# Regime change

- 1. Democratization and democratic consolidations
- 2. Democratic breakdown
- 3. Arab Spring

### Causes of democracy: a muddle

#### Factors thought to promote democracy (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 37-8)

- a high overall level of economic wealth
- a relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth
- a market economy
- a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society
- the absence of feudalism in society
- a strong bourgeoisie
- a strong middle class
- high levels of literacy and education
- an instrumental rather than consummatory culture
- Protestantism
- social pluralism and strong intermediate groups
- the development of political contestation before the expansion of political participation
- democratic authority structures within social groups, particularly those connected to politics

- low levels of civil violence
- low levels of political polarization and extremism
- political leaders committed to democracy
- experience as a British colony
- traditions of toleration and compromise
- occupation by a pro-democratic foreign power
- elite desire to emulate democratic nations
- traditions of respect for law and individual rights
- communal (ethnic, religious, racial) homogeneity
- communal (ethnic, racial, religious) heterogeneity
- consensus on political and social values
- absence of consensus on political and social values

## Causes of democracy: main schools of thought


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## **Examples of cumulative cleavages**

#### Zanzibar, 1961


South Asian bankers Arab landowners Comorian traders Arab shop-owners African workers

#### Guatemala, 1980




## **Cross-cutting cleavages**

#### This box represents society





# Tocqueville uses international comparisons to assess effect of culture on democracy in the U.S.




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


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
# Tocqueville uses internal comparisons to show effect of culture on democracy in the U.S.



## Putnam argued that culture was responsible for difference between northern and southern Italy










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
### **Broad support for democracy**

	Democracy	Strongman	Experts	Military
Germany	2.56	0.70	1.53	0.28
Sweden	2.58	0.85	1.17	0.50
United States	2.09	1.01	1.37	0.68
Taiwan	2.11	1.71	1.57	0.70
South Korea	1.87	1.46	1.50	0.58
Mexico	1.96	1.52	1.73	1.45
India*	2.00	1.98	2.08	1.98
South Africa	1.87	1.56	1.70	1.34
China	1.73	1.03	0.99	0.71
Pakistan	2.04	1.28	1.87	1.66
Russia	1.68	1.76	1.48	0.67
Singapore	2.23	1.46	1.60	0.92
Uzbekistan	2.36	1.13	1.22	0.96

<sup>\*</sup>Relative support for democracy greater in previous waves of WVS. Source: World Values Survey, 2010-14. Scale 0-3. Author's calculations.



## **Dimensions of political culture**




## Causes of democracy: main schools of thought


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### Institutions: We don't know what works, but...

1. DSV: Uruguay, 1970



2. Hyper-presidentialism



#### 3. Presidential election

President and VP on separate tickets

- U.S. 1800
- Philippines (Corazón Aquino)
- Peru (Alberto Fujimori)

President and PM elected on a different schedule

#### 4. Excessive veto players

- a. Plurality-winner presidential elections in multiparty system
- b. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1652-1791 (really 1764)
- c. U.S.? Brazil?

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
## Leadership

With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment I have read with attention the Sentiments you have submitted to my perusal.

Be assured Sir, no occurrence in the course of the War, has given me more painful sensations than your information of there being such ideas existing in the Army as you have expressed, and I must view with abhorrence, and reprehend with severety...

I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs that can befall my Country. If I am not deceived in the knowledge of myself, you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable...


Let me conjure you then, if you have any regard for your Country, concern for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish these thoughts from your Mind, and never communicate, as from yourself, or any one else, a sentiment of the like Nature.




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
# Lipset's relationship between development and democracy



## There are two main clusters of outliers (2)



# The Lipset model (*Political Man*, 1961)



# Breakdown of autocracy ≠ establishment or consolidation of democracy

#### Stages of regime change

- Breakdown of old regime (of whatever type)
- Establishment of new regime
- Consolidation of the new regime

Idiosyncrasies of the old regime may affect trajectory, and once smothered social divisions may emerge

#### Examples

- Breakdown of Communist rule in Eastern Europe (Poland, E. Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania)
- Breakdown of Weimar democracy in Germany, 1933
- Democratization of military dictatorships in Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil
- Breakdown of one-party rule in Mexico

### Background on democratic breakdown

#### Collapse

- Several dozen cases in last two hundred years
- About half to military coups and half to autogolpes; very few to popular revolutions

#### Broad patterns

- Around 1/6 of democracies failed in last 25 years
- Most of failure are low-quality or unconsolidated democracies (Pakistan, Thailand, Russia, Egypt)
- Some far more troubling (Fiji, Venezuela, Turkey)

#### "Hollowing out" and "illiberal" democracy

- Declines in average Freedom House scores every year for past 10 years
- Examples: Argentina, Hungary, Poland

#### Failure of transition to lead to democracy

Arab Spring, most of former Soviet Union

#### Causes of Democratic Breakdown

#### Inhospitable social-structural conditions

- Ethnic or class polarization
- Cumulative cleavages

#### Culture

- Elites
- Mass public
- Military

#### Inappropriate institutional designs

- Constant stalemate / veto-players
- Personalization of power
- Military


#### Leadership

Unfavorable external circumstances → delegitimation

- Exogenous economic crisis
- Defeat in war

## **Arab spring**

#### 1. What happened?



- 2. Why did it happen?
  - The role of discontent
  - The reasons why a regime breaks down are different from the reasons why a new regime emerges

## The Arab Spring: What happened?

	Polity IV (-10 to 10, higher is democ)		Freedom House (1-7, higher is less free)	
	2010	2015	2010	2015
Tunisia	-4	7	6.0	2.0
Egypt	-3	-4	5.5	5.5
Morocco	-6	-4	4.5	4.5
Jordan	-3	-3	5.5	5.5
UAE	-8	-8	5.5	6.0
Kuwait	-7	-7	4.5	5.0
KSA	-10	-10	6.5	7.0
Bahrain	-9	-8	5.5	6.5
Libya	-7	n/a	7.0	6.0
Syria	-7	-9	6.5	7.0
Yemen	-2	n/a	5.5	6.5
Iraq	3	3	5.5	5.5
Algeria	2	2	5.5	5.5
West Bank/ Gaza			5.5/6.0	5.5/6.5 <sub>25</sub>

Background causes of underlying discontent with the regime

Causes of whether discontent erupted into mass protests

Factors that influence whether the regime collapses in the face of protests

Factors affecting the establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime if the regime collapses

Background causes of underlying discontent with the regime

Poor economic performance (+)

Corruption and cronyism (+)

Authoritarianism (+)

Ethnic / sectarian divisions in the country: Whether the regime is allied with specific ethnic groups (+)

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Factors that influence whether the regime collapses in the face of protests

Strength of the coercive apparatus (-)

Foreign involvement (+ or -, depending)

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Nature of the original opposition: civic or not (- for Islamist)

Foreign involvement (+ or – depending, usually negative in this particular context)

Ethnic / sectarian divisions in the country (-)

"Westernization" (+)

Level of economic development (+?)

# Some country examples

Country	Background causes of underlying discontent with the regime	Factors shaping whether discontent erupted into protests	Factors that influence whether the regime collapses in the face of mass protests	Factors affecting the establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime if the regime collapses
Tunisia	All high	High	Weak coercive apparatus, ethnic divisions not salient → regime collapse	Westernized; civic movements strong; high GDP p.c.
Egypt	All high	All high	Strong coercive apparatus (partly as result of foreign aid) → overthrow of dictator without full structural change, elections won by Islamist opposition, eventual coup	Behavior of Morsi government, continued strength of the military, foreign support for coup
	High, but major differences along ethnic /sectarian lines	High though opposition partly along ethnic lines	Strong coercive apparatus (partly as result of foreign support) → civil war, extensive foreign intervention	[Mainly government victory. Depends on outcome of civil war, which is in turn partly a product of

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