24.973 Advanced Semantics Spring 2009

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1. Clarification of last week's discussion

- (1) [[children must go to school]]^w = 1 iff
 ∀w': w' is <u>accessible to</u> w → children go to school in w'
 w' is accessible to w iff w' is compatible with the laws in w
- (2) What should the law book in w say?
 - (a) 'Children go to school'
 - (b) 'Children must go to school'

2. Memorizing the theory

(3) $[\![John must pay a fine]\!]^w = 1$ iff $\forall w': w' \text{ is accessible to } w \rightarrow John pays a fine in w'$

w' is <u>accessible to</u> w iff (a) John parked in the driveway in w' and (b) there is no w" such that John parked in the driveway in w" and w" satisfies more laws of w than w'

(4) Definition 1

Let P be a set of propositions. We write $\lceil w \rceil <_P w \rceil$ to mean that w' satisfies more propositions in P than w does.

 $w' \leq_P w$ iff $\{p \in P \mid p \text{ is true in } w\} \subset \{p \in P \mid p \text{ is true in } w'\}$

(5) Definition 2

Let W be a set of worlds, P a set of propositions, $MAX_P(W) =_{def} \{ w \in W \mid \neg \exists w' \in W : w' <_P w \}$ $P = \{ p, q, r \}$ $W = \{ w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5, w_6 \}$ $w_1 \mid = p$ $w_4 \mid = p, q$ $w_2 \mid = q$ $w_5 \mid = q, r$ $w_3 \mid = r$ $w_6 \mid = p, r$ $\Rightarrow MAX_P(W) = \{ w_4, w_5, w_6 \}$

(6) Definition 3

Let f(w) be the set of worlds compatible with what is known in w, and let g(w) be the set of laws in w $\rightarrow \quad [[\mathbf{must f g}] \phi]]]^w = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in MAX_{g(w)}(f(w)): [[\phi]]^{w'} = 1$

- (7) $g(w) = \{A = \neg parking, B = parking \rightarrow paying \}$ $f(w) = \{w' \mid john parks in w'\}$ $W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4\}$

- (9) $MAX_{g(w)}(f(w)) = MAX_{g(w)}(\{w_1, w_2\}) = \{w_1\}$
- (10) $\llbracket [John must pay] \rrbracket^w = \llbracket [[must f g] John pay] \rrbracket^w = 1 \text{ iff } \forall w' \in MAX_{g(w)}(f(w)): \llbracket John pay \rrbracket^{w'} = 1$

3. Epistemic vs. circumstantial modality

- (11) John can run 5 miles
- (12) a. $\exists w' \text{ compatible with what we know in w, John runs 5 miles in w'} \rightarrow John can run 5 miles, but he is too lazy to$
 - b. \exists w' compatible with what we know in w about John's physique, he runs 5 miles in w' \rightarrow 'John can run 5 miles' can be false even if John does run 5 miles
 - c. \exists w' such that John has the same physique in w' as he does in w, he runs 5 miles

4. Samaritan paradox

- (13) we ought to help the victim
- (14) One-factor theory
 - a. There is a unique victim x in w s.t. ∀w' compatible with the moral rules in w, we help x in w'
 → the moral rules dictate that the actual victim is to be helped under any circumstance
 - b. ∀w' compatible with the moral rules in w, there is a unique victim x such that we help x in w'
 → the moral rules dictate that there be a victim
 - c. $\forall w' \text{ compatible with the moral rules where there is a unique victim x, we help the victim in w'}$ \Rightarrow given the moral rules in w, the sentence is trivially true
- (15) Two-factor theory

 \forall w' such that there is a unique victim in w' and w' satisfies as many moral rules of w as any other world where there is a unique victim, we help the unique victim in w'

(16) Prediction of two-factor theory

[we [ought $f_1 g_1$] to help the victim] \rightarrow [there [ought $f_1 g_1$] to be a victim]

(17) Solution

 $\llbracket [ought f g] p \rrbracket^w \neq \# only if f(w) \nsubseteq p$