Consequentialism and Famine

I. Duty to Prevent Suffering

We have seen that one of the major approaches to ethics is consequentialism. Consequentialism, generally, evaluates the rightness or wrongness of an action by considering its consequences. Utilitarianism is one version of consequentialism that focuses on the consequences of an action for well-being, and requires that we maximize it. We briefly considered Mill's version of utilitarianism, called Eudaimonistic Utilitarianism, characterized by what he calls "the greatest-happiness principle":

You ought always to act so as to maximize happiness, i.e., the right act is the act that results in the greatest amount of happiness overall.

Other forms of consequentialism vary in the kind of consequences they consider relevant, and the kind of requirement. A template might look like this:

You ought always to act so as to [fill in requirement here] [fill in kind of consequence here].

For example, another consequentialist principle might look like this:

You ought always to act so as to relieve suffering.

We have considered some problems with utilitarianism, but consequentialism does seem to capture some basic elements of moral thinking, e.g., that moral thinking ought to be impartial in how it regards each person's well-being. Drawing on these insights Peter Singer argues that our obligations to those who suffer are much greater than what we might have thought.

Note that Singer is not aiming to defend consequentialism. His point is to draw on consequentialist insights about morality to raise deep challenges to our ordinary moral beliefs; in particular, he's concerned to show that the line we draw between DUTY and CHARITY is misplaced. Here's the argument:

1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are very bad.

2. PREVENT SUFFERING PRINCIPLE (PSP): If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
   • This principle doesn't require that we promote happiness; it simply requires that we prevent bad. It also allows that we only have to act if nothing comparably important is at stake.
   • For the principle to avoid collapsing into a maximizing requirement, we have to introduce the notion of a baseline (otherwise, if things are bad simply by being less than optimal, then we'd be required to do everything the maximizing principle requires).

3. The things we'd have to give up in order to make large contributions of money, time, and/or energy to famine relief, are less important (morally speaking) than life, food, shelter, or medical care.

4. So we ought to make large contributions of money, time, and/or energy to famine relief.

Further notes:
• What we ought to do is not affected by the proximity or distance of those we're aiming to affect. It may be psychologically difficult to identify with others far away, and so difficult to care about them, but that's compatible with its being a moral requirement that I act with their welfare in mind.
• What we ought to do doesn't depend on whether I alone or millions of us could equally well help out. One might feel less guilty if others are also shirking--but why should this matter morally? Am I less obligated to save the drowning child if others are also watching?

But is the Prevent Suffering Principle plausible? It would seem to require that we make contributions that would reduce ourselves (and dependents?) to the level of marginal utility--i.e., that level at which, by giving more, I'd be worse off than those I'm aiming to help. This clearly contradicts our ordinary judgments, so would require very
strong backing—which Singer doesn't try to offer. Instead he suggests a weaker principle that seems extremely plausible. Here are the revised premises:

**2*. MODIFIED PREVENT SUFFERING PRINCIPLE (MPSP: weaker/moderate version):** If it is our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, then we ought, morally, to do it.

- Example: saving a drowning child only at the cost of ruining one’s new shoes.

**3*. The things we'd have to give up in order to make large contributions of money, time, and/or energy to famine relief, are not morally significant.

**4 (same as before). So we ought to make large contributions of money, time, and/or energy to famine relief.**

**Questions for Singer:**

- Singer relies heavily on an analogy with refusing to sacrifice one’s new shoes to save a drowning child. Is this analogy apt? How is this case different from giving to famine relief? What can we learn from the differences?

- How should we determine the moral significance of something? Are my shoes morally significant if they bring me happiness? If they help me to get a good job that supports my family?

**II. Duty and Charity**

The move from the strong to the weak version helps, but it puts added pressure on premise (3*)--are the sacrifices we'd have to make morally insignificant? We tend to distinguish DUTY from CHARITY--what we give to relief organizations here or abroad is morally optional--we're good to do it, but we don't really have to. If we recognized that aid and assistance to relieve suffering is not morally optional, then our lives would look very different.

But why should we think that our "luxuries" aren't morally significant? If happiness is morally significant, and “luxuries” bring us happiness, why aren't they morally significant? What marks the line between the morally significant and the morally insignificant? Singer seems to think that the only thing that matters morally is suffering and relief from it – as long as you've reached the baseline for a reasonable life, anything more is morally irrelevant. Is this plausible? It might seem that a life for everyone at the baseline might be a pretty gloomy existence, but is this true? What does the research in empirical psychology tell us? Singer would certainly ask us to look at the alternative: some people suffer and die when they could be helped, while others luxuriate in their riches? Is this a morally acceptable situation?

**III. Lifeboat Ethics**

It might be tempting to respond to Singer that the affluent have a right to what they have earned and what they have purchased with what they have earned. And no one has a right to demand it be given to them. Let’s grant this for the sake of argument. The problem is that Singer is not arguing that those dying of starvation have a right to be given aid (though some others would argue for that). Rather, he is arguing that even if we have a right to our wealth, we are doing something morally wrong by holding onto it and not using it to help those who are suffering and dying for lack of food, water and medical care.

Garrett Hardin offers an argument against aid in consequentialist terms. In fact, he claims that not only do we have no moral obligation to give relief aid to poor countries, but we are morally obliged not to provide aid. He relies on an analogy with a lifeboat. Do those on a lifeboat have an obligation to bring aboard all others who are drowning? Hardin says “No.” The right action is to bring aboard only that number compatible with the safety of those on board, for any other action would be to bring about, or at least risk, disaster. He then argues that we shouldn’t help feed the starving in poor countries because given the patterns of population growth and limitations on resources, like overloading the lifeboat, this will only result in worse consequences down the road.

**Questions for Hardin:**

- Are we currently in a lifeboat situation? Are rich countries at their “carrying capacity”?

- Does it matter if the lifeboat (wealth) was obtained unjustly or immorally?
• Who is responsible for the famine? If we [those in the First World] are responsible for inequity in the
distribution of resources, should they [those in the Third World] suffer for it?
• Is population growth in poor countries the primary cause of famine? Is it plausible that aid to poor countries
causes population growth? How does adequate food, education and health care affect population growth?
• Is it really better to avoid the risk of a slightly worse disaster [the lifeboat capsizing] by allowing a certain
disaster [all those in the sea to drown]?
• Suppose we grant that, in the future, more will die of starvation if we give to famine relief now than will die if
we withhold aid. What are we to make of all the additional years lived and people born between now and
then? Many lives will be lost, but many will also be gained.