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PROFESSOR: Good afternoon.
I decided to go for a little amplification today because I'm
feeling a little underpowered and I think that if I do my
usual unamplified version that sometime around 3 o'clock I'll
fall over and somebody will have to haul me away.
Actually, a lot of the experiments I'm going to talk
about today suggest that you wouldn't do it.
You'd just leave me in a little heap there and slowly file out
and I could try that as like a demo.
But that would be sad.
So I don't think I'll do that, but I will amplify myself in
the effort not to run out of steam here.
When last we met I had setup the Asch experiment-- that's
the 3 line thing, the Milgram experiment where it turned out
that people would shock another apparently innocent individual
to a pretty severe degree without what looked like an
awful lot of provocation.
And then the manufacturers, whatever it was, consultation--
whatever it says on the handout, that experiment
suggested that under other circumstances people wouldn't
be so willing to comply with a suggestion that would
run against what they would normally do.
And I left it there to say that we'll come back today and
talk about why that must be.
Why that might be the case.
And the context in which I want to talk about that is the
social impact theory.
The source I put on the handout out is-- the guy's got a great
name-- his name is Bibb Latane.
It looks like Latane, but you pronounce it Latane
and the B stands for Bibb.
I don't know who names their kid Bibb, but maybe that's how
you grow up to be a famous social psychologist.
So when you're studying for the final you can remind yourself
that social impact is a function of SIN, but
that's just the acronym.
I don't know that Latane every particularly noticed this, but
that's the acronym for his 3 big factors in this theory of
strength, immediacy, and number.
And what I want to do is try to explain those in the context,
particularly at the Milgram experiment.
See how those speak to the question of when it is that you
will give into the social pressures from the outside.
So strength in this case refers to-- well, in the Milgram case
really, it would be the authority of the guy giving
you the instructions.
Remember that all the subjects in Milgram's experiment were
upset by the notion that they should be shocking somebody.
And shocking them apparently, severely.
And Milgram had trained himself to say, please continue.
The experiment must go on.
And not more than that.
He wasn't going to get into an argument with them, he was
just going to say that.
If the guy's saying, please continue.
The experiment must go on is Stanley Milgram, white-jacketed
scientist professor from Yale, you got 63% of people going
through all the way to 450 volts in that experiment.
But if you made a small change in the experiment
and the person running it was just some guy.
You know, Kristen [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
well-intentioned research assistant in the lab or
something like that, compliance dropped to 20%.
I don't know.
I'm sure actually if Kristen was doing it, compliance
would be like 100%.
Because she'd smack them around and stuff like that, but if it
was not an authority figure, if the person giving you the
instruction was a person with less authority compliance
dropped way down.
That is the sort of thing that the military knows, right?
Who gives you the order makes a difference.
Immediacy refers to the vividness of the factors.
Sort of the salience of the factors here.
So I already talked about one immediacy manipulation.
Remember, in the original version of the experiment 100%
of the people went all the way through to 450 volts.
Milgram figured, oh my goodness.
That's because they didn't buy the story at all and he brought
the learner slash victim into sight and into the range of
hearing and that change in the immediacy-- increasing the
vividness of the impact you were having on this other
person decreased compliance from 100 to about 2/3
of the population.
If you manipulate the vividness of the pressure on the subject,
compliance can change.
So if Milgram is right there saying, please continue.
The experiment must go on.
You went on.
But if you said, look, I got a rinse a few things out.
I'll be down in my office, if you got any questions about
the experiment call me.
So you know, I have a heart attack.
You know, the learner is busy making all of its bad noises.
The subject is getting antsy.
He picks up the phone.
Please continue.
The experiment must go on.
Yeah, right.
Compliance dropped again to 20%.
So big drop in compliance if the source of the authority
was not right there to help you out.
And if you make the consequences even more vivid,
you can again drop compliance in this experiment.
So in one particularly vivid version of Milgram's
experiment, Milgram didn't have the learner off
in another booth.
He had the learner right next to you making his noises.
And at a critical time in the experiment the electrode is
slipping off the guy's hand and Milgram says, hold
the electrode on him.
And he's still doing the same thing, right?
[UNINTELLIGIBLE]
I'm not going to respond anymore.
I quit.
[UNINTELLIGIBLE]
Compliance drops, you'll be glad to know.
What you may be a little distressed to know is
it drops only to 30%.
30% of the people were still willing to deliver these
punitive shocks all the way through to the end even when
they're holding the guy's hands down on the electrode.
It's this immediacy factor that makes it psychologically easier
to shoot a missile over the horizon and kill somebody than
to actually look somebody in the eye and kill them.
They're dead the same way in either case, you may know
objectively that they're dead.
This is a real issue for the military.
The military knows that it is in the unfortunate business of
killing other people and it also knows that in a way, much
more profound of course than the Milgram experiment that
this is very upsetting to its own soldiers.
To say nothing of the people who get killed, but people
don't like killing other people, typically.
It takes work to get somebody to kill other people and it's
psychologically less damaging if it's over the horizon
than if it's face-to-face.
Though, all you need to do is watch the latest video of some
charming person slitting somebody's throat-- some
hostages throat in Iraq-- to realize that it is also
perfectly possible to kill somebody right there.
But there is an immediacy effect, a real world
immediacy effect.
Well, that's perhaps a gruesome one then and you might think
this is only stuff that works in the realm of the
truly horrible.
That's not true either.
Suppose I get curious this evening and I send a note
around saying, what do you think of the Milgram
experiment?
I might get an e-mail back.
I wouldn't bet on it.
Maybe a couple.
I know who would be sending them too by
this point in the term.
If I ask right now, well, what do you think about
the Milgram experiment?
Is that a disturbing experiment?
Few people will nod their heads.
The eastern bloc might raise its hand.
But you know, most of you will successfully sit on your
hands and not do anything.
But you know, if I was to wander over here somewhere--
she's getting very nervous here.
You can see the experiment really works.
And if I was to ask, what do you think of the
Milgram experiment?
I won't actually make her respond, but I could, right?
There's no doubt.
The only person capable of not responding under those
circumstances would be my 15 year-old son, right?
You have perfected this within the realm of your own family,
why did you get that grade?
But under other circumstances the social impact, the social
pressure there is so strong by the time it's all directed at
you that you got to respond.
You can feel that social pressure.
Actually, it was a great experiment.
This was a great experiment because several people thought
I might be headed their way.
And I caught these great fleeting looks of relief from
that side of the aisle when they realized, he's
going that way.
That's immediacy.
That's also actually, an illustration of the effect
of this third factor, which is number.
In the Milgram experiment this was not manipulated.
Milgram experiment is a one-on-one experiment.
There's Milgram or his surrogate exerting pressure
on you, the subject.
In that manufacturers consultants' study or in the
Asch experiment, it is manipulated and you find that
the more people that the authority is trying to spread
his impact over, the less the impact on any given individual.
Similarly here, if I ask you, 300 of you, what do you think?
Each of you gets-- I don't know if this is actually a linear
operation-- but roughly, 1/300 of my impact.
But if I go and find her she gets all the impact and
she has to say something.
Actually, I think, that we could probably work out the
equations here because there's also probably a distance
equation, right?
You know there are people, you out there in the cheap seats
know there are people who sit out in the back because the
possibilities of social impact are less out there.
I can do what I want out there in the cheap seats.
He can't see anything anyway.
Look at all those computers up there, they're all
surfing the web anyway.
But I don't know that anybody's ever looked at the distance
effects in any sort of a direct way.
There's a very nice study done at Ohio State some years
ago during Greek Week.
What the experimenters did was they hung out backstage because
at Greek Week at Ohio State what you had to do was your
fraternity had to get up in front of all these people,
like a big stadium full of people and do something.
Typically, something kind of embarrassing to show how cool
you were and why everybody should join your fraternity.
And what the experimenters noticed was that the number
of guys in the group varied.
You know, you sent out your one guy or you sent out this troop
of 10 guys to do something.
And so what they did was they simply asked people
before they got on stage, how nervous are you?
And the answer was, it was monotonically related to
the number of people.
If it was just you, you felt much more nervous than if there
were 10 guys going out there.
Now there's no real rational basis for that.
You're not going to get hurt out there, but if you imagine
that everybody in that stadium had a tomato you can kind
of understand the social impact version of this.
How many tomatoes are going to hit you if there's just
one of you verses if there's 10 of you.
It's going to diffuse in this case, very literal
sort of impact.
Social impact theory has one of its roots actually in a
lurid and media- circus murder from the 60's.
In fact, a murder that I remember because it happened
in New York City when I was growing up in the New Jersey
suburbs and so it got a lot of coverage.
This was the murder of a woman named Kitty Genovese, who was
murdered in the courtyard of her fairly large
apartment block.
And it wasn't a quick business.
The guy stabbed her and she sort of crawled off into the
bushes and she didn't die and he came back and he finished.
It was gross.
You know, just disgusting murder.
And the reason gross disgusting murders I mean, there are whole
New York radio stations devoted to that.
The reason this was a particularly salient one was it
was clear afterwards that there were at least 40 or so people
who had heard this and nobody had called the police, let
alone intervene directly.
Nobody had called and this generated a whole lot of sort
of media brow beating and stuff about, was it the case that New
Yorkers were just cold, heartless individuals?
Or what?
And rather like the Milgram experiment being motivated by
the question of, were the Nazis special in some evil sense?
Some of this work on social impact theory was based on the
hypothesis that no, that this didn't illustrate the cruel,
heartless nature of New Yorkers.
What it illustrated was what happens when you're on the
losing end up of what boils down to a social
impact experiment.
The problem was that she was diffusing her impact across
this whole apartment building and when you interviewed
people, people said over and over again, I thought somebody
else would have called.
I wasn't quite sure what was happening.
Somebody else would have had a better look.
They figured that somebody else would have taken care of it.
The notion is that had this been taking place in the front
yard of your isolated farmstead on the Great Plains or
something like that, you would've done something.
Because you would have known nobody else could have.
Is there any evidence for this?
Well, yes actually.
John Darley, who was one of my professors at Princeton, and
Latane, who worked with him, did a series of beautiful
experiments on this.
Obviously they didn't go around murdering people in courtyards,
but what they did was you'd come into the lab and lab had a
whole bunch of isolation booths in it.
Because except if you're in a weird experiment
like that Asch three
line experiment you want to have people doing
the experiment alone.
So a lot of labs are setup this way and so, you, the subject,
would go into this little booth to do the experiment.
And then something would happen.
For instance, you'd hear crash and help.
And the question was, who cares what you're doing in the booth?
The only interesting question in this experiment is,
how fast do you come out of the booth to help?
The answer is it depends on how many other booths
you think are occupied.
And of course, Darley and Latane made very sure that
you knew exactly how many booths were occupied.
So if it was the case that you knew that you were all alone
you were out there fast because the impact was on you.
If there was going to be any help around it
was going to be you.
If the booth was full-- if you knew that there were six other
people in the experiment you were slower to come out
because well, I'm not the biggest, strongest guy.
Somebody else will help and I didn't take that Red
Cross course or whatever.
The responsibility gets diffused across
multiple people.
It's not just for helping.
In another one of their entertaining versions,
smoke comes into the lab.
How fast do you get out of there?
If you're alone, you're moving.
If you're not alone, you're thinking, he's not moving.
He must know something I don't know.
And if he's not moving it's going to be
embarrassing, right?
If I go, fire!
And I go running around.
Fire!
Everybody's going to think I'm a complete doofus.
Now the downside, this is a beautiful experiment showing
beautiful social impact effect-- the downside of this
was this was done at Princeton where I eventually showed up as
an undergraduate to do my nice boring research on
visual perception.
None of my subjects ever believed that I was doing a
visual perception experiment.
It didn't help that the room I had was one of these rooms with
a half silvered mirror in it.
So that I could look in and they couldn't look out.
I didn't care I was planning to look in, it was left over
from the social psych guys.
But nobody ever believed I was there to do a regular just
straight up and down-- I just want to know what color it
looks like experiment.
They all figured, you're watching me, right?
Something weird's going to happen here.
Oh, along those lines, didn't happen to me, but a word to the
wise should you ever find yourself in an experiment in
one of these rooms that looks like one wall is mirrored.
If you're in a psych lab it's probably a half
silvered mirror.
The implication of a half silvered mirror is that that's
not a mirror that you want to use to readjust large
parts of your anatomy.
It was a great story.
The poor grad student was embarrassed for life.
He was a very, kind of straight up and down squarish kind of
guy and anyway, it was very embarrassing.
The grad student was the observer here and it
was embarrassing.
So don't do that.
You don't want to embarrass people.
Oh, one last example, closer to a real world example of this,
the great I think, it's another Darley and Latane, liquor
store experiment.
You go into a liquor store.
You're hanging out in the liquor store.
These two guys come in, they ask the guy in the liquor
store, do you have any [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
weird beer, some weird beer.
The liquor store guy says, I don't have it up here.
I might have some in the basement and he takes
off for the basement.
As soon as he's gone the two guys look at the case of Bud,
say, haha, he'll never miss this.
Pick up the case of Bud and leave.
The guy comes up from the basement and asks,
where are those guys?
And the question is, everybody's a stooge
in this experiment of course except you.
The question is, what do you say?
The answer is, if you are all alone 2/3 of you say, the
guys-- they like stole the beer.
But if you're with even one other person that drops to 1/3.
Again, because of this diffusion of responsibility,
you say to yourself, unconsciously, implicitly, or
whatever-- if he's not saying anything, why should
I say something?
And so you're less likely to say something.
Now the one good side of this, this is all sort
of depressing, right?
It sort of suggests that if we're going to hang out in
large social groups, one of the downsides of this is that
we're not going to look after each other terribly well.
There's a useful inoculation effect here and I've
just inoculated you.
The fact that you know about this, there are experiments
suggesting that the fact that you know about this makes you
more likely, the next time the occasion arrives to discount
the number of other people there.
So now it is probably the case that if I do keel over somebody
will rescue me, even though the responsibility for this
has been diffused across.
Of course, the reason is because somebody's going
to think it's a fake.
And they think, I'm going to win the prize if I
collect him or something.
But I'll try not to do the experiment at all.
But in any case, there is evidence that once you know
about these things you're less vulnerable to those effects
and less likely to find yourself complying with an
instruction that's wrong.
I mean, look, you probably have a good intuitive feeling and I
hope you're right that all over Iraq now, if you're holding
prisoners you've now been inoculated against doing a
whole round of stupid things.
When the Abu Ghraib broke every social psychologist in the
country was on some talking heads show on national public
radio saying, we knew about this.
We can explain this because that's exactly the sort of
thing that's understandable in the context of these
sorts of experiments.
People doing things that they would never-- you know, what's
the chance that you were back home before going off to Iraq
saying, I'm going to go to Iraq.
I'm going to get me some prisoners, put them in
compromising sexual positions and get photos sent back home.
No, nobody thinks about doing that, but the social situation
that you find yourself in with perhaps an implicit command
from somebody that loosens things up a bit
produced the effect.
The fact that this was a disaster has presumably now
inoculated the system at least in the short-term against
it happening again, at least we may hope so.
The practical sort of questions, like what do you do
about prisoner abuse are one interesting line that grows
from this sort of work.
Another question, returning perhaps to this sort of more
basic, psychological side of things is what I think I
labeled on that handout as-- oh yes, the fundamental question.
I decided if you could have the fundamental attribution error
that I would invent for today's purposes, the
fundamental question.
But understand that that's my invented jargon and I won't put
a question on the exam saying, what's the fundamental
question?
The question here is, who is this-- I keep talking about
you-- you know, you can be pushed around by these laws
of social impact and stuff like that.
Who is this you, or I that can be so readily manipulated?
There's a lot of folk psychology about it.
Well, look, we understand for instance, it is possible to
control a car in such a way that the car kills somebody.
It is also possible to train a dog in such a way that the dog
kills somebody, and history tells us, it is possible to
train human beings in such a way that a human being
kills another human being.
There's something fundamentally different, folk psychology
understands that there's something fundamentally
different about the responsibility involved here on
the part of the car, the dog, and the human.
And that seems to have to do with this sense of self.
The sense of you as a self-aware, psychologically
continuous overtime kind of entity.
Is there anything useful that we can say about that?
About that sense of you as a psychological self?
All right, let's back into this a little bit.
If you look at me, you know who I am, right?
Pretty much, those of you who don't, it's getting a
little late in the term.
But you know, you recognize me.
That's fine.
Could I be a cunningly disguised actor who's
impersonating Wolfe today?
Yeah, that's possible.
Be mildly interesting.
OK fine.
Switch.
All right, let's suppose this is your mother or somebody else
who you feel strongly about.
You look at that person and the recognition
has two pieces to it.
More than presumably looking at just some person you know.
There's a fairly strong affective component.
Let's take the best case scenario here.
You see your mother you recognize, that's my mother
and I love my mother.
OK, good.
Let's suppose that something goes wrong with the
affect piece of that.
You know, there's some hunk of brain that's
doing that for you.
Something goes wrong with that little hunk of brain and you
look at your mother and you say, I recognize my
mother and I hate that.
Or I don't feel anything would be another possibility.
That doesn't make sense.
This again, happening-- you're not sitting there with a little
checklist saying, does this makes sense?
You're toting up your current experience and asking
implicitly, does this make sense?
The answer is no.
How could that be?
Well, one possibility-- it sounds a little odd-- but
one possibility is that's not really my mother.
It looks like my mother, but actually she's been cunningly
replaced by a fake.
Why would that be?
Well, you know, if it was my real mother, I love my mother.
I don't love this, therefore it's a fake.
Now that sounds weird, but it's a real neurological condition.
It's called Capgras syndrome.
I put a definition of it, I think, on the handout.
I always think of it as crab grass syndrome, but the
Capgras is correct and it's the name of somebody.
The disorder seems to be an effort to reconcile
an unreconcilable pair of thoughts.
It sometimes travels with schizophrenia as a diagnosis.
It may be the result of a brain injury.
Typically, when there's a brain injury involved it looks like
it's frontal lobe in some fashion.
It's relevant to the current discussion because you can
have the same phenomenon for yourself.
You look in the mirror, you say, that's not me.
And you have a denial that you are you.
It points out that even something as self- evident as--
is it a Dr. Seuss book-- I am I, where's that from?
I can almost hear it.
You haven't been reading your kid lit recently enough.
AUDIENCE: Sam I Am.
PROFESSOR: No, Sam I Am, but I don't think Sam
has Capgras issues.
I am I, and I can't remember what comes next.
Oh well, doesn't matter.
In any case, one might ask whether there is some little
piece of neural tissue that is you in this sense.
That if we were to go in and take out this one little bit
of tissue that what we would discover is that you
weren't you anymore.
That you'd be-- yeah, you'd still have a memory, you'd
still have this, you'd still have that, but you just
wouldn't have this sense of being you.
The short answer to that is there doesn't seem to be any
specific lesion that does that.
That used to be sort of the end of this part of the lecture.
However, particularly with the advent of fMRI it's becoming
increasingly clear that aspects of this sense of the self do
have homes in the brain that can be localized to some
extent, damaged in various odd neurological disorders, and
give us some idea about how it is that this sense of
self is assembled.
So what I've done is I've actually modified a list from a
recent article in Trends in Cognitive Science to come up
with six aspects of the self.
To give you some notion about how you could take this problem
apart the first of these-- I must have just listed them
on the handout, right?
The first of these is representation.
Nobody, when asked about themselves, what kind
of person are you?
Nobody says, Oh, I am just a collection of reflexes
responding to the current situation in the environment.
Everybody has a list of you know, I'm an honest,
loving individual.
You may have some sort of trait or situational theory about how
you came to be honest and loving and all that, but you've
got a set of traits that you believe to be fundamental
to you, at least at the present time.
And that's your representation of yourself.
That's your theory of you.
You also, as part of that theory you have this
notion of agency.
That you are responsible and in fact, you are the cause
of at least a reasonable number of your actions.
You feel that you own those actions.
That's part of what makes the Milgram experiment disturbing.
It's not disturbing that a machine can produce 450 volt
shocks of some schnook.
It's disturbing that you can because you figured that you
own that action and that if you did it that says
something about you.
That's this question of agency.
Now not only do you own actions, you own your body.
That's the aspect of ownership that I'm talking about
in number 3 there.
You own your body.
Look, you also own your laptop.
But you own your body in ways that are more profound than the
way that you own your laptop.
There's something fundamentally different about that.
You're able to use this information that you've got
about what kind of you you are.
You're able to use that to perform new calculations,
if you like.
Like, do I like-- I don't know-- I need a new fruit.
Durian.
Do I like durian?
Well, it's a fruit.
I like fruits.
It's supposed to smell like fermented garlic.
Sounds [UNINTELLIGIBLE].
I can ask myself questions about my self based on
my knowledge of myself.
That's this evaluation aspect.
Monitoring is sort of a sub-- well, I don't know if I would
consider it to be a subset of that.
Monitoring is keeping track of what you are doing and asking
yourself how it's going.
All right, so I'm self- monitoring here saying,
am I really going to fall over today?
No, I don't think so.
I'm feeling pretty good just at the moment.
That's monitoring.
You're asking yourself, am I still awake?
If you're answering yes, the answer is probably yes.
If you answer no, that's a little weird.
Or it's lucid dreaming or something.
That's nice, too.
And finally there's this sense of integration where the whole
thing is tied together into a single self.
There's been plenty of evidence that we've been accumulating
during the course of the term that you are in some
sense a committee.
That you've got lots of semi-autonomous bits and pieces
doing their thing and giving rise to you, but an important
sense of you is that it doesn't feel that way to you.
You don't think of yourself as a committee or a collective or
what's that thing-- is Star Wars where the colonial
organism-- is that the Borg?
The Borg, right?
You don't think you're the Borg.
You've got this sense that you are a unitary thing.
Now each of these bits, while it's not the case that we can
go in and somehow pull out the thing that is you, at least
nobody's figured out what piece of brain that might be.
Each of these aspects of you is subject to attack and to some
degree at this point of localization in the brain.
A clear example would be the question of ownership.
I think I actually talked about some of this earlier when we
were talking about perception.
If you get a lesion in your right parietal lobe you will
typically show symptoms of what's known as
contralateral neglect.
Contralateral meaning on the other side and what I think I
talked about when I was talking about perception is the fact
that you will ignore the left side of visual space and I
think at that point I also mentioned that people ignore
the left side of their body.
You can have all sorts of varieties of neglect, but it
can include ignoring the left side of your body to the point
of denying-- I mean, you can see it, but you might
deny that it's you.
That's neglect.
Interestingly, if you lesion the left parietal lobe you do
not typically get neglect of the right side of the body.
At least not in right-handed individuals.
The best understanding I've ever come up with for that is
that it may be that in right-handed individuals the
right side of the body is represented more robustly or
redundantly than the left side of the body and so a typical
lesion that leaves you alive, at least, doesn't take out the
entire sense that you own that side of the body.
Whereas, a lesion of the less dominant, right hemisphere,
left side of the body takes out this sense-- leaves you with
the sense that you don't own the left side of
your body at all.
Now the flip side of this is our phantom limb phenomena.
So suppose you lose the limb rather than the piece of brain
that represents the limb.
So if you lose a limb very typically-- well, the hunk
of brain is still there.
And the brain is a kind of a noisy place.
What's going to happen if you've got activity that goes
above some sort of threshold in the chunk of brain that
used to represent this arm?
The answer is, you're going to think you've still got an arm.
And you may know at some nice cognitive or depressing
cognitive level that you don't have that arm anymore, but it's
going to feel like it's there.
And it can be really annoying.
Because phantom limbs do things like they get
stuck in a position.
Why's that annoying?
Well, that's annoying because somebody with a phantom limb
stuck like this walking out the door does things like this.
Which is exactly what you would do of course if your arm was
like in a sling out there because you don't want
to bash into the door.
But you know, you feel a bit of a fool if you're doing that
with a limb that you know perfectly well isn't there.
What do you do if you've got an itch in your phantom limb?
Or actually pain in phantom limbs is an even more
serious problem.
Perfectly possible to have pain in your phantom limb.
It's not particularly easy to treat that.
Now it turns that the brain, the brain, like nature,
abhors a vacuum.
And if you lose a limb the chunks of the brain surrounding
the arm representation start to say, there's open
territory here.
We could take that.
And over time the brain reorganizes and you get
very curious reports about the limb changing.
So the limb may shrivel up.
There are reports where the guy comes back to the doctor
and says, how you doing?
I'm doing much better.
Now instead of this stupid limb out here I just have fingers
hanging off my shoulder.
Which it's kind of weird, but since they're invisible
it's not that weird.
What seems to happen is that neighboring stuff takes over
what's near to the arm and the hand in the sensory
homunculus, for example, are things like the face.
And I put a reference to Ramachandran's entertaining, as
I said, a book on the handout.
Blakesley is a science writer, Ramachandran or Rama as he is
usually called is-- well, I think of him as a vision
researcher though, mostly these days he's gone off more into
the sort of neurological work.
But what he did was he was testing phantom limb patients.
He would touch them on their face and ask, what do you feel?
And the patient-- he's got interesting video actually of
the patient saying, well, look of course, I can feel you
touching my face, but the interesting thing is it also
feels like you're touching my phantom thumb.
You move over a little bit and now it feels like you're
touching this phantom finger and so on.
And you could actually map out for hand and arm across the
surface of this guy's face.
He loved it, by the way.
Why did he think this was good?
Yeah?
AUDIENCE: He could itch it?
PROFESSOR: Yeah, he knew where to scratch if it itched.
And it worked.
You get an itch on your phantom arm, he's now learned that he
can scratch there and you get a degree of relief.
So the sense of ownership of the body can be localized in
the brain to the things like these parietal structures.
The degree to which the brain is plastic even in adulthood is
a growing story where you find that the chunks of-- oh there
was an fMRI study showing for instance, that if you look at
violinists, the representation of the fingering hand in the
brain is larger than the representation of
the bowing hand.
The fingering hand is learning a whole lot of stuff that the
bowing hand doesn't need to and it ends up using more
brain, apparently.
All right, lets go back to this notion of the self as a bundle
of personality attributes.
And of your understanding of the implications
of that knowledge.
So these are the ideas of representation and evaluation
from that earlier list.
Does this have a home?
Maybe is a reasonable answer.
There is evidence from neuropathology that suggests
disorders that specifically attack that aspect of the self.
The disorder I'm thinking of is known as Pick's disease,
which I probably labeled on the handout as a
fronto-temporal dementia.
Oh, it says that on the handout also.
The way to think about it is sort of like an Alzheimer's
of the personality.
It's an Alzheimer's like disorder, it's a terrible
diagnosis by the way because it typically is a very
progressive-- quite rapidly progressive dementia that
leaves you witless fairly quickly and dead fairly
shortly thereafter.
Very bad news.
But it is of psychological interest because while the
initial manifestations of Alzheimer's are often this
sort of forgetfulness, the manifestations-- what gets your
family to bring you to the doctor if you've got Pick's
is a change in personality.
I'll tell you a couple of anecdotes here.
Here's a patient, 54 year-old woman described as a charming,
dynamic real estate agent who goes from wearing expensive
designer apparel to choosing cheap clothing and gaudy beads
and asking strangers how much their clothes cost.
Once a lover of French cuisine, she adopted a love of fast
food, particularly, Taco Bell.
Now look, if you like Taco Bell that doesn't mean you're going
to die of dementia next week.
The point is that what people notice, what your family
typically notices is an unexplained change in that
sort of list of attributes that makes you you.
Or a patient, 63 year-old woman described as a well- dressed--
I don't know why they're all well- dressed-- well- dressed,
lifelong political conservative who became an animal rights
activist who hated conservatives, dressed in
T-shirts and baggy pants and liked to say Republicans should
be taken off the earth.
So again, you can imagine somebody whose political
opinions evolve, but you could also imagine that if your rock-
ribbed Republican grandma was suddenly doing a kind of a
late hippie thing and people might worry.
The lesions here seem to be typically at this stage in the
right frontal lobe when you get these people into a scanner.
That was a mistake.
Shouldn't try lecturing while you're drinking.
But no, you don't have to rescue me.
I think I'll be able to rescue myself.
Anyway, so the loci that seem to be particularly important,
but if I've been eating you should come up and
then Heimlich me and stuff like that.
I don't think the Heimlich maneuver works well for water.
Anyway, the particular chunks of brain that seem, at least
one recent study suggests are important here, are chunks of
the frontal lobe lying on the midline, so your
brain's like this.
If you open it up that's the medial surface of the
cerebral hemispheres.
And there's evidence that locations sort of in there
are what's important.
What may be very important for putting together
this sense of the self.
I think I did-- oh yes, I put on the handout the notion that
orbital medial prefrontal cortex might be a possible
home for representation.
I put that there just because it's got to be so much fun to
go off and be able to talk about the OMPFC and to
distinguish it from the DMPFC.
I promise not to ask exactly that-- is representation
localized in the OMPFC or DMPFC?
This is for the subset of you who are dying to go off to med
school and stuff like that and want practice using jargon that
nobody else will understand.
Don't get me wrong, this is useful stuff.
If you're interested in the topic the reference on the
handout to-- did I put the reference on the handout?
Yes, this comes from this Northoff and Bermpohl article
way up at the top of page 2.
By all means, go check it out.
I just realized when I was thinking about lecturing about
this that I knew that a whole bunch of people are going to go
get deeply obsessive about worrying about whether they've
got the OM versus the DM straight and I don't want
people to spend a lot of time worrying about that.
What I want you to come away with is the notion that there
are a set of localizable bits of particularly frontal
structures in the brain where you can make a case for each
little bit being responsible for a little bit of this
overall sense of the self.
Well, one of the ones actually where the little chunk of
brain-- again, I probably won't ask a question, but where
little chunk of brain is quite clearly doing something
specific for you is the anterior cingulate.
Again, and the midline of the brain or the medial surface of
the cerebral hemispheres are wrapped around the corpus
callosum, that big bundle of fibers that connects the
two halves of the brain.
The cool thing about that is that it really looks like it's
serving a monitoring role.
What it does is it's the thing that's siting there checking,
am I making a mistake here?
If you're in our lab I can feel my anterior cingulate light up
because if you're in the lab and you're doing a whole bunch
of visual search experiments and you hit the no key just as
you see the target-- that "Oh dear" phenomenon.
Where you can just feel yourself saying a word you
shouldn't say, that's your anterior cingulate
error monitoring.
How do we know that?
Because if you do these experiments in a scanner
when people make errors that lights up.
It's really quite lovely.
It's also, in the practical advice side of the course, it
turns out at least from a couple of things that I
read that the anterior cingulate is particularly
vulnerable to alcohol.
What's that mean?
Well, it means have a few drinks and the chunk of your
brain that's saying, "Is this a mistake?" takes a vacation.
So have a few drinks, go down to Kenmore Square to celebrate
the Red Sox-- look, there's a car.
Could we flip that over?
Yeah, we could do that.
Would that be a mistake?
I don't know, the guys asleep so don't wake him up.
Or you know, go and drink a few things and should I
sleep with that person?
I don't know, we'll ask in the morning.
Well, I guess the answer was no, I shouldn't have.
But anyways, next time you are inclined to imbibe something
stronger than Poland Spring Water just think of your little
anterior cingulate that's bathing in alcohol and then you
can go drive down the highway and say, "Would it be a mistake
to pass this semi on a wet road tonight?
Well, I don't know, let's find out." So you want to keep that
piece of your brain and you want to keep it more
or less functional.
The conscious you, this notion of integration
seems to have something to do with the notion.
What's it mean that it's all one thing?
In some way this is all tied into the fact that you feel
like a single, self-reflective, conscious entity.
Well, one interesting question is, are you conscious?
Well, sure.
Now that I asked you.
Were you conscious before I asked you?
Oh maybe.
This is what's known in the philosophical literature as the
refrigerator light problem.
Is the refrigerator light on when the
refrigerator is closed?
AUDIENCE: No.
PROFESSOR: Well you know that the answer is really no
and look-- even most philosophers know that.
But that's because you have some sort of a deeper
understanding of refrigerators.
But if you're just faced with this thing and the question
is, is the light on when the door is closed?
How would you know?
Open the door, light's on.
It's always on.
Every time I open it up the light is on, it's cool.
People seriously entertain the possibility that
consciousness is like that.
It feels continuous because every time you ask yourself in
any fashion about whether or not you're conscious, not
counting the guys who were out cold and well, they can't ask
themselves anyway, you feel conscious, right?
The closest you can get to a sort of a feeling that there
might be an issue here is there's a phenomenon known to
long haul drivers where you're driving down the interstate,
you get from point A to point B and you have no recollection
of having done that.
The good thing is if you're doing that while you're asleep.
Asleep is a different problem.
It's a very serious problem, but the greatest number of car
accidents per mile is not like in downtown Boston where you
would think it ought to be.
But it's like way out West because 600 miles, the
road doesn't even turn.
The problem is the 601 mile it makes a 10 degrees slant off to
one side and you're semi doesn't.
And you're straight into the sage brush or something like
that because you've gone to sleep.
But the less dire version of this is you can get into a sort
of a "nnnnn" kind of state driving down the interstate
where you really seem to lose a chunk of time and you
ask yourself, was I conscious during that?
I must have been awake because I didn't crash the car,
but there's nothing there.
Whether or not you were conscious or not I can't
speak to because of this refrigerator light problem.
If we asked you while you were in the midst of the
state, are you conscious?
You'd say, "Of course I'm conscious.
That's a stupid question."
If you're interested, one of the projects-- one of the more
interesting neuroscience projects out there is to decide
which bits of brain are important for consciousness.
Christof Koch at Caltech has done a lot of work on this,
wrote an interesting new book, which I would've put on the
handout if I could have quickly found the reference, but if you
go to my website you can find my one page review of the
book-- which tells you what the books about without you
actually having to read it, but it would also give you the
reference to the book.
But Christof refers to the neural correlate
of consciousness.
The question is, which bits of brain do you
need to be conscious?
And then you can go on from there to ask, what that
consciousness might actually be for?
It's very clear that we can do an awful lot of stuff
without being conscious.
This is an important wrinkle on this issue of agency.
There's an interesting body of research that suggests that
when you feel like you are making a decision-- which one
of these things do you want-- the brain, we can pick up a
lecture of physiological indications that you have made
the decision before you, the owner of the brain, know that
you've made the decision.
One can wrap oneself in philosophical knots trying to
ask yourself what that means about the agency of your acts,
are you-- the conscious you-- committing those acts or are
you merely reporting on them afterwards?
But there is this interesting data that suggests that you
have made the decision before you know that you've
made the decision.
In any case, what we can't find is clear evidence of a single,
little piece of neural tissue that is you.
No single lesion seems to leave everything else
intact, but take you out.
So what I want to do now is to switch from neuropathology
to psychopathology.
But I will do that after you take a brief stretch here
and then we'll talk about that a bit.
[INTERPOSING VOICES]
AUDIENCE: I had a question about the syndrome that you
talked about where you can't recognize who you are.
Is it visual?
Like so if you look in the mirror--
PROFESSOR: Oh, no.
You know perfectly well looking in the mirror that that
looks exactly like me.
The weird thing is it just isn't me.
If I had a photograph of you, you would know that was you
and you would also know that it wasn't you.
I mean, it's not you, you're this person right here.
Now if I had a photograph of your mother you would know that
this was a representation of your mother, but wasn't
necessarily your mother, per se.
The weird thing about Capgras is if I had your mother here
you would have the same sort of sense of it being it looks like
mother, but it just isn't.
It's one of those things where it'd be cool if you could have
this reversibly just to know what it felt like.
It'd be very hard to wrap you brain around what
that particular delusion must feel like.
There are visual disorders where you don't recognize
faces, that's prosopagnosia.
I think I talked about earlier.
Where I look at you, I say, two eyes, nose, mouth, it's a face.
Whose is it?
I don't know.
This is in some sense the opposite, a complement of that.
I know exactly who it is, I just don't believe
it in some sense.
AUDIENCE: Well I mean, if I have that disorder and
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE].
PROFESSOR: Your hand.
That's interesting.
I'm not sure I've ever read anything about whether people
deny their own-- in neglect you would deny it was your own
hand, but in neglect typically the hand would be paralyzed.
You wouldn't be doing anything with it because of the
nature of the stroke.
I don't know.
I thought you were going to ask whether I could look at that
water bottle and deny it was my water bottle and it doesn't
seem to extend to objects.
It seems to be a very person specific kind of delusion.
That it's about people and about people with whom you have
strong affective relations.
Very sad kind of thing because you read these anecdotes about
how would you feel because typically somebody is in tough
shape for one reason or another when they've got this disorder.
So you're visiting your kid in hospital said he's busy
declaring you're an evil agent who's disguised as Daddy.
You know, that must be heartbreaking.
And I remember reading one account where Daddy, in an
effort to cure the kid, comes back and declares.
I did it, I killed him.
And I think the story was it provided some temporary relief
and then it didn't stick.
But very weird stuff and very, small, it's rare stuff;
small literature.
I just realized I suppose it didn't matter, but I just
realized that if I'm going to mike myself having discussions
during the break could be a little risky.
I got to make sure that I'm just talking about the details
of Capgras syndrome, which we were as opposed to having a
discussion about-- I hate my TA.
Oh yeah, what's the name of your TA?
That wouldn't work.
Or I love my TA, and nevermind.
Let's get onto psychopathology--
my own and others.
The first thing to do is to say something about the distinction
between a neuropathology and a psychopathology, which might
seem a little weird in a course that began by asserting the
mind is what the brain does.
I mean, in what sense can you talk about neuropathology on
one side and a psychopathology on the other?
I decided today and I'll see if I still think tomorrow that
it's a useful distinction to think of it sort of like a
hardware bugs versus software bugs.
Same computer not working in some interesting fashion or
other, but you can have a problem because some piece
of the equipment is broken.
And you can have a problem because the program running
over that equipment is not working properly.
Now I realize as I'm saying that that there is one problem
with that analogy, which is that if I have a hardware bug
I'm going to be inclined to fix the hardware and if I have a
software bug I'm going to be inclined to fix the software.
That distinction is by no means as clear in psychopathology
versus neuropathology.
So you can have a brain lesion where the treatment is
essentially behavioral because you want to do some sort of
retraining of the brain that you've got left and you can
have a psychopathology, a problem if you like with the
way that the software is running where the intervention
is to give somebody a drug that's doing its work
essentially on the hardware.
So the metaphor is not perfect, but it gets at something.
Psychopathologies are...
it's worth thinking of as problems with the way that the
program is using the brain.
Are there psychopathologies that specifically
attack the self?
The answer is yes.
Those are what's known in the trade as
dissociative disorders.
Much beloved of various and sundry literary outlets, so the
cleanest one if you like is psychogenic amnesia or
depersonalization.
Occasionally resorted to by soap opera writers who have
backed themselves into a corner.
That's the get a knock on the head and I don't know who I
am, I don't know where I am.
And that allows you to do a certain amount of plot
twiddling as needed.
Oh, let me say a word about-- now that we're talking about
psychopathology-- I need to say something about psychiatric
hypochondria, which is psychogenic amnesia.
Very rare, it's not going to happen to you.
It's not even going to happen to you after I tell you we
don't really know what the cause is, but the best we know
about it is that it's a response to severe stress.
The problem is, you say that and people say "huhh!".
I'm under more stress than I've ever been all my life.
I'm going to wake up tomorrow and not going to know who I am.
Not going to happen, very rare stuff.
But this is a close kin, this is the intro psych kin, to med
student hypochondria which is a very real known phenomenon.
Med students are always coming down with spectacularly
rare diseases, at least in their own minds.
You hear about some new set of symptoms of some weird tropical
disorder and you can kind of-- is that like a tape worm
right about there?
They worry about these things a lot.
And in the same way that they probably don't have that tape
worm because you just don't pick them up at
Harvard Med, mostly.
You shouldn't worry about whether tomorrow you're
going to wake up without knowing who you are.
Even though you may be under a certain degree of stress.
That said, so let me tell you one case.
A woman wakes up-- a woman is found, actually in a bad state
under the bushes in Florida somewhere back in 1980.
Doesn't know who she is.
Can't remember anything about her past.
And eventually, in an effort to figure out who she is and they
call her Jane Doe of course, and then take her on morning TV
and ask basically, does anybody know who I am?
And immediately got a string of phone calls that suggested that
they knew exactly who she was.
She had apparently left Ohio a few years earlier and moved to
Florida and then disappeared.
Her parents hadn't heard from her for several years.
And unclear what happened in this particular case,
atypically she did not recover her memory.
Typically, these global amnesias are transient.
In her case, at least at the time of the report I was
reading, she had not recovered her memory.
That's the most global, if you like, of these
dissociative disorders.
Fugue states, from the Latin word "to fly" are related.
Again, it's presumed to be a response to severe stress.
There's a very nice case described by William James
in his great Principles of Psychology-- the best intro
text ever written in 1890, so we can't still use it.
But he talks about the Reverend Ansel Bourne who took some
money out of the bank in Providence, Rhode
Island and vanished.
He reappeared-- well, he woke up one morning in, I think,
Norristown, Pennsylvania and discovered that for the past
two months he had been running a store in the name of A.J.
Brown.
He had no recollection of the preceding two months.
Hypnosis turns out to be a useful, if somewhat mysterious
tool in such cases.
And James, who was very interested in hypnosis found
that under hypnosis he could sort of call up either
Brown or Bourne.
They didn't seem to know each other, but what seems to have
happened was-- that the characteristic of a fugue state
is that you disappear to another location and pick
up another identity.
Now one of the interesting things about this and it's
actually a theme that will recur through a lot of
discussions of psychopathology.
Is that a fugue state is in a sense an abnormal version
of something that we all understand as a normal story.
In fact, most of us in our family histories somewhere have
somebody back in Germany or Poland or China or Russia or
Korea or somewhere who was under a lot of stress in the
Old Country, picked up, and developed a whole new identity
in the U.S. The major difference of course, is that
grandpa remembered the old country.
Grandpa hadn't suddenly just gone poof and hey, now I'm
running a store in Brooklyn.
Nothing like that.
But the notion that a response to an intolerable situation
here might be to move here is sort of like the
American story.
The pathological aspect is if you don't remember
what had happened before.
Now by the time you've got a couple of different characters,
particularly, who can be called in and out of awareness under
hypnosis, you are very close to everybody's favorite
dissociative disorder, long known as multiple
personality disorder.
Now more officially known as dissociative identity disorder,
but I will continue to refer to it as multiple personality
disorder because if I think multiple personality disorder I
know what I mean immediately.
If I say dissociative identity disorder I
have to think about it.
They are essentially the same thing.
This is the situation in which two or more personalities
appear to occupy the same individual.
Popular with popular supermarket psych books.
The great movie of my youth was a movie called
Three Faces of Eve.
Has anybody ever seen it?
Oh good, must still be playing in reruns on some old-- scared
the wits out of me when I was little.
Can't remember anything about it except that I mean, she
didn't have really three faces, she did have
three personalities.
Let me tell you instead about Billy Milligan,
a convicted rapist.
Not a nice person.
But one who attempted to get off his conviction by claiming
a lack of responsibility due to a multiple
personality disorder.
Depending on which of the multiple accounts you read of
this he had anywhere between 10 and 24 personalities including
Arthur, a sort of master personality who knew all
the others rattling around inside him.
Arthur is reputed to know Arabic and to be self- taught
in physics and chemistry.
Regen was aggressive, fluent in Serbo-Croatian, spoke with a
thick accent and was reported to be the initiator of
the sexual assaults.
Adalana is a shy, introverted lesbian with a spontaneous
nystagmus, reported to be the actual rapist.
Now there's a whole collection of weird stuff there.
One point is that there's no guarantee that all
the personalities are the same gender.
A perhaps more salient point here is this spontaneous
nystagmus thing.
And nystagmus is a beating movement of the eyes.
It's hard to fake.
There's an argument about whether multiple personality
disorder is for real.
And even if it is for real there's always an argument in a
court case for whether or not somebody's just trying to get
off the hook by faking it.
This spontaneous nystagmus is important because
it's hard to fake.
If you sit there and try to vibrate your eyes continuously
that's not easy.
So as Allen he's a con man, Tommy knows electronics and
plays the sax, Samuel is an Orthodox Jew and a woodcarver
and so on and so on and so on.
So it's very odd business.
On the face of it it's a fragmentation of the self.
If you think of the self as a kingdom this is like a bunch of
the provinces have rebelled and they have complicated
diplomatic relationships with each other.
Who knows who?
Who's talking to who?
Who likes who?
Very complicated construct here.
Oh, one important way to distinguish a psychopathology,
which if it's for real-- it clearly is-- from a
neuropathology is nobody would expect to put this guy in a
scanner and call up-- I don't know-- Regen, the
Serbo-Croatian rapist and find, there he is.
That piece of brain and now the other guy's over here
and this guy's over here.
Look, they're all making use of the same brain.
They're all forming memories, for instance, and using
presumably the same hippocampus to do it.
This is a case of very odd software running
over the hardware.
So it's a troubling pathology.
Yep, there's a question?
AUDIENCE: What's the deal with the eye beating and
why is that hard to fake?
PROFESSOR: Why is it hard to fake?
Well, just sit yourself in front-- well, you can't look at
your own eyes moving in the mirror, so you can't
try it that way.
Pick a friend, look at a friend, try to keep your eyes
beating rhythmically for five minutes by an act of will.
Make sure you have aspirin handy.
It's just very hard to do.
I can do all sorts of really weird things with my eyes
actually, but that's not a nystagmus.
That's some sort of weird, spastic movement.
Even if you could produce a movement any competent
opthamologist can look at a nystagmus or you can record it
and know whether this is a plausible neurological sign or
something weird that the guy's doing.
Who knows?
You know, maybe he's a genius at this sort of thing, but it
would be a hard thing to fake.
I don't think there's much more to be said about it than that.
But this issue of whether it's fake or not-- one of the other
arguments in favor of the notion that there is a real
disorder is imagine you've got 24 personalities or imagine
your parents tell you-- how many parents when you were
little made up some sort of long-running story
that they told you?
No?
Oh good.
The rest of you was deprived.
They were just reading out of the books.
Anyway, I used to have a nice long-running
story about bunnies.
Very complicated stuff.
The problem is once there were like 24 bunnies or whatever, I
don't remember how many there were-- the kids would keep
calling me on errors.
No, no, he lives over there.
It's very difficult to keep all this stuff straight.
If you have a story with 24 characters in it that you're
making up as a fake in your own head you've got
to keep that lie.
Well, you don't have to do stories.
Think of a good lie.
How many times when you were a kid did you get stuck because
the lie fell apart because you told it wrong?
You changed the story.
If it's a truth it's easy enough because you just go back
and refer to the Truth and it's just kind of there.
But the lie you have to remember the details of and
there's an argument that the same thing is going on here.
If you really had twenty-four different personalities it'd be
just very difficult to keep them straight unless you were
just reporting on-- so here's Chuck, the personality,
who do you know?
I know boom, boom and boom.
If you're faking it-- you-- the owner of this whole story have
to think, Chuck, Chuck-- oh God.
I don't remember who Chuck knows and so on.
Now a more troubling fact perhaps, is that multiple
personality disorder was practically not on the radar
screen twenty years ago.
When I first started talking about multiple personality
disorder I could like read the whole literature on this--
handful of cases from a handful-- a handful of patients
from a handful of therapists.
In twenty years it's skyrocketed.
It became sort of flavor of the month, everybody had a multiple
personality disorder for a while.
That's faded off a bit since then, but that's odd.
Why should that be?
One theory is that is that it's a well- intentioned delusion,
cooked up between a therapist and a patient.
Patient's got some real problem, the therapist believes
in multiple personality disorder, and through the use
of hypnosis, which is a common tool for therapists who treat
multiple personality disorder you come to the conclusion--
you and the therapist come to the conclusion that you have
more than one character rattling around in there.
And that it wasn't real before you came into
the therapist's office.
The counter argument to that is that what brings people in
often is that they're missing chunks of their lives.
You come to the therapist's office.
You say look, I have no idea what I did Tuesday afternoon,
but there's a new dress in my closet and there's a charge
on my Visa card and this is disturbing.
If things were happening to you, you just didn't remember
it might eventually get you into therapy.
AUDIENCE: Well, couldn't multiple personality disorder
popularity skyrocket after that movie came out
and everyone saw it?
PROFESSOR: Oh yes.
To anticipate what I will actually end up getting to do
in next Tuesday's-- since there's no class on Thursday--
there is a sense in which you get to choose how to go insane.
The culture around you enables certain forms of certain
patterns of mental disorder and not others.
And sure, there's a lot of this sort of copycat
cracking up, if you'd like.
Let me say one last thing about this issue of what
gets people into therapy.
It's one thing to find a dress in your closet.
The sort of thing that drives you to the therapist really
quickly is you wake up in the morning, there's a guy in bed
with you, it's pretty clear that he's been there for awhile
and the suggestion is that you've been doing stuff of some
sort and you don't know who he is.
There's a lovely-- well, lovely-- scary anecdote by one
patient where sort of a case where bad girl/good
girl personalities.
The good girl didn't know the bad girl personality, but the
bad girl knew the good girl and the bad girl in therapy
said, oh, this is great.
She's such a prig.
So I take over and we go out to a bar and pick up a guy.
I bring him home and you know, we do stuff, and then I just
withdraw back into her and watch the next morning.
It was great, man, she'd wake up and she'd freak every time.
Well, you've got to imagine the guy's point of view, too.
You know, guy comes home with somebody, the next morning
she's ranting and raving that she's never seen him before
and kicking him out the door.
It must be very strange for all concerned, but is certainly the
sort of thing that would land you wanting to talk to somebody
in the mental health field.
All right, we'll pick up next week.