

Semantic Ockham's Razor: Don't multiply senses beyond necessity.

"And"	He ran to the edge and jumped. He jumped and ran to the edge.
"Or"	Bob's in his office or in an opium den.
"If/then"	If today is Thursday, then I will be rich tomorrow.
"Some"	Answering some questions correctly isn't as good as answering all of them correctly.
"A" "the"	I went to a school vs I went to the school vs I went to school.

Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically...cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them...a common purpose or set of purposes...This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start...or it may evolve...but at each stage, *some* possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (*ceteris paribus*) to observe, namely *The Cooperative Principle*: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage of the conversation at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you find yourself. In particular:

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as required; do not make it more informative

Quality: Don't say what you believe to be false; don't say that for which you lack evidence.

Relation: Be relevant (subsumes the second quantity rule?)

Manner: Avoid obscurity, ambiguity, prolixity, disorderliness.

Why? Contractual basis? Precondition for any communication? Could there be societies in which these maxims do not hold?

Convention vs conversational implicature.

Cancellability. "I don't mean to suggest that..." (unlike conventional implicature)

Nondetachability. Doesn't depend on particular verbal form employed (except Manner implicatures)

Calculability. Audience must be able to work it out.

Externality. Not part of what is said, or of truth-conditions.

Case Study: The indicative conditional in English. (If Oswald... someone else...)

If it's the material (truth-table) conditional, then (i) from B we can infer *If A then B*, for arbitrary A ; and (ii) from *not-A* we can infer *If A then B*, for arbitrary B , and (iii) from *not-If-A-then-B* we can infer *A and not-B*.

Grice's response to (i) and (ii). If you are in a position to assert *not-A*, or you are in a position to assert B , you shouldn't assert the weaker *If A then B*. Saying *If A then B* implicates that you know *not-A or B* without knowing either disjunct. You presumably then know of some *connection* between A and B .

Problems: (1) Asserting P or Q when you know P is similarly misleading, but P , so P or Q doesn't seem an incorrect inference. (2) No explanation yet of why inference (iii) seems wrong.

Jackson's neo-Gricean response: the conditional brings a *conventional* implicature that $P(A \supset B \mid A)$ is high. The indicative conditional indicates the *robustness* of the corresponding material conditional with respect to its antecedent. Likewise A or B implicates $P(A \vee B \mid \sim A)$ and $P(A \vee B \mid \sim B)$ are high. A disjunction indicates robustness with respect to the denial of each disjunct.

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