CAUSES OF THE ISRAEL-ARAB CONFLICT

I. ISRAEL/PALESTINE IN ANCIENT TIMES

The territory west of the Jordan River—today's Israel/Palestine—was called Canaan before 1200 B.C.E. It was inhabited by Canaanites, a semitic people culturally like the Israelites of that age, for most of the third millennium B.C.E. and the first half of the second millennium B.C.E. Israelites (forbears of today's Jews) and Philistines appeared in Canaan at about the same time, in the 12th century B.C.E. The Israelites traced their origins to Abraham of Ur of Chaldea (circa 1900 B.C.E.). Some historians today instead think that the Israelites formed from a community of escaped Canaanite slaves. They settled the highlands of Canaan, which is today's West Bank area. The Philistines settled its coastal plains, which are Israeli territory today. After two centuries the Jews subjugated the Philistines, Canaanites, and others. They created a Jewish kingdom in around 1000 B.C.E.¹

This Israelite kingdom split into northern and southern kingdoms in 927 B.C.E. The northern kingdom was destroyed by Assyria in 722 B.C.E., the southern was conquered by Babylon in 528 B.C.E.

The Jews of the region regained independence during 140-63 B.C.E. but were then annexed by Rome, which then ruled the Jews with great cruelty. This left the Jews stateless until 1948 C.E.

The Jews rebelled disastrously against Roman rule in 66-73 C.E. (the Great Revolt) and in 132-135 C.E. (the Bar Kokhba Rebellion). The latter rebellion, a Quixotic death-ride, was led by Simeon Bar Kokhba and sparked in part by Rabbi Akiba, who proclaimed Bar Kokhba the Messiah.²

Vastly superior Roman forces smashed the Bar Kokhba revolt in 135 C.E., slaughtering perhaps half the Jews of the area³ and dispersing most of the rest to the four winds. Rome renamed the rebelling province after the Philistines as "The Syrian Province of Palestine."

The Arabs are a Mideast people racially and linguistically related the Jews and Canaanites. In ancient times the Arabs were desert people—indeed the eighth century B.C.E. the Assyrian term "Arab" referred to camel herders of the desert.⁴ The Arab language and culture were spread mainly by force throughout the Mideast and North Africa by Muhammad (570-632 C.E.), the Meccan founder of Islam, and his followers.

II. THE ROOTS OF THE TRAGEDY: CHRISTIAN OPPRESSION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH DIASPORA

Over the past thousand years Western Christian societies have relentlessly oppressed their Jewish minorities. During the Crusades (1096-1291) Christians massacred thousands of Jews in many parts of Europe. Jews then were expelled en masse from Britain, France (three times) and Spain during 1290-1497. They were subsequently hunted and killed by the Spanish inquisition and were ghettoized throughout Europe. They were massacred again in Eastern Europe in 1648 (about 100,000 Jews killed), were subjected to pogroms in Russia in the 19th and early 20th century, and were mass-murdered by White Russian forces during the Russian Civil War of 1918-20 (another 100,000 Jews killed). Then came the Nazi German holocaust of 1941-1945 (5.6 million Jews killed). Stalin was planning another great killing of Jews when he died in 1953. Those fleeing these horrors were sometimes refused refuge by nearby states. Even after the Holocaust thousands of Jews were driven from Poland by Polish Christians.

Europe's Jews tried self-reform, socialism, and even assimilation to appease the rage of the Christians. Nothing worked. Jews made magnificent contributions to European culture, science, economic progress and public life, but this won them little credit. Christian Jew-hatred continued with only

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³ Harkabi, Bar Kokhba: 46.
⁴ Smith, Palestine: 5.
minor intermissions, most notably in the early-mid nineteenth century. In the Muslim world Jews were also oppressed but less severely.\(^5\) The Palestinian Arabs showed considerably more tolerance toward Jews than did Western Christians. Thus in the 20th century Palestinians paid for crimes that others committed.

III. THE BIRTH OF ZIONISM

The relentless European Christian oppression of the Jews, and despair that it would ever end, drove Leo Pinsker, Theodore Herzl and others to launch the Zionist movement, which sought a state for the Jews. These early Zionists were secular Jews who were animated by desire to free the Jews from oppression, not by Jewish religious or historic claims to the land of Israel.\(^6\) But they mobilized Jews around these religious and historical claims to build Jewish support for Zionism.

The publication of Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State* in 1896 and the 1897 Zionist congress at Basel marked the Zionist movement's beginning.

The Zionist movement gained important British help with Britain's Balfour declaration (1917), which announced that Britain would look with favor on creation of a Jewish home in Palestine.

Early Zionist leaders foresaw that Palestinian Arabs would resist Zionism by force if they pressed ahead, and prepared for this eventuality.\(^7\)

IV. THE PARTITION PLAN OF 1947

By 1947 Jews comprised 37 percent of Palestine's population while Arabs comprised nearly 63 percent.

In 1945 the Zionist leadership in Palestine launched a violent revolt against British rule. Pressed by this revolt Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine in 1947 and threw the problem into the lap of the new United Nations. The U.N. devised a partition plan that divided Palestine into two states: a Jewish state on 55 percent of Palestine, an Arab state on 42 percent, and 3 percent forming an international zone including Jerusalem. Both states lacked defensible borders. The Zionists accepted the plan although Zionist leaders did not accept as final the borders it laid down for Israel—they aimed for more.\(^8\) The Arabs rejected the plan because they rejected the Jews' right to a state in Palestine. They also disputed the fairness of a partition that awarded 55 percent of Palestine's territory to a Jewish community comprising only 37 percent of Palestine's population.\(^9\)

V. THE 1948 WAR

Fighting between Jews and Palestinians erupted in Palestine right after the U.N. partition plan was approved on November 28, 1947. The Arab states neighboring Palestine—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon—attacked Israel promptly on its declaration of statehood on May 15, 1948. Arab motives were mixed. Jordan sought only to annex the Palestinian state. Egypt sought to destroy Israel and to forestall Jordan's move.

Israel won a decisive military victory by early 1949 at the cost of 6,000 Jewish lives.

Israel conquered large new territories in the 1948 war, expanding its domain from 55 percent to 78 percent of Palestine.

Some 700,000-750,000 Palestinians—the great majority of its Palestinian inhabitants—fled from Israel during the war. Only 92,000 Arabs remained in

\(^5\) Smith, *Palestine*: 8, 11.
\(^7\) Vladimir Jabotinsky, leader of the Revisionist Zionist movement, wrote in 1923 that "Every indigenous people will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement. This is how the Arabs will behave and will go on behaving so long as they possess a gleam of hope that they can prevent 'Palestine' from becoming the Land of Israel." Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (NY: W.W. Norton, 2000): 13.
\(^8\) Shlaim, *Iron Wall*: 28-29, speaking of Ben Gurion. See also ibid.: 21, quoting Ben Gurion.
Israel. For decades Israelis claimed the Palestinians left voluntarily but historians now agree that the Israelis expelled them. The former director of the Israeli army archives estimated that Israeli forces conducted about 10 large massacres of Palestinians (over 50 murdered) and about 100 smaller massacres (one or a handful murdered). He wrote: "In almost every Arab village occupied by us during the War of Independence, acts were committed which are defined as war crimes, such as murders, massacres, and rapes." In perhaps the largest massacre, at Lydda, some 250-400 Palestinians were killed and perhaps another 350 died in a later forced march. This was a velvet expulsion compared to those conducted by Stalin or Hitler, which entailed mass killing, but it was an expulsion nonetheless.

The 700,000-750,000 Palestinians refugees of 1948 plus their descendants now total about 4,000,000 people—the largest refugee population in the world. This expulsion is easy to condemn but such condemnation is unfair without proposing an alternative Zionist policy. What would it be? To accept a far smaller Jewish state—one with indefensible borders? A larger state with defensible borders but an Arab majority population? A binational state with a large Arab majority? Few of those who condemn the deeds of the Zionists in 1948 would have favored these alternatives had they stood in the Zionists' shoes. (See the assigned interview with Benny Morris.)

Should the Palestinians have refused the partition agreement (and earlier partition plans) and resisted Zionism by force? Israelis today condemn Palestinian unwillingness to accept a Jewish state in Palestine, but history has few examples of indigenous people who did not resist when threatened by domination or expulsion by settler-colonial movements. Should Palestinians be asked to act differently? Some early Zionist leaders understood this, writing long before the 1948 war that any people in the Palestinians' situation would resist Zionism by force. Benny Morris says that Israeli expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 should have been more complete. True?

Had you been leading the Zionist movement in 1948, what would you have done? What if you had been leading the Palestinians?

Who is morally responsible for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? A possible perspective: both sides are right, as both did what most would do if standing in their shoes. But if so, who is wrong? Someone must be accountable! A possible answer: responsibility lies with the European Christian societies who for centuries directed unprovoked hatred at their Jewish neighbors. Their heinous crimes set the whole calamity in motion. They committed these crimes without reason or excuse.

Some proximate causes of the 1948 war: (1) bad borders that bred insecurity and perceived opportunity on both sides; (2) Arab false optimism.

VI. GENERAL PATTERNS, 1949-PRESENT

A. Religious motivations and religions extremism have risen on both sides.
   1. In the 1970s an extremist religious Israeli settler movement appears. It aims to colonize the West Bank and perhaps more.
   2. In the 1980s an extremist religious Palestinian movement, Hamas, appears. Its stated goal is to destroy Israel. It now controls Gaza.

B. Secular communities on both sides have greatly moderated their views, and now largely accept the need to share Palestine/Israel with one another. Secular Israelis (for example, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert) accept the notion of a Palestinian state, secular Palestinians (for example, Palestinian President Abu Mazen) accept the need to recognize and live with Israel.

C. Since 1949 Israel has become far more secure from conquest, and control of the West Bank has become far less important to Israeli security.
   1. Israel has developed a secure nuclear arsenal that makes Israel

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10 Shlaim, Iron Wall: 54.
unconquerable.
2. Israel achieved peace with Egypt in 1979, lifting threat of Egyptian attack.
4. The Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian economies have stagnated, while Israel has prospered.
5. The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 and now controls it.
6. The Israeli military has adopted new technologies while Arab militaries have stagnated.
Overall, threat of Arab/Iranian invasion from the east has become implausible.

VII. INTERLUDE: 1949-1956
Israel rejected Arab peace-feelers during this period, knowing that a peace settlement would require Israel to surrender territory and to accept a large return of refugees. This Israel would not do. Israelis felt their borders were already vulnerable, their territory too small, and their Palestinian minority (one-ninth of Israel's population in 1949) too large. They also expected their relative power to grow over time. Why settle now when Israel could later use its greater power to gain better terms?

Israel did not allow Palestinian expellees to return to their homes after the 1948 war. So during 1949-56 thousands tried to sneak back into Israel. Some attacked Israelis, killing some 200 Israeli civilians. Israel met them with force, killing between 2,700 and 5,000, most them unarmed.

VIII. THE 1956 WAR
The Egyptian-Czech arms deal threatened Israel with growing Egyptian military power. Israel struck in part to forestall this growth.
Reverberations of the 1956 war in the Arab world: a civil war in Lebanon (1958), a radical coup in Iraq (1958), a near-coup in Jordan, the rise of Nasserism. Arab states were cowed by Israel's victory but Arab rejectionist rhetoric toward Israel also grew louder.
A proximate cause of the 1956 war: Israel's perception that Egypt's relative power would rise as it acquired new Czech arms, creating a large Israeli window of vulnerability.

IX. THE 1967 WAR
Egyptian President Nasser sparked this war inadvertently, as outlined in your readings. On May 14, 1967 he triggered a crisis he thought he could control, perhaps to deter an Israeli attack on Syria. The Arab "street" then mindlessly pushed him toward this ruinous war. Nasser made war inevitable by ordering the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel attacked Egypt on June 5, 1967.
Jordan foolishly joined the war, sparking Israeli seizure of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. As a finale Israel conquered Syria's Golan Heights.
For several years after 1967 the Arab states spurned all talks with Israel, instead declaring the "Three No's of Khartoum"—no negotiations with Israel, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel—in October 1967.
The Palestine Liberation Organization was formed in 1964. It pursued Israel's destruction until 1988, when it first recognized Israel's existence.
Proximate causes of the 1967 war: (1) Israel's insecure borders, sense of insecurity; (2) a first-move advantage between Egyptian and Israeli forces; (3) unhinged belligerent Arab discourse about Israel, leading to rhetorical overbidding against Israel by Arab nationalist leaders (including Egypt's Nasser), which intoxicated Arab streets and elites, which pushed Arabs forward; (4) false optimism in Egypt; (5) crisis blundering by Nasser.

X. THE WAR OF ATTRITION, 1969-70
Egypt tried and failed to use limited war along the Suez Canal to coerce Israel into negotiating the return of the Sinai.

15 Shlaim, Iron Wall: 82.
16 Morris, Righteous Victims: 300-301.
XI. THE 1973 WAR
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat organized an Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel after Israel spurned his peace feelers. Israel won but at a high cost: 3,000 dead. Israel learned that it could not command the Arabs with impunity.

Proximate causes of the 1973 war: (1) A first strike advantage between Israeli and Egyptian/Syrian forces; (2) Israel's sense of insecurity, leading it to retain its 1967 conquests, causing an Arab war to regain them; (3) false Israeli optimism, leading Israel to see no need to negotiate these territories' return.

XII. THE 1982 LEBANON WAR
Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 under sway of its defense minister, Ariel Sharon. Sharon aimed to remake Lebanon as a pro-Israel Christian-dominated state and, in so doing, cow the Palestinians into ending Palestinian resistance to Israel's hold on the West Bank.

Israeli forces were warmly greeted at first by Lebanon's Shi'a. But ham­fisted Israeli occupation policies provoked Shi'a hostility and soon the Shi'a were fighting to eject the Israelis. Hezbollah, a Shi'a terrorist organization, grew vastly in this nourishing environment. Israel withdrew from south-central Lebanon in 1985 and from the remainder in 2000 after losing hundreds of lives.

Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza conducted a stone-throwing campaign of harassment of Israeli forces. Weariness with this campaign helped energize some Israeli military officers to push for peace.

XIV. THE 2006 LEBANON WAR.
Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces on the Israel-Lebanon border in July 2006, killing 8 and capturing 2. Israel responded by launching wide air attacks on Hezbollah and Lebanese infrastructure, and invading Lebanon. Hezbollah then rocketed much of northern Israel. Over a thousand Lebanese and Hezbollah were killed; Israel lost 119 soldiers and 44 civilians killed. Hezbollah soon recovered strength, remains a major force in Lebanese politics.

XV. THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS, 1993-2001
Motion toward a withdrawal-for-peace solution began in late 1988 when Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat finally recognized the state of Israel, thereby de facto accepting Israel's existence within its 1949 borders. This led to the Oslo peace process of 1993-2001, which saw Israel and the Palestinians negotiate a possible settlement based on a land-for-peace trade. At a climactic meeting hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton during July and August 2000, at Camp David, Maryland Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's government offered the Palestinians the Gaza Strip and 86-91 percent of the West Bank (76-81 percent up front with more to come later), a small piece of Israeli territory equivalent in size to 1 percent of the West Bank, and part but not all of Arab East Jerusalem. The West Bank would be divided into two or three non-contiguous pieces. The Palestinians rejected this offer while failing to make a comprehensive counter-offer.

Both Israel and the Palestinians were more forthcoming on peace terms at a later conference in Taba, Egypt in January, 2001. Before that conference, in December 2000, President Clinton proposed parameters for a peace settlement.

17 The best account of events at Camp David II and Taba is Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003): 5-43. For Israel's offer at Camp David II see Ibid., 16-18. The 91 percent figure uses Israel's method for measuring the West Bank, the 86 percent measure uses the Palestinian method. Ibid., 17. Israel proposed to delay the transfer of another ten percent of the West Bank for 6-21 years, so by Israeli accounting the Palestinian state offered at Camp David II would have initially comprised only 81 percent of the West Bank, and by Palestinian accounting the Palestinian state would have initially comprised only 76 percent. Ibid., 17-18.
that envisioned Israeli cession of the Gaza strip, 94-96 percent of the West Bank, and Israeli territory equivalent to 1-3 percent of the West Bank, plus all of Arab East Jerusalem, to the Palestinians in exchange for a full and final peace.\(^\text{18}\) Both sides accepted the Clinton plan, albeit with reservations, and used its parameters as a starting point for negotiations at Taba. These negotiations made progress but had not reached a settlement when Israel ended negotiations to conduct a national election, held on February 7, 2001.

During the interval between the Camp David meeting and the Taba talks the Palestinians launched a campaign of violence and terror against Israel, starting on September 29, 2000. This Palestinian violence provoked a popular backlash among Israelis that helped hard-liner Ariel Sharon to defeat the more moderate Barak in the February 7, 2001 Israeli election. Sharon then opted not to renew negotiations on taking office as prime minister. In the U.S. the newly-inaugurated George W. Bush Administration chose not to push for renewing negotiations, so they ended despite Palestinian objections.

The breakdown of the Taba talks was a major lost opportunity as the two sides were not far apart when talks ended. Most experts believe that with more time, and without an Israeli election for prime minister, the two sides could have compromised on the remaining issues and ended the conflict.\(^\text{19}\)

After Sharon's election the Palestinian intifada continued until a truce was arranged in early 2005. About 1,000 Israelis and over 3,000 Palestinians died in the violence. Sharon refused to renew negotiations with the Palestinians, arguing that the Palestinians were unserious about making peace and so were unfit negotiating partners. Instead he pursued a policy of unilaterally withdrawing Israeli control over Palestinian population centers while retaining substantial Palestinian territory. Most importantly he unilaterally withdrew Israeli forces and settlers from the Gaza strip during the summer of 2005. Sharon seemed poised for further unilateral withdrawals, this time from the West Bank, when he suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2006.

Two upheavals in Palestinian politics occurred during this period. Longtime Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat died in November 2004. His death brought the more moderate Abu Mazen to the fore as president of the Palestinian authority and as leader of Fatah, then the strongest Palestinian political party. Abu Mazen opposes violence and seems willing to make peace on reasonable terms. On the other hand, the radical Islamist group Hamas won control of the Palestinian parliament in a surprise election victory in January 2006. In its public rhetoric Hamas rejected a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead seeking Israel's destruction. Hamas also used violence to seek its goals, including many terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians within Israel. The rise of Abu Mazen was a step toward Palestinian moderation, while the election of Hamas was a step back toward extremism.

Why did Oslo fail? Big reasons: (1) Israeli leaders underestimated the Palestinians' minimum demands, expecting the Palestinians could be low-balled. The Palestinian minimum was at least "what Sadat and Hussein got," meaning, an agreement that could be presented to the Palestinian public as a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. Israel offered well less than this at Camp David II. It later offered more but only as time ran out. (2) The Palestinians self-ruinous campaign of violence in the second intifada brought to power the more hawkish Sharon. Clearly a miscalculation. Palestinians thought violence would compel Israeli concessions but it only destroyed the Israeli peace camp and stiffened Israeli resolve to resist. (3) The Israelis greatly expanded Jewish settlements in the West Bank during Oslo period, doubling their total size. The Palestinians considered this a provocation. (4) Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat adopted a disastrous negotiating style, rarely framing counter-offers, often dragging his feet, and often lying. (5) The three parties did not agree at the outset on the general outlines of the peace toward which they were proceeding. Hence they battled hard over every detail.

\(^{18}\) Pressman, "Visions in Collision": 21.  
\(^{19}\) Pressman, "Visions in Collision": 22.
XVI. SOME CAUSES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

A. Incomplete explanations:
   1. European colonialism toward Arab world ---> intermingling of peoples and bad borders ---> conflict. Clearly European colonialism was a necessary precondition for the Arab-Israel conflict, but what else caused it? Moreover, diverse peoples have sometimes learned to live together in other post-colonial areas (e.g., Eastern Europe). Why not here?
   2. Extreme goals on both sides. During much of the conflict Arabs have sought Israel's destruction and Israel has sought to expand and colonize land beyond its borders. But what explains this extremism?
   3. Ideologies of the parties:
      a. Zionism--a colonial ideology. But where did it come from?
      b. Palestinian or Arab nationalism--an exclusivist ideology?
      c. Arab anti-semitism?
         Debated: Is Arab hostility to Israel fueled by loss of land or by anti-semitism? Israel doves say Arab hostility will abate if Arabs regain land; Israeli hawks reject this, arguing that anti-semitism fuels Arab hostility. How can we resolve this debate? What evidence would resolve it?
         But if ideologies are to blame, what caused them?

B. Deeper explanations:
   1. European Christian anti-semitism since 1000 C.E. This triggered Zionism. It is therefore the taproot of the Arab-Israel conflict. What caused this Christian viciousness toward the Jews? It is among the least-provoked hatreds in human history. Its origins remain poorly understood.
   2. Invented chauvinist history. Both Arabs and Israelis wallowed in historical mythmaking about the origins of Zionism, the 1948 war and later wars. Each exculpated itself of wrongdoing while casting all blame on the other. Neither put much blame for the conflict on the Christian West.
   3. Security dilemma. Geography--close proximity and open borders--make the Palestinians and Israelis a threat to each other so each seeks to dominate the other. (But this may no longer be true. Does Israel's nuclear deterrent make it unconquerable?)
   4. False optimism. Both sides have relentlessly believed that force could make the other fold. Neither has proven right so far.
      a. The Palestinians refused the 1947 partition and then refused to accept the 1967 lines.
      b. Israel has generally sought to compel the Arabs by force to accept its 1967 gains.
   5. Other strategic and tactical illusions and misperceptions.
      1. Some argue that the Palestinians' strategy of violence has served them poorly. In this view the methods of Gandhi and Martin Luther King would serve them better at this stage of the conflict. Likewise, more use of public relations instead of violence would serve them better.
      2. Regarding Israeli strategy:
         a. Some argue that Israel cannot be expansionist and Zionist. In this view Israeli colonization of the West Bank and Gaza threatens Israel's Jewish character.
         b. Some argue that Israeli expansion (that is, Israeli colonization of West Bank and Gaza) on balance harms Israeli security.
            i. "Israeli expansion retards Israel's ability to attract Jewish immigrants."
            ii. "Israeli expansion could trigger a resurgent pan-Arabism. Such pan-Arabism could lead to an Arab union of some kind--as German, Italian, and Vietnamese movements of union produced nation states. This would gravely threaten Israeli security."
            iii. "Israeli expansion raises the risk of grand terror against Israel." Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak both worried that the conflict could produce grand terror.
against Israel unless it is resolved.

XVII. SOLUTIONS TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: LARGE OPTIONS
A. Partition the land of Palestine--the two-state solution.
   1. Through agreement, and failing that,
   2. By Israeli fiat.
B. Create a binational state with power-sharing between Jews and Arabs.
   Once proposed by dovish Zionists (Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, Ahad Ha'am); later proposed by Palestinian hard-liners.
C. Palestinian exhaustion, eventual submission to greater Israel. This is a greater Israel solution.
D. Expel (or "transfer") Palestinians into Jordan if they don't submit to Israel. Eventually the Palestinians would accept life in Jordan. This is another greater Israel solution from Israel's Kach and Moledet parties.
E. The Jews eventually leave the Middle East as the Crusaders did in 1300. This is the rejectionist Palestinian solution--often masked under solution B, "binational state."

Which solutions are feasible? How do we know? What evidence is needed to judge their feasibility?

XVIII. SOLUTIONS TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: ACHIEVING A 2-STATE SOLUTION
Most experts argue that only solution XVI "A", partition, hold promise of durable peace in the near term.
If so, how could partition be achieved?
A. The 2002 Quartet Plan. Get both sides to the negotiating table and leave them to talk among themselves? It seems certain that this is not enough--negotiations will fail without more interventions to make them succeed.
B. New historical narratives?
   1. Israelis and Palestinians could take responsibility for their own misdeeds and stop false blaming of the other.
   2. Israelis and Palestinians could put more blame for the conflict where it belongs--on the Christian west--and less on each other.
      a. Could Palestinians then grant the Zionist enterprise some moral legitimacy?
      b. Could Israelis more easily admit their own cruelties toward the Palestinians, knowing that they could attribute these in a final sense to the Christians instead of taking full responsibility for these cruelties themselves?
C. Could the U.S. impose peace? Specifically, could it frame an American final-status peace agreement and then persuade both sides to accept it with carrots and sticks? Some hopeful signs:
   1. Years of negotiation have made clear to both sides the peace terms that each can and cannot accept. If they want peace they know what its outlines must be. Long months of fumbling in the dark for a mutually acceptable formula will not be necessary. That formula is well known.
   2. Most Israelis and Palestinians now agree on the same peace terms. Specifically, polls taken in December 2004 and January 2005 show that 54 percent of Palestinians and 64 percent of Israelis endorse the parameters for settlement proposed by President Bill Clinton in December 2000. If the publics can agree on terms there is little reason their leaders cannot do likewise.
      a. The Palestinians have markedly moderated their position on the

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conflict over the past 20 years. Fatah refused to recognize Israel's existence until 1988 but now indicates a willingness to settle on the 1967 lines. It refused an offer of 75-92 percent of the West Bank in 2000 but never rejected a better offer. Its leaders hint at willingness to accept 1967-lines terms. And polls now show that most Palestinians endorse the Clinton parameters as a framework for peace. The Clinton parameter's terms: Israel withdraws from nearly all the territories it seized in 1967 (specifically, from all of Gaza and 94-96 percent of the West Bank plus Israeli territory equivalent in size to 1-3 percent of West Bank) in exchange for an end to the conflict and robust security arrangements for Israel. The Palestinians would renounce any large return of refugees to Israel in exchange for large compensation. Jerusalem would be shared along ethnic lines. Control over Jerusalem's holy places would also be shared, with the Western Wall going to Israeli control and the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount going to Palestinian control, and sovereignty over both perhaps going to God.

b. Israeli public views have moderated on the question of peace terms. Polls show that most Israelis, like most Palestinians, are now willing to accept the Clinton parameters as the basis for peace, if strong measures to ensure Israel's security are included and the peace settlement is truly final. >> Citizen initiatives—the "Geneva Accord" of December 2003 and the 2003 "People's Voice" Ayalon/Nusseibeh initiative--highlight this convergence of popular opinion on the two sides.

3. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are now anxious for peace.
4. Israelis are increasingly worried that Israel will lose its Jewish character unless it makes a land-for-peace trade. This worry extends to important elements in the Likud, who see the West Bank as Israeli territory but now accept that demographic realities require Israeli withdrawal.
5. Israeli fears of an invasion from the east have greatly abated with the stagnation of the Syrian and Iraqi economies since the 1960s, the collapse of the Soviet sponsors of Syria and Iraq, the U.S. smashing Saddam's regime and putting Iraq under occupation, and the development of a secure Israeli nuclear deterrent. Hence Israeli hawks, who had long argued that Israel needed the West Bank as a buffer against an eastern invasion, were now more willing to trade it for peace.
6. The United States has vast influence over both sides. Consider U.S. influence after the 1956 war and Bush 41's successful effort to persuade Israel to negotiate in 1991.
7. The U.S. could further assuage Israeli security concerns by offering an American security guarantees, perhaps in the form of a U.S.-Israel alliance, in exchange for Israeli willingness to live within its 1967 borders.

Most experts agree that the only terms for peace that hold any chance of approval by both sides are those of the American "Clinton Plan" of 2000, the Geneva Accord, the People's Voice and Saudi "Abdullah Plan" of spring 2002—essentially "full withdrawal for full peace." Israel's Netanyahu government does not endorse these terms, nor has it even endorsed in principle a two-state solution. It also continues building a formidable wall that might form the new Israeli-Palestinian border, imposed by fiat. If so some 195,000 Palestinian East Jerusalemites and 10,000 West Bank Palestinians would be included in Israel. Some 63,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank--some 26 percent of the 240,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and 15 percent of the 415,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank plus East Jerusalem--would be compelled to leave their settlements.21 The prospects for such a scheme, and

21 Figures are from Steven Erlanger, "Israel, on Its Own, Reshaping West Bank Borders," New York Times, April 19, 2005.
its likely impact, are much debated.

A key question: Does Israel have a Palestinian partner for peace? Yasser Arafat's death in November 2004 brought to power a new Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who opposes violence and gives indication of seeking peace on reasonable terms. On the other hand the radical Hamas, which opposes peace and seeks Israel's destruction, won election in January 2006 and now controls the Palestinian authority government and Gaza. The direction of Palestinian politics remains in flux.

A key question: when outsiders impose peace, does it hold once they leave the scene?

A key question: if Israel can compel the Palestinians to concede its maximum goals, is it wise to seek these goals? Or will the resulting peace be frail?

XIX: ANNEX: JUDGING MORAL CLAIMS TO ISRAEL/PALESTINE: CRITERIA

A. Religious claims--"God gave it to us." (A Jewish claim, echoed by the Jews' evangelical Christian allies.)

B. Ancient ownership--"We had it first." (A Jewish claim. Some Palestinians counter by noting their likely relationship to the Canaanites and other ancients who owned Palestine before the Jews. They also note that in ancient times the Jews lived mainly in the highlands of the West bank. Jewish settlement in the lowlands, including Tel Aviv, was sparse and brief. Under an "ancient ownership" principle the Israeli Jews and Palestinians would have to trade land.)

C. Longest tenure--"We had it longest." (A Palestinian and Jewish claim. In fact it's a close-run thing.)

D. Most recent tenure--"We had it last." (A Palestinian claim.)

E. Current tenure--"We have it now." (A Jewish claim regarding Israel within 1967 lines; and a Palestinian claim regarding the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem.) Related: "It's ours under civil law. Please respect property rights!" (A Palestinian claim.)

F. Necessity--"Our straits are more dire than yours--we need Palestine to survive, you don't." Also, "Palestinians can live in any one of 21 Arab states; Jews have only one Jewish state." (A Jewish claim.)

G. Human rights--"You can't take Palestine without subjugating and expelling us, because we live there now. That's barbaric!" (Mainly a Palestinian claim, although Israelis make a parallel claim to denounce Palestinian rejection of Israel's right to exist.)

H. Best use--"You wasted the land, we made it bloom." (A Jewish claim.)

I. Forfeit by misconduct:

   > "You should have shared Palestine with us but refused--so you lose it by moral forfeit." (A Jewish claim.) Related: "You started the wars between us, especially the 1948 and 1967 wars--so you lost Palestine by moral forfeit." (A Jewish claim.) Related: "The Arab states expelled many Jews in 1948 and after; this expulsion negates any wrong that the Jews committed against the Palestinians in 1948." (A Jewish claim.)

   > "You came here to create an ethnically exclusive Jewish state that would dominate us and expel us, not to live together with us in a secular state. You are the ones who wouldn't share Palestine! Hence your Zionist enterprise is morally illegitimate." (A Palestinian claim.) Related: "You started the wars between us. You knew that any indigenous people in our shoes would resist your movement by force but you pushed ahead anyway. Thus you knowingly provoked war by colonizing Palestine." Related: "You lost Palestine fair and square when you foolishly launched the Bar Kokhba rebellion in 134 C.E. That folly canceled your claims based on ancient possession, as you threw the possession away." (A Palestinian claim.)

How can these moral claims be assessed?