The lecture notes are closely tied to the readings and are designed to help the student comprehend and consider the issues presented.
| WEEK # | TOPICS | LECTURE NOTES |
|---|---|---|
| Section One: Sense and Reference, Names and Descriptions | ||
| 1 | Frege: On Sense and Nominatum |
I: Introductory (PDF)
II: On Sense and Reference (PDF) |
| 2 |
Russell: On Denoting
Russell: Descriptions |
III: Russell on Denoting (PDF) |
| 3 | Quine: Two Dogmas of Empiricism | IV: Quine’s Two Dogmas (PDF) |
| 4-5 |
Kripke: Naming and Necessity
Putnam: Meaning and Reference |
V: Naming and Necessity, Lecture One (PDF)
VI: Naming and Necessity, Lecture Two (PDF) VII: Naming and Necessity, Lecture Three (PDF) |
| 6 |
Strawson: On Referring
Donnellan: Reference and Definite Descriptions Kripke: Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference |
VIII: Strawson and Donnellan on Referring and Denoting (PDF)
IX: Kripke on Donnellan (PDF) |
| 7 |
von Fintel: Would you believe it? The King of France is Back!
Yablo: Non-Catastropic Presupposition Failure Perry: The Problem of the Essential Indexical Lewis: Attitudes De Dicto and De Se |
X: Presupposition and Empty Names (PDF)
XI: Indexicals and De Se Attitudes (PDF) |
| Section Two: Pragmatics | ||
| 8 |
Austin: Performative Utterances
Grice: Logic and Conversation |
XII: Austin on Peformatives (PDF)
XIII: Grice: Implicature (PDF) |
| 9 |
Lewis: Scorekeeping in a Language Game
Langton: Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts Langton and West: Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game |
XIV: Lewis: Scorekeeping (PDF)
XV: Langton: Unspeakable Acts (PDF) |
| 10 | Lewis: Languages and Language | XVI: Lewis: Language and Languages (PDF) |
| Section Three: Propositional Attitudes | ||
| 11 |
Frege: On Sense and Nominatum
Davidson: On Saying That |
XVII: Propositional Attitudes: Frege and Davidson (PDF) |
| 12 |
Kripke: A Puzzle About Belief
Salmon: How to Become a Millian Heir |
XVIII: Propositional Attitudes: Kripke (PDF) |
| 13 |
Crimmins and Perry: The Prince and the Phone Booth
Saul: Substitution and Simple Sentences |
XIX: Propositional Attitudes: Crimmins and Perry (PDF) |
| Section Four: Truth | ||
| 14 |
Frege: On Sense and Nominatum
Tarski: The Semantic Conception of Truth, and the Foundations of Semantics Stoljar: The Deflationary Theory of Truth |
XX: Truth: The Liar (PDF)
XXI: Truth: Minimalism (PDF) |
| Section Five: Rule Following | ||
| 15 |
Kripke: On Rules and Private Language
Millikan: Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox Holton: Meaning and Rule Following |
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