'The father of Charles II was executed' becomes

(i) Someone fathered Charles II  \[\exists x \, Fx \land\]
(ii) At most one person fathered Charles II  \[\forall y \, \forall z \, (Fy \land Fz \supset y = z) \land\]
(iii) Everyone who fathered Charles II was executed  \[\forall y \, (Fy \supset Ey)\]

Simplifying a little, 'The F is G' is analyzed as  \[\exists x \, (Fx \land \forall y \, (Fy \supset y=x) \land Gx)\].
Simplifying some more,  \[\exists x \, (\forall y \, (Fy = y=x) \land Gx)\]
Even more:  \[\exists x \, (F!x \land Gy)\]

This appears to solve Frege's four problems: \textit{Informativeness of Identity, Meaningful Empty Terms, Non-Existence Claims, and Attitude Attributions}.

At least, it solves them when they are construed as problems about \textit{definite descriptions}. But Frege raises them as problems for \textit{names}. What's the relevance, then?

Russell's "Name Claim": Names are almost all definite descriptions in disguise. 'Pegasus' is just an abbreviation of 'the winged horse that did so and so.'

Two kinds of criticism.
(1) Definite descriptions don't work the way Russell thinks. (Peter Strawson, Keith Donnellan.)
(2) Russell is wrong about names' being definite descriptions in disguise. (Ruth Marcus, Saul Kripke)

Objections to Russell's Theory of Descriptions.

\textbf{Uniqueness}. 'The F is G' does not require for its truth that there be at most one F.
'The book is on the table,' 'The square root of 9 is odd,' 'A dog walked in; the dog barked.'....

\textbf{Existence}. 'The F is G' doesn't say there is at least one F; it isn't false if no Fs exist.
'The Mayor of Idaho is forgetful,' 'The largest prime number is over ten,'...

\textbf{Descriptiveness}. 'The F is G' doesn't require that the so-called F really be an F; that's often irrelevant.
'The King is in the counting house,' 'The man with the martini is a philosopher,'...

How could Russell respond?

\textbf{Uniqueness}
1) Maybe 'The F is G' is short for 'The FH is G' and at most one thing is FH.
2) Maybe 'the F' stands for the F that is currently most salient.
3) Quantifier restriction; maybe it stands for the one F in the current domain of discourse.

\textbf{Existence}
1) Sometimes it does too seem false in the absence of an F. 'The King of France owes me $5.'
2) The intuition of gappiness may just reflect that 'The F is G' is false for the wrong kind of reason.

\textbf{Descriptiveness}
1) 'The martini man is a philosopher' is false; the speaker \textit{said} something true with it.
2) Maybe 'the F' in context is short for 'the one assumed to be F.'
Russell's Name Claim: 'n' means 'the F'. Objections.

1. **No known F**
   Oftentimes we don't know enough about \( n \) to formulate a denoting description. 'Feynman' is a famous physicist. 'Anaximander' was a Greek philosopher.....

2. **No shared F**
   I may associate a different description with \( n \) than you do. I think of Twain as the author of *Huck Finn* and you think of him as the author of *Tom Sawyer*. If I say 'Twain was honest' and you say 'Twain was dishonest,' we aren't necessarily disagreeing!

---

| Epistemically necessary = knowable a priori. |
| Metaphysically necessary = true in every possible world. |

'This animal is a dog' is metaphysically necessary but epistemically contingent. 'Jack the Ripper if he exists is a murderer' is epistemically necessary, metaphysically contingent.

1. **F not metaphysically necessary**
   'It could have happened that Twain was an illiterate tramp.' True. 'It could have happened that the author of such and such books was an illiterate tramp.' False.

2. **F not metaphysically sufficient**
   'Necessarily Bertrand Russell descended from Lord John Russell.' True. 'Necessarily the most famous 20th Century British philosopher descended from Lord Russell.' False.

3. **F not epistemically necessary**
   Say 'Godel' means *the man who proved that arithmetic is incomplete.* 'The man who proved arithmetic was incomplete was a mathematician' is known a priori. 'Godel was a mathematician' is not; it's something you learn empirically.

4. **F not epistemically sufficient**
   Suppose it turns out that the man known as Godel in fact stole the proof from Schmidt. Does that mean 'Godel' really refers to Schmidt?

Replies. To 1. The description gets wide scope. Or, it's 'the actual author of such and such books.'
To 2. Same. 'As for the most famous philosopher, he is necessarily descended from Lord Russell.'
To 3. You've chosen the wrong description. Maybe it's 'the guy originally dubbed 'Godel'.'
To 4. Same. It's not a priori that the guy originally dubbed 'Godel' was a mathematician.