WHO FIGHTS AMERICA'S WARS

1. RECRUITMENT

Three types: Militias, Draft, and AVF—pre-modern, Mass, Professional—recruiting affects way you manage org and fight

Eliot Cohen has pointed out: America free and democratic society
   >> Free men usually don't wish to become soldiers
   >> Democratic society abhors unequal burdens

Wars big or small risk soldier lives;
   Recruitment methods place unfair burdens—some must die

Behind method is a type of public consent and a set of unique problems

A. MILITIAS

Initially mandatory for local defense but grew into voluntary club-like organizations---Originally elected officers---legacy is the National Guard---really 50 plus organizations with mix of merit and politically appointed officers. Rod and Gun clubs. Alternative status for failed businessmen.

Mobilization base for Army, which was until recently kept small. Wars would require state contributions and consent. (Very big wars need drafts as well.)

[Enlisted regular forces criminals, immigrants
What was USMC job through much of 19th Century—Ship Guards]

Militia evolved into NG in Progressive Era reforms.[ Naval reformers wanted USMC off ships.]

Regulars hate NG and vis versa. Amateurs; in past always relieved Guard officers/ use troops as fillers

Politically difficult to deal with --- no service gets along with reserve component-----not even USAF and USMC; Guard is just harder to deal with
Politicians afraid of them ---8 divisions called for Korea—lots of grousing 150K for Berlin Crisis---Johnson learns to avoid ---none for VN. Afraid of 35 year married types—becomes haven for politicians' sons (George W. Bush).

Army doesn't trust Guard—Round out brigades in Gulf War. Wants them Combat Service Support. Guard wants combat reserve role –kills USAR capability.

Out of date, costly, unreformable except through exhaustion; Iraq deployments may destroy: have to cut or reform. Homeland Defense role?

**B. DRAFT**

Drafts are hard to initiate and sustain

Civil War Draft Riot in NYC killed 1500

WWII (greatest generation) draft passed by one vote in 1940. Fight with Mac and Never Come Back

WWII registered 49 Million
   Selected 19 million
   Inducted 10 million

Big long Wars pool gets exhausted
Small long wars pool too big ---VN

**WW II** shortages by 1943
   22 million men in 18-37
   7 million already in service
   8 million unfit
   1.7 million job deferral
   1.5 million farmers

   3.8 to find 2.5 (1 million exempt for being married with children)

**Cold War** Draft 1948-1974
Korea 1.5 Million draftees sent to Korea plus 700 K Reservists/Guardsmen

Vietnam -no reservists sent, system eventually cracks
Draft 25% of personnel who served in VN
50% of Army
88% of infantry
70% of deaths (1969) 18-26 2 years of service -- 1 year train, 1 VN
50% overall deaths
Draft fills ranks of other services "Viet Cong ain't got no submarines."

Long, medium sized wars too much for system
- too much for volunteers
- too many in pool

WWII 3 appeals per 1000, K 47/1000, VN 98/1000 (Spain > 50%)

CO, 60-100K go to Canada, Sweden, NG for some elites to get out
In Mass required draft of 320 to get 100, it was AVF by end.

1966 was peak 335-380K drafted, needed about 30K a month; 150K males turned 19 each month. Needed 1 in 5 to get 2 of the 5 to enlist.

Guilt lots of problem --- you stayed, guys who went get brush with death;
It must not be a good war if you don't want to go.

Two Key Changes
- Politicians ------- AVF 1972
- Military ------------ Total Force - No use of military without reserves—1973

Impact: wasteful attitudes toward manpower wares away, but lingers

C. ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE

Hard to get right
• Fears of quality and not representative – class/college

• Fear of Black disproportionate force

• Fear that will not attract enough

Brings in women (now 15+%), higher pay (paid too much?), better living conditions, more technology (precision guided weapons, UAVs, robots), more contracting out (Brown & Root), fear of casualties------

BIG FACTOR IN USE OF FORCE --- what about Iraq? How do we police Iraq?

• Not enough volunteers (What influences enlistment?)

• No Draft (what would it take? How would you deal with women? Too many – 4 million in each age cohort)

• Reserve call up (150-200K now). Living in Baghdad.

Alternatives to AVF Total Force in long run:

• Mercenaries

• Foreigners to get citizenship (4 % now)

• Contractors

D. RACE and GENDER what are the percentages?

Better than rest of society------why?

Are problems hidden------Tail Hook, post-Tail Hook?

Segregation and fairness?---minorities concentrated in few occupations

The blending of cultures

Distorting the facts on racial composition of killed/wounded
E. SOCIOLOGICAL CHANGES

Force is married with children

Need more technically trained people/ more have college

Foreign born

II. TRAINING/ SOCIALIZATION

Recruit training, cadet induction classic examples in org theory of process by which what sociologists call Total Institutions give new participants new organization identity---strip away class, income, outside status and give new one.

Break down and build up -----haircuts, uniforms, no money, physical abuse/strain then a new set of values

Values: selflessness, cooperation, unit cohesion

USMC (organizational myths)

Tom Ricks say Marines disappointed by Society (lot made of that), but also USMC

Army training different?; some co-ed. Why?

Class system within military ___Still functional? sustainable? Two organizations-BIG DIVIDE

Stouffer ---Officers over estimate satisfaction, morale

Soldiering

Davis shows even officers don't (can't) live up to code

Moskos  Army/military build on mass, combat has to adjust to PostModern world. Soldiers don't need military as much for training, education (since 1960s) can walk away.
Contracts instead of discipline----Brown and Root?

III. HIERARCHY

Hierarchy (rank) is needed in organizations to make decisions, achieve coordination, gain cooperation especially in operations ---life or death. Best example, medicine another.

But in military organizations rank not only hierarchy

- Combat v. non-combat; rated v non-rated (commands, 30% of officers 88% of generals); pilot v. navigator (only 2 made general by 1970 –first in 65)
- Branches and platform (combat v non-combat, fighters v bombers, types of fighters)
- Unit v unit (ranger v delta, SAC v TAC)
- geography v geography
- regular v. reservist (AF kept ceiling of 30% nonrated for regular into 60s; 3,180 regular officers in '45 and only 69 not pilots)
- pay

Functional? Sustainable? (AF need for space corps and unmanned ops)

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