Frege: "identity challenges reflection." Russell: "you are half-tempted to think that there are two people…., and they happen to be the same. That is obviously absurd, but that is the sort of way one is always tempted to deal with identity."The temptation runs deep. "*They* are identical." "Hesperus is the *Evening* Star, not the *Morning* Star." "Of the ten things on this list, which are distinct?" Similar temptation with existence.

If we think a certain way, but can't take it ultimately seriously, that sounds like a job for pretense. If we're nevertheless making genuine assertions about the world, that sounds like a job for prop-oriented pretense, or what Crimmins calls *semantic* pretense.

Compare (3): Ann is as clever as Holmes and more modest than Watson. The *fictional* truth-condition is the how Ann has to be for this to be fictional. Semantic pretense occurs when the real truth-condition = the fictional truth-condition.

Try it on (11) Hammurabi thought Hesperus was brighter than Phosphorus. How does Hammurabi have to be for this to be fictional?....Well, what is the fiction? "There are two things referred to as 'H' and 'P'; when a thought involves the H-mode (the P-mode), it's directed at the first thing (the second thing). " (5) is fictional if Hammurabi thinks [m_H] is brighter than [m_P], that is, he thinks Venus is brighter than Venus, thinking of it the first time via m_H and the second time via m_P.

This synthesizes Frege and Russell! In the make-believe we're Russellians; no need to mention modes of presentation because there's a different object for each. The serious content by contrast is partly Fregean; we pretend Hammurabi is thinking about two very fine-grained objects to really express that he is thinking via the modes of presentation to which they correspond.

(a) Empty names. (13) Elijah believes Santa is overworked. Just as we talk as if each mode of presentation has its own object, we talk as if each has *an* object.

(b) Simple sentences. (17) Hammurabi's way was lit more often by H than by P. This is fictional if his way was lit more often by Venus when he conceived it via m_H than via m_P.

(c) Existence. (33) Santa does not exist.   Existence is really an indiscriminate property; it attaches to everything. But we pretend that existence is a discriminating property, applying to some things but not others. We pretend a thing exists just on the condition that the corresponding mode of presentation refers.   So we pretend that Santa does not exist, since m_S does not refer. The fictional (hence real) truth-condition is that m_S is empty.

(d) Identity. (31) When two things are identical, the one has the same properties as the other. Identity is really a celibate property, but we pretend it's promiscuous, in the sense of obtaining between distinct things. The rule is to pretend that A = B iff really m_A co-refers with m_B. The fictional (hence real) truth-condition of 'H = P' is that m_H and m_P co-refer, but it "feels" like we're saying that the corresponding fine-grained objects, though two in number, stand in the relation of identity.

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