 00:42:25,230
So if basically, your
back-order level is too high,

910
00:42:25,230 --> 00:42:28,020
and you run out of
your last spare the day

911
00:42:28,020 --> 00:42:32,280
before you're supposed to launch
on the ADV, you're in trouble.

912
00:42:32,280 --> 00:42:36,990
But if that's the case,
then what you have to do

913
00:42:36,990 --> 00:42:42,180
is you have to
exclude the minimum--

914
00:42:42,180 --> 00:42:45,150
and there may be redundancy
in that Ascent Vehicle.

915
00:42:45,150 --> 00:42:47,490
And you may or may not
be willing to sacrifice

916
00:42:47,490 --> 00:42:49,210
the redundancy.

917
00:42:49,210 --> 00:42:51,240
I mean, this is all
about risk, right?

918
00:42:51,240 --> 00:42:55,650
And exclude those or keep out
spares that you cannot touch

919
00:42:55,650 --> 00:42:59,520
because if you can't, then
you can't get back home.

920
00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:02,460
So you just don't count
those in your spares pool

921
00:43:02,460 --> 00:43:03,870
if that's the case.

922
00:43:03,870 --> 00:43:06,840
But you can still do
the whole analysis.

923
00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,250
OK, so what's the
bottom line here?

924
00:43:10,250 --> 00:43:12,660
What's the punch line here?

925
00:43:12,660 --> 00:43:18,953
So the punch line is
that if you have a--

926
00:43:18,953 --> 00:43:22,530
the D case here is the
dedicated case, OK?

927
00:43:22,530 --> 00:43:25,290
So this is where
there's no scavenging,

928
00:43:25,290 --> 00:43:28,200
there's no commonality of
spares among these elements.

929
00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:30,240
You have to have
dedicated spares.

930
00:43:30,240 --> 00:43:34,290
And let's assume you want
a 90% availability, which

931
00:43:34,290 --> 00:43:37,290
is not that high.

932
00:43:37,290 --> 00:43:40,480
That's a relatively
modest requirement.

933
00:43:40,480 --> 00:43:42,510
You want 90% availability.

934
00:43:42,510 --> 00:43:46,420
What it means is you need
to have in this case,

935
00:43:46,420 --> 00:43:49,860
you can see the
line just crosses

936
00:43:49,860 --> 00:43:51,910
below here, this crossover.

937
00:43:51,910 --> 00:43:56,340
You need four spares in
your initial spares pool

938
00:43:56,340 --> 00:43:58,530
for this electronic
control unit.

939
00:43:58,530 --> 00:44:02,190
You have to have at least
four spares, dedicated spares,

940
00:44:02,190 --> 00:44:06,320
for that electronic control
unit for a 600-day mission

941
00:44:06,320 --> 00:44:12,800
for a unit that has
100,000 MTTF or MTBF

942
00:44:12,800 --> 00:44:16,460
to guarantee at least
90% availability.

943
00:44:16,460 --> 00:44:18,240
And you say, oh,
that's not a big deal.

944
00:44:18,240 --> 00:44:19,400
That's just four spares.

945
00:44:19,400 --> 00:44:21,230
Well, that's just one unit.

946
00:44:21,230 --> 00:44:23,180
That's just one box, right?

947
00:44:23,180 --> 00:44:24,890
You probably have
dozens of boxes,

948
00:44:24,890 --> 00:44:27,920
or even hundreds across
all these elements.

949
00:44:27,920 --> 00:44:31,010
And so that could
be a lot of spares.

950
00:44:31,010 --> 00:44:35,300
You translate that to mass
and volume, that's a big deal.

951
00:44:35,300 --> 00:44:43,460
So using closed-form analytics
to calculate the minimum number

952
00:44:43,460 --> 00:44:45,770
of spares you need,
this is the R case,

953
00:44:45,770 --> 00:44:47,480
the reconfigurable case.

954
00:44:47,480 --> 00:44:50,840
You can see that you can
achieve that same requirement

955
00:44:50,840 --> 00:44:53,089
with two spares.

956
00:44:53,089 --> 00:44:53,630
You see that?

957
00:44:53,630 --> 00:44:55,950
That's this line here.

958
00:44:55,950 --> 00:44:58,700
It's this line here, and
this is a conservative model.

959
00:44:58,700 --> 00:45:00,590
This is a conservative model.

960
00:45:00,590 --> 00:45:05,930
So by doing reconfigurable and
common spares and scavenging,

961
00:45:05,930 --> 00:45:09,780
you can cut your number
of spares in half.

962
00:45:09,780 --> 00:45:11,490
You can cut your number
of spares in half

963
00:45:11,490 --> 00:45:15,560
and still achieve a 90%
system availability.

964
00:45:15,560 --> 00:45:18,320
And then you multiply that
across all the elements

965
00:45:18,320 --> 00:45:20,180
in your architecture.

966
00:45:20,180 --> 00:45:22,280
And that's a big deal.

967
00:45:22,280 --> 00:45:24,690
And then this result here--

968
00:45:24,690 --> 00:45:28,040
so this is a rigorous
bound because it

969
00:45:28,040 --> 00:45:29,780
makes some conservative
assumptions,

970
00:45:29,780 --> 00:45:32,780
and it uses closed-form
equations to calculate this.

971
00:45:32,780 --> 00:45:35,070
And the details
are in the paper.

972
00:45:35,070 --> 00:45:37,520
And then this curve
here is the simulated.

973
00:45:37,520 --> 00:45:41,660
So if you simulate this using
essentially a discrete event

974
00:45:41,660 --> 00:45:44,480
simulation several times,
and then you take averages,

975
00:45:44,480 --> 00:45:46,160
it's actually even
a little better.

976
00:45:46,160 --> 00:45:48,930
This suggests you could even
get away with one spare.

977
00:45:48,930 --> 00:45:55,080
But it's not as conservative
as the closed-form solution.

978
00:45:55,080 --> 00:45:57,530
OK, so the bottom line
is reconfigurable parts

979
00:45:57,530 --> 00:46:01,880
allow for 33% to 50% reduction
in the number of required

980
00:46:01,880 --> 00:46:05,280
spares for 90%
availability level.

981
00:46:05,280 --> 00:46:08,090
But if you think about what
that means operationally,

982
00:46:08,090 --> 00:46:10,490
it means that you really
have to know ahead

983
00:46:10,490 --> 00:46:13,400
of time what's going to be
operational when, you have

984
00:46:13,400 --> 00:46:16,910
to have the crew trained
to be able to actually go

985
00:46:16,910 --> 00:46:18,290
in and scavenge.

986
00:46:18,290 --> 00:46:20,000
And the equipment,
the vehicles, have

987
00:46:20,000 --> 00:46:22,760
to be designed such that you
can actually remove this stuff

988
00:46:22,760 --> 00:46:25,470
and put it back in
relatively easily.

989
00:46:25,470 --> 00:46:28,370
So that would impose
some accessibility,

990
00:46:28,370 --> 00:46:32,180
and replaceability, and
maintainability requirements.

991
00:46:32,180 --> 00:46:34,854
The other option is you
say, we don't want spares.

992
00:46:34,854 --> 00:46:36,770
Well, then you need to
do a lot of redundancy.

993
00:46:36,770 --> 00:46:38,145
And then, your
vehicles are going

994
00:46:38,145 --> 00:46:39,547
to get heavy and more complex.

995
00:46:39,547 --> 00:46:41,380
I mean, those are the
real world trade-offs.

996
00:46:41,380 --> 00:46:42,950
Yup, Sam?

997
00:46:42,950 --> 00:46:45,050
AUDIENCE: Does this
potentially increase

998
00:46:45,050 --> 00:46:47,900
the risk for the
crew of the mission

999
00:46:47,900 --> 00:46:52,630
if there's some sort of inherent
failure in the particular part

1000
00:46:52,630 --> 00:46:54,290
that is being used everywhere?

1001
00:46:54,290 --> 00:46:57,670
PROFESSOR: So I don't know if
you looked ahead or you just--

1002
00:46:57,670 --> 00:46:59,090
I know you're a smart guy, Sam.

1003
00:46:59,090 --> 00:47:05,270
So this is the answer to
your question right here.

1004
00:47:05,270 --> 00:47:11,360
So this is great.

1005
00:47:11,360 --> 00:47:14,187
OK, we like the fact
that we can cut down

1006
00:47:14,187 --> 00:47:15,770
on the number of
spares and still meet

1007
00:47:15,770 --> 00:47:17,600
the same availability.

1008
00:47:17,600 --> 00:47:20,540
But you can ask the
question in different ways.

1009
00:47:20,540 --> 00:47:24,470
So on the left side is a
kind of sensitivity analysis

1010
00:47:24,470 --> 00:47:28,110
that says, well, maybe we're
not so mass constrained.

1011
00:47:28,110 --> 00:47:30,830
We have plenty of
transportation capacity.

1012
00:47:30,830 --> 00:47:33,260
So we're not really
mass constrained.

1013
00:47:33,260 --> 00:47:38,600
But we know that designing
ultra-reliable electronic boxes

1014
00:47:38,600 --> 00:47:41,790
or whatever components
is very expensive, right?

1015
00:47:41,790 --> 00:47:48,820
So can we decrease
the requirement

1016
00:47:48,820 --> 00:47:50,740
on the manufacturer
of these boxes?

1017
00:47:50,740 --> 00:47:56,230
And can we go from, say,
100,000 to 75,000 MTTF?

1018
00:47:56,230 --> 00:48:00,290
So we're decreasing the nominal
reliability of the equipment

1019
00:48:00,290 --> 00:48:02,080
by a fourth.

1020
00:48:02,080 --> 00:48:05,980
We're making the job easier
for the supplier of that box.

1021
00:48:05,980 --> 00:48:08,940
Presumably, that
should be cheaper.

1022
00:48:08,940 --> 00:48:11,890
That should be a cheaper
box to design and build.

1023
00:48:11,890 --> 00:48:15,370
So what will happen if we drop
the reliability requirement

1024
00:48:15,370 --> 00:48:17,060
by 25%?

1025
00:48:17,060 --> 00:48:19,000
And then you can
see the impact here.

1026
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,280
So the blue curve
is essentially what

1027
00:48:21,280 --> 00:48:24,340
you get for the less
reliable equipment.

1028
00:48:24,340 --> 00:48:28,920
And then the black
was the original.

1029
00:48:28,920 --> 00:48:31,830
So now, Sam's question.

1030
00:48:31,830 --> 00:48:36,490
So this is basically-- so
here's your failure rate.

1031
00:48:36,490 --> 00:48:39,640
OK, this is your failure
rate, 10 to the minus 3.

1032
00:48:39,640 --> 00:48:42,644
And we're varying the failure
rate over a large range.

1033
00:48:42,644 --> 00:48:44,560
And then we're looking
at system availability.

1034
00:48:44,560 --> 00:48:47,890
This is for a fixed
number of spares.

1035
00:48:47,890 --> 00:48:54,690
And what's really interesting--
so when your failure rate is

1036
00:48:54,690 --> 00:48:55,560
low--

1037
00:48:55,560 --> 00:48:59,400
so we're on the left side--

1038
00:48:59,400 --> 00:49:01,800
then the blue curve is
lower, the dedicated case.

1039
00:49:01,800 --> 00:49:05,760
So for a fixed number of
spares, for relatively reliable

1040
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:09,330
equipment, you're better off
going with the reconfigurable

1041
00:49:09,330 --> 00:49:10,155
or common spares.

1042
00:49:13,270 --> 00:49:15,910
This is logarithmic, so
it's a little tricky.

1043
00:49:15,910 --> 00:49:18,360
So system availability
is higher when

1044
00:49:18,360 --> 00:49:21,970
you have common and
reconfigurable spares,

1045
00:49:21,970 --> 00:49:25,250
relatively reliable equipment.

1046
00:49:25,250 --> 00:49:26,780
But there's a crossover point.

1047
00:49:26,780 --> 00:49:30,920
If your boxes, your
elements, your components,

1048
00:49:30,920 --> 00:49:33,740
are very unreliable, which
is on the right side,

1049
00:49:33,740 --> 00:49:36,090
there's actually
a crossover point.

1050
00:49:36,090 --> 00:49:39,140
And the idea is that,
well, now because it's

1051
00:49:39,140 --> 00:49:41,960
common and reconfigurable
across all the vehicles,

1052
00:49:41,960 --> 00:49:45,560
you have this really bad box
that breaks all the time.

1053
00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:47,810
Now, the problem is everywhere.

1054
00:49:47,810 --> 00:49:49,970
Every vehicle, everything
is affected by it.

1055
00:49:49,970 --> 00:49:53,930
Whereas before, it was kind
of more contained, right?

1056
00:49:53,930 --> 00:49:56,210
And so that's what
that crossover is.

1057
00:49:56,210 --> 00:50:00,080
So if you're in a situation
with very unreliable equipment,

1058
00:50:00,080 --> 00:50:02,240
unreliable components,
you're actually

1059
00:50:02,240 --> 00:50:06,110
worse off making them
common or reconfigurable.

1060
00:50:06,110 --> 00:50:10,400
And you can now calculate
where that crossover point is.

1061
00:50:10,400 --> 00:50:12,860
That's pretty cool,
don't you think?

1062
00:50:12,860 --> 00:50:15,170
I get excited about this stuff.

1063
00:50:15,170 --> 00:50:17,960
I don't know about you
guys, but this is real.

1064
00:50:17,960 --> 00:50:21,290
This is what you care--
in operations, this is--

1065
00:50:21,290 --> 00:50:23,810
how many spares of
each kind, can we

1066
00:50:23,810 --> 00:50:26,660
guarantee that we
can successfully

1067
00:50:26,660 --> 00:50:29,600
do this campaign, whether
it's a military campaign,

1068
00:50:29,600 --> 00:50:31,580
or you go to Antarctica.

1069
00:50:31,580 --> 00:50:33,830
And we heard about
the Octanus Rover.

1070
00:50:33,830 --> 00:50:36,159
And it's just one
Rover, but what's

1071
00:50:36,159 --> 00:50:38,450
all this stuff that you need
to bring with you in terms

1072
00:50:38,450 --> 00:50:40,700
of spares to make
sure you can actually

1073
00:50:40,700 --> 00:50:44,740
have a successful campaign
and have a guarantee of that?

1074
00:50:44,740 --> 00:50:46,550
Yeah?

1075
00:50:46,550 --> 00:50:50,390
AUDIENCE: I'm wondering if the
reconfigurability argument also

1076
00:50:50,390 --> 00:50:53,930
has some sort of impact
on the kind of finances

1077
00:50:53,930 --> 00:50:55,820
and manufacturability--
in terms of if you're

1078
00:50:55,820 --> 00:50:58,460
making reconfigurable
parts for different things,

1079
00:50:58,460 --> 00:51:01,220
they may be more
similarly manufactured,

1080
00:51:01,220 --> 00:51:04,820
and therefore may represent
a decrease in cost

1081
00:51:04,820 --> 00:51:05,960
on the manufacturing side?

1082
00:51:05,960 --> 00:51:08,030
If that's another motivation.

1083
00:51:08,030 --> 00:51:09,750
PROFESSOR: That's a great point.

1084
00:51:09,750 --> 00:51:11,930
What I will say
about that is that

1085
00:51:11,930 --> 00:51:13,550
in order to capture
that benefit,

1086
00:51:13,550 --> 00:51:15,860
you need to lock that
in contractually.

1087
00:51:15,860 --> 00:51:19,370
So either you give all this
work to the same manufacturer

1088
00:51:19,370 --> 00:51:24,170
and say, OK, you're now making
50 boxes instead of just five.

1089
00:51:24,170 --> 00:51:28,430
There has to be a discount
on a per-unit basis for that.

1090
00:51:28,430 --> 00:51:30,140
Or if it's different
manufacturers,

1091
00:51:30,140 --> 00:51:31,640
then it gets hard.

1092
00:51:31,640 --> 00:51:35,750
So yes, but you have to have the
kind of business arrangements

1093
00:51:35,750 --> 00:51:38,530
that will allow you
to capture that value.

1094
00:51:38,530 --> 00:51:41,840
EPFL-- were you
able to follow this?

1095
00:51:41,840 --> 00:51:43,730
I know this is pretty
detailed discussion

1096
00:51:43,730 --> 00:51:45,200
here on these curves.

1097
00:51:45,200 --> 00:51:49,140
Is it-- Maxim, you're
sort of shaking your head.

1098
00:51:49,140 --> 00:51:50,140
Is it clear?

1099
00:51:53,510 --> 00:51:55,360
GUEST SPEAKER: [INAUDIBLE]--

1100
00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:58,030
I can give you a concrete
practical about everyday life

1101
00:51:58,030 --> 00:52:03,405
example that you probably know
about in this particular view

1102
00:52:03,405 --> 00:52:04,540
of [INAUDIBLE].

1103
00:52:04,540 --> 00:52:09,180
But imagine you go with your
car on vacation for two weeks,

1104
00:52:09,180 --> 00:52:14,230
and your children all
need Pampers [INAUDIBLE]..

1105
00:52:14,230 --> 00:52:16,350
And you can take them
with you from your store.

1106
00:52:16,350 --> 00:52:17,516
Well, you know how they are.

1107
00:52:17,516 --> 00:52:19,824
They are more
expensive but reliable.

1108
00:52:19,824 --> 00:52:21,990
But you don't know how many
you're going to consume.

1109
00:52:21,990 --> 00:52:24,450
But you get a certain
minimum amount per day,

1110
00:52:24,450 --> 00:52:26,940
and you hope you don't
go over the limit.

1111
00:52:26,940 --> 00:52:28,200
Now, it takes lots of volume.

1112
00:52:28,200 --> 00:52:30,690
So you have to trade off
your space because you

1113
00:52:30,690 --> 00:52:32,480
have fixed space in your car.

1114
00:52:32,480 --> 00:52:35,970
You cannot take more than
the volume available.

1115
00:52:35,970 --> 00:52:39,665
And so this is exactly the kind
of reliability curve you have.

1116
00:52:39,665 --> 00:52:41,040
You can take too
little with you.

1117
00:52:41,040 --> 00:52:43,780
You have to buy the wrong
stuff when you get there,

1118
00:52:43,780 --> 00:52:44,810
wherever you are.

1119
00:52:44,810 --> 00:52:49,414
And then it might have leaks
and failures and not worth it.

1120
00:52:49,414 --> 00:52:52,160
So you'll need more than
what you thought initially

1121
00:52:52,160 --> 00:52:53,752
and cost more as well.

1122
00:52:53,752 --> 00:52:56,225
So actually, this is extremely
important in everyday life.

1123
00:52:56,225 --> 00:52:59,230
PROFESSOR: OK, so I like your--

1124
00:52:59,230 --> 00:53:01,844
I'm past that stage with
my kids several years.

1125
00:53:01,844 --> 00:53:02,760
GUEST SPEAKER: Me too.

1126
00:53:02,760 --> 00:53:04,740
PROFESSOR: But I'm going
to amend your example

1127
00:53:04,740 --> 00:53:06,240
in the following way.

1128
00:53:06,240 --> 00:53:09,300
Basically, if you had two kids,
and they're very different,

1129
00:53:09,300 --> 00:53:12,930
like one is really tall, and
their same diapers will not

1130
00:53:12,930 --> 00:53:15,690
fit, then you have
a problem, right?

1131
00:53:15,690 --> 00:53:19,260
But if they're twins, or if you
buy stretchable diapers that

1132
00:53:19,260 --> 00:53:22,650
have a huge range, then
you can cut down, right?

1133
00:53:22,650 --> 00:53:26,380
So you have to have like
different kids in the car.

1134
00:53:26,380 --> 00:53:27,720
Then it works.

1135
00:53:27,720 --> 00:53:30,200
I think then the example works.

1136
00:53:30,200 --> 00:53:31,650
OK, let's see.

1137
00:53:31,650 --> 00:53:33,570
We're kind of running
short on time.

1138
00:53:33,570 --> 00:53:34,920
So one more example.

1139
00:53:34,920 --> 00:53:39,120
This is based on the doctoral
thesis of Jeremy [? Oktay. ?]

1140
00:53:39,120 --> 00:53:42,030
He's a flight test engineer.

1141
00:53:42,030 --> 00:53:44,430
And the question
that he looked at

1142
00:53:44,430 --> 00:53:47,430
was robustness of
degraded airplanes.

1143
00:53:47,430 --> 00:53:51,150
So the idea here is
that some systems

1144
00:53:51,150 --> 00:53:54,450
are going to be used longer
in long, ultra-endurance kind

1145
00:53:54,450 --> 00:53:58,950
of systems where you do not
have the option of repair.

1146
00:53:58,950 --> 00:54:02,790
You don't have the option
to land, repair, and fix

1147
00:54:02,790 --> 00:54:05,940
the system, and bring
it back to its pristine

1148
00:54:05,940 --> 00:54:08,190
everything-is-working state.

1149
00:54:08,190 --> 00:54:11,190
And on the right side here, you
see some examples of-- these

1150
00:54:11,190 --> 00:54:13,524
are real systems that
people have worked on,

1151
00:54:13,524 --> 00:54:14,940
or are working on,
or are thinking

1152
00:54:14,940 --> 00:54:16,830
about that have this situation.

1153
00:54:16,830 --> 00:54:21,450
The DARPA Vulture is a program
where a UAV would stay aloft

1154
00:54:21,450 --> 00:54:25,080
for five years with no
landing and a repair allowed.

1155
00:54:25,080 --> 00:54:27,450
So you can obviously see
it's got solar panels,

1156
00:54:27,450 --> 00:54:31,860
and I think it has fuel cells
as well, if I'm not mistaken.

1157
00:54:31,860 --> 00:54:34,440
So how do you achieve that?

1158
00:54:34,440 --> 00:54:39,000
This is an example from
Antarctica flying several UAVs

1159
00:54:39,000 --> 00:54:40,770
to map the ice sheets.

1160
00:54:40,770 --> 00:54:44,280
This was a gap solution
while the iSat satellite

1161
00:54:44,280 --> 00:54:47,790
between iSat I and iSat II.

1162
00:54:47,790 --> 00:54:52,170
And then here's a human
colony maybe on the moon

1163
00:54:52,170 --> 00:54:54,510
or looks like the moon.

1164
00:54:54,510 --> 00:54:56,010
So we have this dome here.

1165
00:54:56,010 --> 00:54:57,900
This crater has been
covered with a dome,

1166
00:54:57,900 --> 00:55:00,090
and we have a greenhouse inside.

1167
00:55:00,090 --> 00:55:02,010
So life support
systems that have

1168
00:55:02,010 --> 00:55:05,470
to be super reliable for a
very long amount of time.

1169
00:55:05,470 --> 00:55:08,940
And so the question
that Jeremy looked at

1170
00:55:08,940 --> 00:55:11,040
is, how do we
design and optimize

1171
00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:14,730
systems that have ultra-long
endurance, where you know ahead

1172
00:55:14,730 --> 00:55:18,610
of time that
failures will occur?

1173
00:55:18,610 --> 00:55:22,060
Failures will occur, and you
can't repair the failures

1174
00:55:22,060 --> 00:55:23,080
easily.

1175
00:55:23,080 --> 00:55:25,540
So you have to design
the system apriori,

1176
00:55:25,540 --> 00:55:29,050
such that in those
partially-failed states,

1177
00:55:29,050 --> 00:55:31,980
it will give you the
maximum residual performance

1178
00:55:31,980 --> 00:55:34,060
that it possibly could.

1179
00:55:34,060 --> 00:55:37,150
And it turns out, when that's
your objective function,

1180
00:55:37,150 --> 00:55:39,340
you design the
systems differently

1181
00:55:39,340 --> 00:55:41,830
than if you just optimize
nominal performance

1182
00:55:41,830 --> 00:55:47,470
and then worry about what
happens if there's failures.

1183
00:55:47,470 --> 00:55:51,220
And this is the second paper
that I uploaded for you.

1184
00:55:51,220 --> 00:55:55,480
So both of these papers
"The Reconfigurable Spares"

1185
00:55:55,480 --> 00:55:58,810
and then this one are uploaded
both on Moodle and Stellar

1186
00:55:58,810 --> 00:56:00,640
if you want to
take a deeper look.

1187
00:56:00,640 --> 00:56:03,310
So the case study
here is the C-12--

1188
00:56:03,310 --> 00:56:05,350
this is the King Air airplane.

1189
00:56:05,350 --> 00:56:08,210
This is the military
version of it

1190
00:56:08,210 --> 00:56:12,430
and typically flies out
of Edwards Air Force base.

1191
00:56:12,430 --> 00:56:15,480
And the idea is that there
can be different failures

1192
00:56:15,480 --> 00:56:16,320
on this airplane.

1193
00:56:16,320 --> 00:56:20,790
So this diagram, this is
a so-called Markov chain

1194
00:56:20,790 --> 00:56:22,860
where n means nominal.

1195
00:56:22,860 --> 00:56:24,940
And you can see the table
that goes with this.

1196
00:56:24,940 --> 00:56:27,840
Nominal means
nothing has failed,

1197
00:56:27,840 --> 00:56:29,460
and you just do turn control.

1198
00:56:29,460 --> 00:56:33,120
This is climbing,
left-turn climbing.

1199
00:56:33,120 --> 00:56:35,160
You just turn control
with your ailerons,

1200
00:56:35,160 --> 00:56:37,350
which is just standard flying.

1201
00:56:37,350 --> 00:56:39,030
And then different
failures could

1202
00:56:39,030 --> 00:56:40,430
occur of different elements.

1203
00:56:40,430 --> 00:56:44,070
So the left engine, the rudder,
and the aileron could fail.

1204
00:56:44,070 --> 00:56:45,540
Of course, a lot more can fail.

1205
00:56:45,540 --> 00:56:47,760
But in this case study,
those are the elements

1206
00:56:47,760 --> 00:56:50,060
that are allowed to fail.

1207
00:56:50,060 --> 00:56:53,340
And so 1 means the
left engine has failed,

1208
00:56:53,340 --> 00:56:56,250
2 means the rudder
has failed, and 3

1209
00:56:56,250 --> 00:56:58,950
means the ailerons have failed.

1210
00:56:58,950 --> 00:57:02,340
And then as you move to the
right, it gets worse and worse.

1211
00:57:02,340 --> 00:57:07,050
So state 4 means you lost your
left engine and the aileron,

1212
00:57:07,050 --> 00:57:09,060
but you still have your rudder.

1213
00:57:09,060 --> 00:57:12,300
And then, the worst is state
7, where everything's failed.

1214
00:57:12,300 --> 00:57:14,250
The left engine's
failed, the rudder,

1215
00:57:14,250 --> 00:57:16,110
and the aileron has failed.

1216
00:57:16,110 --> 00:57:20,070
And what you worry about is
what we call availability.

1217
00:57:20,070 --> 00:57:24,300
Expected availability is what's
the probability or fraction

1218
00:57:24,300 --> 00:57:26,430
of probability that
the system will

1219
00:57:26,430 --> 00:57:30,210
perform above some minimum
threshold, which in this case

1220
00:57:30,210 --> 00:57:31,800
we call WM.

1221
00:57:31,800 --> 00:57:35,310
And then expected performance
is the probability of each

1222
00:57:35,310 --> 00:57:38,670
of these failure states
multiplied by the performance

1223
00:57:38,670 --> 00:57:42,280
that you're still getting
in that failure state, OK?

1224
00:57:42,280 --> 00:57:45,610
And what was done
here is to say, OK,

1225
00:57:45,610 --> 00:57:47,670
we know what the
C-12 airplane looks

1226
00:57:47,670 --> 00:57:49,590
like the way it exists today.

1227
00:57:49,590 --> 00:57:51,090
But what if that
airplane had been

1228
00:57:51,090 --> 00:57:53,400
designed slightly differently?

1229
00:57:53,400 --> 00:57:55,620
Low value and high value
around the baseline,

1230
00:57:55,620 --> 00:57:57,765
a little bit bigger
wing, bigger tail--

1231
00:58:00,690 --> 00:58:02,670
how would it impact the
performance, not just

1232
00:58:02,670 --> 00:58:06,330
the nominal, but the off-nominal
performance in these failed

1233
00:58:06,330 --> 00:58:07,770
states?

1234
00:58:07,770 --> 00:58:12,300
So just to show you why this
is interesting or relevant--

1235
00:58:12,300 --> 00:58:15,180
I picked out the most
interesting failure

1236
00:58:15,180 --> 00:58:17,430
states are the
intermediate ones here,

1237
00:58:17,430 --> 00:58:19,500
these partially-failed states.

1238
00:58:19,500 --> 00:58:21,750
And so on this
picture, you can see

1239
00:58:21,750 --> 00:58:24,330
in red what's failed
on the aircraft,

1240
00:58:24,330 --> 00:58:29,280
and then plotting bank angle
versus specific excess power,

1241
00:58:29,280 --> 00:58:30,660
which is essentially
your ability

1242
00:58:30,660 --> 00:58:32,850
to climb in feet per minute.

1243
00:58:32,850 --> 00:58:36,060
And this is all calculated
through a simulator,

1244
00:58:36,060 --> 00:58:39,150
a pretty accurate six degree
of freedom simulator, where

1245
00:58:39,150 --> 00:58:41,460
you can actually
modify the airplane.

1246
00:58:41,460 --> 00:58:43,860
It's a very cool
open-source simulator

1247
00:58:43,860 --> 00:58:48,210
that Jeremy modified where you
can actually fly the airplane

1248
00:58:48,210 --> 00:58:52,290
simulated, and you can change
the plane during flight.

1249
00:58:52,290 --> 00:58:56,000
Like you could grow
the wings as the plane

1250
00:58:56,000 --> 00:58:59,100
is flying-- like morphing
wings and things like this.

1251
00:58:59,100 --> 00:59:02,880
And of course here, you
fail parts of the airplane

1252
00:59:02,880 --> 00:59:03,660
during flight.

1253
00:59:03,660 --> 00:59:07,230
And then, the flight dynamics
are automatically the physics,

1254
00:59:07,230 --> 00:59:10,500
automatically you have to
adjust to that failure.

1255
00:59:10,500 --> 00:59:13,290
So this is not like
spreadsheet-type analysis,

1256
00:59:13,290 --> 00:59:15,240
just so you know.

1257
00:59:15,240 --> 00:59:18,390
So if you're inside
the safe region here,

1258
00:59:18,390 --> 00:59:22,890
then you can keep the
bank angle between--

1259
00:59:22,890 --> 00:59:26,070
we defined it between
25 and 35 degrees--

1260
00:59:26,070 --> 00:59:29,010
and you have positive
rate of climb.

1261
00:59:29,010 --> 00:59:31,350
Then you're still
in the safe region.

1262
00:59:31,350 --> 00:59:35,130
And each of these points here
is a slightly tweaked version

1263
00:59:35,130 --> 00:59:37,740
of the baseline airplane.

1264
00:59:37,740 --> 00:59:42,270
So what's interesting here
is in some of these states,

1265
00:59:42,270 --> 00:59:44,430
you're outside of
the safe region.

1266
00:59:44,430 --> 00:59:48,270
So a small difference in the
design of the nominal airplane

1267
00:59:48,270 --> 00:59:51,540
will mean the difference
between losing the plane

1268
00:59:51,540 --> 00:59:53,310
or still being able to fly.

1269
00:59:53,310 --> 00:59:55,785
So these points
that are out here,

1270
00:59:55,785 --> 00:59:57,660
these are the interesting
points because they

1271
00:59:57,660 --> 01:00:00,570
fall outside the safe region.

1272
01:00:00,570 --> 01:00:03,240
And the points inside are
inside the safe region.

1273
01:00:03,240 --> 01:00:06,600
Everything is the same
except the airplane geometry

1274
01:00:06,600 --> 01:00:07,350
has been tweaked.

1275
01:00:10,740 --> 01:00:13,360
And then of course, state
7 everything has failed.

1276
01:00:13,360 --> 01:00:14,400
You lose the airplane.

1277
01:00:14,400 --> 01:00:16,200
There's no way to
recover the airplane.

1278
01:00:16,200 --> 01:00:18,160
So in some cases,
it's very clean.

1279
01:00:18,160 --> 01:00:20,160
It's very clear
what will happen.

1280
01:00:20,160 --> 01:00:22,770
And these intermediate
failure states

1281
01:00:22,770 --> 01:00:25,770
are the interesting ones
because small changes

1282
01:00:25,770 --> 01:00:29,370
in the upfront design make
a big difference in how

1283
01:00:29,370 --> 01:00:32,910
the airplane will perform in
a partially-degraded state

1284
01:00:32,910 --> 01:00:34,920
or partially-failed state.

1285
01:00:34,920 --> 01:00:36,450
So the other thing
you can do then

1286
01:00:36,450 --> 01:00:39,820
is you can do a sensitivity
analysis and say, well,

1287
01:00:39,820 --> 01:00:43,680
how sensitive is, for
example, expected performance

1288
01:00:43,680 --> 01:00:46,800
to the various design
variables in the airplane?

1289
01:00:46,800 --> 01:00:50,640
Like rudder cord, and I'll
talk about vertical tail here,

1290
01:00:50,640 --> 01:00:53,170
and the engine failure
rate, and so forth.

1291
01:00:53,170 --> 01:00:56,460
And the difference between
the yellow and the green

1292
01:00:56,460 --> 01:00:59,280
is yellow is an
eight-hour mission.

1293
01:00:59,280 --> 01:01:01,080
So this is a typical
eight-hour mission.

1294
01:01:01,080 --> 01:01:02,550
You fly, you come back.

1295
01:01:02,550 --> 01:01:05,100
And if something's failed,
you just repair it.

1296
01:01:05,100 --> 01:01:08,700
In the 20,000 mission,
20,000-hour mission,

1297
01:01:08,700 --> 01:01:11,320
you can't come back and repair.

1298
01:01:11,320 --> 01:01:14,280
So what you see
here is interesting.

1299
01:01:14,280 --> 01:01:21,870
It means the sensitivity of
performance to these design

1300
01:01:21,870 --> 01:01:26,320
decisions depends on how long
you will operate the system.

1301
01:01:26,320 --> 01:01:28,710
And because the longer you
operate it, the more likely

1302
01:01:28,710 --> 01:01:32,310
is that it will see these
partial failure modes, which

1303
01:01:32,310 --> 01:01:35,190
will then influence the degraded
or the residual performance

1304
01:01:35,190 --> 01:01:36,780
of the airplane.

1305
01:01:36,780 --> 01:01:39,360
And the most interesting
parameter here,

1306
01:01:39,360 --> 01:01:43,680
if you just look at this diagram
beside the engine failure

1307
01:01:43,680 --> 01:01:47,970
rate-- so the engine failure
rate matters a lot when you fly

1308
01:01:47,970 --> 01:01:49,740
a 20,000-hour mission.

1309
01:01:49,740 --> 01:01:52,260
But if you look at the
cross these parameters,

1310
01:01:52,260 --> 01:01:56,620
which one of these is
the most interesting?

1311
01:01:56,620 --> 01:02:01,660
Which one of these is the
most interesting parameter?

1312
01:02:01,660 --> 01:02:02,620
Let's see at EPFL.

1313
01:02:02,620 --> 01:02:04,340
Can you see this diagram?

1314
01:02:04,340 --> 01:02:07,356
Which one of these parameters
is the most interesting?

1315
01:02:14,170 --> 01:02:15,464
Go ahead.

1316
01:02:15,464 --> 01:02:16,630
AUDIENCE: The vertical tail?

1317
01:02:16,630 --> 01:02:17,620
PROFESSOR: Why?

1318
01:02:17,620 --> 01:02:20,290
AUDIENCE: Because it
has different behavior

1319
01:02:20,290 --> 01:02:22,960
for the lifecycle and just
for the single mission.

1320
01:02:22,960 --> 01:02:24,010
PROFESSOR: Yes.

1321
01:02:24,010 --> 01:02:27,580
So if you're only going to
fly short missions with it

1322
01:02:27,580 --> 01:02:29,410
and then land and
repair, you see

1323
01:02:29,410 --> 01:02:32,410
the sensitivity is off
to the left, slightly

1324
01:02:32,410 --> 01:02:34,330
negative sensitivity.

1325
01:02:34,330 --> 01:02:37,330
So you could actually make
it just a little bit smaller.

1326
01:02:37,330 --> 01:02:38,890
But if you're going
to fly very long,

1327
01:02:38,890 --> 01:02:41,110
you should actually
make it bigger.

1328
01:02:41,110 --> 01:02:46,320
And this particular airplane
has an undersized vertical tail.

1329
01:02:46,320 --> 01:02:49,390
It has a Dutch roll
mode, where it has a yaw

1330
01:02:49,390 --> 01:02:51,710
damper that was added later.

1331
01:02:51,710 --> 01:02:58,180
And so if you're going to
fly for a long time period,

1332
01:02:58,180 --> 01:03:00,820
you're going to see a failure
mode that will then exasperate

1333
01:03:00,820 --> 01:03:02,050
that particular failure mode.

1334
01:03:05,600 --> 01:03:08,770
So what it means is that if
you're actually going to design

1335
01:03:08,770 --> 01:03:14,770
this airplane for a 20,000-hour
mission that you would design

1336
01:03:14,770 --> 01:03:17,590
a much larger vertical
tail which penalizes you

1337
01:03:17,590 --> 01:03:19,960
in the nominal.

1338
01:03:19,960 --> 01:03:22,600
It penalizes you in
nominal operations,

1339
01:03:22,600 --> 01:03:28,206
but it will benefit you in
these partially-failed states.

1340
01:03:28,206 --> 01:03:29,580
Does that make
sense to you guys?

1341
01:03:29,580 --> 01:03:32,430
You guys were
laughing, or smiling,

1342
01:03:32,430 --> 01:03:33,610
or thinking about this.

1343
01:03:33,610 --> 01:03:34,140
AUDIENCE: Yeah, it does.

1344
01:03:34,140 --> 01:03:35,931
PROFESSOR: So have you
flown this airplane?

1345
01:03:35,931 --> 01:03:37,590
Or do you have experience in it?

1346
01:03:37,590 --> 01:03:39,180
AUDIENCE: We did a
flight test course,

1347
01:03:39,180 --> 01:03:42,330
and we tested that troll.

1348
01:03:42,330 --> 01:03:46,685
PROFESSOR: OK, so this brought
up some fuzzy memories or--

1349
01:03:46,685 --> 01:03:47,310
AUDIENCE: Yeah.

1350
01:03:47,310 --> 01:03:48,960
PROFESSOR: I mean, it's
basically the wing tip

1351
01:03:48,960 --> 01:03:50,252
does like a figure eight.

1352
01:03:50,252 --> 01:03:51,210
That's sort of classic.

1353
01:03:51,210 --> 01:03:51,876
AUDIENCE: Right.

1354
01:03:51,876 --> 01:03:54,330
PROFESSOR: That's the classic
manifestation of Dutch roll.

1355
01:03:54,330 --> 01:03:55,390
AUDIENCE: Yeah.

1356
01:03:55,390 --> 01:03:57,270
PROFESSOR: But if the
Dutch roll is too big,

1357
01:03:57,270 --> 01:03:58,870
you can actually
lose the airplane.

1358
01:03:58,870 --> 01:04:00,720
You can induce an instability.

1359
01:04:00,720 --> 01:04:01,975
So this is a big deal.

1360
01:04:01,975 --> 01:04:02,951
Yeah?

1361
01:04:02,951 --> 01:04:04,950
AUDIENCE: Would that mean
that the vertical tail

1362
01:04:04,950 --> 01:04:06,600
is sized properly then?

1363
01:04:06,600 --> 01:04:09,109
Because you can make it
smaller and get a little better

1364
01:04:09,109 --> 01:04:11,400
in this area, or make it
bigger and get a little better

1365
01:04:11,400 --> 01:04:11,850
in this area.

1366
01:04:11,850 --> 01:04:13,710
Because It seems like the
vertical, like, other things--

1367
01:04:13,710 --> 01:04:15,630
PROFESSOR: It's fine
with the yaw damper.

1368
01:04:15,630 --> 01:04:17,070
It's fine with the yaw damper.

1369
01:04:17,070 --> 01:04:21,910
But actually, there has
been an airplane lost.

1370
01:04:21,910 --> 01:04:24,510
There has been an
airplane lost in flight.

1371
01:04:24,510 --> 01:04:27,060
And the accident
investigation showed

1372
01:04:27,060 --> 01:04:32,790
that it was basically a Dutch
roll mode that became unstable.

1373
01:04:32,790 --> 01:04:36,300
And so the point here is,
if you have a failure,

1374
01:04:36,300 --> 01:04:38,820
then you're in trouble with
the small vertical tail.

1375
01:04:38,820 --> 01:04:42,440
But if you don't have a failure,
then you're probably OK.

1376
01:04:42,440 --> 01:04:45,110
And that's the whole point
of me showing you this--

1377
01:04:45,110 --> 01:04:50,660
is to make the point that if you
are going to deal with a system

1378
01:04:50,660 --> 01:04:53,660
or operate a system that is
going to have a very long

1379
01:04:53,660 --> 01:04:56,360
operational life,
long endurance,

1380
01:04:56,360 --> 01:05:01,140
without the possibility to land,
repair, and send it back out--

1381
01:05:01,140 --> 01:05:04,430
so it's going to be perfect
and pristine on day one.

1382
01:05:04,430 --> 01:05:06,320
And then gradually,
stuff will fail,

1383
01:05:06,320 --> 01:05:09,830
and that's the case for
infrastructure, bridges,

1384
01:05:09,830 --> 01:05:14,360
spacecraft past Neptune,
airplanes that are going

1385
01:05:14,360 --> 01:05:16,910
to be aloft for five years.

1386
01:05:16,910 --> 01:05:19,550
You just have to design
them differently.

1387
01:05:19,550 --> 01:05:21,950
You just have to design-- and
this is hard for engineers

1388
01:05:21,950 --> 01:05:27,280
to think about-- that I'm
actually designing for failure.

1389
01:05:27,280 --> 01:05:29,770
I am designing a
system expecting

1390
01:05:29,770 --> 01:05:33,800
that it will partially fail, not
completely, but partially fail.

1391
01:05:33,800 --> 01:05:38,060
And by taking that into account,
the design looks different.

1392
01:05:38,060 --> 01:05:40,640
This is kind of
non-conventional.

1393
01:05:40,640 --> 01:05:43,010
OK, final thing,
post-flight review--

1394
01:05:43,010 --> 01:05:46,130
what happens at the post-flight
or post-launch review?

1395
01:05:46,130 --> 01:05:48,080
PLR, PFR.

1396
01:05:48,080 --> 01:05:51,620
So essentially, what you do
is you review the telemetry

1397
01:05:51,620 --> 01:05:52,830
from flight.

1398
01:05:52,830 --> 01:05:54,530
You compare against
your predictions.

1399
01:05:54,530 --> 01:05:56,480
You find repair any failures.

1400
01:05:56,480 --> 01:05:58,940
You secure the
data for later use.

1401
01:05:58,940 --> 01:06:01,370
And then you initiate the
detailed commissioning and

1402
01:06:01,370 --> 01:06:03,380
hand-over to Operations.

1403
01:06:03,380 --> 01:06:07,400
And here's a detailed list of
entrance and success criteria

1404
01:06:07,400 --> 01:06:09,200
for post-flight review.

1405
01:06:09,200 --> 01:06:12,170
And I put this up here because
those of you that will actually

1406
01:06:12,170 --> 01:06:16,610
go to the CanSat competition,
this is part of the package.

1407
01:06:16,610 --> 01:06:20,690
You are expected to launch
your payload, do the flight,

1408
01:06:20,690 --> 01:06:24,470
and if something goes wrong, you
can maybe have a backup flight.

1409
01:06:24,470 --> 01:06:27,890
And then after the flight,
you do a post-flight review.

1410
01:06:27,890 --> 01:06:31,520
And good post-flight
reviews are planned ahead.

1411
01:06:31,520 --> 01:06:34,586
You already know what data
you're going to analyze,

1412
01:06:34,586 --> 01:06:35,960
if you already
have your software

1413
01:06:35,960 --> 01:06:38,900
ready to suck in the
data after the flight

1414
01:06:38,900 --> 01:06:42,460
and really get
insights out of it.

1415
01:06:42,460 --> 01:06:45,430
Summary here-- this is
just kind of a checklist

1416
01:06:45,430 --> 01:06:48,700
for thinking about operations.

1417
01:06:48,700 --> 01:06:50,920
System check-out and
the lab, hangar, field--

1418
01:06:50,920 --> 01:06:52,300
is everything working OK?

1419
01:06:52,300 --> 01:06:55,630
Bring sufficient consumables,
spare parts, tools,

1420
01:06:55,630 --> 01:06:59,800
support equipment, remote
control, telemetry, cameras.

1421
01:06:59,800 --> 01:07:03,010
Train the operators
and support personnel.

1422
01:07:03,010 --> 01:07:04,930
Checklists for
nominal operations

1423
01:07:04,930 --> 01:07:07,960
and routine emergency
and contingencies.

1424
01:07:07,960 --> 01:07:10,360
Think about your
transportation logistics

1425
01:07:10,360 --> 01:07:13,360
and plan enough time for a
ramp-up for commissioning

1426
01:07:13,360 --> 01:07:15,810
before operations.

1427
01:07:15,810 --> 01:07:19,210
OK, so that was all I
wanted to cover today.

1428
01:07:19,210 --> 01:07:22,730
Any questions about
commissioning and operations?

1429
01:07:22,730 --> 01:07:25,250
My main point in
this lecture today

1430
01:07:25,250 --> 01:07:29,600
was to kind of get you
excited about operations

1431
01:07:29,600 --> 01:07:32,960
and to highlight that
there's a lot here.

1432
01:07:32,960 --> 01:07:34,970
System engineers are not done.

1433
01:07:34,970 --> 01:07:38,600
After CDR or PDR, you
say, oh, I did my job

1434
01:07:38,600 --> 01:07:39,650
as a system engineer.

1435
01:07:39,650 --> 01:07:41,580
It's up to you
guys, the operators.

1436
01:07:41,580 --> 01:07:47,480
No, no, this is territory for
system engineering as well.

1437
01:07:47,480 --> 01:07:52,650
And in the end, you just have
to get operational experience.

1438
01:07:52,650 --> 01:07:54,650
There's no substitute
for actually being out

1439
01:07:54,650 --> 01:08:01,160
in the field operating systems
and getting that experience.

1440
01:08:01,160 --> 01:08:05,210
Any questions or
comments about this?

1441
01:08:05,210 --> 01:08:09,230
OK, so a quick reminder,
a quick reminder,

1442
01:08:09,230 --> 01:08:11,390
we're going to have our PDR.

1443
01:08:11,390 --> 01:08:12,410
You saw the schedule.

1444
01:08:12,410 --> 01:08:15,380
Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, please log

1445
01:08:15,380 --> 01:08:16,910
in five minutes before.

1446
01:08:16,910 --> 01:08:20,000
We're going to be using
my WebEx Personal Room.

1447
01:08:20,000 --> 01:08:21,260
The link is here.

1448
01:08:21,260 --> 01:08:22,700
Upload your slide deck.

1449
01:08:22,700 --> 01:08:24,590
30 minutes presentation,
and then we

1450
01:08:24,590 --> 01:08:28,790
have up to 30 minutes
of Q&A. All right?

1451
01:08:28,790 --> 01:08:30,640
Questions?