1952-1959

The “Nuclearization” of U.S. National Security Policy

Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomber Gap</td>
<td>Missile Gap</td>
<td>U2</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Sputnik</td>
<td>DIA</td>
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<td>BM EW</td>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
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<td>Arms control</td>
<td>Open Skies</td>
<td>Gain Report</td>
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<td>'hardening' sites</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>First strike attack</td>
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<td>Wars of national liberation</td>
<td>(strategic)  &quot;sufficiency&quot;</td>
<td>Fall out shelters/civil defense</td>
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<td>Intelligence failure</td>
<td>survivability</td>
<td>SEATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNW</td>
<td>Delicate balance of terror</td>
<td>Military industrial complex</td>
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The Setting -- 1952

- Eisenhower elected President
- Korean War stalemate
- New Nuclear Technologies
  - H-Bomb
  - Tactical Nuclear Weapons
  - Missiles

Administration Outlook

- US Interests
  - to trade freely
  - Access to markets, goods, & raw materials
- East-West Cold War is Ideological and immutable
  - Focus on intentions of U.S.S.R.
  - Belief that a coherent external threat helps solidify the nation & allies
- Revulsion to Korean War experience

Eisenhower State of the Union Address (2/33)

- Deny the opponent the choice of time, place, and means of conflict
  - deterrence via uncertainty
  - asymmetrical responses
  - NSC-68 called for symmetrical responses
- balance military needs against economic needs
  - Stable economy and military strength are inseparable
  - cannot sacrifice former for the latter
- mobilization is no longer sound basis for defense
  - we must have capacity to strike back massively
  - maximum deterrent at acceptable cost
  - city targeting

Massive Retaliation (1952-1953)

- Four Point Strategy
  - Nuclear weapons
    - Strategic weapons
    - Substitute for manpower
  - Alliances
    - Provide manpower for land combat (no U.S. troops)
    - Covert operations
    - Negotiations
New Look

NSC 162
- Threat = wars of national liberation (nibbled to death)
- local wars like Korea to be fought by local forces
- shift military emphasis to deterrence
- strategic nuclear power & air defense
- development of tactical nuclear weapons to offset manpower
- prevent Army from generating large numbers of troops
- reduce the Navy
- U.S. to take the initiative – not react

Impact
- US forces drop from 3.5 mill to 2.5 mill by 1960
- Military Budget Fixed; Service Budgets Fixed
- MILEXP (1955) ~ 13% GNP
- MILEXP (1960) ~ 9% GNP
- Army COs Maxwell Taylor resigns in protest

What Happened?

McCarthy & Communist Scare
- H-Bomb (1952)
- US TNW (1952)
- DEW Line authorized (1952)
- Soviet H-Bomb (1953)
- Open Cross (1953)
- Guatemala Crisis (1954)
- Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
- Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-1955)
- Austrian peace treaty (1955)
- Open skies (1955)
- BMEWS Construction (1959)
- Eisenhower MIC Speech (1960)

End
The DEW Line (1956)

Distant Early Warning System (1956)

NATO and the Warsaw Pact (1955)

Suez Crisis (1956)

Poland & Hungary (1956)

Middle East (1957-1958)
Eisenhower Doctrine

- Military and economic cooperation with Middle East regimes to ensure regional stability
- Use U.S. military forces if requested to help resist communist-inspired aggression

U2 Reconnaissance Aircraft

The Missile Gap

- Delicate Balance of Terror
  - First strike threat ➔ bomber dispersal & alert status
- U.S. MRBMs/IRBMs go to Europe

CENTO (1959)

BMEWS