

Questions on Leiter, *Why Tolerate Religion?*, chs. 1, 3

1. What is “pure” or “principled” toleration? Why does Leiter say that Lockeans “mimic principled toleration”? (11).
2. What is the distinction between *moral* and *epistemic* arguments for toleration?
3. Leiter considers (62-3) whether religion’s capacity to provide “existential consolation” (explained on 52) might provide a special reason for tolerating religion. Why does he think it doesn’t?
4. According to Professor Paulsen (quoted in the preface, xi-xii):

Religious freedom only makes full, rational sense on the premise that God exists (or well may); that God’s nature and character is such (or may well be) as to give rise to obligations with respect to human conduct; that the true commands of God, whenever knowable, are, in principle, prior to and superior in obligation to the commands of men; and that human civil society, acknowledging the priority of God’s true commands yet conceding the inability of human institutions to know them perfectly, must accommodate the broadest possible sphere of religious liberty, often including conduct in conflict with society’s usual rules.

Leiter agrees: “if these claims about religion were true, or even reasonable, then the argument of this book fails.” Why?

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24.150J / 17.043J/ CMS.125J Liberalism, Toleration, and Freedom of Speech
Fall 2023

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