IX. Questions?

A. How and why was there any focused effort on COIN in the 1960s?

1. How do we explain the extent to which there was ultimately a “half successful” COIN capability and operation?
2. What does the process look like and what can we learn from it?
3. What Innovation “Look alikes” do we see in this period, and why? (Air cav.)
4. Did any of the “Innovation” survive?

B. Is there a “dominant strategy” “technology” or “cook book” for Counter-Insurgency, or is it fairer to day there are “best practices” that affect probabilities, against the backdrop of local factors? Sometimes this may not be doable?

1. Does the diffuse rhetoric around the GWOT and its solutions now seem familiar, having read Shafer and Marquis?
2. Will we often know enough to understand ex ante whether the general lessons of successful COIN could help us with the specific situation, or whether it is virgin territory?

C. What if anything has changed about the environment of insurgencies since the 1960s?

1. Demography – way more people, more politically mobilized people.
2. Topography – sub or ex-urbanization?
3. Weapons – too damn many, too damn cheap.
4. Skills – some important ones seem to have diffused? And continue to diffuse?
5. Public eye? – COIN lends itself to human rights abuses: even limited ones will loom large publicly.
6. Western militaries – professionalisation limits size in country? What does this mean? The 1-2-5% rules of thumb?? (Plus TAIL)

D. If we pretend that our adversaries read a bit about Viet Nam, is there any evidence they learned anything?

1. IE The transition to Phase 3, it is a thing of the past?
2. A very Weberian insurgent bureaucracy, is it a thing of the past?
3. Clear political programs with strong ideological content [Viet Cong to the Al Q Caliphate]? (as opposed to diffuse nationalism, localism, patriotism, religion to center on ANTI-OCCUPATION?)