behaviorism
propositions

false : true

might have been true

possible

contingent

necessary

might have been false

impossible
1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition $p$ to be true, then $p$ is possible. (‘[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it’ (p. 16))

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that I am not my body (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am not my body), therefore:

C. I am not my body
we live in the best of all possible worlds

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)
possible worlds are ‘complete stories’—maximal ways the world might have been

a proposition is **necessary** iff it is true at every possible world

a proposition is **possible** iff it is true at some possible world
there might have been a talking donkey

there is a possible world in which there is a talking donkey
1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition $p$ to be true, then $p$ is possible. (‘[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it’ (p. 16))

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that I am not my body (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am not my body), therefore:

C. I am not my body

??? - we will return to this step
Kripke's objection → argument D → behaviorism → the identity theory
philosophical toolkit: metaphysics and epistemology

‘metaphysics’/metaphysical’
what there is (the ‘furniture of the universe’)
‘epistemology’/‘epistemological’
how/whether we have knowledge or justified belief
two problems for dualism

1. mental causation
   a metaphorical problem

2. how do I know that you have a mind?
   an epistemological problem
why not reject this nonsense and go for the simplest theory?

the mind isn’t some spooky unknowable cause of behavior

it is behavior (more-or-less)

behaviorism in psychology (Watson, Skinner) and behaviorism in philosophy followed parallel tracks, and they ran into sand at about the same time (late 50s, early 60s)*

*the classic critique of psychological behaviorism is Chomsky, review of Skinner’s *Verbal Behavior* (1959), in readings
the measure of a man

Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Two characters from Star Trek: The Next Generation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Measure_of_a_Man_ (Star_Trek:_The_Next_Generation)
reading for next session

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