### American Electoral Institutions Session 3

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MIT Department of Political Science 17.263: American Elections

### Roadmap

Electoral Geography

Institutions and Rules

Example: First-Past-the-Post Elections

# Electoral Geography

# A Closer Look at Pennsylvania (Trump +0.7% in 2016)





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# A Closer Look at Pennsylvania (Trump +0.7% in 2016)




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### A Treemap of Pennsylvania Counties




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### Southeastern Pennsylvania




Bloch, Matthew, Larry Buchanan, Josh Katz, et al. "An Extremely Detailed Map of the 2016 Election," New York Times, July 25, 2018. © The New York Times Company. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/.

## Philadelphia, PA



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# Reading, Berks County, PA




Bloch, Matthew, Larry Buchanan, Josh Katz, et al. "An Extremely Detailed Map of the 2016 Election," New York Times, July 25, 2018. © The New York Times Company. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see <u>https://ocw.mit.edu/help/fac-far-use/</u>.

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
#### Key patterns:

- Political support is geographically clustered (homophily, context).
- Democratic support is correlated with density (Republicans dominate space).
- Democrats are more spatially concentrated than Republicans are (true most places since 1930s).


Histogram of presidential vote margin in 2016 (counties)



# Reading, Berks County, PA



# The legacy of the 2nd Industrial Revolution $\longrightarrow$



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### Institutions and Rules

### **Democratic Institutions**

- As Manin et al. (1999) emphasize, institutions powerfully shape how (well) democracy functions.
- In particular, institutions facilitate political coordination and cooperation, reducing information, transaction, and other costs and discouraging individually rational but collectively destructive actions.
- Institutions can be governmental or societal and formal or informal.
- Examples:
  - **Formal governmental**: the Electoral College (written in Constitution).
  - Informal governmental: the Senate filibuster (pre-1917)
  - Formal societal: party organizations (though regulated by law)
  - Informal societal: journalistic objectivity (enforced by reputation)

### **Rules and Norms**

- As these examples suggest, many institutions are (or contain) rules: they specify a standard of conduct and they are enforced.
  - e.g., the Electoral College is a formal rule specifying how many electors each state receives and how electors select the president.
- ▶ Rules that are informal are called norms and serve several functions:
  - Completing: fill in gaps and ambiguities in formal institutions
    - e.g., two-term presidency
  - Parallel: jointly regulate behavior in conjunction with formal rules
    - e.g., Senate obstructionism
  - Coordinating: integrate multiple, intersecting institutions
    - e.g., informal coordination of presidential nomination mechanisms
- Trump has violated a lot of norms (not to mention rules): tax return disclosure, avoiding ethnic slurs, accepting election results, nonpolitical use of pardons, noninterference in federal investigations, avoiding conflicts of interest, generally acting "presidential", ....

# Consequences of Rules

Rules (and other institutions):

- 1. Affect who wins and who loses.
- 2. Shape political strategies.
- 3. Induce institutional conflict and manipulation.


### Example: First-Past-the-Post Elections

# Single-Member District Plurality Elections

- Most elected offices in the USA are filled using single-member district plurality (SMDP), or "first-past-the-post," elections.
  - "Single-member": Each office or seat is filled by one occupant, for which each voter can cast a single vote.
  - "District": Each office represents a specific geographic constituency.
  - "Plurality": The winning candidate is the one with the most (but not necessarily a majority of) votes.

# 1. Winners and Losers of SMDP

- SMPD makes it hard for geographically concentrated parties to win nat'l majorities b/c so many votes are "wasted" in lopsided districts.
- Thus, SMDP systems (e.g., USA, UK) disadvantage leftist parties (Democrats, Labour), which everywhere are concentrated in cities.



# 2. Strategic Adaptation to SMDP

- Two important strategic effects of SMDP:
  - 1. Discouraging politicians from creating small parties, because unless they form local majorities these parties will be unable to win legislative seats, let alone a legislative majority.
  - 2. Encouraging voters to support whichever of the two largest parties they like more (or dislike less).
- The result of these effects is Duverger's Law: the strong tendency for SMDP systems to have only two parties in each district (non-SMDP systems almost always have > 2 two parties).
- The USA, the Electoral College fosters a *national* two-party system because a party cannot win the presidency unless it is competitive in a elector-weighted majority of states.
- SMDP also creates incentives to cater to the median *district* rather than the median *voter*, fostering conflict within left parties between hard-left urban core and moderate non-urban swing districts.

### 3. Conflict over Electoral Rules

- By the mid-20th century, most European democracies abandoned SMPD in favor of proportional representation (PR).
- PR was a major demand of the socialist left, but many center-left liberals came to support it to avoid being squeezed out of cities.
- Nothing in the US Constitution requires SMPD elections, and states and cities have strategically experimented with various alternatives.
  - e.g., multi-member legislative districts; at-large city council seats
- One prominent contemporary reform proposal, adopted in Maine and in many municipalities, is ranked-choice voting (aka instant-runoff or alternative vote), which keeps single-member districts but replaces plurality voting with a system in which voters rank candidates, who are then eliminated in reverse order of their first-choice votes.
- Key point: Electoral rules advantage some interests over others, so strategic actors try to manipulate them to their advantage.

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