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PROFESSOR: I've prepared
some slides, of course,

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but I don't know, please
interrupt at any time

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00:00:27,820 --> 00:00:30,230
and ask questions, OK?

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00:00:30,230 --> 00:00:35,370
I've sort of got a big panorama
of things to talk about.

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It's basically impossible
to cover everything, OK?

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I mean, basically I
advertise this talk

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as an outlook for the
future, and of course, that's

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too broad.

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So I've picked a
few things which

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are of special interest
to me, and what

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they are are the possible
pathways to nuclear war.

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Now, as you know, what
I talk about often

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is in comparing the danger
to the planet, and of course,

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its population, of climate
change and nuclear war.

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So climate change is just--
I think the probability is

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pretty close to 100%.

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I don't know how to quantify
it, but it's fairly certain

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that we are into an
era of global warming

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and its consequences.

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And this is a slow,
steady thing in terms

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of probability of occurrence
with all its ramifications.

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Nuclear war is much
easier to avoid,

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but if it happens-- and
of course, every day

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the probability is very low.

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That's what I call the
probability structure.

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So the probability of a nuclear
war any specific day is low.

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The cumulative probability
is higher, of course.

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And if that event occurs,
it's catastrophic.

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So what happens is the
destruction just starts in.

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The destruction, of course,
is local in the place

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where the weapon blows up.

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The destruction, it depends
how many bombs go off

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and how much soot
goes into the air,

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but we could have
global consequences

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if there are enough of them.

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A so-called nuclear winter.

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So having said that, I
just want to talk about--

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and this is the fear, of course.

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And that's what keeps some of
us worrying about this problem

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and working on it.

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So basically I want to talk
about the possible pathways

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to nuclear war.

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I'll talk a little bit
about proliferation

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and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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I'll say just a few words
about the possibility

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of nuclear weapons abolition.

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I'll talk a wee bit about
Obama's record and the outlook.

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That's a pretty
ambitious agenda.

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There are endless debates about
the utility of nuclear weapons.

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Some people are at
least pro having them.

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Not using them, but having
them, because, of course,

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they were pro in the one
case that they were used,

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and of course, we used them
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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One group of people
says that actually saved

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lives because the war ended
more quicker that way.

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I think that's highly
debatable, but it's

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a point of view which is held.

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So it actually saved casualties
and it prevented World War III.

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These are some of the arguments.

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I'm not trying to
give all of them,

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but these are arguments that
you can find in the literature.

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And you can find books, and
this just goes back and forth.

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And of course, the
counter argument

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was that the use of
atomic weapons in Japan

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was not necessary.

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What was really
necessary was to agree

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that the Emperor could
stay on, and that

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turned out to be the
key that people argue.

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And certainly almost
everyone agrees

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that the use of the
second bomb in Nagasaki

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was something that should
not have been done.

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I think there's much
more agreement to that.

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There are books that
this use was actually

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the first step of the Cold War.

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Of course, many
Japanese civilians

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were killed, several
hundred thousand,

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and two cities were destroyed.

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On the other hand, we destroyed
almost all the major cities

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in Japan by
conventional weapons.

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And of course, Japan did not
have an unblemished record

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in Korea and China and so forth.

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I'm not going to go into
that, but the moral dimensions

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of World War II are
pretty horrible.

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I'll stop there.

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The inhibition about
killing civilians

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pretty much disappeared
in World War I

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and was just totally ignored
in World War II, I would say.

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And in the post-war
era, the argument

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is that you didn't
need nuclear weapons

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to prevent a war between the
United States and the Soviet

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Union.

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I pretty much think
that's the case myself.

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So here are the questions.

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There have been no nuclear
wars since the first two

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weapons were used.

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Of course, there have
been many explosions,

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but they were tests.

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So was that deterrence?

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There's a theory
about nuclear taboo

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because they're
morally so awful.

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I'm a bit skeptical,
but it's a theory

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that's out there by an
important Yale sociologist.

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Is it luck, other
reasons, and so forth.

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So many of us-- well, I'll
give you some of my conclusions

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at the end, but the
crucial question

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is does the possession
of nuclear weapons

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make a country more secure?

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You heard this in
the case of Ukraine

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when the Russians took the
Crimean, when they basically

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have their stealth invasion
of the Ukraine, which

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is going on as we speak.

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Would a Ukrainian nuclear
weapon deter them?

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And when the Soviet Union
broke up in the end of 1991,

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there was a lot of discussion
about what would happen

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to all the nuclear weapons.

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They were mostly in Russia,
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

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And we managed to
persuade the Ukrainians--

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they were the toughest--
and the Kazakhs

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to give all those
weapons to Russia.

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But in fact, one of the
things-- and there's

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a lot of history here-- but
one of the best articles

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that I've read, and I
think it's obviously true,

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states that in fact the Ukraine
and Kazakhstan never really

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owned those weapons.

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They were really owned
by the Soviet Union.

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The Ukrainian army was
not prepared to take them

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in any way.

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They really didn't have an army.

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They hardly have an army now,
20 years later or something.

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So there's no realistic
way that the Ukrainians

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had a nuclear weapon
that could be used.

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They had possession
of nuclear weapons,

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but not the actual
ability to use them.

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So it's a very funny thing.

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It's a very special case,
and it's a very funny thing.

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But that argument is heard.

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I would say more important,
or at least as important,

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is is the present
situation stable?

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This is a key question.

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Many people doubt it
that our good fortune

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in not having any nuclear
exchanges since 1945

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is purely deterrence.

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if there isn't an element of
luck or other issues involved.

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And each specific
case is different.

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So it's hard to generalize.

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I mean, one of the issues,
one of the differences

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between physics
and arms control,

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is how the lack
in arms control is

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the lack, really, of science.

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How much more difficult the
situation is to evaluate.

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And of course, now
with relationships

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between the United
States and Russian,

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in fact, the whole west and
Russia at a low point, probably

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a few decade old low point,
the future of arms control

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seems bleak at this
moment, I have to say.

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It's hard to maintain optimism.

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And finally there's
this perennial question

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about abolishing
nuclear weapons, which

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is certainly more and more
remote as time goes on.

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But I think as
academics we should

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think about it, because these
are very important issues.

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So we should think long-range
is what I'm saying.

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It's not going to happen
quickly, obviously.

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If at all.

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But is it desirable?

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There are two
separate questions.

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Is it desirable and
is it going to happen.

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So immediately after the
development of the atomic bomb,

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there were intense discussions
inside of the Manhattan Project

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before the public knew about it.

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And there was this
famous Franck Report,

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and the conclusions of the
Franck Report are here.

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Use the bomb for a
demonstration, not on cities.

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Share the secret.

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The secret-- not necessary
the details of how to make it.

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I don't think anyone
ever proposed that.

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What's meant here is share
the secret of its existence

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before its use.

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That's what they're
talking about.

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Because the use without notice,
particularly without notice

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to the Soviet
Union, would ensure

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the start of a war, a Cold
War, and a nuclear arms race.

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And that's exactly what
the scientists predicted.

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These were very
sophisticated people.

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Franck was a Nobel
Laureate from Germany

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who escaped from Hitler.

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And there were many other
things that happened.

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The scientists banded together.

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They formed the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists,

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the Federation of Atomic
Scientists, which still goes on

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although it's not
as strong as it was.

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And they developed this
Acheson-Lilienthal plan,

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in which Oppenheimer
played a major role.

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And it ended up as the
Baruch plan, which was not

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really what was proposed, and
it was turned down immediately

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00:13:52,960 --> 00:13:57,110
by the Soviet Union
for various reasons.

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I can go into them, but I won't.

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So the era of possible
arms control in 1945,

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00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:18,260
1946, collapsed in the beginning
of the Cold War period.

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And what the scientists
feared the most happened.

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00:14:24,860 --> 00:14:27,940
And the other thing
is-- and you hear this

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00:14:27,940 --> 00:14:32,240
from the people who
first developed the bomb

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00:14:32,240 --> 00:14:36,030
and then worked as actively
as they could against it,

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and many of them were at MIT.

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00:14:38,910 --> 00:14:41,100
Some of the names
you know very well.

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00:14:41,100 --> 00:14:42,710
Victor Weisskopf.

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00:14:42,710 --> 00:14:44,840
There was Hans
Bethe from Cornell.

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And there was just a
whole group of people,

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00:14:49,060 --> 00:14:52,290
very prominent scientists.

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00:14:52,290 --> 00:14:58,720
And Hans Bethe-- both Viki
Weisskopf and Hans Bethe

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00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:02,490
told me personally, but they
said it many times in public,

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00:15:02,490 --> 00:15:06,730
that when we realized
in about 1946

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00:15:06,730 --> 00:15:09,760
that there was no agreement
was going to happen,

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00:15:09,760 --> 00:15:14,580
we asked ourselves, what is the
worst thing that could happen?

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00:15:14,580 --> 00:15:19,880
And they said, we would
build a hundred weapons.

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00:15:19,880 --> 00:15:21,950
100.

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00:15:21,950 --> 00:15:25,080
And the Russians would
build 100 weapons.

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00:15:25,080 --> 00:15:29,160
And then we would face each
other down with 100 weapons.

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00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:33,590
That was the worst these
sophisticated, bright men could

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00:15:33,590 --> 00:15:39,540
imagine in 1946.

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00:15:39,540 --> 00:15:43,400
So what did people expect?

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00:15:43,400 --> 00:15:45,740
First, the atomic
scientists, they

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00:15:45,740 --> 00:15:49,970
thought that the nuclear
weapon was so horrible

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00:15:49,970 --> 00:15:54,200
it would change the
behavior of mankind.

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And politicians like
Churchill and Roosevelt

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00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:01,870
believed that this
powerful weapon

234
00:16:01,870 --> 00:16:05,990
would allow England
and the United States,

235
00:16:05,990 --> 00:16:11,760
with their monopoly,
to be able to say

236
00:16:11,760 --> 00:16:13,395
the way the world evolved.

237
00:16:16,080 --> 00:16:20,100
So both sides were wrong.

238
00:16:20,100 --> 00:16:22,130
Typical.

239
00:16:22,130 --> 00:16:29,170
So the influence that it had
has been reasonably small.

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00:16:29,170 --> 00:16:32,350
We never got the Russians
to agree to almost anything

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00:16:32,350 --> 00:16:34,680
we wanted them to do.

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00:16:34,680 --> 00:16:37,500
For example, they took
over Eastern Europe.

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00:16:37,500 --> 00:16:39,600
We hated that.

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00:16:39,600 --> 00:16:41,560
They did it.

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00:16:41,560 --> 00:16:42,220
Et cetera.

246
00:16:42,220 --> 00:16:44,230
You know, it just
goes on and on.

247
00:16:44,230 --> 00:16:45,630
The Communists took China.

248
00:16:45,630 --> 00:16:46,665
We hated that.

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00:16:49,610 --> 00:16:54,840
The list of things-- I just
mentioned a few major ones.

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00:16:54,840 --> 00:16:57,870
So that's what I mean by
its coercive influence.

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00:16:57,870 --> 00:17:02,390
Its possession became a status
symbol almost right away.

252
00:17:04,900 --> 00:17:08,970
But there is some
deterrence in it.

253
00:17:08,970 --> 00:17:11,700
Deterrence isn't
completely useless.

254
00:17:11,700 --> 00:17:14,960
Deterrence and abhorrence,
a combination of the two

255
00:17:14,960 --> 00:17:17,710
of them I think,
works to some extent.

256
00:17:17,710 --> 00:17:21,170
So there's been a non-use.

257
00:17:21,170 --> 00:17:24,450
Now, I want you to
look at this graph.

258
00:17:24,450 --> 00:17:29,470
This is the buildup of
nuclear weapons between us

259
00:17:29,470 --> 00:17:31,790
and the Soviet Union.

260
00:17:31,790 --> 00:17:33,115
And you notice this scale?

261
00:17:37,120 --> 00:17:39,550
5,000, 10,000.

262
00:17:39,550 --> 00:17:41,320
100 is down here.

263
00:17:46,520 --> 00:17:49,430
The Soviet Union blew
up their first bomb

264
00:17:49,430 --> 00:17:54,720
four years after we
did, as predicted.

265
00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:58,450
Not only was it predicted
that they would get the bomb,

266
00:17:58,450 --> 00:18:02,310
but that it would take
them three to five years.

267
00:18:02,310 --> 00:18:06,290
That was the number that was
given by the atomic scientists.

268
00:18:06,290 --> 00:18:10,510
And it was hotly disputed
in Washington, but so what.

269
00:18:10,510 --> 00:18:15,570
And again, we built up
to astronomical numbers.

270
00:18:15,570 --> 00:18:18,410
Tens of thousands of weapons.

271
00:18:18,410 --> 00:18:21,070
And finally we
have a slow decline

272
00:18:21,070 --> 00:18:23,300
through nuclear arms
control agreements

273
00:18:23,300 --> 00:18:26,810
and through terrifying events,
like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

274
00:18:30,300 --> 00:18:34,560
And the spirit of
that build up is,

275
00:18:34,560 --> 00:18:39,760
I think, exemplified
in this great cartoon,

276
00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:43,131
which you can read for yourself,
from the middle of the Cold

277
00:18:43,131 --> 00:18:43,630
War.

278
00:18:46,560 --> 00:18:49,290
And I think this says the story.

279
00:18:49,290 --> 00:18:51,050
AUDIENCE: Is that
the only reason?

280
00:18:51,050 --> 00:18:52,025
PROFESSOR: Fear.

281
00:18:52,025 --> 00:18:52,500
AUDIENCE: Fear is
the only reason?

282
00:18:52,500 --> 00:18:53,780
PROFESSOR: Fear.

283
00:18:53,780 --> 00:18:57,270
Well, I mean, they developed
all kinds of fancy strategies,

284
00:18:57,270 --> 00:19:00,550
but at the heart of it was fear.

285
00:19:00,550 --> 00:19:05,790
Just plain fear of a
devastating first strike.

286
00:19:05,790 --> 00:19:09,670
And then you had to build up
counterforce capabilities,

287
00:19:09,670 --> 00:19:12,030
be able to absorb
the first strike,

288
00:19:12,030 --> 00:19:16,970
and able to destroy the
enemy after the first strike.

289
00:19:16,970 --> 00:19:23,870
But the astronomical
number was mad.

290
00:19:23,870 --> 00:19:28,450
And it was called MAD,
Mutual Assured Destruction.

291
00:19:28,450 --> 00:19:32,330
It was literally called MAD.

292
00:19:32,330 --> 00:19:34,290
Those of us looking
from the outside--

293
00:19:34,290 --> 00:19:36,200
but we weren't really
on the outside,

294
00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:40,130
because we would have been the
victims-- thought it was mad.

295
00:19:40,130 --> 00:19:45,030
But you know, logic
is in a certain sense,

296
00:19:45,030 --> 00:19:48,600
irrelevant in this situation.

297
00:19:48,600 --> 00:19:55,220
I mean, there's such a
grip of fear on both sides.

298
00:19:55,220 --> 00:19:56,250
And it's really true.

299
00:19:56,250 --> 00:19:59,270
I sat through the
Cuban Missile Crisis

300
00:19:59,270 --> 00:20:02,140
personally with a
dedicated Russian

301
00:20:02,140 --> 00:20:05,840
Communist who had actually
come to work in my laboratory.

302
00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:09,980
It was a very
interesting experience.

303
00:20:09,980 --> 00:20:14,130
He thought it was all the
fault of the United States.

304
00:20:14,130 --> 00:20:15,700
Most of the people
thought it was

305
00:20:15,700 --> 00:20:20,860
the fault of the Soviet Union.

306
00:20:20,860 --> 00:20:22,830
Most of the people here.

307
00:20:22,830 --> 00:20:29,870
But I thought they were
both at fault. You know,

308
00:20:29,870 --> 00:20:32,960
I thought-- not that they
were equally nice people,

309
00:20:32,960 --> 00:20:37,320
but that they were just
operating from too much fear.

310
00:20:37,320 --> 00:20:40,400
So they overdid it.

311
00:20:40,400 --> 00:20:42,640
You know, this business
of a hundred weapons.

312
00:20:42,640 --> 00:20:46,840
I often ask students in class
how many weapons are enough,

313
00:20:46,840 --> 00:20:51,210
and nobody knows how to
answer that question.

314
00:20:51,210 --> 00:20:52,850
But then I say,
well, how many cities

315
00:20:52,850 --> 00:20:55,190
are you willing to give up?

316
00:20:55,190 --> 00:20:58,120
You now, in the case of
the Russians, is it Moscow?

317
00:20:58,120 --> 00:20:58,730
Leningrad?

318
00:20:58,730 --> 00:20:59,630
That's two cities.

319
00:21:02,140 --> 00:21:05,430
And there's a famous exchange
between Jerome Wiesner, who

320
00:21:05,430 --> 00:21:09,570
was ex-president of
MIT, and also a science

321
00:21:09,570 --> 00:21:13,860
adviser the Kennedy, with
Gorbachev where he asked them

322
00:21:13,860 --> 00:21:17,060
exactly this question.

323
00:21:17,060 --> 00:21:20,540
And Gorbachev was just amazed.

324
00:21:20,540 --> 00:21:25,740
So well, there you go.

325
00:21:25,740 --> 00:21:30,440
So I think it's fear
and distrust, of course.

326
00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:34,180
Fear and distrust,
they go together.

327
00:21:34,180 --> 00:21:35,590
And that's very important.

328
00:21:35,590 --> 00:21:39,890
I just want to point out that
one of our nuclear submarines--

329
00:21:39,890 --> 00:21:42,460
this is the maximum
loading, by the way.

330
00:21:42,460 --> 00:21:45,660
They're loaded a little less
now, but it doesn't matter.

331
00:21:45,660 --> 00:21:49,170
I don't change this slide.

332
00:21:49,170 --> 00:21:54,450
But basically they have 100
and 300 kiloton warheads.

333
00:21:54,450 --> 00:21:59,320
So in order of magnitude,
larger than the Hiroshima weapon

334
00:21:59,320 --> 00:21:59,935
on Nagasaki.

335
00:22:02,490 --> 00:22:07,570
And each submarine has a
maximum loading, it should say,

336
00:22:07,570 --> 00:22:09,680
of 96 warheads.

337
00:22:09,680 --> 00:22:12,090
They're independently targeted.

338
00:22:12,090 --> 00:22:15,870
You can destroy 96 targets.

339
00:22:15,870 --> 00:22:21,670
After firing, it takes 10 or
15 minutes to reach Russia.

340
00:22:21,670 --> 00:22:26,700
So you could-- it's
kind of staggering.

341
00:22:26,700 --> 00:22:30,640
So the total explosive
power is three times that

342
00:22:30,640 --> 00:22:32,680
of World War II.

343
00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:34,579
One submarine.

344
00:22:34,579 --> 00:22:35,245
It's incredible.

345
00:22:42,310 --> 00:22:46,590
This is the present global
inventory, more or less.

346
00:22:46,590 --> 00:22:49,350
You can see-- this is
the number that counts.

347
00:22:49,350 --> 00:22:53,950
These are the
strategic warheads,

348
00:22:53,950 --> 00:22:58,210
and you can see there
the order of 1,500, which

349
00:22:58,210 --> 00:23:00,960
is this new START Treaty limit.

350
00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:03,350
We're just about at
that limit anyway.

351
00:23:03,350 --> 00:23:06,920
And that all the other countries
have typically a few hundred

352
00:23:06,920 --> 00:23:09,360
at the most.

353
00:23:09,360 --> 00:23:11,730
This is all guesswork
as to the numbers.

354
00:23:14,720 --> 00:23:16,580
It's not known.

355
00:23:16,580 --> 00:23:19,570
I think 10 for North
Korea is probably

356
00:23:19,570 --> 00:23:24,020
a factor of two to
three high, but it

357
00:23:24,020 --> 00:23:26,230
gives an order of magnitude.

358
00:23:26,230 --> 00:23:29,930
This is guesswork, frankly,
because these are all secret.

359
00:23:29,930 --> 00:23:32,390
So people do the best they can.

360
00:23:32,390 --> 00:23:36,830
This is a table from Hans
Kristensen and the Federation

361
00:23:36,830 --> 00:23:40,590
of American Scientists who keeps
track of these things as well

362
00:23:40,590 --> 00:23:41,300
as he can.

363
00:23:41,300 --> 00:23:44,180
AUDIENCE: How can they
make these guesses?

364
00:23:44,180 --> 00:23:46,170
PROFESSOR: Oh, they
look at the literature

365
00:23:46,170 --> 00:23:48,150
and they look at
budgets and they

366
00:23:48,150 --> 00:23:50,850
look at satellite pictures.

367
00:23:50,850 --> 00:23:52,770
They do their best.

368
00:23:52,770 --> 00:23:54,970
I think they have the
right order of magnitude,

369
00:23:54,970 --> 00:23:58,790
but nobody claims they
know the exact number.

370
00:23:58,790 --> 00:24:02,620
I mean, if you talk to Hans
Kristensen, who's very good,

371
00:24:02,620 --> 00:24:08,990
and who knows what he's doing,
he's very smart and competent.

372
00:24:08,990 --> 00:24:11,170
He'll tell you this
is educated guesswork.

373
00:24:14,140 --> 00:24:16,280
But it's more or
less-- it's enough.

374
00:24:16,280 --> 00:24:20,910
You know, I mean, 90
or a hundred weapons.

375
00:24:20,910 --> 00:24:25,208
It's all-- a hundred
weapons is overkill.

376
00:24:25,208 --> 00:24:26,707
AUDIENCE: But is
it usually the case

377
00:24:26,707 --> 00:24:30,906
where the countries would
want to make that number

378
00:24:30,906 --> 00:24:33,880
look higher or lower than that?

379
00:24:33,880 --> 00:24:35,878
PROFESSOR: They want it
to be higher so that--

380
00:24:35,878 --> 00:24:36,794
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE].

381
00:24:39,750 --> 00:24:40,540
PROFESSOR: Right?

382
00:24:40,540 --> 00:24:44,050
Except for Israel, which doesn't
want to admit it has any,

383
00:24:44,050 --> 00:24:47,130
but they want it known anyway.

384
00:24:47,130 --> 00:24:48,820
So it's a complex game.

385
00:24:48,820 --> 00:24:51,240
But for most of the
other countries,

386
00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:54,330
they say it's for deterrence.

387
00:24:54,330 --> 00:25:00,570
So it's better to let your
adversary know what you've got.

388
00:25:00,570 --> 00:25:03,870
China is also very coy
about their numbers,

389
00:25:03,870 --> 00:25:06,600
because they have
relatively few numbers,

390
00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:10,770
and they want to keep this--
positions secret and all

391
00:25:10,770 --> 00:25:11,280
of that.

392
00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:15,110
So they don't want to have-- and
they don't keep their missiles

393
00:25:15,110 --> 00:25:18,710
on alert either.

394
00:25:18,710 --> 00:25:22,090
China's a very
interesting country

395
00:25:22,090 --> 00:25:25,120
with respect to nuclear weapons.

396
00:25:25,120 --> 00:25:26,240
And perhaps exceptional.

397
00:25:30,400 --> 00:25:37,020
So the pathways to nuclear
escalation and war,

398
00:25:37,020 --> 00:25:41,450
as I've stressed, is fear.

399
00:25:41,450 --> 00:25:45,340
Fear, to me, is
the biggest factor.

400
00:25:45,340 --> 00:25:47,490
I'm sure people
will argue with me.

401
00:25:47,490 --> 00:25:50,140
Every point I'm
making at some level

402
00:25:50,140 --> 00:25:53,480
as controversial, by the way.

403
00:25:53,480 --> 00:25:55,830
I'm not trying to
hide it, but it's

404
00:25:55,830 --> 00:25:59,570
just I can't give
you every nuance.

405
00:25:59,570 --> 00:26:02,450
You know, it's one hour.

406
00:26:02,450 --> 00:26:06,070
People write books
about each subject.

407
00:26:06,070 --> 00:26:08,140
So, you know, have
to oversimplify it.

408
00:26:11,890 --> 00:26:16,660
But anyway, I consider the
two possible pathways to War.

409
00:26:16,660 --> 00:26:21,750
One is an accidental launch
between the United States

410
00:26:21,750 --> 00:26:22,660
and Russia.

411
00:26:22,660 --> 00:26:26,460
And the other is escalation
from conventional war

412
00:26:26,460 --> 00:26:27,610
in India and Pakistan.

413
00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:36,220
Now, somewhat less likely is
North Korea's use of a weapon,

414
00:26:36,220 --> 00:26:39,050
but I suspect they
won't, because I

415
00:26:39,050 --> 00:26:47,230
think that they are constrained
by other military reasons

416
00:26:47,230 --> 00:26:49,520
on the Korean peninsula.

417
00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:53,920
So North Korea wants to
rattle the sword, so to speak,

418
00:26:53,920 --> 00:26:59,560
but they, I think, really
want it for both deterrence

419
00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:03,000
and, as far as I can tell,
for the survivability

420
00:27:03,000 --> 00:27:04,830
of the regime.

421
00:27:04,830 --> 00:27:07,020
Which is a whole
other-- but that

422
00:27:07,020 --> 00:27:08,440
comes into all these things.

423
00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:11,260
That's why each case is special.

424
00:27:11,260 --> 00:27:13,440
North Korea's a
very special case.

425
00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:17,386
It's a very odd
government, and so forth.

426
00:27:21,320 --> 00:27:25,020
Now, we had-- Vipin Narang
talked about escalation

427
00:27:25,020 --> 00:27:28,630
from conventional war, and he
talked about the deployment.

428
00:27:28,630 --> 00:27:30,870
One of the things
he talks about,

429
00:27:30,870 --> 00:27:35,040
which I think is very
sound, is that this whole

430
00:27:35,040 --> 00:27:37,710
issue when you talk
about deterrence,

431
00:27:37,710 --> 00:27:39,170
it isn't just numbers.

432
00:27:39,170 --> 00:27:41,960
There's a whole other
dimension, at least.

433
00:27:41,960 --> 00:27:46,940
And one is the
deployment posture.

434
00:27:46,940 --> 00:27:51,170
And Pakistan has a very
aggressive deployment posture,

435
00:27:51,170 --> 00:27:55,310
because they feel inferior in
conventional weapons to India.

436
00:27:55,310 --> 00:28:01,900
And they feel threatened
by India in many ways.

437
00:28:01,900 --> 00:28:06,540
And they've already been
partitioned by India

438
00:28:06,540 --> 00:28:10,730
when the country broke up into
the eastern and western part,

439
00:28:10,730 --> 00:28:12,820
Bangladesh and India.

440
00:28:12,820 --> 00:28:18,610
So there's a historic enmity
between the two, which

441
00:28:18,610 --> 00:28:22,700
needs to be-- and I want
to-- it needs to be fixed.

442
00:28:22,700 --> 00:28:27,540
And I have to say,
personally, that I

443
00:28:27,540 --> 00:28:30,390
was very disappointed
with Obama's visit

444
00:28:30,390 --> 00:28:34,720
to India in many respects.

445
00:28:34,720 --> 00:28:37,960
You know, I look at
the nuclear issue,

446
00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:42,410
and that's one of my lenses.

447
00:28:42,410 --> 00:28:47,360
It isn't my sole lens, but
it's an important focus for me.

448
00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:52,110
And what I see is Obama talks
about the climate, which

449
00:28:52,110 --> 00:28:58,940
is excellent, then he gets
on this very poor policy

450
00:28:58,940 --> 00:29:08,040
of selling nuclear energy,
nuclear reactors, to India

451
00:29:08,040 --> 00:29:13,260
and not exempting India
from the restrictions that

452
00:29:13,260 --> 00:29:18,210
used to be in place
before the Bush

453
00:29:18,210 --> 00:29:24,556
administration of exempting
India from the restrictions

454
00:29:24,556 --> 00:29:25,930
we've placed on
them because they

455
00:29:25,930 --> 00:29:30,990
violated the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and tested weapons.

456
00:29:30,990 --> 00:29:34,130
Now of course,
Pakistan did so, also.

457
00:29:34,130 --> 00:29:37,520
But the point is that
we just aggravate

458
00:29:37,520 --> 00:29:45,750
the Indian-Pakistan tension.

459
00:29:45,750 --> 00:29:48,930
As far as I can tell, and
I just read The New York

460
00:29:48,930 --> 00:29:58,140
Times, you know, and listen to
the BBC, as far as I can tell,

461
00:29:58,140 --> 00:30:01,810
the subject of
treating Pakistan,

462
00:30:01,810 --> 00:30:07,300
of defusing the tension with
Pakistan, did not arise.

463
00:30:07,300 --> 00:30:08,270
As far as I can.

464
00:30:08,270 --> 00:30:11,170
At least these there was
no public mention of it.

465
00:30:11,170 --> 00:30:13,490
And I was very disappointed.

466
00:30:13,490 --> 00:30:20,370
And Obama's also trying to
draw-- India is more concerned

467
00:30:20,370 --> 00:30:23,500
with China than with Pakistan.

468
00:30:23,500 --> 00:30:28,030
This is a sort of
three-way dance,

469
00:30:28,030 --> 00:30:31,320
if you want to put it that way.

470
00:30:31,320 --> 00:30:35,790
And so it's more complicated
than a bipolar interaction.

471
00:30:35,790 --> 00:30:41,520
It's a three-way game where
China frightens India, India

472
00:30:41,520 --> 00:30:44,830
frightens Pakistan.

473
00:30:44,830 --> 00:30:49,450
China ends up helping
Pakistan with nuclear issues

474
00:30:49,450 --> 00:30:50,870
and nuclear weapons issues.

475
00:30:50,870 --> 00:30:55,570
They originally gave Pakistan
the design for the bomb.

476
00:30:55,570 --> 00:31:00,410
So this is something
that if India

477
00:31:00,410 --> 00:31:05,360
wants to solve this
issue of Pakistan's

478
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:08,000
aggressive deployment,
they either

479
00:31:08,000 --> 00:31:13,180
have to do it by force,
which won't work,

480
00:31:13,180 --> 00:31:16,090
because India has been deterred.

481
00:31:16,090 --> 00:31:18,580
Or they have to do
it through diplomacy,

482
00:31:18,580 --> 00:31:22,700
and it always ends
up with this message.

483
00:31:22,700 --> 00:31:25,260
You can use force,
which won't work,

484
00:31:25,260 --> 00:31:28,240
or you can use diplomacy,
which has a chance.

485
00:31:28,240 --> 00:31:31,500
Which is difficult,
but has a chance.

486
00:31:31,500 --> 00:31:36,270
Those are the two ways
to solve the problem.

487
00:31:36,270 --> 00:31:44,490
So how could a war start by
accident between US and Russia?

488
00:31:44,490 --> 00:31:50,330
Well, basically the
most likely path

489
00:31:50,330 --> 00:31:53,765
is a malfunctioning of
the Early Warning system.

490
00:31:58,060 --> 00:32:06,540
So here's a chilling quote
from Vice President Cheney,

491
00:32:06,540 --> 00:32:09,460
when he was Vice President.

492
00:32:09,460 --> 00:32:11,160
I'll just let you
read it for a minute.

493
00:32:19,730 --> 00:32:22,540
The famous football
he's talking about.

494
00:32:26,920 --> 00:32:30,120
Or black box.

495
00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:34,010
And this is carried around
wherever the President

496
00:32:34,010 --> 00:32:37,000
of the United States goes.

497
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:45,120
There's somebody a few doors
down, 24/7, who can say,

498
00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:48,665
Mr. President, we're under fire.

499
00:32:48,665 --> 00:32:49,415
Here's the button.

500
00:32:54,630 --> 00:32:56,760
Now, it actually isn't
a physical button,

501
00:32:56,760 --> 00:32:58,330
but that doesn't matter.

502
00:32:58,330 --> 00:33:03,110
That's irrelevant.

503
00:33:03,110 --> 00:33:06,760
It's the equivalent
of a physical button.

504
00:33:06,760 --> 00:33:08,080
It's a virtual button.

505
00:33:11,500 --> 00:33:13,210
So this is chilling.

506
00:33:13,210 --> 00:33:15,330
And you ask, what
about the Constitution?

507
00:33:15,330 --> 00:33:16,800
What about consulting?

508
00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:18,220
What about anything?

509
00:33:18,220 --> 00:33:23,040
No, because of the 10-minute,
the 30-minute launch time

510
00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:25,100
and the 10-minute warning time.

511
00:33:28,950 --> 00:33:34,260
So we have roughly
a thousand missiles,

512
00:33:34,260 --> 00:33:37,430
and so does Russia,
on hair trigger alert.

513
00:33:37,430 --> 00:33:41,040
They're ready to be
fired at minutes' notice.

514
00:33:41,040 --> 00:33:48,840
The number's probably
closer to 900, but so what.

515
00:33:48,840 --> 00:33:53,120
I mentioned the delivery
times and decision times.

516
00:33:53,120 --> 00:33:56,110
So the probability of an
error is not negligible.

517
00:33:59,230 --> 00:34:07,370
It is true, this is a complex
physical, emotional system.

518
00:34:07,370 --> 00:34:11,010
It's a human system with fear.

519
00:34:11,010 --> 00:34:13,310
I keep emphasizing
this, because there

520
00:34:13,310 --> 00:34:20,469
is fear, a very basic fear.

521
00:34:20,469 --> 00:34:26,820
And each side-- what hawks don't
realize is that on each side

522
00:34:26,820 --> 00:34:29,340
is vulnerable to
the other's system.

523
00:34:29,340 --> 00:34:33,050
You cannot stop the attack.

524
00:34:33,050 --> 00:34:35,466
All you can do is retaliate.

525
00:34:38,130 --> 00:34:42,870
In other words, it's
deter or revenge.

526
00:34:42,870 --> 00:34:45,750
Those are the two
modes of operation.

527
00:34:45,750 --> 00:34:49,440
This is chilling, but
that is the world we've

528
00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:51,770
been living in for 50 years.

529
00:34:51,770 --> 00:34:54,310
Literally.

530
00:34:54,310 --> 00:34:56,820
People don't think about
it, but it's pretty awful.

531
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:04,250
Now, the fact is that the
Russian system is less robust.

532
00:35:04,250 --> 00:35:06,730
So we are actually
more vulnerable

533
00:35:06,730 --> 00:35:09,270
than they are, except that
we'll fire if they do.

534
00:35:13,890 --> 00:35:15,840
And of course,
why does it go on?

535
00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:18,850
Each side does it because
the other side does it.

536
00:35:18,850 --> 00:35:21,560
It's sort of nutty.

537
00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:23,220
This is not logic.

538
00:35:23,220 --> 00:35:24,840
This is not normal logic.

539
00:35:24,840 --> 00:35:26,390
This is a tight circle.

540
00:35:31,030 --> 00:35:36,120
And so the latest that has
surfaced in the last few years

541
00:35:36,120 --> 00:35:39,420
is cyber attack.

542
00:35:39,420 --> 00:35:41,750
So you ask how this can happen.

543
00:35:41,750 --> 00:35:44,130
Well, a cyber attack.

544
00:35:44,130 --> 00:35:47,370
Just imagine, somebody
hacks into the system,

545
00:35:47,370 --> 00:35:52,970
somebody who really wants
the United States and Russia

546
00:35:52,970 --> 00:35:59,530
to destroy each other,
hacks into the Early

547
00:35:59,530 --> 00:36:02,530
Warning system of either side.

548
00:36:02,530 --> 00:36:04,109
Just imagine that.

549
00:36:04,109 --> 00:36:04,900
That's a nightmare.

550
00:36:09,570 --> 00:36:15,180
So the irony, as I mentioned,
is that the safety of each side

551
00:36:15,180 --> 00:36:19,260
depends on the other
side not launching.

552
00:36:19,260 --> 00:36:21,470
And then of course, there's
the political question,

553
00:36:21,470 --> 00:36:22,400
why do we persist?

554
00:36:25,280 --> 00:36:27,840
Obama promised to do
something about it

555
00:36:27,840 --> 00:36:31,360
when he came to office,
but he has given it up.

556
00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:38,690
He's clearly given it
up without explanation.

557
00:36:38,690 --> 00:36:41,262
But it was one of his promises.

558
00:36:41,262 --> 00:36:41,762
Yeah?

559
00:36:41,762 --> 00:36:43,970
AUDIENCE: You would think
even with the tensions that

560
00:36:43,970 --> 00:36:46,700
exist that we would both be
better off if this system were

561
00:36:46,700 --> 00:36:47,200
up.

562
00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:48,190
PROFESSOR: Of course.

563
00:36:48,190 --> 00:36:54,070
The more tension there is,
the more scary this is.

564
00:36:54,070 --> 00:36:58,550
It's less scary when there's
no tension, obviously.

565
00:36:58,550 --> 00:37:00,920
It's fear, again.

566
00:37:00,920 --> 00:37:02,830
And all the things
that go with fear.

567
00:37:02,830 --> 00:37:04,922
AUDIENCE: And distrust.

568
00:37:04,922 --> 00:37:05,880
PROFESSOR: Fear-- yeah.

569
00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:10,540
I'm going taking them
almost as synonymous.

570
00:37:10,540 --> 00:37:13,450
Distrust because the other
side has the capability

571
00:37:13,450 --> 00:37:16,190
to destroy you.

572
00:37:16,190 --> 00:37:20,630
And a second strike
capability, in the language

573
00:37:20,630 --> 00:37:22,980
of Cold War-- you
know, you ask why

574
00:37:22,980 --> 00:37:26,450
it happens with all
this strategic doctrine,

575
00:37:26,450 --> 00:37:30,300
but a second strike capability
and launch on warning

576
00:37:30,300 --> 00:37:34,595
are physically identical
with a first strike posture.

577
00:37:37,570 --> 00:37:41,070
So you cannot tell.

578
00:37:41,070 --> 00:37:45,640
I mean, the other side
tells you, we love you.

579
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:48,590
But it's like having a
guest over for dinner

580
00:37:48,590 --> 00:37:53,850
when the guest comes
with a loaded Uzi.

581
00:37:53,850 --> 00:38:00,580
Not just a pistol, but a
high-powered weapon, and

582
00:38:00,580 --> 00:38:01,290
says, oh, yes.

583
00:38:01,290 --> 00:38:01,967
We're pals.

584
00:38:01,967 --> 00:38:02,800
I'm here for dinner.

585
00:38:05,692 --> 00:38:09,760
You know, what kind
of pals are these?

586
00:38:09,760 --> 00:38:10,585
Right?

587
00:38:10,585 --> 00:38:13,820
I mean, it's a little nutty.

588
00:38:13,820 --> 00:38:18,140
But maybe who am I to judge?

589
00:38:18,140 --> 00:38:23,450
So I want to talk a little bit
about the Non-Proliferation

590
00:38:23,450 --> 00:38:29,060
Treaty, because I think it's--
one of the things that's very

591
00:38:29,060 --> 00:38:34,990
important in this world is that
nuclear weapons don't spread

592
00:38:34,990 --> 00:38:35,960
to other countries.

593
00:38:35,960 --> 00:38:40,580
And the cornerstone of that is
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

594
00:38:40,580 --> 00:38:48,360
And, honestly, I think in
the nuclear weapons states,

595
00:38:48,360 --> 00:38:50,910
particularly in the
United States and Russia,

596
00:38:50,910 --> 00:38:57,640
the NPT is not taken as
seriously as it should be.

597
00:38:57,640 --> 00:38:59,490
And I think it's very important.

598
00:38:59,490 --> 00:39:07,460
The NPT is taken seriously
for half of what it does.

599
00:39:07,460 --> 00:39:10,340
Namely, it says that
people should not

600
00:39:10,340 --> 00:39:13,210
acquire nuclear weapons.

601
00:39:13,210 --> 00:39:17,300
But it is not taken seriously,
because it obligates

602
00:39:17,300 --> 00:39:22,470
the five nuclear powers,
established nuclear powers,

603
00:39:22,470 --> 00:39:26,050
to give up their
nuclear weapons.

604
00:39:26,050 --> 00:39:29,770
And this is really the heart of
abolition of nuclear weapons,

605
00:39:29,770 --> 00:39:31,560
because it's built-in.

606
00:39:31,560 --> 00:39:34,930
It's Article VI of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.

607
00:39:34,930 --> 00:39:37,590
It obligates us to do it.

608
00:39:37,590 --> 00:39:39,790
And so there's a
tremendous tension.

609
00:39:39,790 --> 00:39:41,620
I'll come back to
this in a minute.

610
00:39:41,620 --> 00:39:47,290
But the tension is
between the countries who

611
00:39:47,290 --> 00:39:53,370
gave up aspirations for
nuclear weapons saying

612
00:39:53,370 --> 00:39:58,650
to the nuclear weapons powers,
OK, you are obligated to do it.

613
00:39:58,650 --> 00:40:02,600
But the nuclear
weapons countries say,

614
00:40:02,600 --> 00:40:06,210
we're doing it very
gradually and responsibly.

615
00:40:06,210 --> 00:40:12,240
And now-- I'll talk more about
this-- the non-nuclear weapons

616
00:40:12,240 --> 00:40:15,230
states want,
really, a timetable.

617
00:40:17,900 --> 00:40:20,150
So there's a lot of
tension over this.

618
00:40:20,150 --> 00:40:23,440
And I'll come to
this in a minute.

619
00:40:23,440 --> 00:40:26,130
So the cornerstones,
as I mentioned,

620
00:40:26,130 --> 00:40:30,490
Article VI nonproliferation,
disarmament.

621
00:40:30,490 --> 00:40:33,840
And I write disarmament
and in black,

622
00:40:33,840 --> 00:40:38,400
although they're all
extremely important.

623
00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:40,660
I do this for a US audience.

624
00:40:43,260 --> 00:40:47,920
But the last point is that
there's a five-year review.

625
00:40:47,920 --> 00:40:51,280
Every five years
there's a review.

626
00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:54,555
The next one will be
this May, and there

627
00:40:54,555 --> 00:40:56,450
are going to be fireworks.

628
00:40:56,450 --> 00:40:57,724
So I'll talk about that.

629
00:41:00,720 --> 00:41:03,270
So how effective is the NPT?

630
00:41:07,220 --> 00:41:15,120
So there are four states outside
the treaty, Israel, India,

631
00:41:15,120 --> 00:41:18,120
Pakistan, North Korea.

632
00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:21,610
There was this AQ Khan
Network from Pakistan,

633
00:41:21,610 --> 00:41:25,380
which was shut down.

634
00:41:25,380 --> 00:41:28,180
It's never been
absolutely clear how much

635
00:41:28,180 --> 00:41:31,780
the Pakistani state
was involved or if this

636
00:41:31,780 --> 00:41:35,090
was a private venture.

637
00:41:35,090 --> 00:41:39,580
Scott Kemp talked
interestingly about how

638
00:41:39,580 --> 00:41:45,460
the actual material that was
sold by the AQ Khan Network

639
00:41:45,460 --> 00:41:52,525
actually setback
countries like Iran

640
00:41:52,525 --> 00:41:54,530
and their development
of centrifuges.

641
00:41:54,530 --> 00:41:59,890
Because what was sold
was a technology which

642
00:41:59,890 --> 00:42:03,033
was obsolete and inefficient.

643
00:42:05,660 --> 00:42:06,810
So it's very ironic.

644
00:42:10,270 --> 00:42:16,420
So a few countries have given
up their bombs-- oh, excuse me.

645
00:42:16,420 --> 00:42:20,970
And many countries have given
up nuclear weapons programs.

646
00:42:20,970 --> 00:42:22,950
I've listed some of them.

647
00:42:22,950 --> 00:42:25,870
There are many
nuclear-capable countries

648
00:42:25,870 --> 00:42:27,840
that don't have weapons.

649
00:42:27,840 --> 00:42:30,380
Japan is one of them, of course.

650
00:42:30,380 --> 00:42:33,310
Not surprisingly.

651
00:42:33,310 --> 00:42:35,100
Canada.

652
00:42:35,100 --> 00:42:36,790
Our friends in Canada.

653
00:42:36,790 --> 00:42:44,050
But even South Korea, that feels
very threatened by North Korea,

654
00:42:44,050 --> 00:42:45,130
has no bomb.

655
00:42:45,130 --> 00:42:48,350
But they are quite capable.

656
00:42:48,350 --> 00:42:51,650
And the main point
I want to make

657
00:42:51,650 --> 00:42:56,040
is that fewer countries have
nuclear weapons that were

658
00:42:56,040 --> 00:42:58,720
predicted in the early '60s.

659
00:42:58,720 --> 00:43:09,690
Like, famously, Kennedy, JFK,
said aloud that in a few years,

660
00:43:09,690 --> 00:43:13,230
15 to 25 countries would
have nuclear weapons.

661
00:43:13,230 --> 00:43:16,680
And he was reflecting
what the US intelligence

662
00:43:16,680 --> 00:43:19,240
agencies told him.

663
00:43:19,240 --> 00:43:20,730
He wasn't making this up.

664
00:43:20,730 --> 00:43:22,920
It wasn't just a speech.

665
00:43:22,920 --> 00:43:25,015
He was reflecting
what he was told.

666
00:43:27,560 --> 00:43:29,740
And right now,
the political norm

667
00:43:29,740 --> 00:43:34,180
is to renounce nuclear weapons
and press the ones that

668
00:43:34,180 --> 00:43:37,090
have it to disarm.

669
00:43:37,090 --> 00:43:43,160
And that is a big plus and
one that needs encouragement.

670
00:43:46,260 --> 00:43:50,380
There are problems with
the NPT, of course.

671
00:43:50,380 --> 00:43:52,180
Life isn't perfect.

672
00:43:52,180 --> 00:43:55,780
North Korea, in my view, is
the most serious problem.

673
00:43:55,780 --> 00:43:59,000
Well, Pakistan-- I haven't
even written it down here,

674
00:43:59,000 --> 00:44:02,690
but Pakistan and India
are bigger problems

675
00:44:02,690 --> 00:44:05,430
because of the possible
pathways to war.

676
00:44:05,430 --> 00:44:06,810
I already said that.

677
00:44:06,810 --> 00:44:08,090
I didn't want to repeat it.

678
00:44:08,090 --> 00:44:10,390
That's why it's
not on the slide.

679
00:44:10,390 --> 00:44:13,450
But the whole issue with Iran.

680
00:44:13,450 --> 00:44:21,490
There's no question that Iran's
enrichment capabilities exceed

681
00:44:21,490 --> 00:44:23,340
what they can do for power.

682
00:44:23,340 --> 00:44:26,860
In other words, they are very
well-suited for making weapons

683
00:44:26,860 --> 00:44:32,680
and not for power, because they
don't produce enough enriched

684
00:44:32,680 --> 00:44:34,930
uranium for power needs.

685
00:44:34,930 --> 00:44:37,460
But they do produce
enough for weapons.

686
00:44:37,460 --> 00:44:41,710
And that's been clear since
the beginning of the program,

687
00:44:41,710 --> 00:44:44,010
despite what is said.

688
00:44:44,010 --> 00:44:51,670
And so there's been a
tremendous tension there.

689
00:44:54,770 --> 00:44:58,350
I just want to talk a little bit
about the ongoing negotiations.

690
00:44:58,350 --> 00:45:02,610
They're making a
lot of news now.

691
00:45:02,610 --> 00:45:07,720
It's very important, because
we have an interim agreement,

692
00:45:07,720 --> 00:45:11,190
and this is the
time, six months--

693
00:45:11,190 --> 00:45:13,780
it's really four months
on the political level

694
00:45:13,780 --> 00:45:16,690
and six months on
the technical level,

695
00:45:16,690 --> 00:45:18,400
to reach a final agreement.

696
00:45:18,400 --> 00:45:20,140
That's what was set up.

697
00:45:20,140 --> 00:45:22,694
I mean, the first one was
supposed to be six months.

698
00:45:22,694 --> 00:45:23,360
It was extended.

699
00:45:26,520 --> 00:45:27,530
Well, excuse me.

700
00:45:27,530 --> 00:45:30,620
The first phase agreement
was for six months,

701
00:45:30,620 --> 00:45:33,660
and then it's been
extended-- it's not on here--

702
00:45:33,660 --> 00:45:37,150
but it's been extended
for six more months.

703
00:45:37,150 --> 00:45:40,280
So the deadline for
the political agreement

704
00:45:40,280 --> 00:45:45,310
is in March, and then
in June, I think,

705
00:45:45,310 --> 00:45:49,010
is the deadline, the
official deadline.

706
00:45:49,010 --> 00:45:53,720
People are skeptical,
but I don't know.

707
00:45:53,720 --> 00:45:56,205
There are some technical issues.

708
00:45:56,205 --> 00:45:59,520
The Iraq reactor can
produce plutonium.

709
00:45:59,520 --> 00:46:01,890
But there are a simple
solutions to that.

710
00:46:01,890 --> 00:46:03,690
There are simple
technical fixes,

711
00:46:03,690 --> 00:46:08,050
and Iran has agreed to
them, as I understand it.

712
00:46:08,050 --> 00:46:11,900
So that the amount of plutonium
production from the Iraq

713
00:46:11,900 --> 00:46:13,610
reactor will be small.

714
00:46:19,700 --> 00:46:22,430
In the interim
agreement there's not

715
00:46:22,430 --> 00:46:24,550
supposed to be any
additional sanctions.

716
00:46:24,550 --> 00:46:27,850
That's very important in
terms of the US Congress,

717
00:46:27,850 --> 00:46:33,010
because bills have circulated
demanding new sanctions.

718
00:46:33,010 --> 00:46:36,470
But they're probably in
abeyance, fortunately.

719
00:46:44,830 --> 00:46:47,800
There are really four
parties involved,

720
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:49,810
the two official
parties and then the

721
00:46:49,810 --> 00:46:52,470
hardliners on both sides.

722
00:46:52,470 --> 00:46:55,440
So this is a
complex negotiation.

723
00:46:55,440 --> 00:46:59,850
Within each side it's complex.

724
00:46:59,850 --> 00:47:03,780
I can't go into all of it.

725
00:47:03,780 --> 00:47:09,670
And I think people know
what's going on better

726
00:47:09,670 --> 00:47:11,900
here on the American side.

727
00:47:11,900 --> 00:47:19,750
But the real issue, as far as
I can see it, in terms of Iran,

728
00:47:19,750 --> 00:47:25,890
what Iran wants is
to have, I think,

729
00:47:25,890 --> 00:47:31,560
the Ayatollah said something
like 15,000 centrifuges.

730
00:47:31,560 --> 00:47:36,585
The West, the most hardline
people in the West say zero.

731
00:47:39,530 --> 00:47:41,100
Netanyahu, for example.

732
00:47:41,100 --> 00:47:44,256
Zero is the only acceptable
number of centrifuges.

733
00:47:47,020 --> 00:47:50,790
And that's why he's
campaigning so hard against it,

734
00:47:50,790 --> 00:47:53,060
because he knows
that there will be

735
00:47:53,060 --> 00:47:56,420
no deal with zero centrifuges.

736
00:47:56,420 --> 00:48:00,930
So he already knows in
advance that what he wants

737
00:48:00,930 --> 00:48:03,360
is not possible.

738
00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:05,867
AUDIENCE: How many do
they need to really power

739
00:48:05,867 --> 00:48:09,030
a nuclear power
plant in the future?

740
00:48:09,030 --> 00:48:12,430
PROFESSOR: Well, they need
probably 20,000 advanced ones.

741
00:48:12,430 --> 00:48:18,190
Advanced ones, not what they
have, the so-called P1s.

742
00:48:18,190 --> 00:48:20,710
Ones that work really well.

743
00:48:24,300 --> 00:48:26,980
I don't know off
the top of my head,

744
00:48:26,980 --> 00:48:29,260
but to supply-- what is it?

745
00:48:29,260 --> 00:48:29,910
Bushehr?

746
00:48:29,910 --> 00:48:32,220
Is that the right
pronunciation?--

747
00:48:32,220 --> 00:48:34,560
the Bushehr reactor.

748
00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:36,310
Which they don't
need, by the way,

749
00:48:36,310 --> 00:48:38,350
because Russia's going
to supply the fuel.

750
00:48:38,350 --> 00:48:41,124
But they don't quite
trust Russia, of course,

751
00:48:41,124 --> 00:48:45,270
for reasonable reasons, I think.

752
00:48:45,270 --> 00:48:49,970
But anyway, this whole
business is so murky,

753
00:48:49,970 --> 00:48:51,520
in my personal opinion.

754
00:48:54,550 --> 00:48:59,170
It's hard to tell facts
from motive, in my opinion.

755
00:48:59,170 --> 00:49:01,920
I don't think I can
do it, honestly.

756
00:49:01,920 --> 00:49:04,220
I'll talk with you
privately if you want,

757
00:49:04,220 --> 00:49:10,000
but I don't think I can
really evaluate it in a way

758
00:49:10,000 --> 00:49:13,930
that I would consider
satisfactory.

759
00:49:13,930 --> 00:49:15,090
I can speculate.

760
00:49:15,090 --> 00:49:18,120
That's what I can do.

761
00:49:18,120 --> 00:49:25,420
But the point is-- you
know, there's an old saying

762
00:49:25,420 --> 00:49:31,730
that the ideal solution gets in
the way of the good solution.

763
00:49:31,730 --> 00:49:34,840
The good solution,
in my opinion,

764
00:49:34,840 --> 00:49:40,280
is pretty much to continue the
interim agreement that we have.

765
00:49:40,280 --> 00:49:42,150
Why is that good?

766
00:49:42,150 --> 00:49:46,680
Because what people are not
talking about in the United

767
00:49:46,680 --> 00:49:53,590
States is the best thing
about the whole negotiation.

768
00:49:53,590 --> 00:49:58,270
Namely, that Iran keeps
saying they don't want

769
00:49:58,270 --> 00:50:00,920
to develop nuclear weapons.

770
00:50:00,920 --> 00:50:02,860
And there's a fatwa.

771
00:50:02,860 --> 00:50:06,060
That's excellent.

772
00:50:06,060 --> 00:50:14,710
Second, Iran says that they
want to be part of the NPT.

773
00:50:14,710 --> 00:50:18,890
They are enduring-- and
I'm going to use that word,

774
00:50:18,890 --> 00:50:21,700
enduring-- the most
rigorous inspection

775
00:50:21,700 --> 00:50:28,050
regime that the IAEA, that's
the international agency that

776
00:50:28,050 --> 00:50:31,300
inspects, the
International Atomic Energy

777
00:50:31,300 --> 00:50:37,100
Agency-- they are enduring
the most rigorous inspections

778
00:50:37,100 --> 00:50:41,440
that any country ever endured.

779
00:50:41,440 --> 00:50:43,710
Those are two excellent things.

780
00:50:43,710 --> 00:50:47,720
There are people on the
ground all the time.

781
00:50:47,720 --> 00:50:50,240
People say, well,
they can break out.

782
00:50:50,240 --> 00:50:53,090
Yes, they can break
out if they want to.

783
00:50:53,090 --> 00:50:59,170
They will only
agree to all of this

784
00:50:59,170 --> 00:51:02,080
if it's in their self-interest.

785
00:51:02,080 --> 00:51:07,515
Nobody can expect anything
more of them or us.

786
00:51:10,070 --> 00:51:16,710
So I think what we've got is the
best possible solution that's

787
00:51:16,710 --> 00:51:18,590
feasible.

788
00:51:18,590 --> 00:51:24,110
And if they kick inspectors out
and decide to go for a bomb,

789
00:51:24,110 --> 00:51:29,070
because it's close to
impossible for them

790
00:51:29,070 --> 00:51:36,520
to do a bomb without kicking
the inspectors out, and--

791
00:51:36,520 --> 00:51:39,370
AUDIENCE: Even if they
have hidden sites?

792
00:51:39,370 --> 00:51:41,830
PROFESSOR: Well, they
would have to then develop

793
00:51:41,830 --> 00:51:44,140
so many thousand
more centrifuges

794
00:51:44,140 --> 00:51:47,180
and have that material
and no news could leak out

795
00:51:47,180 --> 00:51:48,860
and all of that stuff.

796
00:51:48,860 --> 00:51:50,380
There are opposition groups.

797
00:51:50,380 --> 00:51:54,150
We found out about some of the
sites-- I forget which one.

798
00:51:54,150 --> 00:51:55,410
The one that's underground.

799
00:51:55,410 --> 00:52:01,200
I forgot the name of it--
through dissenters in Iran.

800
00:52:01,200 --> 00:52:03,430
It always can happen.

801
00:52:03,430 --> 00:52:08,160
The Soviet Union found out
about the Manhattan Project

802
00:52:08,160 --> 00:52:10,370
in a most remarkable way.

803
00:52:10,370 --> 00:52:12,290
I want to talk about
that for a minute,

804
00:52:12,290 --> 00:52:14,700
because that's really important.

805
00:52:14,700 --> 00:52:19,530
In 1940, a Soviet
nuclear physicist,

806
00:52:19,530 --> 00:52:23,260
a very good one named
Flyorov, realized

807
00:52:23,260 --> 00:52:26,430
that all the publications
about fission

808
00:52:26,430 --> 00:52:31,920
in the United States, England,
and France had stopped.

809
00:52:31,920 --> 00:52:35,230
And he went to Stalin
and said, the West

810
00:52:35,230 --> 00:52:38,820
is developing an
atomic bomb, based

811
00:52:38,820 --> 00:52:43,740
on what was not appearing
in the literature.

812
00:52:43,740 --> 00:52:45,450
This is remarkable.

813
00:52:45,450 --> 00:52:47,090
And it's a fact.

814
00:52:47,090 --> 00:52:50,900
Of course, the Soviet
Union had spies,

815
00:52:50,900 --> 00:52:53,130
and they found out about
the Manhattan Project

816
00:52:53,130 --> 00:52:54,460
through the spies.

817
00:52:54,460 --> 00:53:02,040
But Flyorov, just reading
the physical review--

818
00:53:02,040 --> 00:53:06,240
this is a remarkable story
which should not be ignored.

819
00:53:09,610 --> 00:53:14,590
So I think we'd find out.

820
00:53:14,590 --> 00:53:17,980
Maybe slowly, but, you know.

821
00:53:17,980 --> 00:53:22,340
And if they really want
the weapon as a deterrent,

822
00:53:22,340 --> 00:53:25,800
they've got to show
us that they have it,

823
00:53:25,800 --> 00:53:27,200
like North Korea's done.

824
00:53:27,200 --> 00:53:30,120
There are all kinds of
steps, and one weapon

825
00:53:30,120 --> 00:53:31,550
isn't good enough.

826
00:53:31,550 --> 00:53:34,660
I mean, I wrote an
op ed with Jim Walsh

827
00:53:34,660 --> 00:53:38,580
that this whole break out
time thing is too short.

828
00:53:38,580 --> 00:53:41,750
You know, the calculations,
because it assumes one weapon.

829
00:53:41,750 --> 00:53:44,650
So I have an op ed in
Reuters about this.

830
00:53:44,650 --> 00:53:47,050
So there are all
kinds of arguments.

831
00:53:47,050 --> 00:53:48,960
I mean, you could argue forever.

832
00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:51,830
I mean, I don't
expect people who

833
00:53:51,830 --> 00:53:54,730
are what I would call
hardliners to adjust

834
00:53:54,730 --> 00:53:57,950
agree with me because
I've published an op ed.

835
00:53:57,950 --> 00:54:06,420
But I'm just saying-- it's not
so simple, is what I'm saying.

836
00:54:06,420 --> 00:54:07,740
There are arguments.

837
00:54:07,740 --> 00:54:10,330
You have to decide which
is right, because these

838
00:54:10,330 --> 00:54:13,660
are very complicated issues.

839
00:54:13,660 --> 00:54:21,380
So anyway, we have our
Menendez-Kirk bill,

840
00:54:21,380 --> 00:54:22,540
which is in the Senate.

841
00:54:22,540 --> 00:54:25,800
It seems to be in abeyance
for a couple of months.

842
00:54:25,800 --> 00:54:27,350
There's a grace period.

843
00:54:27,350 --> 00:54:29,370
People are working
hard against it,

844
00:54:29,370 --> 00:54:34,460
so it's a very political
thing in both countries.

845
00:54:34,460 --> 00:54:35,150
I know it.

846
00:54:38,850 --> 00:54:46,820
So I sort of wound together the
discussion of two things, Iran

847
00:54:46,820 --> 00:54:49,140
and the NPT.

848
00:54:49,140 --> 00:54:50,950
So I want to come
back to the NPT,

849
00:54:50,950 --> 00:54:54,830
because I embedded the
Iranian discussion in the NPT

850
00:54:54,830 --> 00:54:56,000
discussion.

851
00:54:56,000 --> 00:54:58,680
Because it came up
naturally, that's why.

852
00:54:58,680 --> 00:55:02,390
But so to come back to
it, the next thing that's

853
00:55:02,390 --> 00:55:06,100
going to happen, and
I'm just quoting here,

854
00:55:06,100 --> 00:55:12,170
Stormy weather predicted for
the NPT review in May at the UN.

855
00:55:12,170 --> 00:55:14,386
So I'm actually
quoting an article

856
00:55:14,386 --> 00:55:17,880
from Daryl Kimball of the
Arms Control Association.

857
00:55:17,880 --> 00:55:20,790
I didn't have time to
make all the points,

858
00:55:20,790 --> 00:55:27,070
but in 2005 we had a
disastrous NPT review.

859
00:55:27,070 --> 00:55:33,230
That was under George Bush,
and the nonaligned countries,

860
00:55:33,230 --> 00:55:37,600
Egypt and Sweden and
Denmark and Ireland

861
00:55:37,600 --> 00:55:41,900
and a whole bunch of
countries were very angry.

862
00:55:41,900 --> 00:55:46,510
Particularly at the United
States and George Bush.

863
00:55:46,510 --> 00:55:49,220
It was a disastrous conference.

864
00:55:49,220 --> 00:55:52,930
2010, Barack Obama had
delivered his speech

865
00:55:52,930 --> 00:55:55,460
that he wanted to
eliminate nuclear weapons.

866
00:55:55,460 --> 00:55:59,870
The United States
was very welcome,

867
00:55:59,870 --> 00:56:02,840
and it was a
productive conference.

868
00:56:02,840 --> 00:56:08,570
And they had 22 interrelated
disarmament steps.

869
00:56:08,570 --> 00:56:10,420
I'm not even going to
try to repeat them.

870
00:56:10,420 --> 00:56:15,880
The two major ones were that
the nuclear weapons countries

871
00:56:15,880 --> 00:56:21,820
should give a timetable
for going to zero.

872
00:56:21,820 --> 00:56:23,770
A timetable.

873
00:56:23,770 --> 00:56:27,080
And the second
thing is that they

874
00:56:27,080 --> 00:56:34,930
should convene a
conference in the Middle

875
00:56:34,930 --> 00:56:39,530
East looking towards a
nuclear-free zone in the Middle

876
00:56:39,530 --> 00:56:40,790
East.

877
00:56:40,790 --> 00:56:43,490
That's very delicate,
because getting Israel

878
00:56:43,490 --> 00:56:47,530
to come, getting Iran and Israel
to the table at the same time

879
00:56:47,530 --> 00:56:52,180
is difficult. The whole thing
is difficult, and not just Iran.

880
00:56:52,180 --> 00:56:56,380
AUDIENCE: But the concept was
originally started by Iran

881
00:56:56,380 --> 00:57:02,020
and, I think Egypt, but Israel
was a party to it at one point,

882
00:57:02,020 --> 00:57:02,695
too.

883
00:57:02,695 --> 00:57:03,570
PROFESSOR: They were?

884
00:57:03,570 --> 00:57:05,450
AUDIENCE: They were interested.

885
00:57:05,450 --> 00:57:08,390
They were considering.

886
00:57:08,390 --> 00:57:12,540
PROFESSOR: In my
personal humble opinion,

887
00:57:12,540 --> 00:57:15,400
Israel's interests
are best served

888
00:57:15,400 --> 00:57:19,220
by a nuclear-free zone
in the Middle East.

889
00:57:19,220 --> 00:57:20,700
If you ask me.

890
00:57:20,700 --> 00:57:25,130
I carry zero weight in
Netanyahu's cabinet.

891
00:57:25,130 --> 00:57:27,800
Believe me.

892
00:57:27,800 --> 00:57:32,120
I probably carry-- no, that's
an exaggeration of my influence.

893
00:57:37,260 --> 00:57:42,200
Zero weight is better
than what I have.

894
00:57:42,200 --> 00:57:46,550
So anyway, I'm not even going
to go through any of those,

895
00:57:46,550 --> 00:57:53,660
but the follow through on these
steps have been disappointing.

896
00:57:53,660 --> 00:57:57,090
They've basically
been nonexistent.

897
00:57:57,090 --> 00:58:01,680
There's been basically no
follow through on the 22 points.

898
00:58:01,680 --> 00:58:05,270
And so that's one of
the reasons everyone

899
00:58:05,270 --> 00:58:09,230
who knows anything about
this is predicting that it's

900
00:58:09,230 --> 00:58:15,110
stormy weather ahead, especially
for the nuclear weapons states.

901
00:58:15,110 --> 00:58:19,400
So you can look forward to
some interesting news in May.

902
00:58:24,260 --> 00:58:28,790
I'm kind of running out of
time, so basically Obama

903
00:58:28,790 --> 00:58:31,780
raised a lot of hopes
with his Prague speech

904
00:58:31,780 --> 00:58:35,740
in 2009 talking
about the possibility

905
00:58:35,740 --> 00:58:40,050
of a nuclear-free world.

906
00:58:40,050 --> 00:58:44,220
Of course, he hedged right away,
it won't be reached quickly.

907
00:58:44,220 --> 00:58:46,870
And the US, as long
as the weapons exist,

908
00:58:46,870 --> 00:58:49,320
we're going to have
our little toys, too.

909
00:58:53,570 --> 00:58:59,810
But anyway, it was still the
most forthright statement

910
00:58:59,810 --> 00:59:04,950
since 1945.

911
00:59:04,950 --> 00:59:09,280
I mean, so it was a
breath of fresh air.

912
00:59:09,280 --> 00:59:11,920
And he won the
Nobel Peace Prize.

913
00:59:15,010 --> 00:59:18,240
Probably prematurely,
but who am I to quibble?

914
00:59:23,850 --> 00:59:28,230
So there are many arguments
against nuclear weapons

915
00:59:28,230 --> 00:59:28,960
abolition.

916
00:59:28,960 --> 00:59:30,230
I'm just going to pick one.

917
00:59:33,560 --> 00:59:37,650
Because it eliminates
deterrence, and to me

918
00:59:37,650 --> 00:59:41,890
that's the biggest
argument against it.

919
00:59:41,890 --> 00:59:44,210
And it cannot be achieved.

920
00:59:44,210 --> 00:59:48,120
That's a different kind of
argument, but in my opinion

921
00:59:48,120 --> 00:59:49,150
that's even stronger.

922
00:59:52,020 --> 00:59:55,660
I wouldn't say cannot, but
my personal statement is

923
00:59:55,660 --> 00:59:57,980
it's unlikely.

924
00:59:57,980 --> 01:00:00,500
But that doesn't mean
it's not desirable.

925
01:00:00,500 --> 01:00:03,370
And that doesn't mean that
academics, in particular,

926
01:00:03,370 --> 01:00:05,390
shouldn't talk about it.

927
01:00:05,390 --> 01:00:07,710
That's one of the things
that I have in mind,

928
01:00:07,710 --> 01:00:11,900
and we should have a
long-range view, academics.

929
01:00:11,900 --> 01:00:13,860
That's one of our luxuries.

930
01:00:13,860 --> 01:00:16,340
We can try to look ahead.

931
01:00:16,340 --> 01:00:18,840
And so there are
really two questions.

932
01:00:18,840 --> 01:00:28,550
One, is it desirable in view
of all of the difficulties

933
01:00:28,550 --> 01:00:30,960
with it conceptually?

934
01:00:30,960 --> 01:00:36,150
And then, is it achievable
if it is desirable?

935
01:00:36,150 --> 01:00:38,540
You should only ask
the second question

936
01:00:38,540 --> 01:00:44,060
if the answer to the first
is yes, it's desirable.

937
01:00:44,060 --> 01:00:47,080
And I can't go through
all the arguments,

938
01:00:47,080 --> 01:00:51,420
but deterrence is a very
interesting question.

939
01:00:51,420 --> 01:00:56,620
I think I'm going to convene
a little working group on it.

940
01:00:56,620 --> 01:01:00,290
I've been thinking about it
a lot for the last few years,

941
01:01:00,290 --> 01:01:07,980
and I'm ready to do some more
serious research in this arena.

942
01:01:07,980 --> 01:01:13,090
But the point is that
it's never worked

943
01:01:13,090 --> 01:01:17,660
in the sense of coercing
others to do what you want,

944
01:01:17,660 --> 01:01:22,150
which is the way it's often
used in US diplomatic circles.

945
01:01:22,150 --> 01:01:27,970
I don't know about Russia, but
it's certainly used in the US.

946
01:01:27,970 --> 01:01:32,400
And another problem
with it, as we

947
01:01:32,400 --> 01:01:37,050
heard about India
and Pakistan, is it

948
01:01:37,050 --> 01:01:39,870
enables brinkmanship,
low-level brinkmanship.

949
01:01:44,560 --> 01:01:49,640
In other words it
introduces instabilities,

950
01:01:49,640 --> 01:01:51,090
is what I'm saying.

951
01:01:51,090 --> 01:01:55,490
Deterrence isn't what
it's cracked out to be,

952
01:01:55,490 --> 01:01:59,560
because by having
the weapons, you also

953
01:01:59,560 --> 01:02:02,160
introduce instabilities
in the system,

954
01:02:02,160 --> 01:02:07,125
especially if you have
aggressive basing mechanisms.

955
01:02:07,125 --> 01:02:09,800
This is very important.

956
01:02:09,800 --> 01:02:13,340
And Pakistan certainly
is an example of that.

957
01:02:13,340 --> 01:02:17,070
They have deterred India, but
with a very aggressive basing

958
01:02:17,070 --> 01:02:20,600
mode and threatening verbally.

959
01:02:20,600 --> 01:02:24,570
So, yes, they've deterred,
but is it stable?

960
01:02:24,570 --> 01:02:27,170
How will it last?

961
01:02:27,170 --> 01:02:31,520
They have delegated
command and control

962
01:02:31,520 --> 01:02:38,230
of these local tactical
weapons to field commanders.

963
01:02:38,230 --> 01:02:42,520
Suppose you get a
rogue field commander

964
01:02:42,520 --> 01:02:46,640
who wants to create mischief.

965
01:02:46,640 --> 01:02:52,570
Like you had somebody from
Pakistan goes to Mumbai,

966
01:02:52,570 --> 01:02:59,240
and shoots everyone in
the hotel and so forth.

967
01:02:59,240 --> 01:03:03,010
Or when they entered the
Indian parliament a few years

968
01:03:03,010 --> 01:03:03,930
before that.

969
01:03:03,930 --> 01:03:09,770
So these are actions which don't
introduce love or stability

970
01:03:09,770 --> 01:03:10,625
between countries.

971
01:03:13,680 --> 01:03:15,870
Putting it mildly.

972
01:03:15,870 --> 01:03:19,410
And of course, deterrence
requires rationality,

973
01:03:19,410 --> 01:03:22,250
which is in short supply.

974
01:03:22,250 --> 01:03:24,450
My view.

975
01:03:24,450 --> 01:03:29,430
Accidental use, which
we've talked about.

976
01:03:29,430 --> 01:03:31,720
And of course, it won't
work against terrorists.

977
01:03:31,720 --> 01:03:38,390
They want-- a real terrorist
who's a suicide bombardier

978
01:03:38,390 --> 01:03:42,530
wants death and destruction.

979
01:03:42,530 --> 01:03:46,770
So, boy, that's a bad mixture.

980
01:03:49,980 --> 01:03:55,650
And I think one of the points
that people should not forget

981
01:03:55,650 --> 01:03:58,430
is deterrence requires a
small number of weapons.

982
01:03:58,430 --> 01:04:00,200
AUDIENCE: How many is small?

983
01:04:00,200 --> 01:04:02,420
PROFESSOR: Well, I would
say a hundred is overkill.

984
01:04:02,420 --> 01:04:05,440
So it's less than a
hundred in my view.

985
01:04:05,440 --> 01:04:10,670
I've been giving a number,
and I'll keep giving it.

986
01:04:10,670 --> 01:04:15,840
I have zero weight in
Washington or Moscow,

987
01:04:15,840 --> 01:04:17,140
but that's what I think.

988
01:04:20,190 --> 01:04:23,530
So should we try to
abolish nuclear weapons?

989
01:04:26,900 --> 01:04:29,680
Really is it a good idea?

990
01:04:29,680 --> 01:04:35,010
And so the answer is,
there's no risk-free world.

991
01:04:35,010 --> 01:04:37,730
What you have to
do, when you look

992
01:04:37,730 --> 01:04:39,960
at the arguments
against abolition,

993
01:04:39,960 --> 01:04:42,760
and I've done my best to
look at what I consider

994
01:04:42,760 --> 01:04:50,410
the serious ones,
papers typically

995
01:04:50,410 --> 01:04:57,700
criticize going to zero
because it's risky.

996
01:04:57,700 --> 01:04:59,790
But the question
is what they never

997
01:04:59,790 --> 01:05:03,205
do is talk about
the relative risks.

998
01:05:03,205 --> 01:05:06,290
In other words,
minimizing risks.

999
01:05:06,290 --> 01:05:08,610
How do you minimize the risk?

1000
01:05:08,610 --> 01:05:11,440
You're never going
to eliminate risks.

1001
01:05:11,440 --> 01:05:13,570
It's impossible.

1002
01:05:13,570 --> 01:05:19,090
So the right question is
not to eliminate risks,

1003
01:05:19,090 --> 01:05:20,770
you have to ask
the right question.

1004
01:05:20,770 --> 01:05:23,540
Every scientist knows that.

1005
01:05:23,540 --> 01:05:28,610
The right question here
is minimization of risk.

1006
01:05:28,610 --> 01:05:29,770
That's the right question.

1007
01:05:29,770 --> 01:05:32,030
How do you minimize risk?

1008
01:05:32,030 --> 01:05:34,160
Do you stay on
the present course

1009
01:05:34,160 --> 01:05:39,310
or do you try to do
something more creative?

1010
01:05:39,310 --> 01:05:43,180
And this is one of
the creative things.

1011
01:05:43,180 --> 01:05:52,150
And so the other thing is
that abolition in by itself

1012
01:05:52,150 --> 01:05:53,600
is an important goal.

1013
01:05:53,600 --> 01:05:56,690
And if we want the
NPT to be healthy,

1014
01:05:56,690 --> 01:05:59,600
we better be serious about it.

1015
01:05:59,600 --> 01:06:03,510
And those are the fireworks
that I'm talking about.

1016
01:06:03,510 --> 01:06:06,020
And the nuclear weapons
states had better

1017
01:06:06,020 --> 01:06:09,310
take this into account.

1018
01:06:09,310 --> 01:06:13,100
If you want to look
long-range, how patient

1019
01:06:13,100 --> 01:06:17,577
are the NPT states going to be?

1020
01:06:17,577 --> 01:06:18,410
It's very important.

1021
01:06:22,600 --> 01:06:26,680
So, yeah, Obama
has a mixed record.

1022
01:06:26,680 --> 01:06:28,790
He's inspired great hopes.

1023
01:06:28,790 --> 01:06:31,440
He's done the new START Treaty.

1024
01:06:31,440 --> 01:06:33,175
He's improved nuclear security.

1025
01:06:36,120 --> 01:06:39,990
He tried to engage
Russia for of the steps.

1026
01:06:39,990 --> 01:06:43,140
Actually, that's a dated slide.

1027
01:06:43,140 --> 01:06:44,900
Those efforts and now dead.

1028
01:06:44,900 --> 01:06:49,320
The Russians effectively
said no, by the way.

1029
01:06:49,320 --> 01:06:50,880
So this is bigger than Obama.

1030
01:06:50,880 --> 01:06:56,630
You know, Putin can veto
negotiations easily,

1031
01:06:56,630 --> 01:06:59,170
as you know.

1032
01:06:59,170 --> 01:07:00,650
The nuclear posture review.

1033
01:07:00,650 --> 01:07:02,500
In my view, this
is very important.

1034
01:07:02,500 --> 01:07:07,520
This is our deployment strategy
was only slightly modified

1035
01:07:07,520 --> 01:07:08,945
from earlier years.

1036
01:07:12,080 --> 01:07:19,545
We still have too many
warnings on hair trigger alert.

1037
01:07:19,545 --> 01:07:21,790
With respect to
North Korea, he talks

1038
01:07:21,790 --> 01:07:25,500
about strategic patience,
which is head in the sand,

1039
01:07:25,500 --> 01:07:28,230
as far as I'm concerned.

1040
01:07:28,230 --> 01:07:35,870
I'm very critical of the North
Korean lack of engagement.

1041
01:07:35,870 --> 01:07:37,855
There I'm very
critical of Obama.

1042
01:07:37,855 --> 01:07:40,060
AUDIENCE: They're asking
us right now, aren't they?

1043
01:07:40,060 --> 01:07:41,300
PROFESSOR: Yes.

1044
01:07:41,300 --> 01:07:44,190
They're asking again,
and we're ignoring them.

1045
01:07:44,190 --> 01:07:46,050
And I think it's dumb.

1046
01:07:46,050 --> 01:07:50,360
And the last thing, again, this
has a lot to do with Congress,

1047
01:07:50,360 --> 01:07:54,840
is they're modernizing
nuclear weapons.

1048
01:07:54,840 --> 01:07:57,690
Which, again, in
the NPT review is

1049
01:07:57,690 --> 01:08:01,440
going to come up for tremendous
criticism, and it should.

1050
01:08:01,440 --> 01:08:04,300
And in this day and age
of budgetary restraints,

1051
01:08:04,300 --> 01:08:06,070
it should be criticized.

1052
01:08:06,070 --> 01:08:09,640
And in terms of
strategic stability,

1053
01:08:09,640 --> 01:08:12,480
it should be criticized.

1054
01:08:12,480 --> 01:08:17,270
So there are two buzz words.

1055
01:08:17,270 --> 01:08:21,479
One is "modernization," and
the other is "maintenance."

1056
01:08:21,479 --> 01:08:24,160
So if you have
nuclear weapons, you

1057
01:08:24,160 --> 01:08:29,060
have to maintain that
they're usable and safe--

1058
01:08:29,060 --> 01:08:33,200
that's maintenance--
without testing.

1059
01:08:33,200 --> 01:08:35,430
That's important.

1060
01:08:35,430 --> 01:08:38,229
And the other is to
modernize the weapons,

1061
01:08:38,229 --> 01:08:42,490
make them more
accurate, and so forth.

1062
01:08:42,490 --> 01:08:44,920
And that really
should not be done.

1063
01:08:44,920 --> 01:08:48,359
And the two get fused
together, and it's very hard

1064
01:08:48,359 --> 01:08:51,280
to tell the detail because
it's all classified.

1065
01:08:54,020 --> 01:08:56,725
It's the typical trick
of large bureaucracies.

1066
01:09:00,710 --> 01:09:04,939
So anyway, I find some
reason for optimism.

1067
01:09:04,939 --> 01:09:08,582
The CTBO, I want
to talk about that,

1068
01:09:08,582 --> 01:09:10,040
and I just want to
say a few words.

1069
01:09:10,040 --> 01:09:12,120
That is the-- what is it?

1070
01:09:12,120 --> 01:09:15,399
The-- I forgot
what it stands for.

1071
01:09:15,399 --> 01:09:20,330
It's the worldwide
monitoring system for tests.

1072
01:09:20,330 --> 01:09:25,020
It's basically an
international thing.

1073
01:09:25,020 --> 01:09:27,470
It's technically fabulous.

1074
01:09:27,470 --> 01:09:30,000
I mean, I am really impressed.

1075
01:09:30,000 --> 01:09:33,240
They have seismic detectors.

1076
01:09:33,240 --> 01:09:37,630
They look for
radioactivity in the air.

1077
01:09:37,630 --> 01:09:44,020
And they look for--
there's one more thing.

1078
01:09:44,020 --> 01:09:45,779
I'm sorry, I'm blanking.

1079
01:09:45,779 --> 01:09:51,330
But anyway, they detected a half
kiloton blast in North Korea.

1080
01:09:51,330 --> 01:09:57,160
An unannounced half kiloton
three stations triangulated.

1081
01:09:57,160 --> 01:09:59,180
They can tell it
from earthquakes

1082
01:09:59,180 --> 01:10:00,865
and conventional explosions.

1083
01:10:03,500 --> 01:10:08,150
What happens, just
briefly, is it's the rise

1084
01:10:08,150 --> 01:10:10,700
time in the seismic signal.

1085
01:10:10,700 --> 01:10:14,610
See, from a chemical-type
explosion, it's slower.

1086
01:10:14,610 --> 01:10:17,760
And the instruments have
a fast enough response

1087
01:10:17,760 --> 01:10:23,900
time so you could see
the initial overpressure.

1088
01:10:23,900 --> 01:10:26,420
It's quite wonderful.

1089
01:10:26,420 --> 01:10:29,450
And in several, I think
two out of the three

1090
01:10:29,450 --> 01:10:33,280
of the North Korean
tests, all unannounced,

1091
01:10:33,280 --> 01:10:36,500
they detected
radioactivity in the air.

1092
01:10:36,500 --> 01:10:38,940
I think one of
the xenon isotopes

1093
01:10:38,940 --> 01:10:41,190
from the explosion,
which is long-lived.

1094
01:10:43,790 --> 01:10:46,500
And so finally, and
I outlined this,

1095
01:10:46,500 --> 01:10:49,630
public opinion does count.

1096
01:10:49,630 --> 01:10:55,160
So that's one of the things
I take some comfort from.

1097
01:10:55,160 --> 01:10:59,930
There are many arms
control organizations.

1098
01:10:59,930 --> 01:11:03,300
I'm on the board of the
Council for a Liveable World.

1099
01:11:03,300 --> 01:11:10,930
The Arms Control Association
is a wonderful organization

1100
01:11:10,930 --> 01:11:13,340
in terms of giving
out information.

1101
01:11:13,340 --> 01:11:18,010
And their journal
is quite excellent.

1102
01:11:18,010 --> 01:11:23,120
And Peace Action
is a grassroots.

1103
01:11:23,120 --> 01:11:24,770
It's all to the good.

1104
01:11:27,370 --> 01:11:30,320
I think I've given the answers.

1105
01:11:30,320 --> 01:11:32,170
Is the present situation stable?

1106
01:11:32,170 --> 01:11:35,245
And my answer is with luck.

1107
01:11:39,520 --> 01:11:43,605
And I gave my answer about
abolition of nuclear weapons.

1108
01:11:48,010 --> 01:11:54,090
So anyway, there's plenty to
do, and why don't I just stop.

1109
01:11:54,090 --> 01:11:55,890
You can look at it.

1110
01:11:55,890 --> 01:12:01,170
I'm sure this is only a partial
list of all that can be done.

1111
01:12:01,170 --> 01:12:07,880
Some of it can't be done
without Russia, but some can.

1112
01:12:14,870 --> 01:12:18,520
For example, we could
reduce, more rapidly,

1113
01:12:18,520 --> 01:12:23,320
to the level that Russia has
of launchers and the new START

1114
01:12:23,320 --> 01:12:24,140
Treaty.

1115
01:12:24,140 --> 01:12:26,840
Russia, for example,
just as an example,

1116
01:12:26,840 --> 01:12:31,110
Russia is below the limits
imposed by the START Treaty.

1117
01:12:31,110 --> 01:12:34,000
Those limits go
into effect when?

1118
01:12:34,000 --> 01:12:36,630
In something like six or
eight years or something?

1119
01:12:36,630 --> 01:12:37,160
I forget.

1120
01:12:37,160 --> 01:12:39,330
Do you remember?

1121
01:12:39,330 --> 01:12:40,630
When they go into effect?

1122
01:12:40,630 --> 01:12:44,830
But we could accelerate
those numbers.

1123
01:12:44,830 --> 01:12:47,060
You know, like typical
arms control treaties

1124
01:12:47,060 --> 01:12:49,990
they go into effect almost
the day they expire.

1125
01:12:52,710 --> 01:12:56,240
So it's always too slow
for arms control people.

1126
01:12:56,240 --> 01:13:00,290
You know, it's always
welcome, but always too slow.

1127
01:13:00,290 --> 01:13:02,455
But you take what you can get.

1128
01:13:05,360 --> 01:13:08,000
But again, I want to
just repeat one thing.

1129
01:13:08,000 --> 01:13:14,510
The new START Treaty, the
big success of the new START

1130
01:13:14,510 --> 01:13:17,000
Treaty, in my
view, which was not

1131
01:13:17,000 --> 01:13:20,530
stressed by the newspapers
or the commentators,

1132
01:13:20,530 --> 01:13:24,220
is the fact that the
inspections are going on.

1133
01:13:24,220 --> 01:13:29,070
And the inspections, in my
view, are much more critical

1134
01:13:29,070 --> 01:13:29,990
than the numbers.

1135
01:13:29,990 --> 01:13:35,090
There's such overkill whether
it's 1,000 or 1,500 weapons.

1136
01:13:35,090 --> 01:13:38,340
I mean, again, this
100 number is overkill.

1137
01:13:38,340 --> 01:13:44,460
So to me, it's almost
irrelevant except symbolically

1138
01:13:44,460 --> 01:13:48,150
whether you have a
thousand or 1,500.

1139
01:13:48,150 --> 01:13:50,210
Below a thousand,
you get into issues

1140
01:13:50,210 --> 01:13:53,780
with how many does China
have, and so forth.

1141
01:13:53,780 --> 01:13:54,900
I showed you.

1142
01:13:54,900 --> 01:13:59,350
So a thousand is roughly
the critical point

1143
01:13:59,350 --> 01:14:05,790
in which all the
nuclear weapons states

1144
01:14:05,790 --> 01:14:08,940
have to negotiate
with each other,

1145
01:14:08,940 --> 01:14:12,350
not just the US and Russia.

1146
01:14:12,350 --> 01:14:14,950
Of course, Russia's
critical there.

1147
01:14:14,950 --> 01:14:16,270
OK, I'm going to stop.

1148
01:14:16,270 --> 01:14:18,270
And of course, there's
been a lot of questions,

1149
01:14:18,270 --> 01:14:22,310
but I'm happy for more
discussion or whatever.

1150
01:14:22,310 --> 01:14:23,546
Yeah?

1151
01:14:23,546 --> 01:14:26,210
AUDIENCE: You argued that
it's typical to abolish

1152
01:14:26,210 --> 01:14:32,706
all the nuclear weapons because
it is used as deterrence.

1153
01:14:37,188 --> 01:14:47,148
If it's true, isn't
there another way

1154
01:14:47,148 --> 01:14:52,626
of deterrence that would
replace the nuclear weapons?

1155
01:14:52,626 --> 01:14:54,120
What is your opinion?

1156
01:14:54,120 --> 01:14:56,880
PROFESSOR: Well, first of
all, we already have it,

1157
01:14:56,880 --> 01:14:59,770
and it's conventional
smart warfare.

1158
01:14:59,770 --> 01:15:01,480
I haven't talked about it.

1159
01:15:01,480 --> 01:15:04,110
The United States
calls it Global Strike,

1160
01:15:04,110 --> 01:15:05,730
which we're developing.

1161
01:15:05,730 --> 01:15:08,210
And that's a whole
other dimension.

1162
01:15:08,210 --> 01:15:12,380
It's not the nuclear arms
race, but it was too much

1163
01:15:12,380 --> 01:15:13,570
for me to get into that.

1164
01:15:13,570 --> 01:15:16,480
But, yes, you're asking
a very good question.

1165
01:15:16,480 --> 01:15:22,350
And our conventional military
powers are incredible.

1166
01:15:22,350 --> 01:15:26,000
And we can do now,
in many respects,

1167
01:15:26,000 --> 01:15:28,450
with conventional
weapons what we

1168
01:15:28,450 --> 01:15:33,450
could have done only with
nuclear weapons 20 years ago.

1169
01:15:33,450 --> 01:15:35,530
Or even 10 years ago.

1170
01:15:35,530 --> 01:15:38,950
And this Global
Strike, which is a way

1171
01:15:38,950 --> 01:15:43,010
to strike across the
world with precision,

1172
01:15:43,010 --> 01:15:50,200
with conventional weapons, with
missiles, with cruise missiles,

1173
01:15:50,200 --> 01:15:53,320
and so forth, is incredible.

1174
01:15:53,320 --> 01:15:56,630
And it's all sophisticated
command and control

1175
01:15:56,630 --> 01:15:59,150
stuff plus guidance.

1176
01:15:59,150 --> 01:16:01,040
Yeah?

1177
01:16:01,040 --> 01:16:03,000
AUDIENCE: So in your
opinion that could

1178
01:16:03,000 --> 01:16:06,440
replace the nuclear
[INAUDIBLE] in the future?

1179
01:16:06,440 --> 01:16:08,130
PROFESSOR: Well,
replace it in the sense

1180
01:16:08,130 --> 01:16:09,630
that you don't have
nuclear weapons.

1181
01:16:09,630 --> 01:16:13,750
But then other people are
just as scared as before.

1182
01:16:13,750 --> 01:16:19,380
So it's also an aggressive
military posture.

1183
01:16:19,380 --> 01:16:22,680
And maybe, in the day
and age when we're really

1184
01:16:22,680 --> 01:16:26,480
trying to replace that,
then we can no longer

1185
01:16:26,480 --> 01:16:32,950
distinguish between conventional
arms control and nuclear arms

1186
01:16:32,950 --> 01:16:33,890
control.

1187
01:16:33,890 --> 01:16:36,050
They will become
merged, I think,

1188
01:16:36,050 --> 01:16:40,970
as an intellectual subject as
well as a practical matter.

1189
01:16:40,970 --> 01:16:44,720
But I'm looking ahead
probably at least 10 years.

1190
01:16:44,720 --> 01:16:47,510
But in my view,
that day will come.

1191
01:16:47,510 --> 01:16:50,460
So you're really asking
a great question.

1192
01:16:50,460 --> 01:16:52,140
AUDIENCE: Disturbing.

1193
01:16:52,140 --> 01:16:52,980
PROFESSOR: Yes.

1194
01:16:52,980 --> 01:16:53,670
Disturbing.

1195
01:16:53,670 --> 01:16:55,710
The peace action will
have plenty of work

1196
01:16:55,710 --> 01:17:00,160
to do for plenty of time.

1197
01:17:00,160 --> 01:17:00,700
I'm afraid.

1198
01:17:04,350 --> 01:17:05,310
What can I say?

1199
01:17:05,310 --> 01:17:11,022
I'm not happy about
that, but it's a fact.

1200
01:17:11,022 --> 01:17:12,918
AUDIENCE: I'm curious
about one thing.

1201
01:17:12,918 --> 01:17:16,550
Do you know who in
India or Pakistan

1202
01:17:16,550 --> 01:17:18,330
presses that actual button?

1203
01:17:18,330 --> 01:17:19,778
PROFESSOR: No, I do not.

1204
01:17:19,778 --> 01:17:22,622
AUDIENCE: The reason I'm asking
is is it delegated to some

1205
01:17:22,622 --> 01:17:24,520
[? war-grade ?] people or some--

1206
01:17:24,520 --> 01:17:25,160
PROFESSOR: OK.

1207
01:17:25,160 --> 01:17:28,570
In India-- look,
here's what I know.

1208
01:17:28,570 --> 01:17:31,870
I don't know more
than I do know.

1209
01:17:31,870 --> 01:17:36,190
What I think is true in India
is that the armed forces

1210
01:17:36,190 --> 01:17:37,720
are under civilian control.

1211
01:17:40,360 --> 01:17:45,570
But in Pakistan,
that is not true.

1212
01:17:45,570 --> 01:17:52,550
So Pakistan is not what you
would call a unitary state.

1213
01:17:52,550 --> 01:17:57,130
OK There is no single
command authority.

1214
01:17:57,130 --> 01:17:59,870
I mean, there is
officially, but de facto

1215
01:17:59,870 --> 01:18:05,850
we know that the Pakistani
military is at least

1216
01:18:05,850 --> 01:18:08,620
equal to the civilian branch.

1217
01:18:08,620 --> 01:18:13,430
But this ISI, whatever it
is, the security thing,

1218
01:18:13,430 --> 01:18:16,940
it seems to be
quasi-independent.

1219
01:18:16,940 --> 01:18:19,550
I'm not sure.

1220
01:18:19,550 --> 01:18:22,370
So you can see.

1221
01:18:22,370 --> 01:18:24,770
But what I'm afraid of
is with this aggressive--

1222
01:18:24,770 --> 01:18:26,720
I said it before,
but I'll just repeat

1223
01:18:26,720 --> 01:18:35,670
it-- is this aggressive
first strike military nucleus

1224
01:18:35,670 --> 01:18:41,520
posture of Pakistan is leading
to delegation of authority

1225
01:18:41,520 --> 01:18:45,860
to low-levels where
there's a great danger

1226
01:18:45,860 --> 01:18:47,820
of a rogue commander.

1227
01:18:47,820 --> 01:18:51,280
So I see Pakistan as
the place with the most

1228
01:18:51,280 --> 01:18:53,205
danger of a rogue commander.

1229
01:18:56,060 --> 01:19:01,903
And I think I'm not the only
one who thinks this, by the way.

1230
01:19:01,903 --> 01:19:04,160
AUDIENCE: Again,
how many weapons

1231
01:19:04,160 --> 01:19:06,820
do we think that Pakistan has?

1232
01:19:06,820 --> 01:19:12,170
PROFESSOR: Roughly
between 100 and 200.

1233
01:19:12,170 --> 01:19:15,792
It's more than 100 now.

1234
01:19:15,792 --> 01:19:17,750
AUDIENCE: And they're
making more all the time.

1235
01:19:17,750 --> 01:19:19,240
PROFESSOR: They're
making more all the time.

1236
01:19:19,240 --> 01:19:20,950
They're making them
as fast as they can,

1237
01:19:20,950 --> 01:19:24,470
as far as we can tell.

1238
01:19:24,470 --> 01:19:26,797
AUDIENCE: The same
in India, also?

1239
01:19:26,797 --> 01:19:27,380
PROFESSOR: No.

1240
01:19:27,380 --> 01:19:31,260
India seems to be
more relaxed about it.

1241
01:19:31,260 --> 01:19:33,670
Both in terms of their
aggressive policy--

1242
01:19:33,670 --> 01:19:35,660
they say they won't fire first.

1243
01:19:35,660 --> 01:19:41,350
India has a much more
reasonable stated policy of use.

1244
01:19:41,350 --> 01:19:44,020
They're much more laid back.

1245
01:19:44,020 --> 01:19:46,385
They say they won't
use them first.

1246
01:19:48,960 --> 01:19:56,600
They say the Pakistanis are
just going much, much too far.

1247
01:19:56,600 --> 01:20:00,600
But on the Indian side,
the problem that I see

1248
01:20:00,600 --> 01:20:04,250
is they're not trying for
the political solution.

1249
01:20:04,250 --> 01:20:10,350
In other words, their deployment
posture is more sensible,

1250
01:20:10,350 --> 01:20:11,920
but they're focused on China.

1251
01:20:15,030 --> 01:20:19,450
But they are not-- India--
my big criticism of India

1252
01:20:19,450 --> 01:20:24,260
is they are not
solving the problem.

1253
01:20:24,260 --> 01:20:26,007
I'm going to come back to that.

1254
01:20:26,007 --> 01:20:29,302
AUDIENCE: They're not
initiating any kind of--

1255
01:20:29,302 --> 01:20:30,010
PROFESSOR: Right.

1256
01:20:30,010 --> 01:20:33,690
They're being much
too slow in trying

1257
01:20:33,690 --> 01:20:40,460
to heal problems like
Kashmir and other irritant

1258
01:20:40,460 --> 01:20:43,859
points in the relationship.

1259
01:20:43,859 --> 01:20:45,900
I mean, they're not going
to disappear overnight,

1260
01:20:45,900 --> 01:20:47,915
but they could do things.

1261
01:20:50,940 --> 01:20:53,050
And I can point to
some literature,

1262
01:20:53,050 --> 01:20:56,920
but I'm not a real
expert, by the way.

1263
01:20:56,920 --> 01:21:00,290
The United States is
not being evenhanded,

1264
01:21:00,290 --> 01:21:02,900
and that's a mistake.

1265
01:21:02,900 --> 01:21:07,220
That's a basic American mistake.

1266
01:21:07,220 --> 01:21:11,480
So, you know, I've been
critical since the beginning.

1267
01:21:11,480 --> 01:21:13,930
I'm not the only
one on this basis.

1268
01:21:17,390 --> 01:21:19,910
I think the predictable
is happening.

1269
01:21:19,910 --> 01:21:24,130
They're just spurring Pakistan
into a more frenzied state

1270
01:21:24,130 --> 01:21:26,445
of nuclear weapons development.

1271
01:21:28,960 --> 01:21:31,614
It's unfortunate.

1272
01:21:31,614 --> 01:21:34,160
But we're doing something
we don't want to see happen.

1273
01:21:37,660 --> 01:21:41,360
We deplore it on one hand,
and then we encourage it

1274
01:21:41,360 --> 01:21:43,420
indirectly on the other.

1275
01:21:43,420 --> 01:21:45,773
So it's a contradictory policy.

1276
01:21:45,773 --> 01:21:46,481
It's unfortunate.

1277
01:21:52,740 --> 01:21:56,400
They should know better,
but there they're

1278
01:21:56,400 --> 01:22:00,750
letting commercial
interests override this.

1279
01:22:00,750 --> 01:22:04,875
This is a tug of war.

1280
01:22:08,000 --> 01:22:09,870
The United States
says many interests.

1281
01:22:13,868 --> 01:22:15,868
AUDIENCE: Are you saying
the commercial interest

1282
01:22:15,868 --> 01:22:19,190
with respect to
power plant sales?

1283
01:22:19,190 --> 01:22:20,092
PROFESSOR: Right.

1284
01:22:20,092 --> 01:22:22,743
AUDIENCE: It's sort of
interesting in that this

1285
01:22:22,743 --> 01:22:24,430
got started what?

1286
01:22:24,430 --> 01:22:26,316
In 2005 or 06?

1287
01:22:26,316 --> 01:22:27,565
PROFESSOR: Under Bush somehow.

1288
01:22:27,565 --> 01:22:28,670
AUDIENCE: Yeah.

1289
01:22:28,670 --> 01:22:29,451
PROFESSOR: Right.

1290
01:22:29,451 --> 01:22:31,159
AUDIENCE: And in the
meantime, of course,

1291
01:22:31,159 --> 01:22:32,608
all the American
companies are now

1292
01:22:32,608 --> 01:22:35,506
owned by Japanese
or French companies.

1293
01:22:35,506 --> 01:22:37,921
So what we're doing--

1294
01:22:40,830 --> 01:22:46,040
PROFESSOR: Well, we also
make military hardware sales

1295
01:22:46,040 --> 01:22:49,150
to India, which is increasing.

1296
01:22:49,150 --> 01:22:52,430
That was-- oh, that was one of
the other things from the Obama

1297
01:22:52,430 --> 01:22:58,390
visit, the sale of conventional
military equipment to India

1298
01:22:58,390 --> 01:23:03,220
is going up for the first
time in a long time.

1299
01:23:03,220 --> 01:23:06,614
So that was a big
success, I guess.

1300
01:23:06,614 --> 01:23:09,030
AUDIENCE: So that was a
part of the recent trip?

1301
01:23:09,030 --> 01:23:10,160
PROFESSOR: Yes.

1302
01:23:10,160 --> 01:23:11,390
Yes.

1303
01:23:11,390 --> 01:23:14,620
I forgot to mention that.

1304
01:23:14,620 --> 01:23:15,709
You reminded me.

1305
01:23:25,220 --> 01:23:26,120
Thank you.

1306
01:23:26,120 --> 01:23:28,270
Thank you for coming.