### 18.600: Lecture 24

# Covariance and some conditional expectation exercises 

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## Outline

Covariance and correlation

Paradoxes: getting ready to think about conditional expectation

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## Paradoxes: getting ready to think about conditional expectation

## A property of independence

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- Since $f(x, y)=f_{X}(x) f_{Y}(y)$ this factors as $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h(y) f_{Y}(y) d y \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(x) f_{X}(x) d x=E[h(Y)] E[g(X)]$.


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- Special case:

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\operatorname{Var}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}\right)=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \operatorname{Var}_{19}\left(X_{i}\right)+2 \sum_{(i, j): i<j} \operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{i}, X_{j}\right)
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- If $a$ and $b$ are constants and $a>0$ then $\rho(a X+b, X)=1$.
- If $a$ and $b$ are constants and $a<0$ then $\rho(a X+b, X)=-1$.


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- Are independent random variables $X$ and $Y$ always uncorrelated?
- Yes, assuming variances are finite (so that correlation is defined).
- Are uncorrelated random variables always independent?
- No. Uncorrelated just means $E[(X-E[X])(Y-E[Y])]=0$, i.e., the outcomes where $(X-E[X])(Y-E[Y])$ is positive (the upper right and lower left quadrants, if axes are drawn centered at $(E[X], E[Y])$ ) balance out the outcomes where this quantity is negative (upper left and lower right quadrants). This is a much weaker statement than independence.


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- Recall formula
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- Reduces problem to computijgg $\operatorname{Cov}\left(X_{i}, X_{j}\right)($ for $i \neq j)$ and $\operatorname{Var}\left(X_{i}\right)$.


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- After 10 days, banker reasons, "If I wait another day I reduce my odds of being here forever from $1 / 10$ to $1 / 11$. That's a reduction of $1 / 110$. A $1 / 110$ chance at infinity has infinite value. Worth waiting one more day."


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- Repeats this reasoning every day, stays in hell forever.
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- Fairly dark as math humor goes (and no offense intended to anyone...) but dilemma is interesting.
- Paradox: decisions seem sound individually but together yield worst possible outcome. Why? Can we demystify this?
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- You offer me a deal. I give you sack 1, you give me sacks 2 and 3. I give you sack 2 and you give me sacks 4 and 5 . On the $n$th stage, I give you sack $n$ and you give me sacks $2 n$ and $2 n+1$. Continue until I say stop.
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- Lets me get arbitrarily rich. But if I go on forever, I return every sack given to me. If $n$th sack confers right to spend $n$th day in heaven, leads to hell-forever paradox.
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- In both stories, make infinitely many good trades and end up with less than I started with ${ }^{54}$ "Paradox" is existence of 2-to-1 map from (smaller set) $\{2,3, \ldots\}$ to (bigger set) $\{1,2, \ldots\}$.


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- Every pile is bigger after transfer (and this can be true even if banker takes a portion of each pile as a fee).
- Banker seemed to make you richer (every pile got bigger) but really just reshuffled your infinite wealth.


## Two envelope paradox

- $X$ is geometric with parameter $1 / 2$. One envelope has $10^{X}$ dollars, one has $10^{X-1}$ dollars. Envelopes shuffled.


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- However, "Higher expectation given amount in first envelope" may not be right notion of "better." If $S$ is payout with switching, $T$ is payout withớut switching, then $S$ has same law as $T-1$. In that sense $S$ is worse.


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- Paradoxes can arise even when total transaction is finite with probability one (as in envelope problem).

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### 18.600 Probability and Random Variables

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