

# Cryptocurrency Engineering and Design

MAS.S62

2/7/2018 Lecture 1

# Introduction

- Who we are
  - Neha Narula
  - Tadge Dryja
  - James Lovejoy (TA)
- Digital Currency Initiative
- Course
  - Lectures (20%)
  - Labs (40%)
  - Final project (40%)

# Cryptocurrency Engineering and Design

- What is a cryptocurrency?
- How is it different than a regular currency?
- What does it mean to build one?

# What we are not going to do

- How to ICO
- Trading advice
- Permissioned blockchains

# Origins of Money




## SECURITY DEPOSIT RECEIPT

Owner/Lessor: \_\_\_\_\_  
Renter/Lessee: \_\_\_\_\_  
Property Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
Security Deposit Amount: \_\_\_\_\_  
Received From: \_\_\_\_\_  
Name/Address of financial institution where funds will be held: \_\_\_\_\_

Images of sheep, grains, various ancient and modern currencies © unknown. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see <https://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse>.

# Traditional payments



# Traditional payments



|            |
|------------|
| Alice: \$5 |
| Bob: \$5   |
|            |



Alice




Bob, I sent you \$5!



Bob

# Traditional payments





# Traditional payments



Alice: \$5

Bob: \$5



Alice



Bob



# Pros/cons of banks

## Pros

- Digital payments

## Cons

- Not peer-to-peer (bank must be online during every transaction)
- Bank can fail
- Bank can delay or censor transactions
- Privacy

# The bank can fail



|             |
|-------------|
| Alice: \$10 |
| Bob: \$0    |
|             |




Alice




Bob

# The bank can delay or censor




# E-cash



# E-cash



# E-cash




Alice



Bob

# E-cash




Alice




Bob



# E-cash



# E-cash



# Pros/cons of simple e-cash

## Pros

- Digital payments
- Peer-to-peer


## Cons

- Bank needs to be online to verify
- Bank can fail
- Bank can delay or censor transactions
- Privacy


# Chaumian e-cash

- Alice can choose SN
- Alice “blinds” her message to the bank so bank can’t see SN
- When Bob redeems, bank doesn’t know payment came from Alice


# Chaumian e-cash



# Chaumian e-cash



# Chaumian e-cash



Alice




$\text{Sig}(\text{SN}), \text{SN}$




Bob

# Chaumian e-cash





# Chaumian e-cash



# Double spend detection



# Pros/cons of Chaumian e-cash


## Pros

- Digital payments
- Peer-to-peer
- Privacy
- Offline double-spend detection

## Cons

- Bank can censor withdrawals and deposits

# How to build decentralized digital token transfer?



# mas.s62

# lecture 1

2018-02-07

Neha Narula & Tadge Dryja

# Primitives for making a cryptocurrency

Hash functions

Signatures

# Hash functions

Simple, right? But powerful.

hash(data) -> output

data can be any size; output is  
fixed size

# Hash functions

Important. You can do everything\*  
with just hash functions.

\*can't do some fun stuff with keys

(Key exchange, signature aggregation, etc)



# Hash functions

Any size input, fixed output.. output is “random” looking

What’s that mean? Deterministic, no randomness

But the outputs look like noise; half the bits are 1s, half are 0s

# Hash functions

Somewhat more well defined -

“Avalanche effect”: change 1 bit of the input, about half the output bits should change

# Hash functions

Well defined: what it shouldn't do

preimage resistance

(2nd preimage resistance)

collision resistance

preimage resistance

given  $y$ , you can't find any  $x$  such  
that  $\text{hash}(x) == y$

(you can find it eventually, but  
that will take  $2^{256}$  operations ( $10^{78}$ ))

## 2nd preimage resistance

given  $x$ ,  $y$ , such that  $\text{hash}(x) == y$ ,  
you can't find  $x'$  where

$x' \neq x$

and  $\text{hash}(x') == y$

(this one is a bit of a mess so lets  
leave it at that)

collision resistance

nobody can find any  $x, z$  such that

$x \neq z$

$\text{hash}(x) == \text{hash}(z)$

(again, you can find them eventually. And in this case, not  $2^{256}$ )

# resistances

Practically speaking, collision resistance is “harder”;

collision resistance is broken while preimage resistance remains

Examples: sha-1, md5

**usages**

**hashes are names**

**hashes are references**

**hashes are pointers**

**hashes are commitments**



# Commit reveal

Commit to something secret by  
publishing a hash

Reveal the preimage later.

Example: `a1c089bf65e852cf2ba2010d2ba84e2025ec937b5f8b9dac682c35dcf498aef4`

# Commit reveal

a1c089bf65e852cf2ba2010d2ba84e2025ec937b5f8b9dac682c35dcf498aef4

Reveal:

I think it won't snow Wednesday! d79fe819

```
$ echo "I think it won't snow Wednesday! d79fe819" | sha256sum
```

```
a1c089bf65e852cf2ba2010d2ba84e2025ec937b5f8b9dac682c35dcf498aef4 -
```


# Commit reveal

```
$ echo "I think it won't snow Wednesday! d79fe819" | sha256sum  
a1c089bf65e852cf2ba2010d2ba84e2025ec937b5f8b9dac682c35dcf498aef4 -
```

Add randomness so people can't guess  
my preimage; HMAC

This is a kind of proto-signature


# Linked list with hashes



We could call this a “hash-chain”

Also, it’s basically git

# Binary tree with hashes



How can 2 inputs go to 1 output?  
Not a collision. Concatenate then  
hash:  $h(a,b)$

# What's a signature?

Signatures are useful! Messages from someone. 3 functions needed:

`GenerateKeys()`

`Sign(secretKey, message)`

`Verify(publicKey, message, signature)`

**3 functions**

**GenerateKeys()**

**Returns a privateKey, publicKey pair**

**Takes in only randomness**

## 3 functions

`Sign(secretKey, message)`

Signs a message given a `secretKey`.

Returns a signature.



## 3 functions

`Verify(publicKey, message, signature)`

Verify a signature on a message from a public key. Returns a boolean whether it worked or not.

# Signatures from hashes

It's doable! In fact, you'll do it!

First pset is to implement a signature system using only hashes.

This is called "Lamport Signatures"


# Lamport Sigs: Generate key

0  ... (256)

1  ... (256)


Make up  $256 * 2$  random 256 bit numbers

# Lamport Sigs: Generate key



Get hashes for each

# Lamport Sigs: Generate key



 = Secret key


 = public key

# Lamport Sigs: Sign

Hash string to sign.

“Hi” = 8f434346648f6b96df89dda901c5176b10a6d83961dd3c1ac88b59b2dc327aa4

Pick private key blocks to reveal  
based on bits of message to sign




# Lamport Sigs: Sign

Hash string to sign.


Pick private key blocks to reveal  
based on bits of message to sign

01101110



# Lamport Sigs: Verify


Hash each block of the signature  
Verify that it turns into the block  
of the public key






# Lamport Sigs: Signing again

Signing more than once reveals more pieces of the private key



# Lamport Sigs: Signing again

Signing more than once reveals more pieces of the private key



# Lamport Sigs: Signing again

1 sig: can't forge anything

2 sigs:  $\sim\frac{1}{2}$  bits constrained

3 sigs:  $\sim\frac{1}{4}$  bits constrained

# pset01: Lamport signatures

In go1ang

On github

Most of the signing code is written

Tests implemented

Also public key with 4 signatures;

try to forge another!

Office hours / messages on slack

MIT OpenCourseWare  
<https://ocw.mit.edu/>

MAS.S62 Cryptocurrency Engineering and Design  
Spring 2018

For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: <https://ocw.mit.edu/terms>.