

14.123 Microeconomics III—Problem Set 1

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Instructions. You are encouraged to work in groups, but everybody must write their own solutions. Each question is 25 points. Good Luck!

- Consider a monopolist with n buyers. At each date $t = 1, \dots, n$, simultaneously, monopolist chooses quality $q \in \{H, L\}$ and the buyer t decides whether to buy (choosing $b \in \{B, N\}$). The stage payoffs are as in the following table

	B	N
H	$2 - c, 1$	$-c, 0$
L	$2, -1$	$0, 0$

where $c \in \{-1, 1\}$ is the cost of producing a high quality product, privately known by the monopolist. The ex-ante probability of $c = 1$ is $1 - \varepsilon$ for some $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2)$; the cost is the same at all dates, and all the previous moves are publicly observable. Find a sequential equilibrium. For any n , find the largest ε under which monopolist chooses high quality in the first date regardless of his cost.

- Let P be the set of lotteries over $\{a, b, c\} \times \{L, M, R\}$. In which of the following pairs of games the players' preferences over P are the same?

(a)

	L	M	R		L	M	R	
a	$2, -2$	$1, 1$	$-3, 7$		a	$6, -1$	$4, 0$	$-4, 2$
b	$1, 10$	$0, 4$	$0, 4$		b	$4, 3$	$2, 1$	$2, 1$
c	$-2, 1$	$1, 7$	$-1, -5$		c	$-2, 0$	$4, 2$	$0, -2$

(b)

	L	M	R		L	M	R	
a	$1, 2$	$7, 0$	$4, -1$		a	$1, 5$	$7, 1$	$4, -1$
b	$6, 1$	$2, 2$	$8, 4$		b	$6, 3$	$2, 4$	$8, 8$
c	$3, -1$	$9, 2$	$5, 0$		c	$3, -1$	$9, 5$	$5, 1$

- Consider the set of lotteries (p_x, p_y, p_z) on the set of outcomes $\{x, y, z\}$ where $p_x, p_y,$ and p_z are the probabilities of $x, y,$ and $z,$ respectively.

(a) For each (partial) preference below, determine whether it is consistent with expected utility maximization. (If yes, find a utility function; if so, show that it cannot come from an expected utility maximizer.)

- $(1/4, 1/4, 1/2) \sim (3/4, 0, 1/4) \succ (1/4, 1/2, 1/4) \succ (3/4, 1/4, 0)$
- $(1/4, 1/4, 1/2) \succ (3/4, 0, 1/4) \succ (5/6, 1/6, 0) \succ (1/2, 1/3, 1/6)$

(b) Find a complete and transitive preference relation on the above lotteries that satisfies the independence axiom but cannot have an expected utility representation.

- (c) Find a complete, continuous, and transitive preference on the above lotteries such that
- whenever there is an indifference between (p_x, p_y, p_z) and (q_x, q_y, q_z) , there is an indifference between (p_x, p_y, p_z) and $\alpha (p_x, p_y, p_z) + (1 - \alpha) (q_x, q_y, q_z)$ for every $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, and yet
 - the preference relation does not have an expected utility representation.

4. Exercise 9 in Chapter 5 of the Lecture Notes.

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