THE CAUSES OF INTENSE WAR

I. THE MYSTERY OF LIMITED/INTENSE WAR

Some wars are total from the outset, like World War I. Some start quietly but end with a bang, like World War II in Europe, which opened with the near-bloodless 1939-40 "Sitzkrieg" but became total. Some remain limited, like Korea and Vietnam. Why?

II. SEVEN COMMON HYPOTHESES ON LIMITED WAR

A. "Destructive Weapons Cause Destructive War"--and its less-popular opposite: "Destructive Weapons Cause Mutual Deterrence; Mutual Deterrence Prevents Destructive War."

Consider four hypotheses on arms and the intensity of war:

1. States destroy what they can. The violence of war corresponds to the destructive power of states.
2. States destroy what they cannot avoid destroying. The violence of war depends on whether weapons are discriminating, e.g., accurate or not.
3. States destroy what they must to accomplish their war goals. The violence of war corresponds to the scope of those goals, and hence to the scope of political conflict between the belligerents.
4. States destroy least when they fear large punishment in return. The violence of war corresponds inversely to the ability of both belligerents to punish the other.

Note: Propositions #A1 and #A2 produce opposite prescriptions from #A4. Indeed, #A1 and #A4 are logical mirror opposites. What to make of this?

Solutions implied by Proposition #A1:
> Disarmament.
> Deploy forces that can disarm the other side--e.g., strategic nuclear counterforce forces (accurate silo-busting ICBMs and national missile defense).

Solutions implied by Proposition #A2:
> Deploy discriminating weapons that can be used without collateral damage--e.g., laser-guided bombs.
Ban land mines, especially hard-to-clear anti-personnel mines; and weapons of mass destruction.

Solution implied by Proposition #A3:
> All states should adopt defensive force postures so that their neighbors will not be insecure, hence will not feel the need to adopt desperate measures in a search for security.

Solution implied by Proposition #A4:
> States should arm themselves abundantly with well-protected weapons of mass destruction. "Nuclear weapons are your friend!"
> We should fear the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-deterrable states or non-state actors (nihilist terrorists or psychopaths). Non-state actors are hard to punish (they have no return address) and non-deterrable crazy states and non-state actors are indifferent to punishment.
> Wars of counterinsurgency will be especially violent, as they are wars in which governments and insurgents compete to coerce unarmed publics. The publics cannot punish either government or insurgents, so violence directed at them is intense.

B. "Total War Doctrine Causes Total War, Limited War Doctrines Allow Limited War."
C. "Defining and Observing Thresholds Helps Keep War Limited"--e.g., "I won't use gas if you won't."
D. "Don't destroy your opponent's command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)"--otherwise they can't observe your restraint or make peace with you. See an old science fiction novel, Berserker, on this danger.

III. CAUSES OF WAR AS CAUSES OF ESCALATION
A. First-strike advantages. When these exist, wars
1. Start at an intense level. Cf. the 1941 Japanese attack on the U.S.; the 1941 German attack on the USSR; and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Compare with the slow-growing 1939 war in Europe, U.S. in Vietnam.
2. Are fought intensely as each attacks before it is attacked.
3. Widen as belligerents preempt neutrals. Cf. the German invasion of Norway 1940.
4. Are harder to stop due to the treachery displayed by a surprise attack—why should the attacker now be trusted to keep peace?

B. Large windows—i.e., impending fluctuations in relative power. When these exist, wars
1. Start at an intense level. Cf. World War I, 1941 Pacific War.
2. Escalate as states jump through windows of opportunity in wartime. Cf. Hitler's 1940 attack on France, and Germany's 1918 offensive.
3. Widen as neutrals jump in to exploit windows opened by war. State A seizes the opportunity to attack state B when B becomes tied down fighting state C.

Note: windows also make war more barbaric. Belligerents often massacre POWs and populations because otherwise they will escape and rejoin the fight. See e.g., the 1976 massacre of Tal Zataar in Lebanon. Moreover, such horrors make losers fight to the end.

C. False optimism. This makes war
1. Persist—see e.g., World War I, World War II, Vietnam.
2. Escalate—see e.g., Germany's 1917 unlimited submarine campaign against the U.S.; and Athens' expedition to Syracuse in the Peloponnesian War, both fueled by false optimism.
3. Widen.

D. Cumulative resources. When resources are cumulative states struggle to control them for themselves, and to destroy them, in order to deny them to their opponent. These two motives drive much wartime destruction.

E. Offense vs. Defense: Does a strong offense make war more or less intense? 1914–1918 vs. 1792, 1939.

IV. WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AND ESCALATION

A. Do offensive military operations cause or dampen escalation? Both can happen. The U.S. rush to the Yalu in 1950 sparked escalation. The US invasion of Germany in 1945 didn't spark chemical use and ended the war.

B. Military operations open windows. Example: France tempted British Admiral Boscawen's attack on French warships in 1756 by stripping these ships of guns and using them as troop transports. A self-opened window.

V. DOES WAR BEGET MORE INTENSE WAR? IF SO, WHY?

A. War aims may expand in wartime as each side adopts a darker image of the other's intentions.
B. The use of force is blackmail, but states pay large reputation costs if they concede to blackmail. So using force makes others less as well as more willing to concede.

C. War creates false optimism. Belligerents' optimism grows as they fight.

D. States at war infuse their populations with hyper-nationalism and chauvinist mythmaking to persuade them to support costly war policies.

E. Wartime non-evaluation:
   1. Critical assessment of official policy becomes "aid and comfort to the enemy"—and in fact it is! Question: should wartime dissent therefore be suppressed?
   2. Ingroup-outgroup dynamics get going. Those who find fault with official policies are excoriated for the crime of sowing disunity in the tribe. Hence war policies are not properly evaluated.
   3. Wartime breakdown of communication between adversaries —> no external evaluation of each side's domestic debate —> lopsided debates on war aims. Sealed information bubbles appear. Hawks can spread unanswered lies about the enemy.

F. Sunk-cost dynamics and ego-investment by elites who can't admit they were wrong.

G. War creates a popular desire for vengeance. An emotional factor.

H. Do "Cleon's" (military hawks, other hawks) wield more political power in wartime?

A missing concept in wartime: The "Treason of the Hawks." Collaborating with enemies is reviled as treason, but ruining one's country in avoidable warfare is a crime with no name and no punishment.

VI. DOES WAR BEGET WIDE WAR? WHY?
Wars tend to spread laterally and engulf other states:
1. Wars open windows that other states jump through. WWI opened a window for the Ottoman empire to regain Russian territory, and for Bulgaria to regain Serb territory, and for Italy to gain Austrian territory. So they joined the war. World War II in Europe opened a window for Japan that caused WWII in the Pacific.
2. Wars have crossfire effects: neutrals are damaged, as the US was damaged in 1914-17; and as in the Gulf Tanker War of the 1980s. The neutrals enter to stop the damage.
3. Decisive wars threaten the security interests of states threatened by the enlarged power of the winner. E.g., Hitler's victories in 1939-40 threatened US security, spurring it to join WWII. Some argue (Buerhig) that possible German success also brought the US into WWI. These dynamics sucked the USA into three of Europe's five great wars of 1792-1945.

VII. WHAT WILL WORLD WAR III BE LIKE? THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION/BIO REVOLUTION AND THE INTENSITY OF WAR