a bit more on Valberg
and then: perception, consciousness, and intentionality
Heidegger’s (?) ‘solution’

reject the causal picture of experience: ‘there is one thing our scientific study of ourselves cannot (legitimately) include, viz. our experience—that from ‘within’ which we are faced by the world, the object of our scientific studies.’

but, Valberg says: ‘I cannot persuade myself that it is illegitimate to extend the concept of causation to how things are within my experience...Here, as I see it, is where all the argument comes to rest.’
presumably (!), the faulty half of the antimony is the first, where we conclude:

C. no external object is an object of experience

but we haven’t explained what is wrong with the argument for (C)

a question for discussion:

are the first half of the antinomy and the argument from illusion basically the same argument, differently presented?
‘half way through the last five seconds
God...eliminated the book but maintained the activity in my brain just as it was when the book was there’

class question: what’s the difference between this example and an everyday case of looking at a (now non-existent) star?
seeing stars compared with Valberg’s example

you do not see the book when God intervenes (the book does not cause light to enter your eye, etc.)

but the star does cause light to enter your eye, etc. (so there is no obvious reason to deny that you see it)

brain state caused by the (now non-existent) star

brain state caused by God, not the book
‘Visual qualia and visual content’

‘Experiences vary widely’

In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character

Images removed due to copyright restrictions. Pictures of sandpaper, a skunk, a hand, a purple square, and an angry man.

‘In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character’
**Qualia and Qualia**

**Qualia** are ‘the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it’s like to have them’

‘in this standard, broad sense of the term, it is hard to deny that there are qualia’

**Qualia** are the introspectively accessible nonrepresentational properties of experiences that characterize what it’s like to have them

**Qualia** ‘are a philosophical myth’
perceptual (in particular, visual) experiences have representational properties (e.g. the property of representing the perceiver’s environment as containing a blue cube)

so visual experiences have intentionality
visual experiences also have qualia
they have Qualia just in case:

two visual experiences can be alike in representational properties but differ in qualia

but: ‘I know of no such counterexample’
more Tye, and then Nagel

Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Batman.