1: Knowledge
(a) We primarily want to understand self-*knowledge*.
(b) No, the focus should be different. Perhaps: the (apparent) security of avowals. We shouldn’t assume that (e.g.) one can *know* that one is in pain, at least at the outset.
(c) Not as dramatic as (b): *justification* is a broader and more tractable category than knowledge.

2: Self-knowledge
The category of self-knowledge is best understood as:
(a) restricted to knowledge of one’s current mental states, including externalistic states like knowing and seeing.
(b) restricted to knowledge of one’s current mental states, internalistically construed (so excluding knowing and seeing).
(c) including knowledge of one’s current actions.
(d) unrestricted, or less restricted than the above.

3: Philosophy
(a) The philosophy of self-knowledge is a distinctively *philosophical* enquiry (whatever that is, exactly). Although psychology may be helpful, we cannot expect the psychologists to solve our problems.
(b) The “philosophical” approach to the subject is scarcely worth distinguishing from the psychological one. We’re all in this together!

4: Privileged access
(a) *Some* exciting version of an infallibility/self-intimation claim is correct.
(b) No exciting version is correct.

5: Independence
Adam and Eve are rational adult humans with normal conceptual and linguistic capacities. Both believe it’s raining. Adam knows that he believes that it’s raining. Eve doesn’t know she believes that it’s raining, and doesn’t even have an opinion, because the issue never came up, or she’s thinking about other things, or something along those lines. This story is:
(a) possible.
(b) impossible.

The answer to the parallel question for other mental states is:
(c) the same.
6: **Unification**

   (a) Basically the same account of self-knowledge applies across the board—to beliefs, sensations, intentions, emotions, perceptions, etc.
   
   (b) No, self-knowledge is disunified.

7: **Pluralism**

   (a) There are a number of significant sources of self-knowledge (e.g. inference from self-observation, inner-sense, transparency-style methods,…)
   
   (b) There’s only one significant source.

8: **Detectivism**

   (a) The process whereby we gain self-knowledge involves broadly causal mechanisms, involving the fact that we are in such-and-such mental state as part of the causal chain.
   
   (b) We do *find out* about our mental states (i.e. 5.(a)) but the process isn’t causal.
   
   (c) There’s no *finding out* (i.e. 5.(b)).

9: **Language and rationality**

   Self-knowledge of belief requires:
   
   (a) language.
   
   (b) rationality (roughly: the capacity to *reason*).
   
   (c) both.
   
   (d) neither.

   The answer to the parallel question for other mental states is:
   
   (e) the same.
   
   (f) different.

10: **Reasons**

   Consider some belief for which you cannot recall any reasons, e.g. that Taft was born in Ohio.
   
   (a) You can know you have that belief in the standard way, whatever that is. (Or ways, if there are more than one.)
   
   (b) You can’t.

11: **Animal minds**

   (a) Non-human primates (e.g. chimps) have a similar complement of mental states to us: in particular, they believe, know, desire, and intend.
(b) Up to a point, Lord Copper. Better to say that our believings and their believings are different species of a common genus, belief.
(c) The brutes may feel, but they do not believe.

**12: Animal self-knowledge**
Non-human primates lack self-knowledge (at any rate, this is a live possibility).

(a) Yes.
(b) No.

**13: Inference**
(a) The acquisition of self-knowledge centrally involves reasoning from premises, and so inference.
(b) No it doesn’t.

**14: Transparency**
Evans’s observation about transparency:

(a) is important, but of fairly limited scope (e.g. maybe it doesn’t apply to sensations).
(b) is the key to all self-knowledge.
(c) set back the study of self-knowledge by fifty years.

**15: Belief and transparency**
For those who think Evans had a point about belief:

(a) the transparency method or procedure, whatever it is, involves some kind of transition from believing p to believing that one believes p. One starts off in the first state and ends up (also) in the second state.
(b) It involves no transition at all.
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