

Back to belief attribution. How can “Hammurabi believes...Hesperus...” be consistent with “Hesperus does not believe...Phosphorus...”? One type of answer: here’s how, it goes like this. Crimmins, Perry, Stalnaker. Another type: they only *seem* to be consistent. Salmon, Saul, Braun.

Crimmins theory approached through a series of cases.

“It’s raining.” “It’s not raining”...	...how can these be consistent?
“Germany is the enemy” “It is not the enemy”	...how can these be consistent?
“Waffledogs are tasty.” “They are not tasty.”	...how can these be consistent?
“Tiny is so-called because of his size.” “Fred is not so-called.”	...how can these be consistent?
“Hammurabi thought Hesperus was bright” “...not....Phosphorus...”	...how can these be consistent?

Surface form is misleading? Maybe, there’s an “unarticulated parameter” or “hidden indexical” at the level of logical form.

It’s raining *here*, not there
 Germany is *our* enemy, not yours
 They are tasty to *me*, not to you
 Tiny is ‘*Tiny*’-called because of his size, Fred is not called ‘Fred’ because of his size

How to extend this to the last case?

Hammurabi thought Hesperus *so-conceived*—conceived as Hesperus— was bright.
 He did not think that Phosphorus so-conceived—conceived as Phosphorus— was bright.

Belief is a *three*-place relation between thinkers, propositions, and belief states.
 The logical form is: A believes x is bright in *that way*, via *that sort of state*.

Does this preserve direct reference? The name’s semantic contribution is just its referent, as Kripke says. It also contributes pragmatically, as a feature of context determining what *that sort of state* is. The second contribution is not a threat to direct reference.

Compare: Hammurabi believes that Venus, conceived like *that*—pointing to picture of Hesperus— is bright. The picture is part of context. The name, even though it occurs in the sentence, makes its *distinctive* contribution the way that the picture does

But wait. This can be the solution only if the phenomenon is confined to belief-attributions. But it also occurs with “simple” sentences, Saul observes.

Clark Kent entered the phone booth, Superman came out.
 Superman wears a cape, Clark wears glasses.
 Phosphorus is not as bright as Hesperus.

How to explain this? Two options. Maybe the truth-value shift is real. “Superman” stands for a persona or time-slice. No, because then it’s not true that Superman = Clark. Also Clark does wear a cape, just not when he’s identifiable as Clark. Second option. The truth-value only *appears* to shift. “Clark ran in and Clark came out” is not false, just misleading. We confuse *implicated* content with *semantic* content. It’s a pragmatic effect.

Saul: if you are going to go pragmatic *anyway* for simple sentences, why not also for belief attributions?

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