Moral judgment

Course: 9.012 Cognitive Science

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Social cognition → Moral judgment

• Virtue (Latin *virtus*; Greek ἄρετή) is moral *excellence* of a man or a woman.

A virtue is a **character** trait **valued** as being **good**. The conceptual opposite of virtue is **vice**.

.........*What is good then?... Perhaps something that leads to a ‘good result’ or at least beneficial for the one that possesses the virtue.*

*ie: Something that from an overall aspect will not lead to chaos, destruction, loss, sadness, lack of justice, death etc...*

The idea of ‘beautiful’
According to Plato

Virtues are:

- **Modesty**: \(\text{σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē)}\)
- **Prudence (precaution)**: \(\text{φρόνησις (phronēsis)}\)
- **Valiance**: \(\text{ἀνδρεία (andreia)}\)
- **Justice**: \(\text{δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē)}\)

Can be achieved only all together—not separate.

There is not much talk about happiness as a self-sufficient state of the active individual; the emphasis is, rather, on problems and difficulties that need to be solved.

Plato's moral ideals: the soul is to remain aloof from the pleasures of the body; communal life demands the subordination of individual wishes and aims.
And Aristotle:

- **Aristotle's ethics**
- Aristotle believed that ethical knowledge is not *certain* knowledge, like epistemology or metaphysics but *general knowledge*.
- It is a *practical* discipline rather than a *theoretical* one,
- He thought that in order to become "good," one could not simply study what virtue *is*;
  - one must actually do virtuous deeds.
- Thus, a human's function is to do what makes it human, to be good at what sets it apart from everything else: the ability to reason.
- Depending on how well people reason, Aristotle classified people as Virtuous, Continent, Incontinent and Vicious.
- emphasizes the importance of **context** to ethical behaviour
  - what might be right in one situation might be wrong in another-
  - (not a ‘rigid’ ethics code)
Evolution of morality during history

• Maybe not be considered always as “for the better” (was never optimized rather was down/upgraded during times).
• Let’s see what people have said so far chronologically:
  • Hebrew (Tanakh) containing (“Law”, “Prophets” and “Writings” rather than direct definitions of morality.
  • Socrates → Plato/Aristotle (~400 BC)
  • Far East & Western Christianity, (~300 AC -1700+)
  • Hume, Kant (1700+)
  • Russel, Wittgenstein, Moore.
  • Today’s : Kohlberg, Gilligan, Chomsky,
  • Greene, Mckhail…
500 years after Plato…Evolution of virtues/morality through religion and civilization

- Western world example:
  Up to and medieval ages, virtues got ‘mutated’, took different forms according to the respective religion frame.
- Christian virtues: faith, hope, love
- Later 7 virtues:
  - **Chastity** (courage, opposes *lust*) —
  - **Liberality** (will, opposes *greed*) -Willingness to give.
  - **Abstinence** (Latin, *frenum*) (self-control, opposes *gluttony*)
  - **Diligence** (ethics, opposes *sloth*)
  - **Patience**
  - **Kindness**
  - **Humility** (form of modesty)

- Lots of the above interconnected variations dominate after 300 AC.

→ Philosophy was pretty much NOT a good sport…up to the 18th century (Renaissance)
Far East example

- Virtue in Chinese philosophies such as **Confucianism** and **Taoism**. Chinese virtues include **humanity**, **filial piety**, (religiousness/spirituality) **loyalty**.

One’s social status should be the result of the amount of virtue that one could demonstrate rather than by one's birth. **Confucius** stated that perfect virtue consists of the global practice of five things:

- gravity (credibility),
- generosity of soul,
- honesty,
- willingness,
- kindness.
Hume's (empirical approach).

• Instead of telling us how morality ought to operate, he tells how we do actually make moral judgments.
• After various examples, he comes to the conclusion that most if not all of the behaviors we approve of increase public utility.
• Does this then mean that we make moral judgments on self-interest alone? –he says No.
• we are swayed by our sympathies for our fellow men (emotions govern us)
• claims that we could never make moral judgments based on reason alone.
• only our natural sentiments can do this.
Kant

• The first formulation (Formula of Universal Law) says: "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature."

• The second formulation (Formula of Humanity) says: "Act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."

• The third formulation (Formula of Autonomy) is a synthesis of the first two. It says that we should so act that we may think of ourselves as legislating universal laws through our maxims, in a possible Kingdom of Ends. We may think of ourselves as such autonomous legislators only insofar as we follow our own laws.
Kant’s argument

we can assume three things:
• Free will – We must have the free will to act
• Immortality – happiness will eventually reward us (in the afterlife)
• God – there is a regulating being that will reward virtue with happiness.

His argument is:
1) “If it is our unconditional duty to follow these moral laws, it must be our unconditional duty to aim for the goal of these laws, and so we seek to bring about the highest good.
2) Humans do not have enough power to bring about the highest good. Even with perfect morality, we cannot ensure the perfect happiness that should follow.
3) However, if we aim for the highest good, it must be possible to achieve it. If we are unable to attain this goal in our present life, there must be someone else to ensure we can attain it in a future life.
4) God has this necessary power, therefore we can assume the existence of God. “
• Kant believes that this does not prove the existence of God, but our sense of morality implies the world is ordered in a moral way.
Moore’s (indefinability of “good”) / Russel

• Moore considered goodness to be a “simple undefinable, nonnatural property”
• Cannot be represented in terms of human desires (comfort, security, pleasure etc).

• Russel in his earlier years, along with Moore, he then believed that moral facts were objective, but only known through intuition, and that they were simple properties of objects.

• These simple, undefinable moral properties cannot be analyzed using the non-moral properties with which they are associated.

• In time Russel agreed with Hume, who believed that ethical terms dealt with subjective values that cannot be verified in the same way that matters of fact are.

• This influenced the ‘logical positivists’: they said that ethical propositions, were essentially meaningless and nonsensical or, at best, little more than expressions of attitudes and preferences.

• Russell also writes that punishment is important only in an instrumental sense. Thus we should not punish someone solely for the sake of punishment.
Wittgenstein

• Wittgenstein argued that "problems" such as Plato's were in fact pseudo-problems that arose from philosophers' misuse of language.
• Language has evolved as a way to cope with everyday problems, and it functions well within the context in which it has arisen,
• "What time is it?" vs "What is time?"

• everyday language functions for the most part unproblematically and does not require correction by philosophers.

• In this manner, he aimed to demonstrate that the great questions posed by philosophers had arisen because they were operating on a mistaken view of language and its relation to reality.

• So the true philosopher becomes more like a therapist removing distress and confusion than someone who creates or discusses philosophical theories or positions.
Today’s idea of Morality

- **Moral reasoning** is a study in psychology that overlaps with moral philosophy. Prominent figures include Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan and John Reed.

- Although all moral choices can be seen as personal choice, some choices can be seen as an economic choice, or an ethical choice described by some ethical code or regulated by ethical relationships with others.

- This branch of psychology is concerned with how these issues are perceived by ordinary people, and so is the foundation of descriptive ethics.
Piaget → Kohlberg-Giligan & Haidt (Chomsky)

• Kohlberg: **Social intuitionism**
  Moral reasoning - Is the basis for ethical behavior - has developmental stages

• More sophisticated reasoning, should lead one to more consistent moral action, because one realizes that moral principles are prescriptive in nature and so demand action from the self
Kohlberg's six stages

- Were grouped into three levels:
- pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional.

{Following Piaget's constructivist requirements for a stage model, it is not possible to regress backward in stages (although none function at their highest stage at all times). It is also not possible to 'jump' stages; each stage provides a new yet necessary perspective, and is more comprehensive, differentiated, and integrated than its predecessors.}
Level 1 (Pre-Conventional)

- Reasoners in the pre-conventional level judge the morality of an action by its direct consequences.

- Common in children, although adults can also exhibit this level of reasoning.

- Consists of two stages of moral development, and are purely concerned with the self (egocentric)
  - 1. Obedience and punishment orientation
  - 2. Self-interest orientation
Level 2 (Conventional)

- Typical of adolescents and adults.
- Persons who reason in a conventional way judge the morality of actions by comparing these actions to societal views and expectations.

- 3. Interpersonal accord and conformity
  » (a.k.a. The good boy/good girl attitude)

- The self enters society by filling social roles.
- Individuals are receptive of approval or disapproval from other people as it reflects society's accordance with the perceived role.
  - may judge the morality of an action by evaluating its consequences in terms of a person's relationships, which now begin to include things like respect, gratitude and the 'golden rule'.
- Desire to maintain rules and authority exists only to further support these stereotypical social roles.
Level 2

- 4. Authority and social-order maintaining orientation
  » (a.k.a. Law and order morality)

- In **Stage four**, it is important to obey actual laws, dictums and social conventions in order to maintain a functioning society.

- Moral reasoning in stage four is thus beyond the need for individual approval exhibited in stage three.

- Society must learn to transcend individual needs.

- If one person violates a law, perhaps everyone would - thus there is an obligation and a duty to uphold laws and rules. When someone does violate a law, it is morally wrong; ***

- Culpability is a big factor in this stage and separates good from bad.
Level 3 (Post-Conventional)

- 5. Social contract orientation
- 6. Universal ethical principles
  » (a.k.a. Principled conscience)

- Realization that individuals are separate entities from society now becomes salient. One's own perspective should be viewed before the society's is considered. (sometimes mistaken for pre-conventional behaviors.)
  - In Stage five, realization of the individual’s uniqueness.
  - Expectation of respect and honor in an impartial way.
  - Issues that are not regarded as relative like life and choice should never be withheld or inhibited.
  - No single choice is considered correct or absolute
    - 'who are you to judge if they are or not'?
  - Laws are regarded as social contracts rather than rigid dictums.
  - Idea of ‘democracy’ is ostensibly based on stage five reasoning.
Level 3

• In **Stage six**, moral reasoning is based on abstract reasoning using universal ethical principles.
• Laws are valid only insofar as they are grounded in justice.
• Commitment to justice obligates us to disobey unjust laws.
• Rights are unnecessary as social contracts are not essential for deontic moral action.
• Decisions are met *categorically* in an absolute way rather than *hypothetically* in a conditional way.
• →Imagine what one would do being in anyone's shoes, who imagined what anyone would do thinking the same.
• Action is never a means but always an end in itself;
• One acts *because* it is right, and not because it is instrumental, expected, legal or previously agreed upon.
• People rarely if ever reach stage six of Kohlberg's model.
• Later, Kohlberg saw the final stage as the manifestation of personal integrity in reasonable discourse.
• Kohlberg speculated that a seventh stage may exist:
  (Transcendental Morality or Morality of Cosmic Orientation) (religion etc..)
Criticism from Gilligan

- Kohlberg's theory emphasizes justice to the exclusion of other values.
- As a consequence of this, it may not adequately address the arguments of people who value other moral aspects of actions.
- Gilligan argued that Kohlberg's theory is overly androcentric.
- He used only male participants. He did not adequately describe the concerns of women.
- She developed an alternative theory based on the ethics of caring.

The important value of Gilligan's theory is:
\[ \text{she ‘illustrates’ that theories on moral development do not need to solely focus on the value of justice.} \]

- (You think Gilligan is a bank teller?😊)
Social intuitionists have challenged the assumption that moral action is primarily reached by formal reasoning. They assume people often make moral judgments without weighing concerns such as fairness, law, human rights and abstract ethical values. If true, Kohlberg’s and other rationalists arguments, indicate that moral reasoning is less relevant to moral action than it seems.
Haidt (2001)

- Was based on studies of "moral dumbfounding" where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction.
- He then disagrees that reasoning gives rise to moral action. Instead, he suggests, reasoning happens post hoc--after the moral decision has been made.
- ‘brother and sister slept together’ example.
- Haidt suggests that we have unconscious, affective, moral heuristics that guide our reactions to morally charged situations and our moral behaviour, and that if we are asked to reason we do so only after we have made the decision.
Mikhail

- Proposes **how** to empirically investigate:
  - Where do our moral intuitions come from?
  - Are they innate?
  - Does the brain contain a module specialized for moral judgment?
  - Does the human genetic program contain instructions for the acquisition of a sense of justice or moral sense?
Mikhail-Theoretical Framework

• A central *empirical* question that divided the 17th and 18th century natural lawyers from their critics:
  ‘the nature and source of our intuitions of right and wrong’
• “Social norms” — explosion of interest
Mikhail-Theoretical Framework

• Existence of systematic neglect of theoretical linguistics by norms theorists.

• However:
  comparison between rules of justice and rules of grammar is a traditional and plausible analogy.

• Chomsky’s revolution in linguistics has transformed our understanding of human language and the workings of the human mind
Mikhail-Theoretical Framework

• (a) What constitutes moral knowledge?

{“A particular generative moral grammar or theory of moral competence:
    a theory of the mind/brain of a person who possesses a system of moral knowledge, or what we might refer to informally as a “sense of justice,” “moral sense,” or “conscience.”}

• Chomsky’s general answer:
    A speaker’s knowledge of language consists in her possession of a grammar. A complex system of unconscious principles.
(Chomsky, 1980:51).
More specifically:

• (b) How is moral knowledge acquired?

  “Answer is given by Universal Moral Grammar (UMG): a theory of the initial state of the human moral faculty—we provisionally assume to be a distinct subsystem of the mind/brain—along with an account of how the properties UMG postulates interact with experience to yield a mature system of moral knowledge.”

• Chomsky’s general answer:
  The system is acquired through the unfolding of a specific genetic program, under the modest triggering and shaping effects of the environment (Chomsky, 1980:31).
(c) How is moral knowledge put to use?

“Answer is given by a theory of moral performance: a theory of how moral knowledge enters into the actual representation and evaluation of human acts and institutional arrangements, as well as other forms of actual conduct.”

His general answer to the linguistic version of (c) begins by distinguishing two aspects of that problem, a production problem and a perception problem. The former is the problem of how people manage to succeed in appropriately and creatively in linguistic behavior and performance.
More general questions…

• (d) How is moral knowledge physically realized in the brain?

• (e) How did moral knowledge evolve in the species?
Mikhail-Theoretical Framework

• Since (a)-(c) are empirical questions, about which we have little scientific understanding at present, anything said about them is highly speculative.

• **Assumption** of Individuals possession of what we call a *moral grammar*: a system of largely unconscious moral principles.

• b) Tentatively hypothesizes that this grammar is acquired through the unfolding of a specific genetic program, under the modest triggering and shaping effects of the environment.

• c) A similar division between production and perception is useful as a method of clarifying the problem of how moral knowledge is put to use.

• → *The production problem* in the theory of moral performance is the problem of determining how individuals succeed in applying their moral knowledge in their actual, day-to-day conduct. (involves free will –mysterious)
Mikhail, 2000

- *Perception problem* appears more tractable.
- How moral observers are able to recognize the moral properties of the acts and institutional arrangements they encounter?

- The case of language or vision: When a person encounters or imagines a particular action, performed under a particular set of circumstances, her rule-system assigns it a structural description which in some manner specifies those properties.
Mikhail, 2000

• Makes no assumptions that we are aware of the operative principles constituting our moral knowledge…

• Hypothesizes that just as normal persons are typically unaware of the principles guiding their linguistic or visual intuitions, so too are they often unaware of the principles guiding their moral intuitions…..

• What are the properties of moral competence?…
Objection your honor 😊

“so too are they often unaware of the principles guiding their moral intuitions…..”

!Attempt to accept morality as an unconscious process –

Overruled! → (morality now is not the same as page 1 of these slides…)

Drawing of judge banging gavel. Drawing removed due to copyright restrictions.
Mikhail-experiments
143 adults and 32 children

• Investigating how adults and children reconstruct and utilize information about intentions and effects when evaluating “morally complex acts”.

• i.e. acts and omissions which are comprised of multiple intentions and which generate both good and bad effects.
Foot (1967) and Thomson (1985)

Mikhail claims these are captured by the so-called: “trolley problem” and related thought experiments:

• (a) Charlie is driving a train when the brakes fail. Ahead five people are working on the track with their backs turned. Fortunately, Charlie can switch to a side track, if he acts at once. Unfortunately, there is also someone on that track with his back turned. If Charlie switches his train to the side track, he will kill one person. If Charlie does not switch his train, he will kill five people. Is it morally permissible for Charlie to switch his train to the side track?
Related thought experiments

(b) Dr. Brown has five patients in the hospital who are dying. Each patient needs a new organ in order to survive. One patient needs a new heart. Two patients need a new kidney. And two more patients need a new lung. Dr. Brown can save all five patients if he takes a single healthy person and removes her heart, kidneys, and lungs to give to these five patients. Just such a healthy person is in Room 306. She is in the hospital for routine tests. Having seen her test results, Dr. Brown knows that she is perfectly healthy and of the right tissue compatibility. If Dr. Brown cuts up the person in Room 306 and gives her organs to the other five patients, he will save the other five patients, but kill the person in Room 306 in the process. If Dr. Brown does not cut up the person in Room 306, the other five patients will die.

Is it morally permissible for Dr. Brown to cut up the person in Room 306?
Related thought experiments

• (c) Denise is a passenger on a train whose driver has just shouted that the train’s brakes have failed, and who then fainted of the shock. On the track ahead are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a side track leading off to the right, and Denise can turn the train onto it. Unfortunately, there is one person on the right hand track. Denise can turn the train, killing the one; or she can refrain from turning the train, letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Denise to switch the train to the side track?
Related thought experiments

• (d) Nancy is taking her daily walk near the train tracks when she notices that the train that is approaching is out of control. Five men are walking across the tracks. The train is moving so fast that they will not be able to get off the track in time. Nancy is standing next to a man, whom she can throw in front of the train, thereby preventing it from killing the men. Nancy can throw the man, killing him but saving the five men; or she can refrain from doing this, letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Nancy to throw the man?
Experiment results

• When both adult and child subjects were presented with these fact patterns, they judged:
  1) Charlie’s turning the train to be permissible,
  2) Dr. Brown’s cutting up the patient to be impermissible
  3) Denise’s throwing the switch to be permissible
  4) Nancy’s throwing the man to be impermissible.

• Mikhail says:
• ’ These responses confront us with a potentially surprising contrast between’ the problems…
• what are the operative principles of moral competence that are responsible for these divergent responses?
• On the one hand experiment’s a) and c) judgments seem to ignore whether or not ‘killing’ is an action that requires intervention in order to be performed. Killing might be considered ‘passive’ observation as well. Therefore 5 killings override 1....
• On the other hand, b) and d) judgments suggest either:

1) Simply observing -while intervention is possible is considered as ‘killing’

OR

2) Moral judgment is not about whether or not intension accommodates killing but actually a matter of ‘avoiding’ a ‘heavier’ moral error than killing.
• Such a ‘heavier’ moral error, is either factual or ‘artificial’
• Artificial to be considered as a consequence of intervention with a ‘higher’ un-violated principle that is either ‘conscious’ or unconscious…(feelings..emotions etc..)
• Free Will? (subconscious) (fuzzy)
Mikhail says…

“any attempt to explain the moral intuitions elicited by examples like (above) by means of a simple stimulus-response model is doomed at the start.”

• “Instead, an intervening step between stimulus and response must be postulated: a pattern of organization of some sort that is imposed by the stimulus by the mind itself. Hence a simple perceptual model must at a minimum look: look more like:”
Perceptual model

(3b)

Input → ? → Structural description → ? → Permissible

Impermissible

Figure by MIT-OCW.
(3b) implies that, like grammaticality judgments, permissibility judgments do not necessarily depend on the surface properties of an action-description, but on more fundamental properties of how that action is mentally represented.

Further, it suggests that the problem of descriptive adequacy is divided into at least two parts:

(a) the problem of determining the nature of the computational principles operative in the exercise of moral judgment, and

(b) the problem of determining the representational structures over which those computational operations are defined.
Mikhail

• Moral intuitions generated by these examples can be most adequately explained by assuming the possession of the following moral intuitions:

• Rescue principle,
• Prohibition of intentional battery
• The first principal of practical reason
• Principle of double effect.
The rescue principle

• Familiar principle of common morality—but not the common law.
• Forbids one from failing to prevent an easily preventable death, where this can be accomplished without risking one’s own life or safety, or without violating other fundamental moral principles
Prohibition of intentional battery

• Familiar principle of both common morality and the common law
The principle of double effect

• Is a traditional moral and legal principle, according to which otherwise prohibited acts may be justified if the harm they cause is not intentional and the act’s foreseeable and intended good effects outweigh its foreseeable bad effects.
Principle of double effect

• In short, the principle appears to enter directly or indirectly into the analysis of a wide variety of legal problems, all of which are potentially controversial.

• (Pandora’s box)

• The principle is very sensitive to variations....
1+1>1 was never taught...

• An ordinary person was never taught the principle of double effect,” Harman observes, and
• “it is unclear how such a principle might have been acquired by the examples available to the ordinary person. This suggests that [it] is built into . . . Morality ahead of time” (Harman, 2000:225).
Poverty of the stimulus even in the moral domain?

- According to Mikhail’s experiments, even young children appear to utilize the rescue principle and the principle of double effect when making moral judgments.
Mikhail

- The key insight of Mikhail’s paper is that these intuitions can be adequately explained only by drawing on complex moral and legal concepts—primarily the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double effect.
- Agrees with Kohlberg’s critiques.

- Mikhail brings us in a better position to determine whether children are explicitly taught these principles or whether they may be innate.

- Results pave the way for future investigations of the nature and origin of moral knowledge.
...in the experiments

- eleven year-old boy, said:
  - “I said no because it never said that she gave permission to kill her; to give away her body parts… I did not feel good about it because I would not like somebody to take my body parts.”

→ The principle: ‘You shall treat others as you expect to be treated’

→ seems higher on the moral scale than other principles’ (ie double effect).
  (has the capacity to ‘override’ certain principles)
Greene: An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment

• The authors’ central thesis is that
• “the crucial difference between the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter’s tendency to engage people’s emotions in a way that the former does not. The thought of pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences, and it is this emotional response that accounts for people’s tendency to treat these cases differently”
Greene: An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment

• Mikhail says:
  • “However, the authors’ conclusion that the moral judgments they examine are caused by differences in emotional engagement strikes us as premature.
  • They have given insufficient consideration to the competing hypothesis that their moral dilemmas elicit mental representations which differ in their structural properties.
  • Put simply, a computational theory of moral cognition has been ruled out too soon.”
Open questions

• Can moral judgment behavior and intuition be considered innate and if yes, how much or in what sense?? (Chomsky approach etc..)
• This translates to:
  • Can a part of set of (ethical code) instructions or a generative frame of instructions be innate?
• Is there any structure in a set of moral commands, that will span any possible ethics code?
  If yes the ‘computational cognitive’ problem could be the following:
  Whether or not a set of universal constraints/instructions exists regardless what the actual ethics code is. And if it exists is it build-in the brain/DNA or is it built?

ie: Or it can be created in the brain as a consequence of collection of experiences/learning?
• Possibility of morality being strictly non-innate but only a part of learning still open…

• Finding possible areas in the brain that can be assigned and be considered responsible for moral judgement, could be easily reduced to usual basic problems in the field that are still unsolved…
MAIN QUESTION: IS THERE ANY STRUCTURE THERE ABOUT MORALITY?

-- that will allow us to infer and span certain ethics codes without actually using any constraints from already given axioms or codes? or emotional inputs etc?

→ How do we realize this problem?
→ possible plan of attack:
  • Two questions shall be asked and try to be answered:
    1) about structure and
    2) about axiom permissibility
  • Ie proof that morals are necessary, then address issue of innatism,
  • If possible, independently of the companion of the effort for the designation of laws.
questions:

• Deep question here: what kind of momentum makes us override any ethics code existent? (during war times) or during (sexual search—passion etc…).

• 2 types are obvious: ‘sexual momentum’ and ‘distribution of death’ momentum… (during war times, crimes, etc)

• Identifying these types in a formal manner, might help in the understanding of the nature of any possible area in the brain were that code (morals) could exist.

• Trying to classify moral construction elements (such as ethical dilemmas), the same way we do with the ‘illusions’ is a fascinating idea, however it is not widely accepted that the nature of moral elements are purely unconscious processes such as with the visual system…
Trolleys..

• Dillema’s such as the trolley’s have certain ‘local’ solutions for personal benefit and satisfaction.

• The question on whether always general solutions will exist is open.

• I.e.: For the example of trolley dilemmas there are ‘logical’ solutions that can be realized more intensively when we perform sensitivity analysis on the numbers.

• ( contrast 5 -1 people with 200-1) and you have your answer…

• the more repetitive-(less rare) is the problem/question the more annoying it becomes if something is wrong with it.
Property of order exists in a moral set

• It is obvious that moral values can override each other (principle of double effect etc..)
• Therefore there is order of importance in any set of moral rules.
• This is extremely useful information as a property of the set can be used to find more ‘structure’ and determine what is innate.
Make it a habit…then study it

• Then…Is moral behavior (or the seek for morality) a subset of a set of habit rules?/habituations? Or vice versa?....

• If yes, habituation will be easier or not depending on the nature of the rules. This is an opportunity to look for moral ‘areas’ near the habituation areas…in the brain.
Morals as a model

• The model has to reflect reality for most of the mass.
• Since models are imperfect in a deterministic way, exceptions may not be avoided and these will be judged more analytically. As a function of all the utilities + morals + sentiment etc.–
• The inverse does NOT seem to be true…
Axiomatic approach

• axiom permissibility
• how do you feel/think a machine shall be programmed as opposed to a human for the same problem?
• emotions input.
Vision analogy

• Would it be right to steal the drug? -→ order of moral importance.  
  First things first…
• Maybe there is local solution but not global for an exception 
  problem.
• HOW do we realize a problem like that?
• ----> by trying to compare it with another "parallel" problem...
• like for example in our vision system...
• If we had seen before a square ( like the Vision field approach..) and 
  we see parallelogram is ok 
• but if we never show a square, then a parallelogram looks strange or 
  unrecognized..
• so the prior recognition of the square plays a huge role on the 
  realization of parallelogram
• if no parallel then new type of problem...but have to prove that there 
  is no parallel...
General observation…

- Morals consist of a set of rules for ‘good’.
- These rules appear in our society through religion and justice systems (state tools).
- They used to be behavioral rules pointing to perfection and it seems they have evolved to some very implicit and fuzzy principles or functions taking as input sentimental and other utilitarian processes and mapping back a behavior…