

Types vs tokens. A sentence-*type* is context-sensitive iff not all *tokens* of it express the same proposition. Sentence tokens go roughly with utterances. So another way to put it is, not all utterances of a given sentence-type "say the same thing."

The problem of determining what is said. Kaplan: perhaps "some or all of the denoting phrases used in an utterance should not be considered part of the content of what is said but should rather be thought of as contextual factors which help us interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain content" (M, 347). Whether utterances of the same sentence say the same thing depends on what goes into the proposition expressed, as opposed to how that proposition is identified.

What is said vs how that is determined. Suppose "yes" means yes in English and *no* in Knoh. When I say "yes," the proposition expressed depends on which language I am speaking. *But that I am speaking English is no part of what I am saying.* Saying "I'm speaking English" doesn't resolve the uncertainty, for that too could mean something else in Knoh. Which language I am speaking is ultimately to be determined on a contextual basis.

Slightly less extreme version of this is resolving ambiguity. Haberdasher to banker, "I am out of checks." That's semantic ambiguity. There's also syntactic ambiguity. "Smith is lying about meditating." "Visiting relatives can be boring." The speaker doesn't say "about" is a preposition, but that's relevant to determining what it is she does say.

Continuing in this way we reach aspects of content-determination that speakers are conscious of. "It is up to you to punish Jordan for what happened today." That it's Jordan the kid, not the country, is determined by context. Kaplan could probably tell you how he knows it's the kid, but it's still no part of content.

That "you" refers to Kaplan is also determined by context in a way Kaplan is conscious of—"you" refers to the addressee. Does his wife mean "It is up to the person I'm talking to to punish Jordan." Intuitively not, but it's a tricky question, since now the mechanism of content-determination is mutually understood.

"Dthat" pursues this mainly with definite descriptions. Donnellan's objection to Russell. "Mary's husband is kind to her." "Smith's murderer is insane." Referential vs attributive reading.

Referential: *That guy —he's presumably Mary's husband—is kind to her.*
 Attributive: *Whoever she's married to is nice to her (or she wouldn't be so happy).*

Donnellan thinks roughly that Russell misses the first reading, Strawson the second. How do we make sense of them both together? Somehow the *husband* part floats in and out of the content.

How to understand that? Russell is presumably right about the attributive reading. But what about the referential? Think of the way pointing accompanies an utterance of "That's my boat, towards the back." The pointing is no part of what is said. "Mary's husband" is on the referential reading like pointing. We need a piece of language that stands to "Mary's husband" the way "that boat" stands to pointing. *Dthat(...)*

Dthat(the F is G) expresses the proposition that x is G, where x is in fact the F.

Contingent a priori. Consider 'Dthat(the President) is the President.' This is contingent for it says that Obama is the President, and he needn't have been. But it also seems a priori, indeed analytic, since knowing the meaning suffices for knowing it's true.

Necessary a posteriori. Consider 'Dthat(the stuff we drink and ski on etc) is H₂O.' This is necessary, for it says of water that it is necessarily H₂O. But knowing the meaning does not suffice for knowing it's true; it's an empirical discovery.

Could it be that (some of) our puzzles about names and definite descriptions stem from failure to distinguish 'the F' from 'Dthat(the F)'? One is descriptive, non-rigid, context-insensitive. The other is non-descriptive, rigid, context-sensitive.

Two aspects of the meaning of 'Dthat(the F).' Character vs content. Character is what you learn when you come to understand the type. You learn that it contributes whichever object is in fact the F to the proposition expressed. Content is just that object itself. Connection to indexicals and demonstratives next time. 'I' as 'dthat(the speaker),' 'here' as 'dthat(the speaker's location),' 'tomorrow' as 'dthat(the day after this utterance).'

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