

17.584, Civil-Military Relations, Spring 2003
Prof. Roger Petersen

Lecture 10: Japan (Guest Lecturer: Richard Samuels)

Week X:

A. Katzenstein, Peter, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). ISBN: 080143260X.

Chapter 1 intro, Chapter 2 norms argument, 3 description of Japan and norms in media, bureaucracy, counts 4 internal security policy, 5 external security, 6 US-Japan relations—Japan responded more flex in security than economic issues stretching the notion of “self-defense.” Chapter 7, comparison with Germany internal security: Hobbest external: Anotius Japan opposite. Chapter 8 compares internal and external Japanese security policy and conclusions.
--Norms~culture. Regulatory(standards of behavior) and
--constitutive (actor identifies). Peaceful norms in security in internal (democracy) then international for Japan. Japan has elite crime and international military presence but large security establishment.

Lecture

Japanese Civil-Military relations

A story of overcompensation (Berger).

Tokyo was the capital in 1600. “Closing” Tokugama period. Only Nagasaki was open to the Dutch. Isolation and peace. No civil or international war. Rigid setting of classes. Military (samurai) was at the top, merchants at the bottom. Confucian influence.

In 1853 commodore Perry-gunboat diplomacy. 1868 “restoration” 16 year-old military and independent modernizers ruled in emperor’s name. Samuel’s book “Machiavelli’s Children.” Before that emperor unknown, royal family hidden in Kyoto as shogun ruled from Tokyo/Edo. Swing from isolation. “Rich nation, strong army.” (Samuel’s other book). Make sure to avoid what happened to China (opium wars).

1930s, fascism in Japan (Today is overcompensation of the decade of decadence of that period.) Military took control of prerogatives of the emperor and looked at success of USSR without communism→ fascism government by assassination. There was a little bit of a racial element in the fascism (foreigners in general) involuntary opening again in 1945. Fascism in this context was a controversial label for Japan. It had been reserved for Italy and Germany but Samuel’s believes it means the state-led solution for mobilization to avoid evils of capitalism and communism. But it came from inside the elites, whereas with Mussolini it was an outsider.

Fear of relapse: to war time norms is still palpable in Katzenstein’s book “norms” and “institutions” are confused terms.

Samuels: Imperial military had too much autonomy from civilian executive. Post-war military has too little legitimacy and virtually no democratic oversight.

Why didn’t Japan manage to strike a good balance?

Propositions Reviewed:

Norms

Pacificism, Article 9: no land, sea, or air forces. Kellogg-Briand pact. Today budget is the second in the world in terms of magnitude. 1% of the stuff is big. Only left really celebrates Constitution Day. Self binding—stop us from killing again. Samuels thinks it's a useful instrument to stay out of fights when you want—cynical view. George Schulz and Samuels think Japan will go nuclear very fast if US credibility decreases. Katzenstein: "non major –but why is there any competition for power then? And what stops them from changing again? Norms is the dominant theory. Bemer article, his MIT dissertation and book. Samuels thinks not true.

Yamagata's ghost. One of the oligarchs during the Meiji restoration. He made sure 1889 Meiji constitution did not subordinate modern military to civil and emperor. Struggle between Yamagata and Saigo Takamori wanted to go into Korea fast.

Watanabe article: norm not in place without a constitution. His father later publishes popular newspaper—conservative right champions new constitution that will make Japan "normal" with real military.

January 2000, both houses established commissions for revision of constitution—not getting anywhere. Now there is a committee for foreign affairs in parliament with debate—not the case a few years ago. Officers were fired for planning joint exercise with US in the 60s without permission. Taboo issue to discuss military and security. No rational debate.

Military didn't do a good job in Kobe emergency. Critical of SDP for weaknesses was fired.

Anti-military ethos coexisting with substantial military establishment.

Divide, conquer, downsize

Used in various periods. During the Sankin Kotai period, it required the regional daimyo to live in Tokyo without their families, but with advisors. They were forced to maintain lavish accommodation in Tokyo—expensive. Those defeated by Tokugama mainly in West, expensive to move to Tokyo. Meiji led by cover samurai from far west. Empowering groups loyal to the law paid off Yoshida doctrine 1948-1954 prime minister. In 1953, decided to defy everyone (US, defense industry firms) and forbid defense spending from being used to revitalize Japanese economy. Brilliant and sticky choice. Yoshida doctrine—we will be loyal ally of US, maintain bases, in exchange for security. And by the 1980s, celebrated spin-ons—commercial technology applied to military vs spin-off from military technology to civilian. Keeping military small is in force 150,000 ~0.001% of the population.

Constitutional and legal controls


1930s junior officers in field made national policy in Manchuria, China. Brilliant civilian politicians assassinated in 20s and 30s. There was a "coup" attempt on Feb. 26th. 1,400 soldiers were led by junior officers surround asking for concessions. (Imperial way faction). Emperor mobilized the navy to defeat them and control faction won control of army.

1947 article 9 but by 1954 SDF created the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) (no one has written on them) was modeled on French *Conseil d'État* 1960s.

[2001, MITI-Ministry of International Trade and Industry changed to METI- Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.]

Samuels: the military controlled not by norms or politicians, but by civilian bureaucrats that were appointed, not elected.

Tokyo Faculty of Law was geared towards the government, similar to the French *École nationale d'administration* (ENA).



No law goes to Diet unless it is vented through the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which is made up of ministry bureaucrats. Don't get press or interviews. They decided Japan had the right to self defense → SDF but not the army. They put limitations on force size and decided Japan was unconstitutional to engage in collective security. In 1981, first used the word alliance for Japan, US by premier and then fired the Foreign minister for letting him do that because he was criticized. Now it's normal to use the term. Very strict rules of engagement for SDF forces abroad.

Watanabe senior wants the CLB eliminated. Right wing argument is for democratic control.

In 1957, CLB ruled that nukes are constitutional. Kishi was an ex important fascist in the Tojo government, sailed and premier in the 50s. Ruling during his time. Parallel civilian hierarchies.

The JDA

Internal bureaus within the JDA are staffed by officials from ministries. Example, equipment bureau is headed by the MITI official, policy bureau is headed by the foreign minister, budget bureau is headed by the finance minister, etc. Uniformed officers can't testify in diet. No unified command structure. Premier sends orders to the JDA director general [political appointee but not minister]. Chiefs of staff are mere advisors and execute orders, but the premier is not commander in chief. The cabinet has this role corporately.

Mass Citizen Army

First appeared in the 1880s-90s. At first, the army consisted of poor peasants who resented capital—didn't exactly share the elite view. Not an option in post war to have conscription so just project intimacy and similarity to civilian elite.

Elite Rotation

Janowitz: officers spend more time in Pentagon offices than civilians. Japan is full of bureaucratic rotations except military. Non-differentiability existed only in fascist period. Very few officers → politicians post war.

Small Professional Army

SDF is not professional, a lot of euphemism. Tanks=special vehicles, brigades=general units, destroyers=escort vessels, soldiers=special public servants.

International Norms

Japan copies wonderfully from rest of world in other respects, but not clear relevance here. Example, Germany and Italy have article 9-type things, but not constrained as with Japan.

Systemic Features (International System)

US is like a cork in the bottle. Systemic, not normative. Japan's neighbors are uneasy about Japanese rearmament. Japan has territorial disputes with all its neighbors (Russia, Korea, China). *Gaiatsu*: term from trade wars with the US—interest groups go to the US and ask it to put pressure on the Japanese government for change in desired direction. Japanese military did the same in 9/11.

Who guards the guardians?

Bureaucratic, not democratic control in Japan. Security policy made in Block. Good that military is non-partisan, it's outside of politics, but the politicians and public have not met the obligations to legitimize it and educate themselves about defense issues.

Military didn't report in time to the civilian government that North Korea would fire missiles over Sea of Japan—US communicated the information to the Japanese military. Military then blamed the US→led to launching of Japanese intelligence satellites to gain autonomous intelligence capabilities.

The CLB isn't controlled by politicians. Politicians need to fight with it to push for change. An example of this is the peacekeeping law in 1990-1991.