Russellians think names “mean” their referents. This generates two big problems. One is to do with existence: why aren’t empty names meaningless? Another is to do with identity: why do coreferential names seem not to be substitutable salva veritate in, e.g. attitude contexts?

Crimmins and Perry offer a straight solution in which the truth-value really does change. But their solution is special to attitude contexts. Saul observes that coreferential substitutions also seem to change truth-value in simple contexts: *Superman catches more criminals than Clark Kent*. The appearance of truth-value shift in simple sentences is misleading; we confuse implicated content with literal semantic content. Why not extend this to the attitude attributions we started with?

Salmon defends just such a pragmatic account. One argument is that *Hammurabi thinks Phosphorus is visible in the morning* seems to imply \( \exists x (x = \text{Phosphorus} \land \text{Hammurabi thinks } x \text{ is visible in the morning}) \). Not clear there’s a real difference here. The second attributes a de re belief concerning Venus. Arguably, then, that’s all the first attributes—in which case the referent is all that matters.

What about substitutivity failures? He uses Kripke strategy: if a phenomenon arises even in a language *stipulated* to be Russellian, then that phenomenon can’t show Russellianism is wrong.

Imagine ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are introduced as pure names of *this* (evening) and *that* (morning). Faced with a choice of which to use in attributing a belief to Hammurabi, it would be perverse to use the one not corresponding to his speech dispositions and/or ways of thinking of the common referent. This creates an implicature that (i) Hammurabi would accept (a translation of) ‘Hesperus is visible in the evening,’ or perhaps (ii) he hespeciously believes Venus to be then visible. Compare: Mary thinks *London* is pretty, Marie thinks *Londres* is pretty.

Braun: Hang on. Speakers do not implicate that BLAH in uttering S unless they mean to communicate BLAH in uttering S. I can make the relevant attributions to Hammurabi (i) without supposing he would accept any sentences of the given type, and (ii) without having the slightest communicative intent vis a vis mental representations of Venus. Who’s to say his language contains a name of Venus at all, much less one that leans towards the evening appearances? Who’s to say we’ve even heard of mental representations?

The pragmatic or implicature explanation assumes too much. Turn now to Braun’s *psychological* explanation of apparent reference failure. Braun accepts that

(A) Hammurabi believed Hesperus was visible in the evening, and
(B) Hammurabi believed Phosphorus was visible in the evening

express the same proposition. How to explain our preference for (A)? No need to say they differ in what they pragmatically convey. Compare, Hammurabi prefers (a) ‘Hesperus is visible in the evening’ to (b) ‘Phosphorus is visible in the evening.’ This is not because he takes them to say the same, but prefers the message (a) sends. It’s because misses that the two propositions are identical. Similarly perhaps we prefer (A) only because we don’t realize it expresses the same proposition as (B)! There are two ways of grasping the proposition; we accept it grasped one way and reject it grasped the other.

And yet... don’t we still find (A) more plausible even if we realize full well that it expresses the same proposition as (B) (section 7)? Surely if I know H = P, that’s enough to tell me that (A) says what (B) does? Braun’s response unclear. Perhaps it’s that she could have (A) and ¬(B) in her belief box even if she knows something given which (B) follows from (A), because the evidence she possesses for (A) and ¬(B) blind her to the fact that (B) follows from (A). It’s not irrational to have beliefs that are inconsistent according to a true semantic theory, unless one is convincingly the true theory.