#### Outline

- What is Cap-and-Trade?
- Some History and Pictures
- Allocation, Allowance Value, and Electric Power Regulation



#### **The Allocation Problem**

- Cap creates a scarcity rent embodied in allowances. Who should receive it?
- Prior Use Claims—incumbent emitters
  - Also, compensation and political uses
- Public Use Claims—the government
  - Expenditures or tax/debt reduction
- Cap-and-Dividend—Per capita to households
- Always recycled. Issue is how & to whom?



## Free Allocation vs. Auctioning

- The usual dichotomy in allocation debate
  - Allowance value to gov't or corporations
  - Auctioning often coupled with "double dividend"
- But ignores who is the ultimate recipient
  - Both govt and corp are legal shells
  - Quite different distributional outcomes
- US debate now focused on ultimate recipients



### **Cost Implications**

- Free allocation raises **opportunity cost** issue
  - Typically fixed and historical; independent of current emissions or production
  - Allowance use incurs an opportunity cost
  - Do emitters recognize opportunity cost?
- Straight-forward with auctioning/purchase
  - Pay as for any other input into production



# Interaction with Electric Power Regulation

- Liberalized power markets marginal cost pricing
  - Allowance cost incorporated into price
  - Free allocation over-compensates assuming opportunity cost is recognized and passed on
- Cost-regulated markets average cost pricing
  - Only incurred costs are included
  - Free allocation reduces consumer price effect



### Summary

- A known, tested, and tried concept
  - Creates a price on emissions and reduces emissions with few other side effects
- A highly desirable form of environmental regulation
  - Radically different from conventional "command-and-control"
  - Object is to reduce and limit emissions <u>only</u>
  - Trading is means for least-cost compliance,
  - Profit is by-product, not the object of trading



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