



Representative democracy is a chain of delegations



Representative democracy is a chain of delegations (2)

[We will assume it works just fine]



But there is more than one type of representative democracy

Institutional engineering is as old as democracy (e.g., confiscations in Athens)

Most analyses of “institutions” focus on a few basic constitutional arrangements

- Electoral rules
- Presidentialism vs. parliamentarism
- [Unitarism vs. federalism]
- Interest group representation
- Others

Key themes

1. Tradeoffs
2. Interactions
 - with one another
 - with corollary institutions
 - with social structure
 - possibility of an oops (e.g., Fiji)

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Presidentialism versus parliamentarism

Chief executive is chosen by legislature?	Yes	[Finland]	Parliamentarism (with some variation in power of PM versus Cabinet)
	No	Presidentialism (with some variations in power)	?
		No	Yes

Chief executive is easily removable by legislature?

But presidents can have very different powers

Unitary or plural

Method of selection

Method of removal once selected (none, supermajority / for cause, majority)

Term in office (long or short; re-electable or not?)

Legislative power

- Introduce legislation; expedited or not
- Quasi-legislative / rule-making power; introducing legislation
- Veto (with or without override)

Budgeting (line-item veto with or without substitution, impoundment, designing budget,)

State of siege (with legislative consent? override?)

Dissolve or convene legislature? (under what conditions?)

Appointments (how many, with legislative approval)

CINC

Pardon (absolute or not)

Ceremonial / head of state functions

Perks, travel, etc.

*Contrast: Brazil
vs. Costa Rica vs.
President of the
Helvetican
Confederation*

Executives can have very different powers (2)

<u>Power</u>	<u>U.S. president</u>	<u>Governor of Texas</u>
Unitary or plural	Unitary	Plural (Lt. Governor, AG, Comptroller...)
Method of selection	Indirect election, majority	Direct election, FPTP
Method of removal	For cause, supermajority	For cause, supermajority
Term in office		
• Years	4	4
• Re-electable?	Once	Yes
Legislative power		
• Introduce leg.	Yes	Not formally
• Rule-making	Rule-making	Limited rule-making
• Veto	Qualified	Qualified, line item
Budgeting	Significant formal & informal	Emergency transfers only; (LBB dominant)
State of emergency	Yes	Yes; can dispatch Texas Guard
Dissolve legislature?	No	No
Appointments	Many, some conditional	Judges elected, plural executive
CINC	Yes; some law enforcement	Yes, some limited policing powers also
Pardon	Absolute	Limited clemency
Ceremonial functions	All	Most except Secretary of State
Travel, perks, etc.	Unrestricted	Salary rather low

Consequences and tradeoffs

Between parliamentarian and presidentialism, which is better at...?

- Passing laws
- Fighting a war
- Promoting economic growth
- Controlling an epidemic
- Reducing ethnic tensions
- Representing minority opinions
- Maximizing system legitimacy
- **Preserving democracy**


Electoral rules: Basic division

1

Vote for a person who represents a single geographic area (a “district” or “constituency”); single-member district (SMD)

2


Vote for a party (which may represent an ideology); multimember districts with proportional representation (PR)



Electoral rules: More nuanced division

1

Vote for a person who represents a single geographic area (a “district” or “constituency”); single-member district (SMD)




First-past-the-post (FPTP),
a.k.a., plurality-winner
(e.g., US, UK)

Preferential voting
(e.g., Australia, Maine, ballot question in MA last year)


2

Vote for a party (which may represent an ideology); multimember districts with proportional representation



Closed-list PR
(no choice about individual candidates)

Open-list PR
(choice about candidates within the party)



Electoral rules: Sample ballots for fictional country of Acirema

FPTP

Vote for one

Bubba Smith Wesson
(Homeland Party)

Jezebel Cosmopolitano
(Progressive Party)

Preferential voting

Rank the following

Bubba Smith Wesson
(Homeland Party)

Jezebel Cosmopolitano
(Progressive Party)

Betty Baker
(Family Party)

Bernie Works
(Democratic Socialist Party)

Closed-list PR (District mag. = 3)

Vote for one

Homeland Party



Family Party



Progressive Party



Democratic Socialist Party



Open-list PR (District magnitude = 3)

Circle one name, rank, etc.

Homeland Party

Bubba Wesson
Joe Veterano
Karen Store



Family Party

Betty Baker
Dallas Enterprise
Juan Iglesias



Progressive Party

Jez Cosmopolitano
Dan Green
Mehmet Taleb



Democratic Socialist Party

Bernie Works
Pat Custodiene
Jaime Obrero



**What if district magnitude was very large?
(e.g., roughly size of Texas, or 30 seats)**

**Answer: There would be lots of parties
representing slices of the electorate**

**Labor
Party**

**States'
Rights
Party**

**La Raza
Party**

**Green
Party**

**Salvation
Party**

**Farmers'
Party**

**Black
Power
Party**

**Women's
Party**

**Second
Amendment
Party**

**Selfie
Generation
Party**

**Deseret
Party**

**Libertarian
Party**

**Enterprise
Party**

**Old Fogey
Party**

**Educators'
Party**

Main effects of electoral rules?

Number of parties

Partisan gerrymandering and disproportionality

Community representation, constituency service, pork-barreling, etc.

Party discipline in the legislature

Candidate-specific voting, “competence” versus party

Representing multiple voices

What institutions do new democracies adopt?

Translation of seats to votes in India's Lok Sabha

Election	Votes (%)	Seats (%)	Disproportionality (%)
1952	45	73	28
1957	48	73	25
1962	45	73	28
1967	41	54	13
1971	44	68	24
1977	35	28	-7
1980	43	67	24

Single-member districts are much easier to gerrymander



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
The original gerrymander:
Elbridge Gerry (pronounced "Gary") district, 1812

(And this tendency hasn't gone away...)



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
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
Recent MA-7

Single member districts are much easier to gerrymander (2)



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
Texas, 2001



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Texas, 2003

My personal favorite: MD-3



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But there is more than one type of representative democracy


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
- Electoral rules
- Presidentialism vs. parliamentarism
- [Unitarism vs. federalism]
- Interest group representation
- Others

Interest Group Representation

Corporatism: All unions and all employer groups fall into “peak associations”



Pluralism: Each interest group directly lobbies the government



Some sample issues: controlling inflation, managing class conflict, consumer rights, and environmental policy, etc.

But there is more than one type of representative democracy

Institutional engineering is as old as democracy (e.g., confiscations in Athens)

Most analyses of “institutions” focus on a few basic constitutional arrangements

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Other institutional design choices

Various institutions of direct democracy

Management of elections

- Counting ballots
- Campaign finance
- Media time
- Vetting of ads, misinformation




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Lobbying (blue dollar system?)



Representing multiple issue dimensions



Internal party democracy

Constitutional interpretation



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Descriptive and other representation

- Occupational categories (Slovenian National Council)
- Set asides + quotas (scheduled castes and tribes, women, minorities, etc.)

Compulsory voting



Theme: Interactions


Interactions

- with one another (example: veto players)
- with corollary institutions (example: presidentialism and number of parties)
- with social structure

Possibility of an oops

- Example: Preferential voting in Fiji

There are many different combinations of electoral rules and executive-legislative relations



There are many different combinations of electoral rules and executive-legislative relations

Parliamentary

New Zealand
(until 1996):
Too few
checks?

Presidential

BRAZIL:
Too many
checks?

PR

SMD

Theme: Interactions

Interactions

- with one another (number of veto players)
- with corollary institutions (example: media, \$, and number of parties)
- with social structure

Restricts number of parties

- What if there is an *cross-cutting cleavage*?
(e.g., ethnicity or region)
- What if electorate is not normally distributed?

Theme: Interactions

Interactions

Possibility of an oops

- Example: Preferential voting in Fiji

Ethnic
cleansing

Ethnic Fijian
chauvinism

Pro-Indian
party

Indian
chauvinism

Pro-gov't

Ethnic
cleansing

Ethnic Fijian
chauvinism


Pro-Indian
party

Indian
chauvinism


Change

Some consensus on “bad” institutions

1. DSV: Uruguay, 1970



2. Hyper-presidentialism



3. Presidential selection

President and VP on separate tickets

- U.S. 1800
- Philippines (Corazón Aquino)
- Peru (Alberto Fujimori)

President, PM on a different schedule

4. Excessive veto players

- a. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1652-1791 (1764)
- b. Plurality-winner presidential elections in multiparty system
- c. Committee structures

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