Week 7 Reading Summaries

Very good review article. Outlines major strands of thought on Latin America and civil-military relations, chronologically. Latin American studies field flourished after Kennedy’s 1961 Alliance for progress → Money for centers of research. Modernization theory: Huntington (praetorian), Stepan Wesson. Military (not controlled by US) differentially modernized vs. the rest of society.

Corporatist/cultural Wiarda, Stepan refer to Iberian/Catholic culture, colonial and war of independence legacy, caudillo.

Dependency: Casanova, Cardoso refuted by growth of export industry including Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela dependence on the US to increase, but democracy/civil and US involvement in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay decreased after the Coup (Rouquie).

Bureaucratic authoritarianism: O’Donnell. Military came to power to facilitate the leap from import-sub to export economy. Need intervention--need to undo high cons, welfare, wages, establish blunt of import-sub economy. Refuted by fear of investors at coup and comparison with Mexico and Columbia industrialization. Comments on were writings on breakdown of military rule (illegitimacy) and recent works. Favors modernization insight into Stepan’s Brazil and Southern Core: attention to coexistence of military and civil government after the military stepped down.


There are 2 schools of thought: “liberal” (military rule is a temporary setback/aberration to democratization) and “economist” (military comes to power to serve economic interests and leaves when job is done.) Both consider the military regimes as temporary and provide block reductionist theory. Doesn’t believe either one is accurate. There has been a lot of diversity in the subsequent ebbs and flows of military dictatorship since WWII in Latin America. Unlike European fascism, the military regime in Latin America, usually has no ideology. Some argue that “national security” and have to invoke some prospect or façade of democracy for legitimization.


Discusses Thomistic legal tradition of Castille and the role of the king as a locus of legitimacy (Aragorn-Spain) to an account of gifted 19th century caudillos in Latin
America: Rosas (Argentina), Castillo (Peru), Santa Cruz (Bolivia), Carrera (Guatemala), and Barrios (Salvador). Caudillo is usually committed to a region, ruled over smaller regional lords (caciques), typically from mestizo background as upper class receded to ruling their estates after independence. Chile and Brazil don’t have caudillos smooth history. Conclusion?


Brazil coup in ’64. During the 70s, the aberturas allowed the opposition to exist as a “civil society.” In 1985, the first civilian was elected president and there were more disappearances in Argentina, totalitarian ideology in Uruguay, but most sophisticated internal intelligence apparatus in Brazil. Old professionalism (external security stay out of politics) vs. new professionalism (internal security, dominate politics).

Paradox: beginning of abertura saw strengthening of intelligence and were hardliners in positions—reflex, dual accommodation, desire of hardliners to show there was reason not to open up. Advocates measures in the end for stronger democratic consolidation, legislatorial oversight, etc.

**Lecture:**

US and the USSR civilian control, not much variation (some in USSR). Now move to other cases with military control and variation.

1964-1976 all but Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica had military rule by the 1990s. All but Cuba and Haiti are democracies.

Explanations:
Structural economic most popular for years.

!.) Huntington Political Order in changing societies: when there aren’t any institutions to resolve conflicts, the military decides—->praetorian (late Rome). Differential modernization. Quick fix: reduce political participation until you build institutions.

B.) Dependency Theory-Marxist. International capitalist order, early and late developers. Capitalist class in developing country sides with early democratic states. Use military to dominate the state. The theory has gone by the way side due to East Asian economic miracle. Also it was pretty vague.

C. Bureaucratic authoritarianism—Guillermo O’Donnell. 1945-1969 populist governments with import substitution. Labor unions were strong, urbanization,
larger middle class. Growth slowed in the 60s and they had to crack down on unions, need for investments and more capital, less labor. Military comes in to discipline society, exercises bureaucratic rather than personalistic authority (outgrowth of dependency theory but assumes rich elite is independent of western subordination; this theory brings more agency within country).

This theory lost credibility because military governments didn’t attract more investments than civilians before them. Its paradigm case was like Chile. Allende nationalized, Pinochet asked University of Chicago economist to provide economic plan.

Cultural/Historical
Compare France and El Salvador. Iberian culture is to blame, etc. We criticize this theory. Britain had a king too.

Ingelheart did a world study on the acceptance of authority. Collectivism vs. individualism. Countries with Catholic heritage are different from Northwest Protestant who were more acceptant of authority. During Medieval times: personalistic and local (Putnam’s argument about Holy too). Renaissance: constitution/liberalism trust leader vs. institutions.

Better version: caudillo history allows the norm, “not bad for military to take over.”

Institutional

Desch:
Brazilian military felt threatened by subversion ranks by leftist leaders. After the military is in power for 10 years, the threat goes back to low. Intervention=threat to budget share, autonomy or cohesion. Other variable: national security doctrine internally based doctrine → Threatens military as an institution. This explains why the military gets in.

Why in the 60s? Is there a general threat to institutional position of the military?

Other interesting thing about Latin America is that the military gets in and gets out. Issue is how much authority remains with the military after transition, why, for how long?

Brazil
1964 coup: 5 military governments return to civilian in 1985. No Franco figure, rotation. Consensus of officers, consult with lower ranks, but senior officers have say. Jean Kirkpatrick, why ok to cooperate with the military but not with the communists? Because these regimes don’t have an ideal that sustains them, it will be temporary. NSC has 5 “divisions” each headed by a colonel domestic and foreign policy, economic development, social development, external defense, international security, SNT(national information service) headed by general, monitors leftists, combined CIA and FBI, no oversight, just subordinate to president. Militarized police separate from regular police. The most powerful section of the organization in Latin America (because so efficient) don’t kill lots of people as in Argentina (Petersen had seen in a study in the 80s, that the US came up as more repressive than Romania because more people were imprisoned for free speech—no one dared to express dissent in Romania.
Stepan: civil society, political society, state. Liberalization (civil society) vs. democratization (political society contestation). *Abertura* were involved in the liberalization but not the democratization. Less censorship, etc.

Professionalism discussion difference from Huntington.

Old and New

Military allowed elections with opposition increased and the percentage of military budget goes down during military rule! Unlike other countries and a decline of military prestige. Stepan: cost of suppression outweighed the benefits—went out by ensuring no one would be persecuted and the military would continue to control key industries, defense industry would be retained.