THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR II

I. US FOREIGN POLICY, 1921-1939
   A. The US flip-flops on the League of Nations. At Versailles, the US sold Europe on the League as the key to postwar peace. Then the US itself refused to join the League.
   B. The US flip-flops on France. The US won French approval of Versailles by promising France a US security guarantee. Then the US reneged, leaving France high and dry.
   C. American unwisdoms, 1921-1939:
      -- Arbitration treaties to prevent war. Effective? No.
      -- Arms control treaties, 1922, 1930. Effective? No--war is not prevented.
      -- War debt controversies, the Dawes Plan. Result: The US lends money to the US.
      -- Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 1930. Result: Other states retaliate ---> less trade overall ---> worldwide depression is a bit deeper.
      -- US neutrality laws of 1935, 1936, 1937, 1939. Result: a scenario like US entry into World War I is prevented. But World War II, not World War I, is looming--and these laws also prevent the U.S. from deterring the outbreak of WWII.

   Unlike most peoples, Americans have never suffered epic horrors as a consequence of their own foreign policy blunders. Could this help explain the sometime-frivolous nature of U.S. foreign policy discourse?

   Footnote: Wilson, Dawes, and Kellogg won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work. What was the Nobel committee thinking?
   D. US non-intervention toward Latin America: FDR’s "Good Neighbor" policy.

II. BACKGROUND TO WORLD WAR II
   A. U.S. strategy is *deja vu* all over again. As in 1914 the US is an economic powerhouse and a military midget.
   B. Germany and Japan are expansionist. Japan wants to conquer Asia; Germany wants Europe, then the world. Their stated motives: to enhance their national security.
   C. World War I historical revisionism, critical of US entry into World War I, rises in the US. An isolationist peace movement rises too.
   D. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) wants to intervene against Germany. He adopts a strategy of covert provocation toward Hitler, saying he would "wage war without declaring it" to provoke Hitler to violence.
   E. British PM Winston Churchill’s only hope for victory against
Hitler: to suck the US into the war. So Britain creates a
U.S. lobby to push the U.S. to enter the war.

III. US-EUROPE CHRONOLOGY
A. The isolation-intervention debate, 1933-41. At issue: Is
European war preventable? Will such a war engulf the USA?
Would German victory threaten US security?
B. The shock of German conquest of France (May/June 1940) and
the German attack on the Soviet Union (June 1941) brings the
US to abandon neutrality, 1940-1941:
-- FDR's Lend-Lease policy (passed Congress in March 1941).
This delivered large arms shipments to Britain and the
USSR, valued at $41 billion in 1941 dollars (far more in
today’s dollars) by 1945. FDR’s sales pitch: the
"Parable of the Garden Hose."
-- The US convoys Lend-Lease shipping and the US navy
secretly chases German subs. A German sub shoots at the
pursuing USS Greer, September 4, 1941. FDR misleads the
US public to believe the attack was unprovoked.

IV. US-ASIA CHRONOLOGY
A. Japan goes on a vast imperial rampage in China and Southeast
Asia, 1931-1941.
B. US responses:
-- The US begins a naval buildup, 1939.
-- The US moves its Pacific fleet from San Diego to Hawaii
and sends B-17 bombers to the Philippines in 1941 to
scare Japan.
-- The US cuts off oil exports to Japan, July 1941.
Japanese oil stocks start dwindling. The US demands that
Japan quit China as the price for more oil.
-- The US won't take yes for an answer from Japan. Japan
seeks a diplomatic solution--it offers a high-level
meeting in Sept/Oct and a "modus vivendi" agreement
later--but the US refuses.

V. JAPAN ATTACKS THE USA, THEN GERMANY DECLARES WAR ON THE USA,
DECEMBER 1941. Did Japan blunder by attacking the US? Did the
US blunder by provoking Japan's attack? Did Germany blunder by
declaring war on the US?
It seems that FDR and Churchill were confident that FDR
could leverage a US war with Japan into a US war with Germany.

VI. THE US DECISION TO CONFRONT GERMANY: EXPLANATIONS
A. US security: balance-of-power arguments, "defense perimeter"
arguments.
B. Human rights? No! We remember WWII as the "good war" that
ended the Holocaust but the US was largely unconcerned with
human rights in 1940-1941. Antisemitic State Department
officer Breckinridge Long prevented many Jewish refugees
from finding haven in the U.S.

VII. THE US DECISION TO CONFRONT JAPAN: EXPLANATIONS
A. US economic motives? Some Americans still sought a "China
Market."

B. US security/geopolitical motives:
   -- Japan is Germany's ally; "To contain Germany the US must contain Japan." (But in 1941 Japan offers to drop the Axis alliance...)
   -- "Japan threatens Britain's Asian colonies." (But these colonies were strategic millstones for Britain...)
   -- "War in Asia is a route to war in Europe"--the "back door to war." (But Asian war could also be a trap door to more and more Asian war while Europe burns.)

C. The China Lobby? Did it cause the tide of anti-Japanese public opinion in US, 1941?

VIII. COULD THE US HAVE PREVENTED WORLD WAR II?
A. Could the US have prevented the war in Europe? Alternate US policies toward Germany:
   -- Tougher policies? Do more to deter Germany before 1933, or even in 1938-1939. Specifically the US might have:
     -- Partitioned Germany in 1919.
     -- Occupied Germany in 1919 and imposed truth-telling in German schoolbooks and media.
     -- Allied with France, as the US had agreed to do in 1919. Kept some US troops in France, 1919-1941.
     -- Built up the US military in 1920s (move from a military mobilization strategy to a standing-force strategy); then used this standing force to deter German expansion.
   -- Softer policies? The US might have:
     -- Imposed a softer peace in 1919--demanded no reparations, take no territory, etc.
     -- And/or pressed Britain and France in 1939 to appease Hitler further--let him have Danzig and the Polish corridor, as AJP Taylor later suggested?
   -- Clearer policies? Some claim a lack of clear US grand strategy, 1933-1941 led Hitler to underestimate US resistance to future Nazi expansion. Solution: clearly tell the Germans in the 1920s and 1930s that the US will do what it eventually did do in 1941-1945--that is, smash Germany if it reached for Eurasian hegemony.

B. Could the US have prevented the war in Asia? Alternate US policies toward Japan:
   -- Tougher policies?
     -- Build up US military in 1920s. Move from a military mobilization strategy to a standing-force strategy.
     -- Use this standing force to deter Japanese expansion in 1931.
   -- Softer policies?
     -- Avoid the crisis-management blunders of 1941.
     -- Don't put US bases in Philippines in 1930s (this threatens Japanese security); don't send the US fleet to Pearl Harbor or US B-17s to Philippines in 1941 (this both frightens Japan and tempts Japanese preemption).
     -- Don't embargo US oil shipments to Japan (this
compels Japan to seize Indonesian oil.
-- Seek a settlement of the China issue with Japan.
Konoye said Japan would settle!
-- Appease Japan in 1941. Let Japan keep China if it
agrees to go no further.
-- Clearer policies? Some claim a lack of clear US grand
strategy, 1933-1941 led Japan to underestimate US
resistance to future Japanese expansion. Solution:
clearly tell Japan in 1931 or 1937 that the US will do
what it eventually did in 1941-1945.

IX. EVALUATING US ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II: A GOOD IDEA?
A. US security rationales for fighting Germany--valid? Or
could the US have avoided the war by just staying home?
-- Would German hegemony in Europe have threatened US
sovereignty?
-- Was US intervention necessary to prevent German hegemony?
-- Could the US stop Germany without allowing Soviet near-
hegemony?
B. US security rationales for fighting Japan--valid? Was the
Pacific war almost a vast diversion? Or a needed path to war
with Germany?
C. Effects of US entry:
-- On global balances of power?
-- On human rights? (Millions of lives were probably
saved--essentially by accident.)

X. US CONDUCT OF WORLD WAR II: SIX CONTROVERSIES
A. Was another European military strategy better? E.g., invade
the European continent in 1943, and race to Berlin and
points East? Or, invade Europe through the Balkans and race
into Eastern Europe?
What if the US had:
B. Demanded Stalin foreswear East European empire in exchange
for Lend-Lease?
C. Made a separate peace with Germany?
D. Reached a spheres-of-influence agreement with Stalin?
E. Air war controversies: Bomb Auschwitz? Also, don’t firebomb
Dresden, Tokyo, Yokohama; don’t A-bomb Hiroshima, Nagasaki?
Some facts: U.S. bombs killed ~900,000 Japanese civilians
during March-August 1945--twice the total U.S. combat deaths
in all U.S. foreign wars since 1776. The March 1945
firebomb raid on Tokyo killed 83,000 Japanese--more than
(Some say this was "terrorism." True?) Relevant fact:
Japan surrendered in August 1945 in response to Soviet entry
into the war (which convinced Japan that more fighting was
futile), not in response to the US a-bombs.
F. What do to with Germany? Pastoralization vs. partition vs.
disarmament vs. neutralization vs. de-brainwashing the
German people.