24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience

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plan

• course overview
• some background
• martin, transparency
the argument from illusion/hallucination

• the good case: one sees a lemon, it looks and is yellow, etc. etc.
• the i-bad case: the lemon before one’s eyes isn’t yellow
• the h-bad case: there’s no lemon; in fact, you aren’t seeing any material object
• in some intuitive sense, the bad cases are “from the inside” exactly like the good case
1. in the bad case, one sees a yellow object
2. that object is “immaterial”
3. if one sees an immaterial yellow object in the bad case, one also sees such an object in the good case
4. if one sees an immaterial yellow object in the good case, one does not see the lemon in the good case, hence:
5. one does not see the lemon in the good case—contradiction
idealism: accept premise 1, but

- point out that the fourth premise is only plausible if the lemon is not "immaterial"
- and claim that the lemon is immaterial
“indirect” realism: accept premise 1, but

• claim that one may see objects “directly” or “indirectly”

• and, further, that in the good case one directly sees the immaterial whatnot and indirectly sees the material lemon
1. In the bad case, one sees a yellow object.
2. That object is "immaterial."
3. If one sees an immaterial yellow object in the bad case, one also sees such an object in the good case.
4. If one sees an immaterial yellow object in the good case, one does not see the lemon in the good case, hence:
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suppose the first premise is false…

• what’s going on in the bad case?
• a two-part worry:
  • whatever mental state one is in the bad case, one is also in that state in the good case, and
  • this “common element” rains on the good case’s parade
    • perhaps preventing the lemon from being “present to the mind” (in some elusive sense to be explained)
when an object is experienced in perception, it is experienced as ‘there’, ‘given’ or ‘present to the mind’ in a way in which it is not in belief, thought and many other mental states and events. Perception seems to involve a particular kind of ‘presence to the mind’. This ‘presence’ goes beyond the mere fact that the objects of perception must exist in order for a perceptual state to be veridical. For the objects of knowledge must exist too, but states of knowledge do not, as such, have presence in the same way as perceptual states—except, of course, in the case when one knows something is there by perceiving it. (Crane, the problem of perception)
common element views

• “Cartesianism”: the good case and the bad cases are mentally exactly the same
• abstract intentionalism: the representational content of experience is not object-involving
  • related are Johnston’s “sensible profiles” (‘the obscure object of hallucination’), although this is not supposed to be a representational view
• AI need not be version of Cartesianism
disjunctivism

- there is no such common element
- Martin: the bad cases (specifically the h-bad case) have the “negative epistemological” property of being not knowably different from the good case, and there’s not much more to say
the fundamental issue

• perceiving the lemon is very different from thinking of it
  • perhaps: perceiving makes the lemon “present to the mind”
• what is that difference, exactly?
• and what constraints does it impose on a theory of perception?